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OUTLINES of PSYCHOLOGY 



WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 



THEORY OF EDUCATION. 



JAMES SULLY, M. A., 

EXAMINER IN THE UNIVERSITY OP CAMBRIDGE, ETC. 

READING-CLUB EDITION; 

ABRIDGED AND EDITED, WITH APPENDICES, SUGGESTIVE QUESTIONS, AND 
REFERENCES TO PEDAGOGICAL WORKS, 



J.»- 



M. A. REINHART, Ph.D., 

PRINCIPAL OF THE HIGH AND NORMAL TRAINING SCHOOL, 
PATERSON, N. J. 




^6 "a± / 




SYRACUSE, N. Y.I 

C. W. BARDEEN, PUBLISHER. 

1886. . 



LB/05/ 
.6$ 



Copyright, 1886, by C. W. Bardeen. 



PREFACE. 



Psychology seems about to share with Educational 
Theory, Method and History in a substantial revival fein 
the regard and studies of the teaching profession. The 
work of which this volume is an abridgment was upon 
its first appearance recognized as a most lucid, syste- 
matic, and popular exposition of the general facts of 
mind. In addition it was, as the title page states, 
written with special reference to the Theory of Educa- 
tion. The original edition was voluminous and ex- 
haustive, and there was a demand for an abridgment 
which should serve as a hand-book of the Science of 
Mind for students of educational science, and which 
should emphasize the connection between pedagogics 
and psychology. 

This edition has therefore been prepared with refer- 
ence to the needs of students of pedagogics in general, 
teachers-in-training in Normal Schools, and members 
of Teachers' Reading Circles. All discussions not 
bearing on educational processes have been eliminated, 
the voluminous notes and citations of authorities have 
been abridged, and the remainder of the treatise pre- 
sented in the form of the original edition. 



VI PREFACE. 



A Brief Appendix has been added to each chapter, 
with the special design of facilitating the study of the 
connection between Psychology and Educational Sci- 
ence. This appendix includes: 

1. Suggestions for Students of Psychology. 

2. Review, Test and Examination Questions. 

3. Applications of Psychology to the Theory: and 
Practice of Teaching; and 

4. Pedagogical References to Standard Works on 
Education, read by Teachers' Reading Circles. 

The ' Suggestions ' will, it is believed be found help- 
ful to those reading the text. The 'Review, Test and 
Examination Questions' may be used as an expeditious 
review of the general argument of each chapter, and 
as frequently pointing out the educational aspects of 
the discussions. kThe I /Applications of Psychology to 
Teaching ' are mainly in the nature of an exposition of 
the [logical relations between the principles of psy- 
chology and the maxims of theory and method in edu- 
cation. In the course of this exposition numerous 
quotations are made from the best authorities on educa- 
tional procedure, which are of great value when viewed 
in their logical connection with the teachers of mental 
science. 

The c Pedagogical References to Standard Educa- 
tioual Works ' are so arranged that the principles of 
psychology may be compared with, and studied in con- 



INDEX. Vll 

nection with the related pedagogical doctrines and methods 
described in such works as Parker's Talks on Teaching, 
Quick's Educational Reformers, Payne's Lectures on Educa- 
tion, Page's Theory and Practice, Fitch's Lectures on Teach- 
ing, Tate's Philosophy of Education, Spencer's Education, 
Johonnot's Principles and Practice of Education, etc. 

These references are available with any edition of 
the works above mentioned in general use in this 
country. Where there is more than one edition, as of 
Payne or Tate, reference is made to the author's divis- 
ions and sub-divisions and often to the specific part of 
the sub-divisions of the lecture on chapter, etc. The 
pages given for these two authorities are those of 
Bardeen's editions. J. A. K. 

Paterson, N". J., January, 1886. 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 
SCOPE AND METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

What is meant by Psychology. Psychology or Mental 
Science is our general knowledge of Mind reduced to 
an accurate and systematic form. 

Relation of Psychology to the Science of Education. A knowledge 
of Psychology, the science of mind, is an essential part of the 
mental outfit of every student of Education. In connection with 
Ethics, the science of Duty, and with Logic, the science of the 
conditions under which the mind can know, Psychology furnishes 
a very large part of those truths or data upon which as a basis the 
science of Pedagogics rests. In a large sense of the word, Psy- 
chology may be said to include both Ethics and Logic. This 
would give emphasis to the apparent intimate relations between 
Psychology and Pedagogics. The latter must have a body of 
general truths or principles. These are to a very great extent 
deduced from our knowledge of mind. The principles of Peda- 
gogics, i. e., the Science of Education, are not necessarily identi- 
cal with the laws of mind. But they are either (1) Laws of mind 
established by the sciences of Psychology, Ethics and Logic, or, 
(2) principles readily to be deduced from these laws, or, finally, (3) 
they are principles established inductively by the concurrent 
experience and observation of the great body of teachers of 
ancient and modern times. 

What is meant by Mind. We familiarly talk about 
minds. All men have minds, and many of the lower 
animals are commonly supposed to have them. Human 



2 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

minds are, however, those which are of chief interest 
here. 

We distinguish between a mind as a unity, or a sub- 
stance, and the several phenomena or states of this mind. 
What mind is in itself, as a substance, is a question that 
lies outside psychology, and belongs to philosophy. As 
a science psychology is concerned only with the phe- 
nomena of mind, with mental states, psychical facts, or 
whatever else we choose to call them. 

What mental phenomena are. How, now, shall we mark 
off these psychical facts from other phenomena? We 
cannot define such phenomena by resolving them into 
something simpler. They have nothing in common 
beyond the fact of being mental states. Hence we can 
only use some equivalent phrase, as when we say that a 
mental phenomenon is a part of our conscious life, or a 
state of our consciousness. 1 Or again we may enumerate 
the chief varieties of these mental phenomena and say 
that mind is the sum of our processes of knowing, our 
feelings of pleasure and pain, and our voluntary doings. 
Popularly, mind is apt to be identified with knowing or 
intelligence. A man of mind is a man of intellect. But 
though intelligence is perhaps the most important part 
of mind, it is not the whole. In mental science we must 
reckon the pain of a bruise as part of mind. Or finally 
we may set mind in antithesis to what is not mind. 
Mind is non-material, has no existence in space as ma- 
terial bodies have. We cannot touch a thought or a 

i This is a rough popular way of speaking. The question whether 
there are any mental phenomena which are unconscious, that is, which 
do not enter into our conscious life or experience, is a subtle and much- 
disputed point in psychology. 



HOW TVE STUDY MIND. 3 

feeling, and one feeling does not lie outside of another 
in space. These phenomena occur in time only. 

Mind and Body. While it is important thus to set 
mind in strong opposition to material things, we must 
keep in view the close connection between the two. 
What we call a human being is made up of a bodily or- 
ganism and a mind. Our personality or " self " is a mind 
connected with or embodied in a material frame-work. 
More particularly all mental processes or operations are 
connected with actions of the nervous system. The 
most abstract thought is accompanied by some mode of 
activity in the brain-centres. Hence, while we must be 
careful not to confuse the mental and the material, the 
psychical and the physical, as though they were of the 
same kind (homogeneous), we cannot exclude the latter 
from view in dealing with mind. We must always think 
of mind as attended by, and in some inexplicable way, 
related to, the living organism, and more particularly 
the nervous system and its actions. 

How we Observe and Study Mind: Subjective Method: 
Introspection. There are two distinct ways of knowing 
mind. The first is the direct, internal, or subjective 
way. By this method we direct attention to what is 
going on in our own mind at the time of its occurrence, 
or afterwards. 1 We have the power of turning the at- 
tention inwards on the phenomena of mind. Thus I 
can attend to a particular feeling, say admiration for a 

i Strictly speaking we never observe a mental phenomenon at the 
exact instant of its occurrence. All introspection is retrospection. But 
we distinguish broadly between studying an Immediately antecedent 
mental state, and one which occurred some time before. (See my work 
on Illusions, Chap. VIII. , p. 1 ( J0 n.) 



4 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

beautiful object, in order to see what its nature is, of 
what elementary parts it consists, how it is affected by 
the circumstances of the moment, and so on. This 
method of internal or subjective observation is known 
as introspection (" looking within "). 

Objective Method. In the second place we may stndy 
mental phenomena not only in our own individual mind 
but as they present themselves externally in other minds. 
This is the indirect, external, or objective way of study- 
ing mental phenomena. Thus we note the manifestations 
of others' feelings in looks, gestures, etc. We arrive at 
a knowledge of their thoughts by their speech, and 
observe their inclinations and motives by noting their 
actions. 

This objective observation embraces not only the 
mental phenomena of the individuals who are personally 
known to us, old and young, but those of others of whom 
we hear or read of in biography, etc. Also it includes 
the study of minds in masses or aggregates, as they pre- 
sent themselves in national sentiments and actions, and 
in the events of history. It includes too a comparative 
study of mind by observing its agreements and differ- 
ences among different races, and even among different 
grades of animal life. 

The study of the simpler phases' of mind in the child, 
in backward and uncivilized races, and in the lower ani- 
mals, is especially valuable for understanding the growth 
of the mature or fully-developed human mind. 

Finally, the external or objective method includes the 
study of mental phenomena in connection with bodily 
and, more particularly, nervous processes. All external 



THE TWO METHODS MUST BE COMBINED. 5 

observation of mental phenomena takes place by noting 
some of their bodily accompaniments (movements of 
expression, vocal actions, and so on). In addition to 
this, psychology seeks to study the connection between 
different modes or phases of mind and special kinds of 
nervous activity. The nature of these enquiries will be 
indicated presently. 

Both Methods must be combined. Scientific knowledge is 
characterized by certainty, exactness, and generality. 
We must observe carefully so as to make sure of our 
facts, and to note precisely what is present. And we 
must go on from a knowledge of the particular to a 
knowledge of the general. From this rough definition 
of what is meant by scientific knowledge we may easily 
see that neither the internal nor the external method is 
complete without the other. To begin with: since we 
only directly observe what is passing in our individual 
minds, some amount of introspection is the first condition 
of all certain and accurate knowledge of mental states. 
To try to discover mental phenomena and their laws 
solely by watching the external signs and effects of 
others' thoughts, feelings, and volitions, would plainly 
be absurd. For these external manifestations are, in 
themselves, as empty of meaning as words in an unknown 
tongue, and only receive their meaning by a reference 
to what we ourselves have thought and felt. On the 
other hand, an exclusive attention to the contents of our 
individual mind would never give us a y^w^'fl /knowledge 
of mind. In order to eliminate the effects of individu- 
ality we must at every step compare our own modes of 
thinking and feeling with those of other minds. The 



6 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

wider the area included in our comparison, the sounder 
are our generalizations likely to be. 

Powers of Abstraction and Imagination must be cultivated. 
Each of these ways of studying mind has its character- 
istic difficulties. To attend closely to the events of our 
mental life presupposes a certain power of " abstraction." 
It requires at first a considerable effort to withdraw the 
attention from the more striking events of the external 
world, the sights and sounds that surround us, and to 
keep it fixed on the comparatively obscure events of 
the inner world. Even in the case of the trained psy- 
chologist, the work* is always attended with a peculiar 
difficulty. On the other hand there is a serious danger 
in reading the minds of others, due to an excess of the 
propensity to project our own modes of thinking and 
feeling into them. This danger increases with the 
remoteness of the mind we are observing from our own. 
To apprehend, for example, the sentiments and convic- 
tions of an ancient Roman, of a Hindoo, or of an 
uncivilized African, is a delicate operation. It implies 
close attention to the differences as well as the similari- 
ties of external manifestation, also an effort of imagina- 
tion by which though starting from some remembered 
experiences of our own, we feel our way into a new set 
of circumstances, new experiences, and a new set of 
mental habits. If children could ever pass their opinion 
on the observations made on their feelings by adults, 
they would probably declare a large part of these 
observations to have been very wide of the mark. 1 

i On the errors incident to Introspection and the interpretation of 
other minds, see my work on Illusions, Chaps. VIII. and IX. 



SCIENCE GENERALIZES OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 7 

General Knowledge of Mind. As has been observed, 
science consists of general knowledge, or knowledge 
expressed in a general form. Hence mental science 
seeks to generalize our knowledge of mine!. In the first 
place, it aims at grouping all the phenomena observed 
under certain heads. That is to say, it classifies the 
endless variety of mental states according to their re- 
semblances. In so doing it overlooks the individual 
differences of minds and fixes attention on their common 
features. 

Laios of Mind. In the secoud place, every science 
aims not only at ordering its phenomena, but at making 
certain assertions about them. There are general truths 
or laws which hold good of numerous varieties of phe- 
nomena. When the phenomena are occurrences in 
time, these laws have to do with the relation of events 
to other events preceding or succeeding them. That is 
to say, they formulate the relations of causal depend- 
ence of phenomena on other phenomena. Mental Sci- 
ence seeks to arrive at such truths or laws of mind. That 
is to say, it attempts to determine the conditions 1 on 
which mental phenomena depend. 

Now a little attention to the subject will show that 
mental phenomena are related in the way of dependence, 
not only to other phenomena immediately preceding, 
but to remotely antecedent phenomena. For example, 
the quick response of a child to a command depends on 
the formation of a habit, which process may have been 
going on for years. Hence the consideration of relations 

i A condition is any circumstance necessary to the production of a 
phenomenon. All the conditions of a phenomenon taken together consti- 
tute its cause. 



8 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

of dependence leads on to the view of mind as a process 
of growth or development. The most important laws 
of mind are laws of mental development. 

Mind and Nervous Conditions. These laws of mind in- 
clude truths with respect to the dependence of mental 
facts on nervous conditions. As already pointed out, in 
saying that mental phenomena have nervous actions as 
their conditions, we make no assumption respecting the 
ultimate nature of mind and body or of their conjunc- 
tion. All that is meant is that the phenomena of mental 
life are somehow connected with the activity of the 
nervous system; that variations in the latter are attended 
with variations in the former; and that by modifying 
by purely physical agencies the state of the nervous 
system, we can indirectly influence the mental accom- 
paniments. 1 The study of this connection of mind and 
body is a valuable preparation for a systematic study of 
psychical phenomena. As it is the borderland between 
physiology and psychology, it is best taken up at the 
outset. 

Knowledge of the Physiology of the Brain important to the 
teacher. It is all-important to the teacher to know how 
the varying state of the brain affects mental efficiency. 
Now owing to the present imperfect state of our know- 

i It is not even implied that the nervous actions precede the mental 
in time. This is no doubt true in certain cases. The stimulation of a 
sense-organ and the propagation of the nervous actions to the brain 
centres precede a sensation. But do the changes in the brain precede the 
mental phenomena which accompany them? This question need not per- 
haps much concern us, as it is a disputed point whether the cause or 
conditions do necessarily precede an effect in time. (See J. S. Mill, Logic, 
Book IV, Ch. V., §6; G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, First 
Series. Vol. II., Prob. V, Ch. II., p. 391.) 



BRAIN EFFICIENCY AND MIND EFFICIENCY. 9 

ledge respecting the particular portions of the brain 
concerned in particular modes of mental activity, we 
are not able to determine the relation between the two 
with scientific precision. At the same time we have 
certain generalizations respecting the variations of men- 
tal activity that accompany variations in the condition 
of the brain as a whole, which it may be useful to 
indicate here. 

Brain Efficiency and Mind Efficiency. It is abundantly 
proved, alike by everyday observation and by scientific 
experiment, that the amount of mental activity possible 
at any time is limited by the quantity of disposable 
energy in the brain. The more vigorous the brain at 
any time, the greater the amount of mental expenditure 
possible. This applies not merely to intellectual work, 
but also to feeling and action. A healthy and vigorous 
brain is the condition of numerous and vivid feelings, 
and of energetic actions. 

On what Efficiency of Brain Centres depends. The state 
of the brain, its degree of readiness for work, fluctuates 
with the degree of disposable energy of the nervous 
system as a whole. This is affected by regular or peri- 
odic causes, the changes incident to the natural altern- 
ating rhythm of waking and sleeping. It is also affected 
by irregular circumstances, such as changes of bodily 
health, and the exhaustion due to great mental agitation. 

In the second place, the condition of the brain, like 
that of all other organs, is affected by the extent to 
which the particular structures have recently been exer- 
cised. After long and severe brain-work of any kind, 



10 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

the organ becomes fatigued and incapable of further 
work. On the other hand, a prolonged rest, as during 
a summer holiday, leaves the organ with the maximum 
degree of disposable energy. 

So far as we are sure of the existence of special cen- 
tres, we may apply the same considerations to these. 
The condition of any given centre, say that of vision, 
will vary according to the amount of work recently 
done. One part of the brain may in this way be much 
more vigorous than another. At the same time it is to 
be remembered that the several parts of the brain stand 
in the closest organic connection one with another, and 
that great exhaustion of any one part will affect the 
degree of efficiency of the other parts. It follows, too, 
that since (as we shall see more fully by and by) all 
kinds of mental work involve attention, the centres espe- 
cially concerned in this activity will become fatigued in 
every case as the direct consequence of mental strain 
or effort. 

Need of Brain Rest. It follows from these truths that, 
in order to maintain brain efficiency, we must supply the 
necessary conditions of repose and alternation of activ- 
ity. After a certain amount of work, the brain should 
be allowed to repose as a whole. An approximate con- 
dition of repose is reached by play, which by calling 
forth the muscles into easy and familiar modes of 
activity relieves the higher centres of attention and 
thought. 

Within these limits of extreme and general fatigue of 
the biain, efficiency can only be secured by varying the 
kind of work so as not to tax any one region of the brain 



RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THE OTHER SCIENCES. II 

overmuch. A change from manual to vocal exercise in 
the kindergarten may be taken as an illustration of this 
rule. 

Relation of Psychology to other Sciences. Psychology is 
a positive science dealing with a certain class of phe- 
nomena, and to this extent is on a level, or co-ordinate, 
with the special physical sciences, as chemistry, botany, 
and so on. Not only so, owing to the connection be- 
tween nervous and mental processes, psychology enters, 
as we have seen, into a peculiar relation with physiol- 
ogy. On the other hand, psychology is above, and 
complementary to, the special sciences. For in consid- 
ering mind, it views knowing as a mental phenomenon, 
as an operation or process in our mental life. Thus all 
knowing, whether of chemistry, botany, or physiology, 
inasmuch as it is the activity of some mind or knowing- 
subject, is a part of the subject-matter of psychology. 
In other words, mental science considers what goes on 
in the mind when we know. On the other hand, it 
does not enquire into the. truth or falsity of this know- 
ing. It simply views the process of knowing on its 
subjective side, and leaves the consideration of knowl- 
edge on its objective side, as true or valid, to Philosophy 
or Theory of Knowledge which includes Logic. 

Psychology and Practical Science. Psychology is a the- 
oretic, as distinguished from a practical science. A 
theoretic science concerns itself about things as they 
are, how they happen or come to pass. A practical 
science concerns itself with things as they ought to be, 
or as we wish them to be. Practical science, though 



12 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

thus contrasted with theoretic, is really very closely 
connected with it. In order to gain our end, we must 
have a certain knowledge of the agencies we employ. 
Thus a sculptor must know something about the prop- 
erties of clay and marble, a physician something about 
the functions of the body, and so on. 

Viewed in this way, psychology forms the basis of a 
number of practical sciences. All the practical sciences, 
indeed, which aim at guiding or influencing our thoughts, 
feelings, or actions, have their footing in psychology. 
Thus the principles of oratory, of legislation, and so on, 
are based on a knowledge of the properties and laws 
of the human mind. These relations may be roughly 
set forth as follows: — 

(A.) Psychology, as a whole, supplies the basis of 
Education, or the Practical Science which aims 
at cultivating the mind on the side of Know- 
ing, Feeling, and Willing alike. 
(B.) In its special branches, psychology supplies a 
basis to the following practical sciences: — 
Psychology of Knowing — Logic, or the regulation of 
reasoning processes; together with the allied 
art, rhetoric, or the art of persuasion, and that 
of forming opinion. 1 
Psychology of Feeling — ^Esthetics, or the regulation of 
feeling according to certain rules or principles, 
to wit, the admirable, or beautiful. 
Psychology of Willing — Ethics, or the determination of 
the ends of action and the regulation of con- 

iThat is so far as the process is a strictly intellectual one. So far 
however, as it involves appeals to feeling it falls under the next head. 



CONNECTION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION. 13 

duct by principles of right and wrong; together 
with the allied arts of politics and legislation. 

General Connection of Psychology and Education. We see,, 
at once, from this rough scheme, the peculiarly close 
connection betweeu Psychology and Education. This 
is the only practical science which is engaged in guiding 
or controlling the whole of mind. The educator of the 
young may be said to unite in himself the functions of 
logician, art critic, moralist and legislator. He has to 
direct thought, to cultivate feeling, and to control 
action. 

We may still further see the closeness of this connec- 
tion by glancing at the dependence of Education on 
other sciences. As a practical science which aims at an 
end, Education must lean on Ethics, which seeks to 
determine the true ends of all action, the ultimate nature 
of what we call good and desirable. But this implies a 
limited connection only. When once the end is settled,. 
Education asks no more aid from Ethics. Again, as a 
practical science greatly concerned with the training of 
the thinking or reasoning powers, Education derives 
considerable aid from Logic. This study, by supplying 
rules for clear thinking and sound reasoning, and by 
pointing out (to some extent) the best methods of ex- 
pounding knowledge, is a matter of great practical value 
to the teacher. The relation of Education to Psycho- 
logy is, however, a closer and a more pervading relation. 
Being a theoretic, as distinguished from a practical 
science, it does not, it is true, give rules for regulating 
mind. But it gives us an account of mind as a whole, 
the way in which it operates, the laws of succession and 



14 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

dependence which govern mental phenomena, and lastly 
a theory of mental growth or development. And since 
Education in all its branches is engaged in producing 
some mental result (e. g., accurate knowledge, good 
feeling), it needs continually to revert to psychology. 1 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I. 



I. SYNOPSIS OF THE METHODS OF STUDYING 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

f 1. Introspection, i. e., the observation 
We Study Psychol- J of our own mental states, and by : 
ogy by J 2. External Observation, i. e., of the 

[ mental phenomena of others. 

Note 1. — The Method of Induction. In both of the above 
cases, the method of proceeding is the Inductive one, just as in 
chemistry or any other natural science. Observe the phe- 
nomena, and classify them. Then infer from them as many 
general truths as possible. 

Note 2. — Method of Verification. The conclusions arrived at 
by our personal study of Mental Phenomena, whether by the 
Introspective or the Objective method, and those reached through 
reading, must be continually verified by an appeal to our own con- 
scious experience. 

II. MAXIMS OF THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

1. The Method of Psychology demands the cooperation of 
Introspection with Observation. — G. H. Lewes. 

il have not touched on physical education here. This plainly rests 
■on physiology, just as mental education reposes on psychology. 



MAXIMS OF THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 15 

2. It has often been shown that the method of Induction 
admits, mutatis mutandis, of an application to the study of the 
human mind, as well as to that of the material universe. The dif- 
ference in the application lies mainly in this, that in the one case 
we use self-consciousness or the internal sense, whereas in the 
other we employ the external sense, as the organ or instrument. 
— James McCosh. 

3. The Laws of our Rational Faculty, i.e., The Human Mind, 
like those of every other natural agency are only learnt by seeing 
the agent at work. — J. S. Mill. 

4. The Order of Mental phenomena must be studied in the 
phenomena themselves. — J. S. Mill. 

5. Psychology is only an evolution by consciousness of the 
facts which consciousness itself reveals. — Sir William Hamil- 
ton. 

6. "Whatever is known by consciousness is known beyond 
possibility of question. — J. S. Mill. 

7. Everything presented to our observation, whether exter- 
nal or internal, whether through sense or self-consciousness, is 
presented in complexity. Every modification of mind is a complex 
state. What ought I to do ? Divide et impera, divide and con- 
quer. Analyze it into its parts, consider each separately; finally, 
by synthesis, view these parts in relation to each other and to the 
whole of which they are the constituents. — Abridged from Sir 
William Hamilton. 

8. The fundamental procedure of psychology is Analysis. 
But still this is but a means to an end. We analyze only that 
we may comprehend. We comprehend only as we are able to 
reconstruct in thought the complex effects which we have ana- 
lyzed into their elements. Analysis and synthesis are only the 
two necessary parts of one and the same method. — Sir Wm. 
Hamilton. 

III.. SUGGESTIONS. 

1. Consult some standard dictionary, or, better still, such a 
work as Fleming's Vocabulary of tlie Philosophical Sciences, on 
the words : Metlwd, Analysis, and Synthesis. 



16 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

2. Fix the full import of these words in the Mind. 

3. By reference to the dictionary or cyclopaedia investigate 
the distinction between Inductive Method and Deductive Method. 

4l. Make out a scheme for studying the mental processes of 
those under your instruction. "What studies exercise mainly 
their knowing powers ? Which bring into play their Emotions? 
Which of their pursuits calls into activity the Will ? 

5. Consult some biographical dictionary or cyclopaedia on 
the life, works, and authority of the authors quoted above, under 
Maxims of the Study of Psychology. 

IV. SYNOPSIS OF THE RELATION OF PEDAGOGICS 
TO PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. 

Some sciences are derived from a single principle or a few 
axioms. Mathematics is an example. Others, like Medicine, 
are constructed differently, the data being drawn from a number 
of other sciences. All the data of Medicine, however, relate to 
a single point, the Health of the Body. So in the case of Peda- 
gogics: its principles are derived from a number of sciences; the 
dataVelate to one central point, the Mental Development of the 
Child. — Sold an. 

1. Pedagogics, or the Science of Education, depends for its 
aims or ends on Ethics, the science which determines the ends 
of action and the regulation of Conduct. 

2. Pedagogics derives its data, its aggregate of knowledges, 
its principles, very largely from the sciences of Psychology, Logic, 
and Physiology. These data are derived directly, or are deduced 
from the truths of these respective sciences. 

3 . Besides the Deductive element in the Science of Pedagog- 
ics, there is also an Inductive one consisting of truths obtained 
from the observation and experience of the teachers and educa- 
tors of all times. 



CHAPTER II. 
MENTAL OPERATIONS AND THEIR CONDITIONS. 

Mental Phenomena and Operations. Matter and Aim of 
Mental Science. Mental Science consists, as we have seen, 
of a body of statements, truths, or laws with respect 
to mental phenomena. The aim of the Science is to es- 
tablish as many general statements or propositions about 
mind as possible. In order to do this we have first to 
ascertain what our phenomena are, and to arrange them 
in general groups or classes, based oh fundamental points 
of likeness. 

Mental phenomena are known by different names. 
They are commonly called states of mind, or states of 
consciousness. Again, since they are phenomena in 
time, having a certain duration and a succession of parts, 
they are just as often spoken of as mental processes or 
operations. It is to be added, however, that we some- 
times distinguish between a mental process or operation, 
and its result or product. Thus, as we shall see, we dis- 
tinguish between a process of perception, and its result, 
a percept. 

Matter and Aim of Educational Science. By way of discrimi- 
nation and contrast, we may here state the matter and aim of 
Pedagogics. It, too, consists of a body of statements and laws — 
all of which relate to Education. Its aim is to establish as many 
general propositions as possible about the training of youth and 
the formation of Character. But these statements, truths and 
B 



18 MENTAL OPERATIONS. 

laws are not all, nor mainly, derived by induction from observa- 
tion, as in Mental Science. 

Pedagogy assumes the phenomena and general truths of psy- 
chology and some other sciences, and from them deduces the main 
part of the body of its doctrine. These deductions arranged in 
logical order, supplemented and verified by the teachings and in- 
ductions of experience, constitute the Science of Pedagogics. 

Analysis of Mental Operations. At any one moment our 
mind presents a complex mass of mental phenomena or 
an intricate chain of mental operations. For example, 
when a person is sitting under a tree on a summer day, 
his mind is receiving numerous impressions of sight, 
sound, touch, etc., which affect him agreeably or other- 
wise; at the same time, perhaps, it is carrying on a train 
of imagery, recalling a sequence of past events, or 
fancying some bright future. At any one moment, the 
mind is a sort of tangle of psychical states or threads of 
psychical j)rocesses. It is the business of the psycholo- 
gist to unravel this tangle, and to take apart the threads. 
This is called analysis (splitting up, taking apart). 1 By 
so doing, he resolves a complex mental state into its 
simple elements, a complex operation into its constituent 
parts. 

Classification of Mental Operations. In thus breaking up 
or analysing a complex mental state, the observer is at 
the same time classing its parts w r ith those of other 
complex states. Thus in distinguishing certain sensa- 
tions from images he is referring to a class, sensations, 
and a class, images. In other words, he is making the 
beginning of a classification of mental operations. 

lOn the nature of psychological analysis, see Sir W. Hamilton, 
Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. II., Lect. XXI., pp. 21, 22. 



CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL OPERATIONS. 19 

Common popular thought has long since drawn 
certain distinctions among mental phenomena. Thus, in 
our everyday language, we describe particular sorts of 
mental operations as perceptions, judgments, and so on. 
All science is nothing but common knowledge made 
more precise and systematic. Hence, mental science 
naturally sets out with the rough classifications adopted 
by popular psychology. 

If we examine these everyday distinctions, we find 
that there are three fairly clear divisions which do not 
seem to have anything in common beyond being classes 
of mental phenomena. Thus we ordinarily describe 
such facts as perceiving, remembering, and reasoning as 
intellectual operations. So, again, we bring sorrow, joy, 
love, anger, and so on, under the general description of 
feeling or emotion. And finally, we gather up operations 
like purposing, deliberating, doing things, under the 
head of will. We broadly mark off these three sides of 
mind, and talk of men as exhibiting now one and now 
another aspect. 

Feeling, Knowing, and Willing. Mental Science adopts 
this threefold division. (1) Under Feeling we include 
all pleasurable and painful conditions of mind. These 
maybe very simple feelings, such as the so-called bodily 
distress of hunger, or the pleasure of the palate. Or 
they may be of a more complex nature, such as love, or 
remorse. (2) Knowing, again, includes all operations 
which are directly involved in knowing, as, for example, 
observing what is present to the senses, recalling the 
past, and reasoning. (3) Finally, Willing or Acting 
covers all active mental operations, all our doings, such 



20 MENTAL OPERATIONS. 

as walking, speaking, attending to things, together with 
efforts to do things, active impulses and resolutions. 
The perfect type of action is doing something for an 
end or purpose. This is what we ordinarily mean by 
doing a thing with will, or voluntary action. 

Opposition letween Knowing, Feeling, and Willing. These 
three kinds of mental state are, as we have seen, in 
general clearly marked off one from another. A child 
in a state of strong emotional excitement contrasts with 
a child calmly thinking about something, or another 
child exerting his active powers in doing something. 
Strong feeling is opposed to and precludes at the time 
calm thinking (recollecting, reasoning), as well as regu- 
lated action (will). Similarly, the intellectual state of re- 
membering or reasoning is opposed to feeling and to 
doing. The mind cannot exhibit each kind of pheno- 
menon in a marked degree at the same time. 

This opposition may be seen in another way. If we 
compare not different states of the same mind, but 
different minds as a whole, we often find now one kind 
of mental state or operation, now another in the as- 
cendant. Minds marked by much feeling (sensitive, 
emotional natures) commonly manifest less of the 
intellectual and volitional aspects or properties. Simi- 
larly, minds of a high degree of intellectual capability 
(inquiring or inquisitive minds), or of much active 
endowment (active minds) are, as a rule, relatively weak 
in the other kinds of endowment. 

Connection letween Knowing, Feeling, and Willing. Yet 
while knowing, feeling, and willing are thus broadly 



KNOWING, FEELING, AND WILLING. 21 

marked off from, and even opposed to, one another, they 
are in a way closely connected. A mind is not a mate- 
rial object which can be separated into distinct parts, 
but an organic unity made up of parts standing in the 
closest relation of interdependence. Or, to put it another 
way, feeling, knowing, and williug are properties of mind, 
and cannot exist in perfect isolation from one another 
any more than the color, form, and so on, of a plant. If 
we closely examine any case of feeling, we find some 
intellectual and volitional accompaniments. Thus, when 
we experience a bodily pain (feeling), we instantly 
localize the pain or recognize its seat (knowledge), and 
endeavor to alleviate it (volition). Most of our feel- 
ings, as we shall see, are wrapped up with, or embodied 
in, intellectual states (perceiving, remembering, etc.). 
Again, intellectual operations, observing, thinking, etc., 
are commonly accompanied by some shade of agreeable 
or disagreeable feeling, and they always involve volun- 
tary activity in the shape of attention or concentration 
of mind. Finally, willing depends on feeling for its 
motives or impelling forces, and on knowledge for its 
illumination or guidance. 

The relation of Feeling, Knowing, and Willing one 
to another is roughly indicated in the common distinc- 
tion between the passive and active sides of mind. On 
the one hand, feeling is (comparatively) passive, and so 
is set in contrast with willing, which is active. Know- 
ing, on the other hand, is called passive-active, because, 
while it depends for its material on passive receptivity, 
it involves the active control of its operations by means 
of voluntary attention. 

It follows that our threefold division of mind is a di- 



22 MENTAL OPERATIONS. 

vision according to the most prominent feature or aspect. 
It rarely happens that two aspects are so nearly equal 
in their prominence as to occasion any difficulty in refer- 
ring a mental state to one of these three classes. 

Species of Knowing, Feeling, and Willing : Mental Faculties. 
Popular psychology recognizes certain divisions or spe- 
cies of knowing, feeling, and willing under the head of 
faculties, capabilities, powers, and so on. More partic- 
ularly we speak of Intellectual Faculties, such as Per- 
ception and Imagination; Emotional capacities, as Love, 
Anger; and. Active Powers, such as Movement, Choice, 
Self-Control. 

Analysis of Faculties. In adopting these popular dis- 
tinctions, however, the psychologist does not imply that 
the several processes of perceiving, remembering, and 
so on, are distinct one from the other fundamentally, 
that is to say, with respect to their elementary parts. 
We endeavor to break up the several processes of per- 
ceiving, etc., into simpler or more fundamental opera- 
tions, of which we regard them as so many various 
modifications or modes of combination. 

The discussion of the ultimate nature of the so-called 
faculties and powers of the mind belongs to rational 
psychology, or that branch of philosophy which treats 
of mind as substance. The hypothesis of faculties can, 
however, be criticized from the point of view of empi- 
rical psychology in so far as it succeeds or does not 
succeed in giving a clear account- of the phenomena. 
Looked at in this way, it must be regarded as productive 
of much error in psychology. It has led to the false 



FUNCTIONS OF INTELLECT. 23 

supposition that mental activity, instead of being one 
and the same throughout its manifold phases, is a juxta- 
position of totally distinct activities answering to a 
bundle of detached powers, somehow standing side by 
side, and exerting no influence on one another. 

Fundamental Intellectual Operations : Functions. Employ- 
ing this instrument of " analysis," the psychologist seeks 
to reduce the several sorts or varieties of intellectual 
operations, such as perception and judgment, to more 
fundamental processes. The essential operation in all 
varieties of knowing is the detecting of relations be- 
tween things. The most comprehensive relations are 
difference or unlikeness and agreement or likeness. All 
knowing means discriminating one impression, object, 
or idea from another (or others), and assimilating it to 
yet another (or others). I perceive an object, as a rose, 
only when I see how it differs from other objects and 
more especially other varieties of flowers, and at the same 
time recognize its likeness to other roses previously seen. 
And so of other forms of knowing. Hence Discrimina- 
tion and Assimilation have been called properties or 
functions of intellect. 1 

Another property of intellect, according to Prof. 
Bain, is Retentiveness. All knowledge clearly implies 
the capability of retaining, recalling, or reproducing 
past impressions. But retentiveness occupies a different 

i For an account of the fundamental intellectual processes, see Prof. 
Bain, Senses and Intellect— Intellect, pp. 321-327: compare H. Spencer's 
theory of ' relations between feeling,' Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., 
Pt. II., Chap. II., and Vol. II., Pt. VI., concluding chapters, especially 
XXVI. and XXVII.; also G. H. Lewes's distinction of function and fac- 
ulty, Study of Psychology (Problems of Life and Mind, 3d Series, Prob. I), 
p. 27. 



24 MENTAL OPERATIONS. 

place in knowing from that of discrimination, etc. It 
is rather the condition of knowing, of coming to know 
and continuing to know than a part of the active know- 
ing process itself. Besides, as we shall see later, it is 
the principle which underlies the growth or development 
of intellect, and not only of this, but of mind as a whole. 

Grades of Intellectual Operation. By thus assuming cer- 
tain fundamental intellectual functions, we are able to 
regard the distinctions of perceiving, imagining, and so 
on, as so many grades or stages of knowing. They be- 
come forms or modes of the fundamental processes of 
various degrees of complexity. In this way we obtain 
a scale of intellectual processes. Thus, at the lower end 
we have, in what is commonly called sensation, the dis- 
crimination of a sense-impression from others: in percep- 
tion, a marking off of a group of impressions under the 
form of an object or thing; in thinking, the separation 
of a whole class of objects. This serial arrangement of 
intellectual operations prepares the way for a theory 
of mental growth or development. 

Truths or Laws of Mind. As was observed just now, 
the psychologist analyzes and classifies mental phe- 
nomena in order to go on to make comprehensive asser- 
tions about them. These assertions are truths of mind. 
The most important of them are commonly spoken of as 
laws of mind. These truths or laws set forth the rela- 
tions between certain j>sychical phenomena and other 
phenomena, psychical or physical. These relations are 
for the most part relations of succession and dependence. 
The truth or law formulates the causal connection be- 



LAWS OF MIND. 25 

tween a phenomenon and its antecedents or accompani- 
ments. That is to say, it seeks to account for a phe- 
nomenon by enumerating the conditions which are 
necessary to its production. 

Here again mental science is supplementing and ren- 
dering precise the inductions reached by popular 
thought. Men have for ages observed certain relations 
of dependence between circumstances and character, 
and one trait of character or habit and another. All 
the well-known sayings about character and life embody 
these observations. Such trite remarks as " experience 
is the best teacher," "first impressions last longest," 
contain the rough germ of psychological truths. The 
psychologist seeks to take up these wise sayings into his 
science, embodying them in larger and more accurate 
propositions, that is to say, in laws. 

Special and General Conditions and Laws. If we consider 
the conditions of any class of intellectual operations, we 
find that some are special and peculiar to the class 
whilst others are of a more general character. Thus a 
perception will be found to have as its special conditions 
a present sense-impression and a recalled group of past 
impressions; while it will be seen to depend too on 
attention which is a much wider and more general con- 
dition. 

Among the very general conditions is change of 
impression or contrast of mental state, which seems 
necessary to any kind of continued mental activity. To 
set forth such more general conditions is to formulate 
the highest laws or first principles of psychology. 



26 MENTAL OPEEATIONS. 

Sum of conditions. In order to explain any class of 
mental operation, it is needful to specify all the con- 
ditions whether special or general which co-operate in 
bringing it about. This will compel ns, in certain cases 
at least, to take note not only of proximate or immediately 
preceding (or accompanying) circumstances but also of 
remote antecedents. Thus, to account for the remem- 
brance of a thing, we must specify not only the presence 
at the time of something which reminds us of that thing 
but also the fact that the reminder and that of which it 
reminds us have been conjoined or l associated ' in our 
past experience. 

To analyze an operation of mind is thus in a manner 
to assign its conditions and account for it. Thus we 
explain a percept, that is, the result of the process of 
perception, by unfolding the mechanism of the process, 
distinguishing its stages, the reception of a sense- 
impression, the recalling of a group of conjoined im- 
pressions, and so on. 1 

Attention as a Condition of Operations. Among these 
constituent parts of an operation none is more important 
than attention. This, as has been remarked, is a general 
condition of mental operations. Knowing, feeling, and 
willing, in so far as they are vivid and distinct phases 
of mental life, involve attention. 

Favorable and Unfavorable State of Mind. Among the 
conditions which help to determine a mental result we 
must not overlook the whole mental circumstances or 

iG. H. Lewes attempts roughly to assign the physiological correlatives 
of feeling, cognition, and action. See Problems of Life and Mind, Third 
Series, Vol. II., Prob. III., Chap. II. 



NERVOUS CONDITIONS. 27 

composite state of the mind at the time. The effect of 
calmness of mind and of emotional agitation respectively 
on intellectual operations is a matter of every day ob- 
servation. Our minds are prepared for a special mode 
of activity in very different degrees. After a disturbing 
shock attention requires time to recover its balance, and 
so intellectual operations are interfered with. 

Nervous Conditions. In specifying all the conditions of 
a class of Rental operations we must refer not only to 
psychical but to physical circumstances. More particu- 
larly we need to specify a vigorous state of the organs 
concerned. This applies not only to intellectual opera- 
tions, as learning or acquiring knowledge, but also to 
feelings and actions. A vigorous state of the brain is a 
condition of lively feeling, as of energetic intellectual 
activity. And as we shall see, voluntary action is 
modified by the varying state of the motor organs. 

Individual Differences of Mental Capability. Mental oper- 
ations are not precisely similar in all minds. They vary 
in certaiu respects, and these variations are referred to 
differences of mental power or capacity. Now as we 
have seen, psychology, as science, has to do with the 
general facts and truths of mind. It takes no account 
of individual peculiarities. Nevertheless, the practical 
importance of estimating individual differences has led 
psychologists to pay considerable attention to this con- 
crete branch of their subject. 

The particular problem to be discussed here is the 
possibility of estimating with an approach to scientific 
precision the several differences of mental capability 
that we find among individuals. 



28 MENTAL OPEKATKXNS. 

Sow Minds Vary. One mind may differ from another 
in respect of one whole phase or side of mind. Thus 
we speak of one man or one child as more intellectual 
or more enquiring than another. Similarly, ODe mind 
has more emotional susceptibility, or more active im- 
pulse or will than another. 

Again, we may make our comparison more narrow, 
and enquire how one mind differs from another with 
respect to a special mode of intellectual (or other) 
operation. Thus we ask whether one mind has more 
discrimination or a finer sense of difference than another, 
or whether it is endowed with a keener sense of likeness. 
Or we may take some special faculty, and enquire how 
two minds differ in respect of observing, imaginative, 
or reasoning power. Or, finally, we may select some 
particular mode of operation of a faculty, and compare 
two minds with respect to their perception of objects 
in space, or of events in time: their memory for things 
(visible objects) , for names, and so on. 

Teacher must note Differences of Mental Capability. This 
subject is of the utmost practical importance. The instructor 
realizing the abstract possibility of great differences in individual 
capacity, susceptibility and excitability must be on the lookout for 
instances of these conditions among those under his instruction 
whether the variations are above or below the average mind. The 
point is that the external stimulus to the mental action of the 
student, i. e., the nature of tasks set, the degree of approbation 
or disfavor foreshadowed, must be within limits accommodated 
to the individual peculiarity. 

Concrete Psychology the Teacher's Province. It is often said that 
the teacher should "study the characters of his pupils." 'Con- 
crete psychology,' that is, the study of individual differences of 
mind marks out to the instructor the necessity and scope of what 



MEASUREMENT OF FACULTY. 29 

is called a knowledge of Human Nature, the study of the char- 
acteristic variations in human minds, the peculiarities and 
distinctive tendencies of individuals. Varying degrees of the 
power of acquiring knowledge, varying emotional susceptibility 
and will power constantly present to the instructor problems of 
greater or less gravity. 

Measurement of Mental Faculty. In order to make our 
comparison of one mind with another exact, we ought 
to be able to measure one against the other. This is 
only jDossible, in most regions of mind at least, in a very 
rough way. Mental phenomena are not material objects 
the size of which can be accurately estimated by juxta- 
position. Yet, if rough, these measurements may serve 
as useful data for practice. 

Quantitative Aspects of Mind. Mental operations have 
three quantitative aspects, each of which is susceptible 
of measurement more or less exact. These are degree, 
duration, and number. 

(a) Degree. — By the degree of a mental state or phe- 
nomenon is meant its intensity. Our sensations and 
feelings clearly vary in intensity. We can say that one 
impression is more vivid than another, one feeling more 
acute than another, and so on. Our actions, too, differ 
in degree according to the amount of energy we con- 
sciously expend. And our intellectual operations simi- 
larly display differences of degree. Thus, we speak of 
the degree of distinctness and vividness of an impression 
or of an idea. Also, we may speak of the degree of 
activity (attention) involved in an intellectual operation. 

(b) Duration. — The duration of operations is a matter 
which lends itself peculiarly well to exact measurement. 



30 MENTAL OPEKATIONS. 

For time is susceptible of objective estimation, that is to 
say, of measurement by means of an external standard, 
such as a clock. Our measurements of the intensity or 
degree of mental states are rough. Thus, we can only 
say that one operation is l easier ' than another, or at 
best, that it is ' much easier.' With respect to dura- 
tion, however, it is possible to measure exactly by means 
of external arrangements. 

(c) Number. — In order to estimate number it is enough 
that we can distinguish one operation from another, or 
one stage of an operation from another. We measure 
mental processes, such as trains of thought, under this 
aspect when we compare the number of distinct steps 
involved in them. The estimate of the complexity of a 
mental state, for example, a ' flight of fancy ' or a 
mingled emotion, takes place by reckoning the number 
of elements or details of which it is made up. 

Modes of Measuring Faculty. There are two well-marked 
methods of measuring faculty: (1) by making the ex- 
ternal excitant or stimulus 1 equal in two (or more) cases, 
and comparing the mental reactions, or (2) by inquiring 
what difference in the stimuli is required to bring about 
equal mental reactions in two cases. Although these 
methods can only be applied with any degree of exact- 
ness in the simpler region of mind, sensation, they may 
be employed roughly in other regions as well. 

First Method. — In this case, we must be careful to 
make the stimulus equal as far as possible in two cases, 

i By stimulus is meant strictly an external agent (as mechanical 
pressure) applied to a sense-organ (e. g., the hand) which it is capable of 
exciting to activity. The word may be extended so as to include all ex- 
citants of mental activity. 



MODES OF MEASURING FACULTY. 31 

and compare the psychical results. Thus we might test 
the discriminative sensibility of two persons by present- 
ing exactly the same amount of 'objective' difference, 
e. g.> between two shades of color or two degrees of 
brightness of one color. Here we must be careful to 
make the circumstances equally favorable to discrimina- 
tion in all respects. Thus the object presented must be 
similarly placed in relation to the observers. Also, the 
external circumstances and the internal state of mind 
must be equally favorable to concentration of attention. 

Having thus made the stimuli equal, we compare the 
reactions as to quantity. Thus the sense of difference 
in one case may be more distinct and vivid than in an- 
other. A much better criterion is duration. If one 
person detects a difference sooner than another under 
precisely similar circumstances, he has the greater dis- 
crimination in that region of impression. In complex 
operations, number may enter into the estimation. Thus 
if the power tested be that of imagination or the faculty 
of picturing visible objects, it may be found that one 
person is able to form fuller and more complete pictures 
than another under similar circumstances. 

Second Method. — The second method has certain ad- 
vantages over the first. In general we can compare 
quantitatively two stimuli much better than their 
psychical results. We can make one physical agent 
twice or three times as large as another, but we can 
never say that one mental impression is three times as 
strong or vivid as another. Moreover it is possible, in 
some cases at least, to fix on a definite quantity of 
psychical effect and make this our unit of comparison. 
This is done by taking the smallest quantity of an effect that 



32 MENTAL 0PEEATI0NS. 

is perceptible or recognizable. Thus the best way to measure 
the power of discrimination in the region of sense im- 
pressions is to find by experiment the amount of objec- 
tive difference, that is, the amount of difference between 
two agents or stimuli {e. g., weights laid on the hand, 
etc.), that will just produce a sense of difference; in 
other words, be barely recognized as a difference. 

Beaeings of the eoeegoing on Education. 

The Teacher should know the Terms of Psychology. A 
word or two may suffice to indicate the more important 
bearings of this chapter on the art of Education. To 
begin with, since Education is engaged with exercising 
the faculties of the mind — memory, judgment, and so 
on, it is well for the Educator to know what these are, 
that is to say, what mental processes are covered by 
the words. A careful analysis of the operations of mind 
carried to a certain point is necessary to a perfect grasp 
and comprehension of educational processes. For ex- 
ample, a teacher cannot intelligently exercise a child's 
powers of observation (perception) till he grasps the 
fact that observation implies discrimination, the mark- 
ing off of the several peculiarities of color, shape, and so 
on, of an object from those of other objects. 

The Teacher should Jcnow The Laws of Mind. It is ob- 
vious, further, that a knowledge of the laws of mental 
operations, in other words, of their conditions, is a mat- 
ter of the greatest practical utility to the Educator. 
Since his aim is to call forth a faculty into exercise, that 
is to say, to bring about a particular mental result, he 
needs to know the laws according to which the particu- 



THE TEACHER SHOULD KNOW MIND. 33 

lar faculty operates, or the conditions on which the 
particular result depends. Thus in order to render the 
meaning of words clear and definite to a child's mind, he 
will do well to note the conditions on which clear notions 
or concepts in general depend, such as familiarity with 
a wide variety of concrete examples. 

The Teacher should know Mind as a whole. Again, though 
the art of Education is concerned more immediately 
with the intellectual than with the other operations of 
mind, it cannot afford to be ignorant of these. The 
teacher is expected to help in moulding the taste and in 
forming the moral character of his pupils, and here some 
knowledge of the feelings and the will and the laws 
which govern them is of importance. And even if we 
look upon the function of the teacher as having to do 
exclusively with the exercising of the intellectual powers, 
we shall still see that some knowledge of the processes 
of feeling and willing is necessary ; for feeling and will- 
ing under the form of interest and voluntary application 
of mind are in a measure involved in intellectual work. 

The Teacher should be able to compare individual Minds. 
Finally, in order to give due flexibility to his system of 
training, and to adapt it to the numerous differences of 
capacity and tastes among children, the teacher should 
be able to compare individual minds as exactly as possi- 
ble. Hence a knowledge of the means which are at our 
disposal here will be of practical use. 

References. 

On the threefold Division of Mind and the nature of the "Faculties," 
see Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, I., Lect. XI. ; Prof. Bain, 
Senses and Intellect (3rd Ed.), Introduction ; James Ward, second article 
on Psychological Principles, in Mind, October, 1883. 



34 MENTAL OP EATIONS. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II. 

SUGGESTIONS. 

1. By reference to the preceding pages and to the unabridged 
dictionary, fix in mind the exact meanings of the words, 'phe- 
nomena, analysis, classification, general statement. 

2. Consider what is meant by the phenomena of heat, the 
phenomena of electricity. In the same manner, determine what is 
included and what is excluded by the term phenomena of mind. 

3. Consider what is the difference between a science and 
an art; whether all the sciences have corresponding arts; or, 
whether some of the sciences simply supply the basis of other 
sciences. 

4. Do not omit to aim at becoming yourself a practical psy- 
chologist. Test the statements of this treatise by the introspec- 
tion of your own consciousness and the observation of the work- 
ings of the minds of others. 

5. Note what is said of the use of imagination in endeavor- 
ing to see what is going on in the mind of another. Consider 
your own mental -processes while reading the mind of another; 
e. g., of a child while learning, by successive efforts, a new word. 

6. Look up the meaning, use, and importance of the terms, 
subjective and objective. Find, if possible, why they are so impor- 
tant in Mental Science. 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. What is meant by saying that the psychologist is con- 
cerned merely with the phenomena of Mind? 

2. What is a law of mind ? 

3. What is meant by deducing a pedagogical principle from 
a law of mind ? 



APPLICATIONS TO TEACHING. 35 

4. If Pedagogics consists of an aggregate of knowledge 
drawn from various sciences, such as psychology, etc., what 
gives unity and consistency to the science ? 

5. What is the difference between the terms, conscious-subject, 
Ego, Self, and Mind ? 

6. "Why is it so important that a teacher should understand 
the fact of varying emotional susceptibility and the like ? 

7. To what method of studying psychology does Mr. Lewes 
allude when he says, "Man, being a part of Nature, ought to 
be studied on the method which alone has proved successful in 
the study of Nature ? " 

APPLICATIONS TO TEACHING. 

1. The Importance of Classification. When our knowledge of 
the nature of the child is classified, we can survey our possessions, 
and the better command them to our service. The classification 
of the learner's powers into those of intellect, feeling, and will, 
signify the extent of true education, that it includes not only the 
evolution of the intelligence, but also cultivation of right senti- 
ments, and training of desire and will. Thus the teacher is 
bound to educate the pupil to the trinity of the True, the Beauti- 
ful, and the Good. 

It is, also, very important to name the tools and instruments 
of one's craft, and to assign any event or fact to its proper place 
in the scale of knowledge. Thus classification of the mental 
operations promotes accuracy of thought and comprehension of 
view. 

2. Primary classification of Mental phenomena applied to 
Rhetoric. There are two kinds of composition addressed to the 
Intellect, — Explanatory and Argumentative, — and one to the Emo- 
tions and the Will, — Persuasive. By the former, we instruct and 
convince; by the latter, we persuade. — Bancroft. 

3. Regarding the Faculties as simply degrees of development 
of self-activity enables us to look at mental growth as a gradual 
progress along certain successive grades or stages of knowing 



36 MENTAL OPERATIONS. 

from sensation to reasoning. This gradual evolution of the 
learner's powers is the unity to which all efforts of teaching 
should tend. 



REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS, 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

(From Chapters I. and II.) 

1. On the Science of Education as founded on Psychology, 
see Payne's Lectures on Education: The Science and Art of Edu- 
cation, p. 41 ; also the Lectures entitled The Theory or Science of 
Education, under Intellectual Education, p. 67, and, The Impor- 
tance of the Training of the Teacher, near the end, p. 204 ; also H. 
Spencer's Education, chap. II., p. 120. 

2. On Education as an art having a corresponding science, 
see Dr. Youmans, quoted in Payne, The Theory or Science of Edu- 
cation, under Intellectual Education, p. 67; on what the Art of Edu- 
cation is, see Payne, Science and Art of Education, Lectures, p. 31, 
and the Lecture on The Practice or Art of Education ; on the 
definition of the Art of Education, Payne's Lectures, p. 161 ; 
Education both a science and an art, Fitch, Lectures on Teach- 
ing, chap. L, and Tate's Philosphy of Education, Introduction. 

3. On the want hitherto of a Science of Education, see Quick, 
Educational Beformers, p. 244, and H. Spencer's Education, chap. 
II. ; on the importance of psychological analysis in relation to 
teaching, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, part II. , chap. I. ; 
and on the importance of right views of education, see Page's 
Theory and Practice of Teaching, chap. V. 

4. On what is included in the complete equipment and 
training of the teacher, see Payne, The Importance of the Train- 
ing of the Teacher, at the end, Lectures, p. 208; on intellectual 
philosophy as a necessity for the teacher, see Page's Theory and 
Practice of Teaching, chap, IV., and Spencer's Education, chap. 
II., p. 116. 

5. For Education defined in terms of Psychology, see Payne, 
The Importance of the Training of the Teacher, Lectures, p. 204; 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 37 

on psychology as the test of the art of teaching, Ibid; on teach- 
ing as the explicit display of the principles of the Science of 
Education, Ibid, p. 161. 

6. On the present condition and future progress of educa- 
tional science, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, chap. II., p. 
27 ; on the character of the true teacher, Ibid, p. 59. 

7. On the gulf between ideal and actual teaching bridged by 
study of human nature, Quick, Educational Reformers, p. 194, 
and on the difference between a teacher and a learner as to the 
need of Psychology, see Payne, Importance of the Training of the 
Teacher, Lectures, p. 199. 

8. For an illustration of psychological analysis for pur- 
poses of education, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, chap. III., 
first part; and for an express illustration of psychologic study 
leading to the adoption of a particular method of teaching, see 
Parker's Talks on Teaching, Talks I-Y. 

9. For summary of the principles of education, see Princi- 
ples of Science of Education, Payne's Lectures, p. 156, and H. 
Spencer's Education, chap. II., p. 120. 



CHAPTER III. 
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

Mental Development Defined. In the last chapter we were 
concerned with ascertaining the nature and conditions 
of the several kinds of mental operation, without any 
reference to the time of life at which they occur. But 
mental operations differ greatly in different periods of 
life, owing to what we call the growth or development 
of capacity. We have now to consider this far-reaching 
process of mental growth. We shall seek to distinguish 
between the successive stages of mental life and point 
out how these are related one to the other. By so doing, 
we may hope to account not merely for the single oper- 
ations of a faculty, but for the mature faculty itself 
viewed as the result of a process of growth. This part 
of our subject constitutes the theory of Mental Develop- 
ment. 

Growth and Development. When speaking of the physi- 
cal organism, we distinguish between growth and 
development. The former is mere increase of size or 
bulk; the latter consists of structural changes (increase 
of complexity). While growth and development usually 
run on together, there is no proper parallelism between 
them. Thus in abnormal growth development is hin- 
dered. And an organ, as the brain, may develop long 
after it has ceased to grow. It is possible to apply this 
analogy to mind. We may say that mind grows when 
it increases its stock of materials. It develops in so far 



CHILD AND MAN COMPARED. 39 

as its materials are elaborated in higher and more com- 
plex forms. Mere growth of mind would thus be illus- 
trated by an increase in the bulk of mental retentions, 
that is, in the contents of memory: development, by the 
ordering of these contents in their relations of difference 
and likeness, and so on. But the analogy cannot be 
pressed very far. 

Characteristics of Development. In order to see how the 
later stages of growth differ from the earlier, let us 
compare the intellectual operations of a man with those 
of a child, (a) We observe, first of all, that in the 
former case, the operations are more numerous and 
various. In the course of a day, a man goes through 
many more processes of observing, judging, and so on, 
than a child, (b) Secondly, we observe that in general 
the operations exhibit a greater degree of perfection. 
Thus the observations of the man are more discriminat- 
ing and accurate, and effected more easily and rapidly, (c) 
Thirdly, it is noticeable that the operations of the adult 
are as a whole more complex, consisting of longer and 
more intricate processes than those of the child. Thus he 
performs elaborate processes of abstract thinking w r hich 
have no place among childish operations. 

Development oj Single Faculty and of Sum of Faculties. 
This aggregate of changes which constitutes the growth 
of mind appears to resolve itself into two parts. On the 
one hand, we see that the several faculties which oper- 
ate in the case of the child have expanded and increased 
in vigor. On the other hand,, we notice that new facul- 
ties, the germs of which are hardly discoverable in the 



40 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

child, have acquired strength. We see, thai is to say, 
that while the faculties have each grown singly, there 
has been a certain order of unfolding among thein, so 
tbat some have reached mature vigor before others. 

Much the same thing is observable in the develop- 
ment of the other sides of mind, feeling and will. Here 
too we notice a great increase in the number and com- 
plexity of the phenomena. The emotions, resolutions 
and actions of a man are both more varied and more 
composite in their nature than those of a child. And 
further, we see that the several emotional capacities 
and active powers have been strengthened, while there 
has been a successive unfolding of higher and higher 
capacities and powers. 

Growth of Separate Faculties. We may now confine oar- 
selves to the intellectual side of mind, and view the 
development of it under each of the two aspects just 
distinguished, the development of the several faculties 
singly, and that of the sum of faculties. 

The growth or improvement of a faculty includes 
three things, or may be regarded under three aspects, 
(l) Old operations become increasingly easy and rapid 3 
requiring less stimulus, less effort of attention, and so on. 
Thus the recognition of one and the same kind of object, 
the recalling of the same impression, tends to become 
easier with the repetition of the operation. This is im- 
provement of a faculty in a definite direction. (2) New 
operations of a similar grade of complexity will also 
grow easier. Thus the improvement of the observing 
powers (perception) includes a growing facility in not- 
ing and recognizing unfamiliar objects: that of memory 



DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIND. 41 

includes a greater readiness in retaining and recalling 
new impressions. This is improvement of a faculty 
generally. (3) This general improvement is completed 
by the attainment of the capability of executing more 
complex, intricate, and difficult operations. The growth 
of observation means the progressive capability of not- 
ing less conspicuous objects, of detecting finer differ- 
ences between objects, and of grasping more complex 
and intricate wholes — that is to say, objects and groups 
of objects made up of more parts or details. 

Development of Sum of Faculties. In the second place, 
we may view the development of the mind as a whole 
through successive stages corresponding to the several 
faculties. This is known as the order of development 
of the faculties. There is a well-marked order in the 
growth of intellect, (l) The process of attaining knowl- 
edge sets out with Sensation, or the reception of external 
impressions by the mind. Sense supplies the materials 
which the intellect assimilates and elaborates according 
to its own laws. (2) Sensation is followed by Percep- 
tion, in which a number of impressions are grouped 
together under the form of a percept, or an immediate 
apprehension of some thing or object, as when we see 
and recognize an orange or a bell. (3) After Perception 
comes Representative Imagination, in which the mind 
pictures, or has an image of what has been perceived. 
It may represent this either in the original form (Repro- 
ductive Imagination), as when we recall the face of a 
friend; or in a new form (Constructive Imagination), as 
when we imagine some historical personage. (4) Finally, 
we have General or Abstract Knowing, otherwise 



42 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

marked off as Thinking. This includes Conception, or 
the formation of Concepts or general Notions out of 
percepts and images, such as l metal,' ' organism,' ' life,' 
and so on; Judgment, or the combination of Concepts, 
as when we assert that no men are omniscient; and 
Reasoning, or the combination of Judgments, as when 
we conclude that a particular writer, say a newspaper 
correspondent, is not omniscient, because no men are so. 

A glance at this order will show that the later opera- 
tions are marked by increasing complexity. Thus 
Perception is more complex than Sensation, since it 
arises by an aggregation of sensations. Again, Con- 
ception is more complex than Imagination, since concepts 
are formed out of a number of mental images. v Similarly 
Judgment is more complex than Conception, and Rea- 
soning than Judgment. 

With this growth in complexity is intimately associ- 
ated another feature of this series of changes, viz., 
increase of inwardness, or aloofness from external sense. 
Cognition begins with outer sense-impressions and euds 
in the inner processes of abstract thought. This aspect 
of development is described by saying that the move- 
ment of growth is from the presentative, or what is 
directly presented to the mind through sense, to the 
representative, what is indirectly set before the mind 
under the form of mental images or notions. 

It is evident, further, that this transition from the 
presentative to the representative implies a growth in 
the generality of knowledge. All presentative knowledge 
is of the individual. In representation, however, we 
are able to take many individuals together and think of 
them as a class. The progress of knowledge is thus 



UNITY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT. 43 

from the individual to the general, or from the concrete 
to the abstract. 

Since the faculties each grow singly, and at the same 
time unfold themselves in a certain order, we see that 
the growth or development of a mind consists in a series 
of parallel movements, certain of which begin later 
than others. Just as the growth of a plant consists 
of unfoldings of leaf, petal, and so on, some parts of the 
organism being in advance of others, but the progress of 
the earlier continuing after that of the later has begun, 
so the growth of a mind is at once a succession and a 
contemporaneous group of changes. 1 

Unity of Intellectual Development. It has already been 
pointed out that modern psychology seeks to reduce the 
several operations of Perception, Imagination, etc., to 
certain fundamental processes, of which discrimination 
and assimilation are the most important (see p. 23). If 
this is so, it may be possible to regard the successive 
unfoldings of the faculties as one continuous process. 
The higher and more complex operations of thought 
would thus appear as only different modes of the same 
fundamental functions of intellect as underlie the 
lower and simpler operations of sense-perception. In 
other words, our distinction between the development of 
a single faculty and the development of the sum of fac- 
ulties would be seen to be a superficial one only. 

Now, a little reflection will show that we can view the 
development of intellect as a whole in this way. Thus 



i On the order of intellectual development, viewed as taking place in 
the history of the race, see Mr. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, Vol- 
II., Pt. VIII., Ch. II. and III. 



44 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

the simplest form of knowing, sensation, involves the 
discrimination of sense-impressions; and the highest 
form of knowing, abstract thinking, is a higher mani- 
festation of the same power. Again, the perception of 
a single object is a process of assimilating present to 
past impressions; and abstract thinking is assimilating 
or classing many objects under certain common aspects. 
We may thus say that the several stages of knowing, 
perception, conception, and so on, illustrate the same 
fundamental activities of intellect employed about more 
and more complex materials (sensations, percepts, ideas, 
etc). 

Growth and Exercise of Faculty. We have just seen how 
each faculty progresses or improves, and how the suc- 
cessive unfolding of the several faculties may be viewed 
as only a continuous growth of the same fundamental 
capabilities or functions. We have now to inquire into 
the meaning of this complex process of growth, in other 
words, into the principles or laws which underlie and 
determine it. 

The most obvious of these principles or laws is that 
all intellectual growth results from the exercise of fac- 
ulty or function. In other words, the faculties or func- 
tions are strengthened by exercise. Let us take the 
case of a single faculty first. The power of observation 
(perception), of detecting differences among colors, 
forms, and so on, improves by the repeated exercise of 
this power. Each successive operation tends to improve 
the faculty. Immediately, it tends to improve it in a 
particular direction only. Thus if the power of obser- 
vation is exercised with respect to colors, it will be 



INTELLECT DEPENDS ON SENSATION. 45 

strengthened more especially in this direction, but not 
to the same extent in other directions, e. g., with 
respect to forms. 

Let us now look at the development of intellect as a 
whole. Since perception, conception, and so on, are only 
different modes of the same intellectual functions, the 
exercise of these in the lower form prepares the way for 
the higher manifestations. This truth is recognized in 
the common saying that, in training the senses, we are 
laving the foundations of the higher intellectual culture. 
But this is not all. No amount of exercise of the 
observing powers will secure a full development of the 
powers of abstract thought. In order that the succes- 
sive phases of intelligenee may unfold themselves in due 
order, the separate exercise of the fundamental func- 
tions in each of these phases is necessary. 

What Exercise of Intellect Involves : Sense -Materials. The 
exercise of the intellectual powers, as a whole, may be 
roughly described as the employment of the fundamen- 
tal functions upon the materials supplied by the Senses 
(Sensations, Sense-impressious). As we have seen, sen- 
sation is the elementary phase of the intellectual life. 
The senses supply the pabulum or nutriment which the 
intellect assimilates or elaborates according to its proper 
laws. The highest manifestations of intellect, abstract 
thought and reasoning, illustrate this dependence of 
intellectual activity on the elements, materials, or 'data' 
of sense. The growth of intellect by repeated exercise 
thus implies a continual supply of sense-materials, a 
multiplication of sense-impressions, to be worked up into 
intellectual products. 



46 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

Retentiveness. In the second place, it is plain that this 
growth of intellect by exercise implies retentiveness. 
By this term is meant, generally, that every operation of 
mind leaves a trace behind it which constitutes a disposition 
to perform the same operation or same kind of operation 
again. This truth obviously underlies the generaliza- 
tion, 'Exercise strengthens faculty.' The increased 
power of discriminating colors, sounds, and so on, due 
to repeated exercises of the discriminative function, can 
■ only be accounted for by saying that each successive 
activity modifies the mind, strengthening its tendency 
to act on that particular side or in that particular mode. 

Growth and Habit. This persistence of traces, and 
formation of a disposition to think, feel, etc., in the same 
way as before underlies what we call habit. By this 
term is meant a fixed tendency to think, feel, or act in a 
particular way under special circumstances. The form- 
ation of habits is a very important ingredient of what 
we mean by intellectual development; but it is not all 
that is so meant. Habit refers rather to the fixing of 
mental operations in particular directions. Taken in 
this narrow sense, habit is in a manner opposed to growth. 
By following out a train of ideas again and again in a 
certain way, we lose the capability of varying this order, 
of re-adapting the combination to new circumstances. 
Habit is thus the element of persistence, of custom, the 
conservative tendency; whereas growth inches flexibility, 
modifiability, susceptibility to new impressions, the pro- 
gressive tendency. 

In order that the intellectual powers, as a whole, may 
be exercised and grow, a higher form of retentiveness is 



DEVELOPMENT IMPLIES RETENTION. 47 

needed. The traces left by intellectual activities must 
accumulate and appear under the form of revivals or 
reproductions. The impressions of sense when discrim- 
inated are, in this way, recalled as images. This retention 
and revival of the products of the early sense-discrim- 
ination is clearly necessary to the higher operations of 
thought. Images, though the products of elementary 
processes of discrimination and assimilation, supply in 
their turn the material for the more elaborate processes 
of thought. We thus see, that the growing complexity 
of the intellectual life depends on the accumulation of 
innumerable traces of past and simpler products of 
intellectual activity. 

Grouping of Parts: Laws of Association. One other law 
or principle involved in this process of intellectual 
development has to be touched on. The growth of 
intellect, by repeated exercise of its functions, leads to 
an increasing complexity of the products. This means 
that the several elements are combined or grouped in 
certain ways. This grouping goes on according to the 
Laws of Association. These laws will be fully discussed 
by and by. Here it is enough to say that the main law 
runs somewhat as follows: Two or more men tal' phe- 
nomena which have occurred together tend to recur 
together. The building up of perceptions out of sensa- 
tions, of trains of images, of judgments (combinations 
of conceptions or ideas) and so on, all illustrate this 
process of combining. 

Summary of Process of Development. Let us now try to 
gather up, as succinctly as possible, the results of our 



48 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

analysis of the process of intellectual development. To 
begin with the Senses, these supply the materials, and 
call into play the functions of discrimination and assim- 
ilation. This early stage of intellectual activity involves 
only a rudimentary form of retentiveness, namely in the 
traces of past sensations blending with present and like 
ones. The repeated conjunction of certain impressions 
leads to the grouping of these in complex aggregates 
of a particular kind (Perception). This involves a 
distinct germ of representation. Later, through the 
cumulation of many traces of impressions and per- 
ceptions, the formation of images becomes possible 
(Imagination, including Memory). Finally, through 
the multiplication of images and their connections, and 
the strengthening of the functions of discrimination and 
assimilation (aided by the growth of the power of vol- 
untary attention), the process of forming concepts of 
classes, and combinations of such concepts, becomes pos- 
sible (Thought). 

Development of Feeling and Willing. While for the sake 
of simplicity, we have confined our attention to the 
development of intellect, it is necessary to add that the 
same features and the same underlying principles are 
discoverable in the growth of feeling and will. The 
earlier feelings (bodily pleasures and pains) are simple 
and closely connected with the senses: the higher feel- 
ings (emotions) are complex and representative in 
character. Again, the first actions (bodily movements) 
are simple and external, being immediate responses to 
sense-impressions, whereas the later are complex, in- 
ternal and representative (choosing, resolving, etc.). 



NO KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT EMOTION. 49 

Interdependence of Intellectual, Emotional, and Active Devel- 
opment. We have so far viewed the growth of intellect, 
of feeling, and of volition as processes going on apart, 
independently of one another. And this is in a measure 
a correct assumption. It must, however, be remembered 
that mind is an organic unity, and that the processes of 
knowing, feeling and willing in a measure involve one 
another (see before, p. 20). It follows from this, that 
the developments of these phases will be closely con- 
nected. Thus, intellectual development presupposes a 
certain measure of emotional and volitional development. 
There would be no attainments in knowledge, if the con- 
nected interests (curiosity, love of knowledge) and 
active impulses (concentration, application) had not been 
developed. Similarly, there can be no development of 
the life of feeling without a considerable accumulation 
of knowledge about nature and man, nor can there be 
any development of action without a development of 
feeling and the accumulation of a store of practical 
knowledge. The mind may develop much more on one 
side than on the others 3 but development on one side 
without any development on the others is an impossi- 
bility. 

This connectedness of one side of development with 
the others may be illustrated in the close dependence of 
intellectual growth on the exercise and improvement of 
the power of Attention. As has been remarked, atten- 
tion, though related to the active or volitional side of 
mind, is a general ingredient or condition of intellectual 
operations; and this being so, its growth is implied in 
the growth of intellect. It is the improvement of this 
capability which makes successively possible accurate 

D 



50 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

observation, steady reproduction, and all that we mean 
by thinking. 

Psychical and Physical Development. Just as in study- 
ing mental operations at a particular time, we have to 
include in our view nervous concomitants, so in studying 
mental development, we must ask what changes in the 
nervous organism, and more particularly in the brain- 
centres, accompany these psychical changes. 

Growth and Development of Brain. The brain, like all 
other parts of the organism, grows in bulk or size, and 
develops or manifests certain changes in its formation or 
structure. The two processes, growth and development, 
do not progress with the same degree of rapidity. The 
size nearly attains its maximum about the end of the 
7th year, whereas the degree of structural development 
reached at this time is not much above that of the 
embryonic condition. 1 

By increase of structural development is here meant 
greater unlikeness of the several parts, or a higher de- 
gree of 'differentiation'; also, a higher degree of intricacy 
of arrangement which seems to be best definable as 
the formation of special connections between part and 
part. 

Order of Development of Brain-organs. There is a further 
order of development noticeable. The higher structures, 
known as the cerebral hemispheres, seem to develop 
later than the lower structures (basal ganglia, etc.). 
These higher structures appear to have greater complex- 

i See Bastian, The Brain as an Organ of Mind, p. 375. 



BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISE. 51 

ity, that is to say, to involve more intricate arrangements 
among themselves and with other structures, than the 
lower brain centres. 



Brain Development and Exercise. The brain, being an 
organ closely connected with the rest of the bodily 
organism, would tend to grow to a certain extent with 
the growth of the organism as a whole, and indepen- 
dently of any activity of its own. But such growth 
would be rudimentary only. Like all other organs, it 
grows and develops by exercise. This physiological law 
is clearly the counterpart of the psychological law that 
exercise strengthens faculty. 

This increase of brain power through exercise implies 
two things. (1) All brain-activity reacts on the partic- 
ular structure engaged, modifying it in some unknown 
way and bringing about a subsequent ' physiological 
disposition ' to act in a similar manner. The most 
striking manifestation of this effect is seen when a man 
who has lost his sight is able to picture visible objects. 
The brain is now able to act independently of external stim- 
ulation, having acquired a disposition so to act through 
previous exercises under external stimulation. 

(2) In the second place, we have to assume that differ- 
ent parts of the brain which are exercised together 
acquire in some way a disposition to conjoint action. 
This fact has been expressed by Mr. Herbert Spencer by 
saying that * lines of least resistance ' are gradually 
formed for nervous action by the repeated flow of nerve 
energy in certain definite directions. 



52 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

Mental Development as Adjustment to Surroundings. So 
far, we have been regarding the growth of an individual 
mind as a process apart, having no relation to anything 
beyond it, save the accompanying nervous changes. 
But this double process of psychical and nervous devel- 
opment may be viewed as related to certain external 
agencies. Let us first look at the relation of these 
external agencies to the mental process. 

We have seen that the materials of the intellectual 
life are supplied by the senses. Sense-impressions 
clearly depend on the action of certain external agents, 
bodies emitting sound, reflecting light, and so on. 
Further, the order of the physical agencies of time and 
space will determine the order of our perceptions, and 
resulting images and thoughts. Thus the fact that in 
our sense-experience a peal of thunder follows a flash 
of lightning, serves to determine the connection be- 
tween our images of these events, and between our 
scientific conceptions of them. Similarly with respect 
to the space order. The relative position of two coun- 
tries, of two stars, and so on, determines the particular 
way of mentally picturing and thinking about them. 
To this extent, then, the order of our mental processes 
follows, and is conditioned or determined by the order 
of external facts or events. 

It follows, further, that all growth of knowledge 
means an increasing adaptation or harmonizing of the 
internal to the external order. With growth of repre- 
sentative power, the mind takes in remote relations of 
events or things in time and space, the succession of the 
seasons, the coexistence of remote parts of the earth's 



ADAPTATION TO SURROUNDINGS. 53 

surface and so on. And the transition from particular 
representation or imagination to general representation 
or thought involves the adjustment of the intellectual 
processes to large groups or classes of external facts. 

What is true of the growth of knowing is true of 
that of feeling and of willing. Feeling gradually adjusts 
itself to external surroundings. Things or persons 
beneficial to the individual come (as a rule) to be objects 
of pleasurable feeling or liking: those injurious to him 
come to be objects of dislike. The higher and more 
representative feelings such as patriotism, the sense of 
justice, and so on, involve adjustments to more numerous 
and extended external relations. Lastly, knowing and 
feeling lead on to acting. And in action we have the 
final outcome of the process of adjustment. In acting, 
we seek what is beneficial and avoid what is injurious. 
In this way, we react on our surroundings and so pro- 
mote the harmonious adjustment of inner to outer re- 
lations. All growth of will illustrates an increasing 
adaptation to the facts and circumstances of life. 
Prudent conduct differs from hasty impulsive conduct, 
in the fact that it involves a representation of remote 
as well as near results, of permanent as distinguished 
from temporary circumstances of life. 

Interaction of Environment and Nervous Organism. Let 
us now look at the other part of this process of adapta- 
tion, the adjustment of the nerve-structures to external 
circumstances. It is plain that external things act upon 
the mind through the medium of the nervous organism. 
The physical agencies, the vibrations known as light ? 
sound, and so on, act upon the appropriate nerve struc- 



54 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

tures calling forth reactions which are accompanied by 
psychical states. Through innumerable interactions 
between the nervous system and the environment, the 
former becomes gradually modified in conformity with 
the latter. Thus nervous connections are built up in 
the brain-centres corresponding to external relations. 
The nervous structures are thus, in a manner, moulded 
in agreement to the external order, to the form or 
structure of the environment. 

Internal and External Factor in Development. Taking this 
view of mental development as a process related to and 
conditioned by the action of the environment, we may 
say that the growth of an individual mind is brought 
about by the co-operation of two sets of agencies or 
factors. Of these the first is the Internal Factor. By 
this is meant the mind itself with its several capabilities 
considered as original or primordial, not susceptible of 
being resolved into anything simpler. With this must 
be taken the nervous organism with which mental 
activity is somehow connected. The second is the Ex- 
ternal Factor. By this is meant the surroundings or 
the environment which acts upon the mind in connection 
with the nervous structures. 

Internal Factor. By this is meant, first of all, the sim- 
ple and fundamental capabilities of the mind. It includes 
the several ultimately distinguishable modes of sensi- 
bility to light, sound, and so on. Further, it includes 
the fundamental intellectual functions, discrimination, 
and assimilation. In like manner, it will include the 
primary or fundamental capacities of feeling, and powers 



INHERITED TENDENCIES. 55 

of willing. To these must be added the property of 
retentiveness itself, which, as we have seen, underlies 
what we mean by mental growth. These several capa- 
bilities must be assumed as present from the first. They 
are original properties of the mind which cannot be 
further analyzed or accounted for. 

Inherited Dispositions. In addition to these common 
fundamental capabilities of mind, the internal factor 
probably contains a more special element. This is known 
by the name of inherited tendencies or dispositions to 
think, feel, and act, in particular ways. An alleged 
example of such a tendency is the disposition to think 
of events as related one to another by way of causation, 
or as causes and effects. 

We must clearly understand what is meant by an 
inherited mental tendency. In the first place, it implies 
that the tendency has not been acquired in the course of 
the individual life or experience. We mean that the 
transmitted tendency is a result of ancestral experience, 
that it represents an acquisition made in the course of 
the history of the race. 

It is important to add that these inherited tendencies 
need not manifest themselves at the beginning of life. 
Some amount of individual experience may be necessary 
to the manifestation of the inherited bent. 

It is a much disputed question how far such inherited 
dispositions extend. In the region of intellect, we have 
as probable examples, the tendency to connect touch 
and sight experiences in the visual perception of objects, 
the tendency to group events under the relation of cause 



56 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

and effect, and so on. In the region of feeling, inherit^ 
ance seems to play a still more extensive part. The 
pleasurable feeling called forth in the infant mind by the 
sight of the mother's face, the painful feeling evoked 
by the looks and tones of anger and rebuke, the fear 
manifested by young children at the sight of strangers, 
and certain animals, are illustrations of such inherited 
emotional tendencies. Finally, in the region of action, 
we find apparent tendencies in the individual to fall in 
with the customary or habitual ways of action of his 
ancestors. Thus, the infant tends instinctively and apart 
from the teaching of experience to move his eyes sym- 
metrically, to stretch out his hand to seize an object, 
and to carry objects to his mouth, and so on. 

External Factor. In the second place, the development 
of an individual mind implies the presence and co-oper- 
ation of the External Factor, or the Environment. By 
this we mean, in the first place, the physical environment 
or natural surroundings. The growth of intellect, feel- 
ing and will is, as we have seen, conditioned by the 
action of the several physical agencies, by the form and 
arrangement of things making up our natural habitat. 
The contents and the order of arrangement of the en- 
vironment thus help to determine the form of our 
mental life. 

The Social Environment. In addition to what we com- 
monly call the Natural or Physical Environment, there 
is the Social Environment. By this we mean the society 
of which the individual is a member, with which he 



THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT. 57 

holds certain relations, and by which he is profoundly 
influenced. The Social Medium, like the Physical, affects 
the individual mind through sense-impressions (sights 
and sounds); yet its action differs from that of the 
natural surroundings in being a moral influence. It works 
through the forces which bind man to man, such as 
imitation, sympathy, and so on. 

The presence of a social medium is necessary to a full 
normal development of mind. If it were possible to 
maintain a child in bodily health and at the same time 
deprive him of all companionship, his mental develop- 
ment would be but rudimentary. The child comes 
under the stimulation, the guidance, and the control of 
others, and these influences are essential to a normal 
mental development. Thus, his intellectual growth is 
determined by continual contact and interaction with 
the social intelligence, the body of knowledge amassed 
by the race, and expressed in everyday speech, in books, 
etc. Similarly, the feelings of the child quicken and 
grow under the touch of social sentiment. And finally 
his will is called forth, stimulated and guided by the 
habitual modes of action of those about him. 

These social influences embrace a wider area as life 
progresses. Beginning with the action of the family, 
they go on expanding by including the influences of the 
school, of companions, and finally of the whole commu- 
nity as working through manners, public opinion, and 
so on. 

Undesigned and Designed Influence of Society. A part of 
this social influence acts undesignedly, that is, without 
any intention to accomplish a result. The effects of 



58 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

contact of urind with mind, of example, of the prevail- 
ing tone of a family or a society, all this resembles the 
action of natural or physical agencies. On the other 
har.d, a considerable remainder of this influence is 
clearly designed. To this part belong all the mechan- 
ism of instruction, the arts of suasion, moral and legal 
control, and so on. 

Both kinds of social influence co-operate in each of 
the three great phases of mental development. Thus, 
the intellect of a child grows partly under the influence 
of contact with the social intelligence reflecting itself in 
the structure of language; and partly by the aid of sys- 
tematic instruction. Similarly, feeling develops partly 
through the mere contact with other minds, or the 
agencies of sympathy, and partly by direct appeals from 
others. Finally, the will develops partly by the attrac- 
tion of example and the impulses of imitation, and 
partly by the forces of suasion, advice, reproof, and the 
whole system of social discipline. 

Scheme of Development. The reader may perhaps be 
able the better to comprehend the above rough theory 
of mental development by help of the following diagram. 

Since all these factors must co-operate in some mea- 
sure in bringing about what we call the normal devel- 
opment of an individual mind, we cannot separate this 
complex effect into parts, referring one part to one fac- 
tor, another part to another factor. Still, by observing 
the variations in the effect which attend variations in 
any particular factor, we may form a rough idea respect- 
ing the comparative value of each of the co-operant 
conditions. This question of comparative value arises 



DIAGRAM OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 



59 




more especially with respect to the Social Factor. Psy- 
chologists, as a rule, have paid but little attention to the 
influence of the social surroundings on the growth of 
the individual mind. Yet it is now commonly ac- 
knowledged that this is an essential condition of a full 
normal development. As to the extent of its influence,, 
however, there is still room for wide differences of 
opinion. 1 



i The importance of the Social Environment has heen emphasized by 
the late G. H. Lewes. See Problems of Life and Mind, First Series, VoL 
I., p. 152 seq.; and The Study of Psychology, Chap. IV. 



60 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

Varieties of Development While all minds pass through 
the same typical normal course of development, there 
are endless differences in the details of the mental his- 
tory of individuals. In no two cases is the process of 
mental growth precisely similar. These diversities of 
mental history answer to the differences between mind 
and mind spoken of in the previous chapter. Such dif- 
ferences of development may be referred to one of two 
causes or factors: (a) variations or inequalities of orig- 
inal capacity, or (b) differences in the external circum- 
stances, physical and social. All differences in the final 
result, that is, the mature or developed aptitude, must 
he assignable to one (or both) of these factors. 

As every teacher knows, the processes of education 
applied to two children at approximately the same level 
of attainment result in widely unlike amounts of pro- 
gress. Such inequalities in capability of mental growth 
(connected in part with different degrees of retentive- 
ness) constitute some of the most striking among the 
original or inherent differences of aptitude among indi- 
viduals. 

Training of the Faculties. The subject of training is 
closely connected with the action of the social environ- 
ment. All education or training is, indeed, the designed 
influence of society on the individual concentrated and 
reduced to a systematic form. The training of a faculty 
means the regular calling of it into activity by supply- 
ing the conditions of its exercise. This includes, first of 
all, the presentment of suitable materials. The powers 
of observation, of memory, and so on, can only be called 
into activity by supplying materials, such as objects to 



TRAINING OF THE FACULTIES. 61 

be inspected, words to be committed to memory. To- 
this must be added the application of a social stimulus 
in the shape of a motive to intellectual effort (concen- 
tration of mind), such as a promise of favor, or a threat 
of punishment. 

Training must be based on Laws of Mental Development. 
Thus, it has to conform to the great law of all growth 
that it is appropriate exercise which strengthens faculty. 
That is to say, it will aim directly at calling forth a fac- 
ulty into its proper mode of action by supplying materi- 
als and motives adapted to the stage of development 
reached at the time. And here it may be well to say 
that there should be an adequate but not excessive 
stimulation of the faculty. By adequate stimulation is 
meant an excitation of sufficient strength and variety to 
secure completeness of growth. By excessive stimula- 
tion is meant an amount of excitation which forces the 
activity to such a point as is unfavorable to growth. 

Training must be based on the Natural Order of Development. 
In the second place, the whole scheme of training should 
conform to the natural order of development of the fac- 
ulties. Those faculties which develop first must be 
exercised first. It is vain, for example, to try to culti- 
vate the power of abstraction before the powers of ob- 
servation (perception) and imagination have reached a 
certain degree of strength. This self-evident proposi- 
tion is one of the best accepted principles in the modern 
theory of Education, though there is reason to apprehend 
that it is still frequently violated in practice. 



4 
62 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

Child Life divided into Periods. Writers on pedagogics 
have sought to divide early life into periods distin- 
guished by the predomiaance of certain faculties. Thus 
Beneke recognizes four periods: (1) To about the end 
of the 3rd year, the period of sense and instinct in which 
the child is mainly engrossed with external things; 
(2) To about the end of the 7th year, in which internal 
mental activity comes up to and balances external activ- 
ity (sense-perception) ; (3) To the end of the 14th year, 
in which inner activity becomes free of sense and gains 
a distinct ascendency over this; and (4) To the end of 
school life, in which the higher mental powers (thought) 
appear in fuller development. It is obvious, however, 
that ail such demarcations must be rough and inexact. 
The process of development is at once too continuous 
and too complex to allow of such sharp divisions, though 
it may be of great practical value to adopt them as 
rough contrivancies. 

A Scientific Method of Training will cultivate Faculty to a 
certain point only. Once more, a method of training based 
on scientific principles will aim not only at taking up a 
faculty at the right moment, but also at cultivating it 
rip to the proper point, and not beyond this. By this 
is meant that each faculty should be strengthened up to 
the level which answers to its rank or value in the whole 
scale of faculties. In other words, the exercise of each 
capability must be adequate aud not excessive, as esti- 
mated by reference to a proportionate development of 
the sum of capabilities. In training the imagination or 
the memory, for example, we should keep in view the 



METHODS MUST BE ELASTIC. 63 

importance of this faculty in relation to the attainment 
of knowledge and mental activity as a whole. 

Methods of Training must be adapted to individual capacities. 
Finally, training in order to be adequate must be to 
some extent elastic, adapting itself to the numerous 
differences among young minds. Up to a certain point, 
a common result, namely a typical completeness of 
development, will be aimed at. It would not be well, 
for example, that any child however unimaginative 
should have his imagination wholly untrained. At the 
same time, this typical plan of cultivation must be 
modified in detail. The greater the natural aptitude, 
the more economical the production of a given psychical 
result. Hence, it would be wasteful to give as much 
time and thought to the training of a bad as of a good 
germ of faculty. Nor do the practical ends of life im- 
pose such a disagreeable task on the teacher. Variety 
of individual development answers to the highly elabo- 
rated division of life-work which characterizes civiliza- 
tion. 



References. 

For a fuller account of the nature and causes of mental development, 
the reader is referred to Mr. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, especially 
Vol. I., Parts III, and IV. A brief statement of the characteristics of 
development as bearing on the work of the teacher will be found in Mr. 
Spencer's Essay, Education, Chap. II. 



64 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III. 

SUGGESTIONS. 

1. When you have read through the volume, ~e-read this 
Chap. III. It is difficult because largely made up of generaliza- 
tions, the full reasons for which are yet to be detailed. 

2. Distinguish carefully by reference to the preceding pages, 
the unabridged dictionary, or some such work, as, Fleming's 
Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences, the fundamental powers 
of the intellect (See Bain's Senses and Intellect, p. 321.): 

(1.) Consciousness of Difference (Discrimination). 
(2.) Consciousness of Agreement (Assimilation). 
(3.) Retentiveness. 

3. Consider, now, that the preceding chapter declares mental 
development to be from beginning to end the result solely, of the 
exercise of these three fundamental functions. 

4. Note how the old notion of the different nature of the 
Faculties now disappears, since they are all fundamentally, 
capacities for detecting agreements and differences. 

5. Look up carefully the meanings of the following terms: 
' increase of complexity ', ' increase of inwardness ', ' increase of 
generality! of knowledge.' Seek for illustrations of these in your 
knowledge of the development of individual minds. 

6. Consider closely how the development of the Feelings 
favors intellectual development. What emotions or sentiments 
should we associate with schools and studies? 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. What is meant by Mental Development? What by growth 
as distinguished from development? Illustrate this distinction by 
reference to the bodily organism. Show how we can apply it to 
mind. 



PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGICS. 65 

2. How are the successive stages of mental life related to 
each other? In what respects are they alike? In what respects do 
they differ? 

3. Why is it possible to regard mental development as one 
continuous process? 

4. In which factor, the External or the Internal, is each of 
the following influences on Mental Development to be classed: 
the family, the school, the state, the church, society, the news- 
paper press, the tendency to too great sensitiveness to rebuke, 
the tendency to left-handeduess? 

5. What is meant in mental development by the "adaptation 
of the internal order to the external order? " 

MAXIMS OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCE. 

Many of the current maxims of educational theory and prac- 
tice have a very close logical connection with the preceding theory 
of mental development. We can indicate briefly a very few of 
these connections: 

1. ' The process of attaining knowledge sets out with Sensation. 
Sense supplies the materials which the intellect assimilates and elabor- 
ates according to its own laics' (p. 41). With this dictum of Psy- 
chology compare the following maxims of Education: 

a. The faculty of intuition, (i. e., the power of gaining 
knowledge in the direct presence of, and from, the object of 
knowledge) is the basis of all intellectual culture. — Diesterweg. 

b. All instruction in elementary schools must rest upon real 
intuition. — Diesterweg. 

c. The development of mind begins with the reception of 
Sensations.— JosEPn Payne. 

d. All knowledge must be ultimately founded on experience. 
— .Teyons. 

e. Personal experience is the condition of development, 
whether of body, mind or moral sense. — Joseph Patne. 

2. 'The later operations are marked by increasing complexity' 
(p. 42). Now this complexity of operation is itself an evidence of 

E 



66 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 

higher potential energy, — is a witness to the possession of the 
higher powers of mind. Compare therefore this educational 
maxim : 

The comparative utility of any teaching, any method, any 
subject of study is to be principally estimated, not by the com- 
plement of truths of which it puts us in possession, but by the 
degree in which it determines our higher capacities to action. 
—Hamilton. 

3. ' The movement of growth is from the presentative to the 
representative ' (p. 42). With this dictum of Psychology compare : 

a. The development of mind, which begins with the recep- 
tion of sensations, is carried on by the formation of ideas. 
— Joseph Payne. 

4. 'This movement of growth from the presentative to the repre- 
sentative implies a growth in the generality of knowledge. ' "With 
this compare: 

a. The mind, in gaining knowledge for itself, proceeds from 
the concrete to the abstract, from particular facts to general facts, 
or principles; and from principles to laws, rules and definitions; 
and not in the inverse order. — Joseph Payne. 



REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

1. For a summary of the processes of mental development 
from the educational stand-point, see Payne, Principles of the 
Science of Education, under General Principles, Lectures, p. 156; 
on mental development the chief object of primary education, 
see Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part I., chap. IV., principle 
II., p. 103; on education as development, not merely instruction, 
see Page's Theory and Practice, chap. V., near beginning, p. 70, 
and Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 185 ; on elementary educa- 
tion as having two objects, development and useful knowledge, 
see Tate, Introduction; on the humanistic or disciplinary, and 
realistic or utilitarian views of education, see Landon's School 
Management, chap. I. 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 67 

2. On methods of teaching as simply adjuncts and supple- 
ments to nature's teaching, see Tate, Part I., chap. IV., principle 
I., and Payne, the summary" of principles above referred to, at 
the end of Principles of Natural Education, Lectures, p. 161 ; on 
methods of teaching as founded on the study of the order and 
mode of the development of the natural faculties, see Tate, Part 
L, chap. L, under Philosophy of Method, p. 39; for Pestalozzi's 
theory of development, see Payne, Pestalozzi, Lectures, p. 238, 
and Quick, p. 185. 

3. On the historical development of mind as an aid to psy- 
chological analysis of mind, see Tate, Part I., chap. III., near 
beginning, p. 65; and on Comte's similar doctrine — the famous 
generalization, that the genesis of knowledge in the individual 
must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge in the 
race,— see H. Spencer's Education, chap. II., p. 122; on the four 
distinct stages of human development, see Tate, Part I., chap. 
III., near the middle, under Classification of the^ Faculties, p. 75. 

4. On nature's development as continuous — natura non oper- 
atur per saltum, — see Quick on Comenius, p. 58; on instruction 
as progressive, see Tate, Part I., chap. IV., principle IV., p. 109. 

5. On the two factors in mental development, inherited pow- 
ers, and environment, see Parker, Talks on Teaching, p. 22; on 
the struggle of development as having its ideal in knowledge and 
skill sinking into the automatic, see the same, p. 159; on the 
contrast between the two ideals of quantity learning and har- 
monious mental growth, see preceding reference. 

6. On all education as self education, all teaching as self- 
teaching, all development as self-development, see Payne, sum- 
mary of the Principles of 'the Science of Education, as before referred 
to, Lectures, pp. 158 and 101, and The Practice or Art of Education ; 
also the following It cture, Educational Methods, and indeed 
passim, everywhere, in all Mr. Payne's teachings; on true teach- 
ing as fostering the principle of self-development, see Tate, Part 
I., chap. IV., principle V., p. Ill; on humanity progressing 
solely by self-instruction, see II. Spencer's Edncatto/,, chap. II., 
p. 125; on advantages of making education a process of self-evo- 
lution, see the same, p. 125. 



CHAPTER IV. 

ATTENTION. 

As we have seen, attention, though closely related to 
the active side of the mind and illustrating the laws of 
volition, is a general condition of our mental operations. 
We must, therefore, understand something about this 
mode of activity and its laws at the outset. 

Definition of Attention. Attention may be roughly 
denned as the active self -direction of the mind to any 
object which presents itself to it at the moment. 1 It is 
somewhat the same as the mind's 'consciousness' of 
what is present to it. The field of Consciousness, how- 
ever, is wider than that of Attention. Consciousness 
admits of many degrees of distinctness. I may be very 
vaguely or indistinctly conscious of some bodily sensa- 
tion, of some haunting recollection, and so on. To 
attend is to intensify consciousness by concentrating or 
narrowing it on some definite and restricted area. It is 
to force the mind or consciousness in a particular direc- 
tion, so as to make the objects as distinct as possible. 

Objects of Attention. The phenomena of intellect, 
emotion and will may alike become directly or indirectly 
objects of attention. The most conspicuous clajss of 
objects is that of external impressions, the sights, sounds, 

iThe idea of activity and effort is directly suggested by the etymology 
of the word, ad tendere, to stretch (sc. the mind) towards. 



EFFECTS OF ATTENTION. 69 

etc., which make up objects of sense. 1 When the 
teacher talks about ' attending', he commonly means 
actively listening, or actively looking. In addition to 
external impressions and objects, internal images, ideas 
and thoughts, may be attended to. Feelings of pleasure 
and pain, if not directly attended to, are so indirectly, 
through the fixing of the attention on the exciting cause 
of the feeling, whether an external object or an internal 
image. Finally, we attend to our actions when we fix 
our minds closely on what we are about, and, more 
particularly, on the result which we are immediately 
aiming at. 

Effects of Attention. An act of attention serves to give 
greater force, vividness, and distinctness to its object. 
Thus an impression of sound becomes more forcible or 
impressive, and further has its character made more 
definite, when we direct our attention to it. A feeling 
of pleasure or pain is manifestly intensified, when we 
attend to it, or its cause or conditions. 

Attention and Intellectual Operations. We may say, then, 
that attention enters as a constituent into all classes of 
mental operation, and this co-operation of attention is 
specially conspicuous in the case of intellectual operations. 
The objects which present themselves to our senses are 
only clearly discriminated one from the other, and 
classed as objects of such and such a class, when we 
attend to them. So again, present impressions only 
exercise their full force in calling up what is associated 

iThe reader will see presently that external impressions and objects 
dilfer from one another. Here they are alike spoken of as 'objects of 
attention.' 



70 ATTENTION. 

with them when we keep them before the mind by an 
act of attention. Once more, all thinking is clearly an 
active state of mind involving a voluntary fixing of the 
attention. We thus see that attention, though a form 
of action or will, stands in the closest relation to the 
intellectual processes. It may be described as the func- 
tion of will in relation to knowing, the co-operation of 
the active side of mind in aiding, directing, and con- 
trolling the mechanism of intellect. This being so, it 
is desirable to single it out for consideration before 
entering on the exposition of intellect. 

Extent of Attention. Attention has already been defined 
as a focussing of the mind for a given point, a concen- 
trating of its activity from a diffused inattentive con- 
dition. All attention is thus, in a measure, concentra- 
tion. But two acts of attention may have unequal 
extent of object. Thus in looking at a picture, I may 
attend now to some small detail, now to the whole com- 
position of the picture. So in listening to music, I may 
single out a particular note, or direct my attention to 
the ensemble of notes making up a chord. 

Relation of Extent to Force or Intensity. There is a very 
important relation between the extent or area of object 
that we try to attend to at one moment and the effect- 
ive force of the act. This relation may be expressed 
as follows : When an equal effort is made, the effective 
force of an act of attention varies inversely as the ex- 
tent of object attended to. "Pluribus intentus, minor 
est ad singula sensus." In other words, the more we 
comprehend or embrace in the act of attention the less 



STIMULI TO ATTENTION. 71 

penetrating will it be. The closest and most fruitful 
attention, therefore, implies the maximum of concentra- 
tion. 

On what the degree of Attention depends. The amount of 
attention exerted at any time depends on two chief 
circumstances (a) the quantity of active energy 1 dispos- 
able at the time ; (b) the strength of the stimulus or 
force which excites the attention or rouses it to action. 
If there is great active energy, a feeble stimulus will 
suffice to bring about attention. The healthy vigorous 
child in the early part of the day has a superabundance 
of energy, which shows itself in attention to small 
and comparatively uninteresting matters. On the other 
hand, a tired or weakly child requires a proportionately 
powerful stimulus. 

External and Internal Stimuli. The stimulus to an act 
of attention may be either something external con- 
nected with the object attended to, or something inter- 
nal. An external stimulus consists of some interesting 
or striking feature in the object itself, or in its accom- 
paniments, by reason of which the attention is said to 
be attracted and arrested, such as the brilliance of a 
light, or the strangeness of a sound. An internal 
stimulus is a motive in the mind which prompts it to 
put forth its attention in a particular direction, such as 
the desire of a child to please his teacher, or to gain a 
higher place in his class. 

i By active energy we mean mental capability as conditioned by the 
state of the motor organs (nerves and muscles) involved. 



72 ATTENTION. 

Non- Voluntary and Voluntary Attention. When the mind 
is acted upon by the mere force of the object presented, 
the act of attention is said to be non-voluntary, It may 
also be called reflex (or automatic), because it bears a 
striking analogy to reflex movement, that is to say, 
movement following sensory stimulation without the 
intervention of a conscious purpose. On the other hand, 
when we attend to a thing under the impulse of a 
desire, such as curiosity, or a wish to know about a 
thing, we are said to do so by an act of will, or volun- 
tarily. 

Attention and Interest. The word 'interest' may be 
used in a wide sense as including the effect of impres- 
sions generally in rousing the attention. In this sense, 
the familiar saying, ' we attend to what interests us,' is 
a perfectly tautological expression. More usually the 
term refers to the rousing effect of an object through 
the medium of feeling. We are interested in a thing 
when we are affected by it either pleasurably or pain- 
fully. In the first case, we call our interest a pleasur- 
able one, in the second, a painful one. In a peculiar 
manner, those things are interesting to us, or awaken 
our interest, which answer to, or are connected with, 
our particular sensibilities, tastes, and related habits of 
thought. Thus, a conceited person is specially inter- 
ested in any talk, flattering or otherwise, about himself; 
a person with artistic taste is specially interested in 
objects of beauty, and so on. The objects which inter- 
est a person thus serve as an index or clue to his custom- 
ary and dominant feelings and tastes. While, however, 
anything which touches us on the side of feeling, 



ATTENTION AND INTEREST. 73 

whether pleasantly or unpleasantly, is said to be inter- 
esting, the term interest usually refers more particularly 
to the attractive force of pleasurable impressions. 

This special reference of the word 'interest' to what 
is pleasurable points to the superior importance of vol- 
untary attention, and to the fact that reflex attention 
easily passes into the higher form. A thing which fully 
interests us excites t lie will to a deliberate concentration 
of the attention with a view either to prolong or gain 
some pleasure or satisfaction, or to get rid of or avert 
some pain. And since the positive end of voluntary 
action is pleasure or happiness, the term interest natur- 
ally comes to point to those objects and related activities 
which arc immediate sources of enjoyment, or which are 
connected with, or have a bearing on these. Our 
'interests,' such as our home, business, country, favor- 
ite art, are the great and permanent sources of our 
happiness. 

Change of Stimulus. Any stimulus will exert a greater 
effect on the attention in proportion as the degree of 
change introduced into the mental state of the moment 
increases. All change, contrast, or transition of mind 
from one state to another acts as a kind of rousing 
shock. The sudden introduction of a sound into the 
stillness of a country retreat acts as a potent stimulus to 
the attention. 

Effect of Novelty. What is oft recurring and familiar, 
as for example, the stroke of a clock, produces little 
effect on the attention. A sound much less powerful 
than that of a good-sized clock, provided it were of a 



74 ATTENTION. 

wholly unfamiliar sort, would certainly arrest the 
attention. 

Familiarity and Interest. While it is thus certain that 
novel sights and sounds, as such, strike the attention 
momentarily, it does not follow that mere novelty will 
succeed in holding the mind. As Volkmann observes, 
the absolutely new does not chain (the attention). In 
order to effect this result, an object must possess, over 
and above the superficial quality of novelty, the deeper 
attribute of interestingness. Now, as we have seen, a 
thing interests us when it touches our feelings, and this 
it can only do by linking itself on somehow to our 
recurring and habitual trains of imagery and thought. 
A good part of our interest in things (more particularly 
our intellectual interest) is connected with the fact of 
their intelligibility. To one who knows nothing of 
mechanics, the complicated movements of a machine are 
apt to be a tedious spectacle. We see with interest and 
enjoyment what we are prepared to see by previous 
experience and knowledge. Hence, the very circum- 
stance of familiarity will sometimes constitute a source 
of interest. If, for example, we happen to overhear a 
person speak in an unknown language and suddenly 
catch a familiar English word, our attention is instantly 
excited. 

Mechanism of Reflex Attention. Under ordinary circum- 
stances, the attention is solicited in a number of direc- 
tions simultaneously. Provided there is the necessary 
activity of mind, the attention will be drawn in a direc- 
tion determined by the foregoing considerations. Speak- 



THE WILL AND ATTENTION. 75 

ing roughly, one may describe what takes place as a 
sort of struggle for existence among stimuli, in which 
the greatest, the most interesting, or the most novel 
survives. At the same time, each survival is but 
momentary, it being of the very nature of reflex atten- 
tion to be easily drawn off by new stimuli. 

Function of the Will in Attention. It is important to 
understand the precise scope of the will's action in 
attention. What is called voluntary attention is not a 
wholly new phase of the process. After the action of the 
will has supervened, the forces of non-voluntary attention 
continue to be active as tendencies. And the range of 
the wili's action is limited by these. Thus, the student 
most practised in abstraction could not resist the allure- 
ment of a beautiful melody sung within his hearing. 

Again, though we can undoubtedly (within certain 
limits) direct our attention in this or that quarter at will, 
we have not ihe power to keep our attention closely 
fixed on any object which we (or somebody else for us) 
may happen to select. 1 Something further is necessary 
to that lively interaction of mind and object which we 
call a state of attention and this is interest. By an act 
of will, 1 may resolve to turn my attention to something, 
say a passage in a book. But if after this preliminary 
process of adjustment of the mental eye, the object 
opens up no interesting phase, all the willing in the 
world will not produce a calm settled state of concentra- 
tion. The will introduces mind and object: it cannot 



i " Experience itself, soon teaches ns that it is not possible to concen- 
trate our attention with any degree of strength we choose, on any object 
we choose." ( Waite, Lehrbuch <i<r Psychologic, p. 689). 



76 ATTENTION. 

force an attachment between them. No compulsion of 
a teacher ever succeeded in making a young mind 
cordially embrace and appropriate by an act of concen- 
tration] an unsuitable, and therefore uninteresting sub- 
ject. We thus see that voluntary attention is not 
removed from the sway of interest. What the will does 
is to determine the kind of interest which shall prevail 
at the moment. This is effected by the initial determi- 
nation to bend the mind in this or that direction. 
After this first stage of determination, the action of the 
will is (commonly) confined to keeping 'the attention 
fixed on an object which is found to yield a pleasurable 
interest. 

The interest which thus finally secures a prolonged 
attention may first disclose itself after the execution of 
the voluntary act. Thus a pupil upon fixing his atten- 
tion' on what seems at first an uninviting subject of 
study may find his thoughts gradually attracted and 
chained. In many cases, the interest has its starting 
point in the very motive which underlies the voluntary 
act. When any object bears on some strongly desired 
end, it becomes, on that account, invested with an asso- 
ciated or reflected interest. By regarding it as a means 
to some object of desire, we draw it for the time within 
the circle of interesting things. Thus a child who has 
reason to anticipate his parent's or teacher's commend- 
ation or disapproval takes a lively interest in the other- 
wise but little interesting movements of his features. 
But in order to the full realization of this result, the 
relation of means to end must be a natural one, and not 
one artificially imposed. A school-boy hardly takes a 
(pleasurable) interest in a piece of task work just be- 



CONTROL OF THE ATTENTION. 77 

cause the completion of it is seen to be a condition of 
enjoying some eagerly desired game. 

Laws of Voluntary Attention. It has been remarked 
above that the degree of attention exerted in any case 
depends partly on the force of the stimulus, and partly 
on the vio*or of mind and bodv at the time. In the 
case of voluntary attention, the initial stimulus is some 
internal motive. We may say, then, that the stronger 
the motive brought to bear (the degree of active vigor 
being supposed to be unaltered), the more energetic 
(within certain limits) the act of attention. The child 
will be prepared to concentrate more activity of mind 
upon an object, such as the lesson he is getting up, when 
he has a powerful inducement to do so. 

Development of Power of Controlling the Attention. While 
the exercise of the power of attention in the reflex form 
is thus going on, the child's will is developing. From 
a very early period of life, the will begins to manifest 
itself in a deliberate exploring or looking out for objects. 
By such successive exercises, the activity of attention is 
little by little brought under perfect control. Although 
the full understanding of this process presupposes a 
knowledge of the growth of will as a whole, we may be 
able to anticipate to some extent, and indicate the main 
lines of this progress. 

The growth of voluntary attention means a continual 
reduction of the difficulty of attending to objects. The 
law that exercise strengthens faculty applies to atten- 
tion. What is first done with labor and sense of diffi- 
culty is, with repetition and practice, done more and 
more easily. 



78 ATTENTION. 

The Impulse of Curiosity. Of the motives or interests 
which aid in the expansion of the field of attention, the 
widest in the range of its influence is the intellectual 
impulse of curiosity, or the desire to inspect and under- 
stand things. Under the influence of this motive, the 
student of science learns to direct his attention to the 
most inconspicuous and fugitive of phenomena. When 
this curiosity is wide and impartial, embracing all kinds 
of subject-matter, we have the versatile mind, ever 
ready to turn its attention in a new and unexplored 
quarter. 

Resistance to Stimuli. A voluntary control of the atten- 
tion involves, in the second place, the ability to resist 
the solicitations of powerful stimuli. Voluntarily to 
turn the mind to a thing is to exclude what is irrelevant 
and distracting. This power of resistance has, of course, 
in every case, its limits. Nobody can withstand the 
disturbing force of a sudden explosion. But the capa- 
bility of resisting such distractions varies considerably, 
and is greatly improved by practice. The child finds it 
hard, at first, not to look out of the window when hear- 
ing a lesson. By and by, he will be able to fix his mind 
on his lesson even when some amount of disturbing 
noise is present. The highest attainment of this power 
is seen in the student whose mind is not appreciably 
affected by external impressions, being directed inward- 
ly in reflection on its own ideas. Here, again, a fairly 
accurate measure of attentive power may be obtained 
by noting the strength of stimulus, e. g., disturbing 
sounds, which is overcome. 



CONCENTRATION OF ATTENTION. 79 

Keeping the Attention Fixed. Another aspect, under 
which the growth of attention may be estimated is the 
ability to detain objects before the mind. As we have 
seen, reflex attention is for the most part a process of 
flitting from object to object. We found, indeed, that 
even here there is a force at work which tends to coun- 
teract the impulse to skip from one thing to another. 
But this would not of itself carry us very far. It is only 
as the attention comes under the control of the will that 
it shows any considerable measure of persistence. To 
attend to a thing voluntarily means commonly to keep 
the mind dwelling on it. Here, again, we have to 
recognize the existence of certain limits in every case. 
Nobody can fix his mind on one and the same object for 
an indefinite time. 1 When once the fresh interest of a 
thing is exhausted a further fixing of the attention costs 
more and more effort. When this stage is reached, the 
mind soon wearies of the prolonged exertion, and atten- 
tion flags in spite of the utmost effort. But the limit 
of fatigue is pushed further off, as the will develops, 
and the act of attention becomes more easy. 

Concentration. The power of sustained attention grows 
with the ability to resist distractions and solicitations. 
The two capabilities are, thus, very closely connected 

i Strictly speaking, what is often called attending to one thing, is the 
following of a series of connected impressions or ideas, and involves a 
continual renewal and deepening of interest. This remark applies to 
such occupations as listening to, or reading a scientific exposition, wit- 
nessing a dramatic spectacle, and so on. And even a prolonged attention 
to a small material ohject, as a coin, or a flower, involves a continual 
transition of mind from one aspect to another, one set of suggestions to 
another. Hence, it would be more correctly described as making the ob- 
ject the centre of attention, the point from which it sets out and to which 
it continually reverts. 



80 ATTENTION. 

with one another, and are both included in the term 
Concentration. To concentrate the mind is to fix it 
persistently on an object or group of objects, resolutely 
excluding from the mental view all irrelevant objects. 
The great field for the early exercises of such concen- 
tration is action. When the child wants to do some- 
thing, as open a box, or build a pile of bricks, the strong 
desire for the end secures a prolonged effort of attention. 
The scholar patiently poring over a mutilated passage 
in an ancient MS., to the neglect of his appetite, or the 
naturalist patiently observing the movements of insects 
or of plants, indifferent to cold and wet, illustrates a 
high power of prolonged concentration. A person's 
power of attention may be conveniently measured by 
the degree of persistence attained. 

Concentration and Genius. It has often been said that 
great intellectual power turns on the ability to concen- 
trate the attention. Newton based his intellectual 
superiority on this circumstance. Helvetius observed 
that genius is nothing but a continued attention. 1 A 
proposition about which there is so general an agree- 
ment among those who ought to know may be safely 
accepted as expressing a truth. Attention is a condition 
of all intellectual achievement, and a good power of 
prolonged concentration is undoubtedly indispensable to 
first-class achievement in any direction. The discov- 
erers of new knowledge have always been distinguished 
by an unusual degree of pertinacity in brooding over a 

i For similar utterances by other authorities, see Sir W. Hamilton's 
Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. I., p. 256, etc. Among more recent eminent 
men, Faraday may be instanced as testifying to the same effect. Car- 
lyle's deliverances on this head are too well known to need quotation. 



IMPROVING THE ATTENTION. 81 

subject, and in following out trains of thought in this 
and that direction, till the required explanation of fact, 
reconciliation of apparent contradictions, and so on, was 
found. But though these sayings undoubtedly embody 
an important truth, they only contain a part of the whole 
truth. No amount of attention simply will constitute 
intellectual brilliance. This depends on the possession 
of the intellectual functions (discrimination, etc.) in an 
exceptionally perfect form. On the other hand, good 
intellectual powers, when aided by a comparatively 
small power of prolonged attention, may render their 
possessor quick and intelligent. 

Grasp of Attention. It has been already remarked that 
our power of simultaneous attention is exceedingly lim- 
ited. The growth of voluntary attention includes an 
increase of power in this direction. A teacher learns to 
keep his eye on all the members of the class, a chef oVor- 
chestre his ears on all the different groups of instruments. 
The acquirement of certain arts, as playing the organ, 
implies a high degree of this power. In proportion as 
this power of taking in rapidly a number of facts or 
details grows, will the perceptions advance in complex- 
ity, and also the comparison of object with object, idea 
with idea, be facilitated. 

Transition of Attention. Somewhat akin to the power 
of carrying the attention quickly over a number of con- 
nected details, is the capability of transferring it from 
one thing to another and disconnected thing. The 
growth of voluntary attention includes an increasing 
facility in turning the mind from one subject of study 



82 ATTENTION. 

to another, or from one matter of business to another. 
Its highest form is seen in the rapid movements of the 
versatile mind. 



Halits of Attention. Voluntary attention, like volun- 
tary action as a whole, is perfected in the form of 
habits. By a habit, we mean, a fixed disposition to do a 
thing, and a facility in doing it, the result of numerous 
repetitions of the action. The growth of the power of 
attention may be viewed as a progressive formation of 
habits. At first, voluntary concentration of mind re- 
quires a spur and an effort, As soon as the pressure of 
strong motive is withdrawn, the young mind returns to 
its natural state of listlessness or wandering attention. 
A habit of attention first appears as a recurring readi- 
ness to attend under definite circumstances, for example, 
when the child goes into his class-room, or is addressed 
by somebody. Later on, there manifests itself a more 
permanent attitude of attentiveness. The transition from 
childhood to youth is often characterized by the acqui- 
sition of a wider habit of mental watchfulness, showing 
itself in thoughtfulness about what is seen and heard. 
The highest result of the working of the principle of 
habit in this region is illustrated in the customary, and 
but rarely relaxed, alertness of mind of tbe diligent 
observer of nature. 

Varieties of Attentive Power. It has been implied that 
the power of attention does not always develop equally 
on all sides. Through differences of native tempera- 
ment, as well as through differences of exercise, we find 
well-marked contrasts of attentive power. And these 



TRAINING ATTENTION. 83 

help to a considerable extent to determine the cast or 
character of mind. Everybody knows the difference, 
for example, between the plodding child able to con- 
centrate his mind on an object for a long period, but 
slow to transfer and adjust his attention to new matter, 
and the quick but rather superficial child who finds it 
easy to fix his attention on new objects, though hard to 
keep it fixed for a prolonged period. Finally, the rul- 
ing habits of attention will vary according to the char- 
acter of the predominant interests. Thus, for example, 
a strong love of nature (whether scientific or artistic) 
will give a habitual outward bent to the attention; 
whereas, a paramount interest in our own feelings, or in 
the objects of imagination and thought, will give a cus- 
tomary inward inclination to the attention. 

Training of the Attention. All intellectual guidance of 
the young implies the power of holding their attention. 
Instruction may be said to begin when the mother can 
secure the attention of the infant to an object by point- 
ing her finger to it. Henceforth she has the child's 
mental life to a certain extent under her control, and 
can select the impressions which shall give new knowl- 
edge or new enjoyment. What we mark off as formal 
teaching, whether by the presentation of external 
objects for inspection through the senses, or by verbal 
instruction, clearly involves at every stage an appeal to 
the attention, and depends for its success on securing 
this. To know how to exercise the attention, how to 
call forth its full activity is thus the first condition of 
success in education. 



84 ATTENTION. 

Mental Science points out the Natural Order of Procedure. 
Mental Science here, as in respect of the other faculties, 
can only point out the general conditions to be observed 
and the natural order of procedure. It is plain, in the 
first place, that the laws of attention must be complied 
with. He would be a foolish teacher who gave a child 
a number of disconnected things to do at a time, or who 
insisted on keeping his mind bent on the same subject 
for an indefinite period. Yet though these conditions 
are obvious enough, others are more easily overlooked. 
Thus, it is probable, that a more exact knowledge of the 
effects on the attention of novelty of subject and mode 
of treatment, on the one hand, and of total unfamiliar- 
ity, on the other hand, would save teachers from many 
errors. Some of us can recall from our school days the 
wearisome effect of an oft-recurring stereotyped illus- 
tration, as well as the impression of repellent strange- 
ness produced by a first, and too sudden, introduction to 
a perfectly new branch of study. 

Power of Attention in Children rudimentary. In the sec- 
ond place, it will be well to bear in mind that the young 
child's power of voluntary attention is rudimentary only, 
and that force must be economized by removing all 
obstacles and making the task as attractive and agree- 
able as possible. It would be idle to try to enlist his 
close attention if he were bodily fatigued, or if he were 
under the influence of emotional excitement and agitated 
in mind and body. Again, it would be vain to expect 
him to listen to oral instruction close to a window look- 
ing out on a busy street. Children's (uncontrolled) atten- 
tion flows outwards to th&sights and sounds of the actual 



TEACHER S DUTY TO AROUSE INTEREST. 85 

external world, and is less easily diverted by the teach- 
er's words towards the world of imagination and thought. 
Consequently, in teaching, everything should be done 
to reduce the force of outward things. The teacher 
would do well to remember that even so practiced a 
thinker as Kant found it helpful to prolonged medita- 
tion to fix his eye on a familiar and therefore unexciting 
object (a neighboring church-spire). Not only so, the 
subject and mode of treatment chosen should be such as 
to attract the learner's attention to the utmost. What 
is fresh, interesting, or associated with some pleasurable 
interest, will secure and hold the attention when dry 
topics altogether fail to do so. Much may be done in 
this direction by preparation, by awakening curiosity, 
and by putting the child's mind in the attitude of tiptoe 
expectancy. 

Teachers duty to arouse and develop interest. As the 
pupil grows, more may, of course, be required in the 
shape of an effort to direct attention. It must never be 
forgotten, however, that all through life forced atten- 
tion to what is wholly uninteresting is not only wearing, 
but is certain to be ineffectual and unproductive. Hence 
the rule to adapt the work to the growing intellectual 
and other likings of the child. Not only so, the teacher 
should regard it as an important part of the training of 
the attention to arouse interest, to deepen and fix it in 
certain definite directions, and gradually to enlarge its 
range. 1 Harder task-work, such as learning the com- 

i Volkmann remarks that the older pa^dagogic had as Its rule, "Make 
your instruction interesting;" whereas the newer has the precept, 
"Instruct in such a way that an interest mayfawake and remain 
active for life." (Lehrbuch der Psychologie, Vol. II., p. 200). 



86 ATTENTION. 

paratively uninteresting letters of the alphabet, or the 
notes of the musical scale, must be introduced gradu- 
ally, and only when the will-power is sufficiently devel- 
oped. Great care must be taken, further, to graduate 
the length or duration of the mental application both in 
a particular direction, and generally, in accordance with 
the progress of the child's powers of voluntary atten- 
tion. An ideal school-system would exhibit all grada- 
tions in this respect; alternation and complete remission 
of mental activity being frequent at first, and growing 
less and less so, as the powers of prolonged concentra- 
tion develop. 



EEFERENCES. 

For a fuller account of the nature of attention, seefSir W. Hamilton's 
Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. I., Lect. XIV. ; also, Dr. Carpenter's Mental 
Physiology, Book I., Ch. III. The characteristics of children's attention, 
and the laws of the growth of attention, are well described by Waitz, 
Lehrlbuch der Psychologie, § 55, and by Volkmann, Lehrbuch der Psychol- 
ogie, Vol. II., §114. 



APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV. 

SUGGESTIONS. 

1. Distinguish accurately between the terms Attention and 
Consciousness; between Reflex Attention and Voluntary Attention. 

2. Consider your present experiences. Which of the phenom- 
ena of your present consciousness are results of reflex attention? 
Which are the result of voluntary attention ? 

3. Discriminate between Attention and Interest; between 
external and internal stimuli; between attention with will and 
attention without will. 



APPLICATIONS TO TEACHING. 87 

4. Fix accurately, the meaning of the following phases: 
mechanism of reflex attention, survival of the strongest stimulus, 
extent of Attention, concentration of mind, solicitations of stimuli. 

5. Consider carefully why forced attention is unproductive 
of good mental result. Fix in mind the psychological reason 
for this. 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. Axe the objects of Attention subjective or objective, or both? 
Which does the author say they are? 

2. What is meaut by Attention giving greater force, vividness 
and distinctness to any object? Is this result, i. e., this greater 
distinctness or vividness, a subjective or an objective result? 

3. What is the law of attention in respect to the number of 
objects of thought? 

4. Into what two classes may the stimuli to attention be 
divided? Does Interest precede or follow attention? Give iustauces 
of the latter. 

5. What is meaut by present imj)ressions not exercising their 
full force unless we attend to them. 

RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO EDUCATIONAL 
THEORY. 

1. 'An act of attention gives greater force, vividness, and dis- 
tinctness to the object 1 (p. 69). This is sometimes stated in this 
wise : 

' The strength, the vividness of knowledge depends upon the 
intensity of the energy of Consciousness in which these acts of 
knowledge are made known. ' 

Several important educational maxims may be deduced from 
this dictum of psychology; e. g., 

a. Of good heed-taking, springeth chieily knowledge. — 
Roger Ascham. 

b. The discovery of truth can only be made by the labor <>f 
Attention; because it is only the labor of attention which has 
light for its reward. — MA.LEBRA.NCHE. 



88 ATTENTION. 

2. 'Wlien an equal effort is made, the effective force of an 
act of attention varies inversely as the extent of object attended 
to ' (p. 70). 

This is called, by Sir Wm. Hamilton, the Law of Limitation. 
It implies that the intension of our knowledge is in the inverse 
ratio of its extension, in other words, that the fewer objects we 
consider at once, the clearer and more distinct will be our know- 
ledge of it. Sir Henry Holland suggests the phrase direction of 
consciousness as a substitute for the word attention, and, similarly, 
Hamilton says attention is to consciousness what the contraction 
of the pupil is to sight; or to the eye of the mind what the 
microscope or telescope is to the bodily eye. 

From the Law of Limitation may be deduced several educa- 
tional principles and maxims : 

a. One thing at a time, one study at a time, one author only 
from which to learn a language. — Ratich. 

b. Only one thing should be taught at one time, and an ac- 
cumulation of difficulties is to be avoided especially in the begin- 
ning of the study. — Marcel. 

c. When our interest in any particular object is excited, and 
when we wish to obtain all the knowledge we can concerning it, 
it behooves us to limit our consideration to that object to the 
exclusion of others. — Hamilton. 

3. 'The Will introduces mind and object' 1 (p. 76). i What the 
will does is to determine the kind of interest which shall prevail at 
the moment. ' Voluntarily to turn the mind to a thing is to exclude 
what is irrelevant and distracting ' (p. 78). The most important 
and comprehensive educational application of this psychologic 
truth we shall state in the words of Carpenter: 

"It is solely by the Volitional direction of the attention that 
the will exerts its domination, so that the acquirement of this 
power, which is within the reach of every one, should be the 
primary object of all mental discipline. The power of the will, 
though limited to selection, is unbounded. It can virtually 
determine what shall be regarded by the mind, through its power 
of keeoing the attention fixed in some other direction ; and, thus, 



APPLICATIONS TO TEACHING. 89 

it can subdue the force of violent impulse, and give to the con- 
flict of opposing motives a result quite different from that which 
would ensue without its interference. This exercise of the Will 
will tend to form the character; . . . and our Character and 
Conduct in Life will come to be the expression of our best Intel- 
lectual energies, directed by motives which we determinately elect, 
as our guiding principles of Action." 

Analyzing this statement, we shall have : 

(1) The primary object of all discipline is the direction of the 
attention by tcill. 

(2) The power of the will can not introduce any new thought, 
or emotion to consciousness: it can only select among the many 
objects claiming the soul's attention. 

(3) But its power to select is unbounded and having chosen 
that to which we shall attend, other things are excluded. 

(4) This is the only way we can form our characters. 

It is evident that a large body of educational doctrine can be 
deduced from this admirable statement of the principles of 
attention. 

a. We may learn to be attentive in the same manner that we 
learn to walk or to write, by practice in attending. And the 
teacher should be insistent in presenting right motives to the 
mind of the learner, and in urging him to a right choice in 
selecting the objects of his attention. 

b. The habit of directing the faculties promptly and intently 
to whatever subject comes before us lays the foundation of 
the intellectual character. This habit requires careful cultivation : 
all pupils should be expected to concentrate the whole of their 
powers of observation on the subject before them. — Tate. 

c. When sympathy fails (to produce attention) try curiosity; 
when curiosity fails, try praise; when praise begins to lose its 
effect, try blame; and when you go back again to sympathy, you 
will find that after this interval, it will have recovered all its 
original power. — Tate. 

d. Strenuous energy is the one condition of all improvement; 
yet this energy is, at first, and for a long time, comparatively 



90 ATTENTION. 

painful. It is painful because it is imperfect. Pleasure is the 
reflex of unimpeded energy. — Sir W. Hamilton. 

REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS, 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

1. For a definition of Attention from the teacher's stand- 
point, see Payne's summary of the Principles of the Science of Ed- 
ucation, under Principles of Natural Education, XL, Lectures, p. 
159 ; for memory as the result of Attention, see the same refer- 
ence; for attention as an attitude, not of the body, but of the 
mind, and for the distinction between real and apparent atten- 
tion, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, XXIV., p. 157. 

2. For a study of the different kinds of attention we may 
expect in infancy, early childhood, childhood, early youth, and 
youth, refer to Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part I., chap. 
III., at the end; on the evils of ' imparting knowledge ' when the 
student does not attend, see Payne, The Science and Art of Edu- 
cation, near the middle, Lectures, p. 33; on the efficiency of a 
lesson as dependent on the part taken iu it by the pupil, not by 
the teacher, see the same reference ; for the different causes of 
the inattention of differently constituted minds, see Tate, Part 
II., chap. III., a most excellent chapter throughout. 

3. On arousing interest — 'waking up mind,' — see Page's 
Theory and Practice, chapter VI., section IV., p. 86, also chap. 
IX., section II., p. 166; for a classification of the proper 
motives of action, see Tate, Part I., chap. III., near the end, p. 
95; on the proper incentives to study, see Page, chap. VIII., 
section III., p. 139; on the fact that the interest must be either 
in the study itself or in the results of the study, see Quick's 
Educational Reformers, p. 264; on the attractiveness of the study 
itself as creating, under natural teaching, an enthusiastic love 
for study, see Parker, XXIV., p. 161. 

4. On the student's interest, the first and most important 
matter, see Quick, p. 275; on Rousseau's saying the desire of 
knowledge is the chief thing, see the same, p. 133; on the habit 
of Attention as the great mainspring of Education, see Tate, 



PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGICS. 91 

Parti., chap. IV., principle XVI., p. 161; on attention to be 
cultivated by all possible artifices, see the beginning of chap. 
III., Part II. , of Tate. 

5. On all subjects as made interesting by emulation, see 
Quick, p. 265; and on how the Jesuits made use of the princi- 
ple of emulation, see the same, p. 8; on the evils of stimulation 
by prizes, see Page, chap. VIII., section II., p. 127; on the mis- 
take of using too violent or too persistent stimulus to attention, 
see Miss Edgeworth, quoted by Tate, Part II., chap. III., p. 189; 
on good teaching alone sufficient to create the closest and most 
prolonged attention, see Parker, XXIV., p. 161; on impressions 
as secured by either repitition or by the strong desire or interest 
of the learner, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, chap. V., p. 130; 
on one topic taught so as to arouse genuine interest, more profit- 
able than one hundred superficially taught, see Parker, XXL, 
p. 146. 

6. On the highest and best teaching as that which leads 
pupils to work for themselves, sec Quick, p. 263, and Payne 
everywhere, particularly pp. 38, 87 and 88. 

7. On great energy as only possible when great interest is 
aroused, see Quick, p. 263; on the connection between play and 
attention and knowledge, see Payne, Fnrbel and the Kindergar- 
ten, ne;ir the middle, p. 263; on Pestalozzi as no friend to the 
plan of always disguising learning as amusement, see Quick, p. 
193; on attention as deadened by long expositions, and by too 
easy or too monotonous exercises, see Tate, Part II., chap. III., 
p. 188; and on the relation of questioning to attention, see Fitch, 
chap. VII., p. 159. 



CHAPTER V. 

SENSATION. 

All knowledge takes its rise in the senses. No intel- 
lectual work, such as imagining or reasoning, can be 
done till the senses have supplied the necessary materials. 
These materials, when reduced to their elements, are 
sensations or sense-impressions, such as those of light 
and color which we receive by means of the eye, of 
sound which we have by way of the ear, and so on. An 
examination of our most abstract notions, such as force, 
matter, leads us back to these impressions. Our ideas 
can never go much beyond our sensations. The want 
of a sense, as in the case of one born blind, means de- 
priving the mind of a whole order of ideas. The 
addition of a new sense, if such a thing were possible, 
would enrich our minds by a new kind of knowledge 
respecting the world. 

Relation to Pedagogics. With the psychology of Sensation, 
the student of Educational Science should connect the doctrine 
that Intuition (sense-experience) is the absolute basis of all in- 
struction; that all learning is founded on the direct personal ex- 
perience of the learner ; and the doctrine of knowledge as of two 
kinds, — Immediate and Mediate, presentative or representative. 
There will be frequent occasions to return to these fundamental 
distinctions in the science of Pedagogics, but the reader should 
anticipate them even here, endeavoring to see their relation to 
the following exposition of Sensation. 



THE ORGANIC SENSE. 93 

Definition of Sensation. A sensation being an element- 
ary mental phenomenon cannot be denned in terms of 
anything more simple. Its meaning can only be indi- 
cated by a reference to the nervous processes on which 
it is known to depend. Accordingly, a sensation is 
commonly defined as a simple mental state resulting 
from the stimulation or excitation of the outer or per- 
ipheral extremity of an ' incarrying ' or sensory nerve. 
Thus the stimulation of a point of the skin by pressure 
or rubbing, or of the retina of the eye by light, gives 
rise to a sensation. 

Sensibility . The mind's capacity of being acted upon 
or affected by the medium of the stimulation of a sen- 
sory nerve is called sensibility. Sensibility is simply 
another name for the mind's capability of having sensa- 
tions. Strictly speaking, this property belongs to the 
mind and not to the body. Yet we are accustomed by 
an allowable looseness of expression to ascribe sensibil- 
ity to the organism in so far as it is the medium by which 
sensations are produced. Thus, we talk of the sensibil- 
ity or sensitiveness of the skin, and of the retina of the 
eye. 

General Sensibility : Organic Sense. The sensations fall- 
ing under this head are marked by absence of definite 
characters. They are vague and ill-defined. Their dis- 
tinguishing peculiarity is that they have a marked 
pleasurable or painful aspect or complexion. Such are 
the feelings of comfort and discomfort connected with 
the process of digestion and indigestion, and with inju- 
ries to the tissues. These sensations are not directly 



94 SENSATION. 

connected with the action of external objects, but arise 
in consequence of a certain condition of the part of tbe 
organism concerned. Thus they give us no knowledge 
of tbe external world. They can at best inform us of the 
condition of the organism, and they can only do this 
adequately when we are able to c localize ' them or refer 
them to their precise seat in the organism. And this, as 
we shall see later, is only possible in the case of sensa- 
tions produced by actions going on in the external parts 
of the organism. 

Special Sensibility: Special Senses. The special sensa- 
tions arising through the stimulation of the eye, the ear, 
and so on, are marked off one from another by great 
definiteness of character. This peculiarity is connected 
with the fact that each sense has its own specially mod- 
ified structure or ' sense organ,' such as the eye, or the 
ear, fitted to be acted upon by a particular kind of 
stimulus (light-vibrations, air-waves, etc.). Owing to 
tbis definiteness of character, the special sensations are 
much more susceptible of being discriminated and 
recognized than the organic sensations. * Moreover, 
these sensations are (in ordinary cases) brought about 
by the action of external agents or objects lying outside 
the organism, and are on that account called impressions. 
For these reasons they are fitted to yield us knowledge 
of the environment. It is the special senses which will 
chiefly interest us in tracing the development of intelli- 
gence or knowledge. 

The Five Senses. The Special Senses consist first of all 
of the well known five, namely, Sight, Hearing, Touch, 



CHARACTERS OF SENSATIONS. 95 

Smell, and Taste. They each involve a special mode of 
sensibility, and a particular kind of ' end-organ ' or 
terminal structure, fitted to be acted on by a certain 
kind of stimulus. The only apparent exception to this 
is Touch. This, as sensibility to mechanical pressure, is 
very closely related to Common Sensibility. Indeed, 
Touch has been called the fundamental Sense out of 
which the other and special senses are developed. 1 But 
what we distinguish as Touch proper or Tactile Sensi- 
bility is possessed in a specially fine form by certain 
portions of the skin, as the lips and the finger-tips, and 
here certain modifications of nervous structure are found 
to exist. Hence, we may speak of a special sense, and 
a special organ, of touch. 

Characters of Sensations. The importance of the sj^ecial 
senses depends, as we have seen, on their possessing cer- 
tain well-defined characters, whereby they are fitted to 
be signs or indications of qualities in external objects, as 
well as of the changes which take place in these. The 
sum-total of our knowledge of things is limited by the 
number of distinguishable characters among our seusa- 
tions. We will first enquire into these distinguishable 
characters generally, and then briefly indicate their vary- 
ing importance in the case of the different senses. ' 

Intensity or Degree. The most obvious difference of 
character among our sensations is that of degree or in- 
tensity. The difference between a bright and a faint 
light, a loud and a soft sound, involves a difference of 

i See Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. 
XXVII.; and H. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., Part III. 
Chap. IV. 



96 SENSATION. 

intensity in the sense-impressioDs. All classes of sensa- 
tion exhibit differences of degree. Those of the special 
senses exhibit them in greater number than other sensa- 
tions. These differences of degree are intellectually 
important as a clue to the nature or structure of bodies, 
the force exerted by them, their distance from us, and 
so on. Thus, a vivid sensation of light indicates (ac- 
cording to circumstances) the brightness of an object 
(e. g., a flame, a mass of snow), or its nearness to the eye. 

Quality of Sensation. Next to differences of intensity 
or degree we have differences of quality among our 
sensations. By a difference of quality is meant one of 
kind and not simply of degree. The group of sensa- 
tions making up a particular sense, as those of sound, 
are marked off by a broad difference of generic quality. 
In addition to these broad differences, there are finer 
differences of specific quality within each sense. Thus, 
there are differences of quality answering to different 
colors in sight, to sounds of different pitch and of differ- 
ent timbre or musical ' quality ' in hearing, and so on. 
These differences of quality are much sharper or more 
definite in the case of some sensations than in that of 
others. Such differences, like those of degree, serve as a 
clue to the properties of external objects. The differ- 
ence between gold and iron is partly a difference of color. 
Musical instruments, including human voices, are distin- 
guished partly by their peculiarities of timbre. 

It is important to observe that we are apt to ascribe 
a difference of quality to objects, on the basis of a dif- 
ference of degree in our sensations. Thus we are often 
disposed to think of two shades of one and the same 



DURATION OF SENSATIONS. 97 

color as two colors. Yet in this case there is no differ- 
ence of quality in the sensation, only one of degree 
answering to degrees of brightness. Similarly, the dif- 
ference between heavy aijd light bodies appears to turn 
on a difference of degree in the sensations. 

Other Characters of Sensation : Duration. We have now 
discussed the two leading characters of Sensation, its 
degree or intensity, and its quality. In addition to 
these, our sensations exhibit other characters, tbough 
these are not so distinctly present in all classes of sen- 
sation as are degree and quality. 

The first of these is Duration. All Sensations, as 
indeed all mental states, have duration: they endure 
for a shorter or longer period. Such differences of du- 
ration range from the shortest possible, that of a mo- 
mentary sensation, up to the longest possible, that 
compatible with a protracted direction of the attention. 
Yet all classes of sensation do not present this aspect 
with equal clearness. Some sensations, as tastes and 
smells, are much less sharply defined in respect of their 
commencement and termination than others: their du- 
ration is less distinct or definite than that of other 
sensations, as those of sound. The importance of this 
difference will appear later on. 

Coming now to the senses in detail, we see that they 
do not exhibit the same degree of definiteness or the 
same number of distinct characters. We usually speak 
of Taste and Smell as the coarse or unrefined senses, 
whereas Hearing and Sight are highly refined. By at- 
tending simply to the degree of refinement, we may 
G 



98 SENSATION. 

arrange the senses in the following ascending order, 
Taste, Smell, Touch, Hearing, Sight. 

No detailed exposition of the senses can be given 
here, but only a brief enumeration of their characters. 

Taste and Smell. These present a decidedly low meas- 
ure of refinement. Indeed, the sensations of these 
senses may be said to approach the organic sensations 
in want of definiteness, and in the predominance of the 
element of feeling (pleasure and pain). These peculi- 
arities are connected with the fact that these senses 
have as their function the determination of what is 
wholesome or unwholesome to the organism as a whole. 
The very position of the organs at the entrance of 
the digestive and respiratory cavities suggests that they 
are sentinels to warn us as to what is good or ill. The 
sensations of taste and smell are easily confused one 
with another, cannot be definitely distinguished either 
in degree or quality. We cannot distinguish a number 
of simultaneous tastes and odors as we can distinguish 
a number of touches locally separate from one another. 
Again, owing to the persistence of sensations, we can- 
not discriminate two odors or two tastes in rapid suc- 
cession. And lastly, both modes of sensibility are liable 
to great fluctuations, temporary and permanent. Hence 
they are of little importance as knowledge-giving senses. 
It is only under special circumstances, as those of the 
chemist, the wine-taster, and so on, that these 'servants 
of the body ' supply a quantity of exact knowledge 
about the properties of objects. 

Touch. By the sense of touch is meant the sensations 
we receive from the contact of bodies with the tactual 



THE SENSE OF HEARING. 99 

organ. These are either sensations of mere contact or 
pressure, or those of temperature. Although sensibility 
to pressure is probably the simplest and least specialized 
form of sensibility, the sense of touch supplies us with 
much more knowledge than those of taste and smell. 
In its highest and more special form, connected with 
definite portions of the bodily surface, more particularly 
the hands, and especially the finger-tips (with which 
the lips may be reckoned), the tactual sensibility be- 
comes a most important means of ascertaining the 
properties of bodies. 

Besides differences of degree in the case of sensations 
of touch, we have important differences of quality, as 
between those of smoothness and roughness. To these 
differences must be added the important qualitative dif- 
ference between hot and cold. 

Hearing. The Sense of Hearing ranks high as an 
intellectual or knowledge-giving sense. This is owing 
to the high degree of definiteness of its sensations. In 
respect both of intensity and of quality, fine differences 
are recognizable. 

The high intellectual character of hearing shows 
itself most plainly in the qualitative differences. We 
have here the broad contrast between musical and non- 
musical sounds or noises. The former depend on 
regularly recurring or periodic vibrations of the air, the 
latter on irregularly recurring or non-periodic vibrations. 
In the case of musical sounds, we have the remarkable 
phenomena of a scale of sensation. If we pass upwards 
from a low note to a higher one through all distinguish- 
able gradations, we experience a continuous variation of 



100 SENSATION. 

sensation in one respect, namely, pitch or height. This 
scale or series of similar or analogous changes (increase 
or decrease of pitch) is described as a ' continuum ' of 
one dimension. All these differences of pitch are known 
to answer to changes in the rate of vibration of the 
medium (the atmosphere). The higher the note, the 
more rapid the vibrations. 

In the discrimination of pitch, the ear shows a deli- 
cacy far superior to that of the other senses. The 
smallest difference recognized in our musical scale (a 
semi-tone) is by no means the smallest perceptible. In 
the median region of the scale, an unpracticed ear can 
easily distinguish tones which differ by only a few 
vibrations per second; and a practised ear can even 
detect a difference of a fraction of a vibration. 

In addition to this scale of pitch-quality, there are 
the differences known as timbre or ' musical quality.' 
These are the qualitative differences in sensations of 
tone answering to differences in the instrument, as the 
piano, the violin, the human voice. These differences 
have been explained as due to the various composition 
of the several kinds of tone. 

. Enough has been said to illustrate the high degree of 
refinement characterizing the sense of hearing. The 
delicate and far-reaching discrimination of quality, aided 
by the fine discrimination of duration, enables the ear 
to acquire a good deal of exact information, as well as 
to gain a considerable amount of refined pleasure. The 
delight of music sums up the chief part of the latter. 
The former is illustrated in the wide range of know- 
ledge derived by way of that system of articulate sounds 
known as language. 



SENSE OF SIGHT. 101 

As a set off against these advantages, we see that 
hearing has very little local discrimination. We cannot 
distinguish two or more simultaneous sounds with any 
nicety according to the position of their external source. 
Hence, hearing only gives us (directly), as we shall see 
by and by, very little knowledge of the position of 
bodies in space, and of their figure and magnitude. 

Sight. The sense of Sight is by common consent 
allowed the first place in the scale of refinement. The 
delicate and intricate structure of the organ, and the 
nature of the stimulus (ether-vibrations), give to its 
impressions a special degree of definiteness. 

The scale of intensity in the case of visual sensations 
is obviously a very extended one. It answers to all 
distinguishable degrees of luminosity from the brightest 
self-luminous bodies which we are capable of looking at, 
down to the objects which reflect a minimum of light 
and are known as black. The eye's capability of recog- 
nizing at a glance the nature of an object and of a 
multitude of unlike objects in a scene, rests in part on 
this delicate discriminative sensibility to degrees of 
light. 

In sight, again, we have numerous and fine differences 
of quality. Of these the most important are color dif- 
ferences. The impressions of color, like those of pitch, 
fall into a series of gradual changes. Passing from one 
extremity of the spectrum (or rainbow) scale to another, 
the eye experiences a series of perfectly gradual tran- 
sitions. These changes fall into the series, violet, blue, 
green, yellow, orange, and red, together with certain 
finer distinctions, as indigo blue, greenish blue. These 



102 SENSATION. 

differences of quality accompany (as in the case of pitch- 
sensations) changes in the rapidity of the vibrations 
constituting the stimulus. Thus the violet rays make 
about 661 billions, the red rays about 456 billion vibra- 
tions per second. 

The several kinds of rays when all combined, as in 
sunlight, produces the impression white. The same 
sensation may result from combining different pairs of 
the several varieties of light in certain proportions. 
Such pairs of rays, and the accompanying impressions 
of color, are spoken of as complementary one to another. 
Thus blue and yellow, purplish red and green, are com- 
plementary. If we add purple to the spectrum series 
and represent this by a circle, we find that any two 
kinds of light standing opposite to one another or at the 
extremities of one diameter are thus complementary. 
Such complementary colors are commonly said to go 
well or to harmonize with one another. 

Muscular Sense. Over and above the five special 
senses, there is a sense of great importance in relation 
to knowledge known as the Muscular Sense. This con- 
sists of the sum of simple mental states or 'sensations' 
which immediately accompany the action of the muscles. 
These have well-marked characters of their own. The 
sensations which accompany an exercise of the vocal 
organ, a movement of the arm or leg, an effort to push 
a heavy body, have certain common traits, and these 
mark them off from all other special classes of sensation. 

Variety of Muscular Sensations. The sensations which 
accompany muscular action may be conveniently divided 



SENSE-IMPRESSIONS AND ATTENTION. 103 

into two main varieties. Of these the most important 
are (a) sensations of movement or of unimpeded energy, 
and (b) sensations of strain or resistance, that is of ob- 
structed or impeded energy. The first are illustrated 
in the mental accompaniments of movements of the 
eyes or of the arms in empty space; the second are ex- 
emplified in the mental state which accompanies the act 
of pushing against a heavy object, or holding a heavy 
weight in the hand. This is the great difference of 
quality among our muscular sensations. 

Sense- Impressions and Attention. For the production of 
clear or distinct sensations, whether in respect of degree, 
quality or local color, it is not enough that the sense- 
organ be stimulated. The brain centres must react. Or 
to speak in psychological language, the mind must 
react in the form of attention. Only by this means 
will a sensation rise into the region of clear conscious- 
ness. 

Discrimination of Sensation. No impression is definite 
or clear unless it is picked out and distinguished from 
others. When we are inattentive, our minds may be 
receiving a mass of visual, tactual and other sensations 
which remain blurred and confused. The direction of 
attention to any one of them separates it from the ad- 
jacent crowd and gives distinctness to it. This fact 
may also be expressed by saying that it is ' differenced ' 
or discriminated. To have a clear sensation is to have 
a consciousness of its difference from other sensations 
accompanying it or immediately preceding it. As we 
have seen, the higher senses admit of much finer differ- 



104 SENSATION". 

ences than the lower. In the case of hearing, two 
impressions when they immediately follow one another 
are finely distinguished. And impressions of touch and 
sight are similarly distinguished in succession by means 
of the mobility of the organs. Finally, in the case of 
touch and sight, two simultaneous impressions may be 
sharply bounded off one from the other by means of the 
discriminative local sensibility. 

Classing of Sense-impressions. A clear sensation involves 
not only a singling out of the impression from the pres- 
ent surroudings but a connecting of it by way of assim- 
ilation with past impressions. In order, for example, to 
have a definite sensation of a bitter taste, or of a blue 
color, the mind must instantly identify it with, assimi- 
late it to, past sensations of the same sort. This shows 
that clear sensations involve a germ of retentiveness. 
They take on a familiar or recognizable character owing 
to the persistence of traces of past similar sensations. 
This combination of traces of past sensations with a pres- 
ent one, which always happens in the case of the adult, 
is seen with special clearness in the case of faint impres- 
sions. A moment's reflection will tell us that a faint 
smell, or a feeble sound would not have the definiteness 
which it has, were it not reinforced by these traces 
of past impressions. 

Growth of Seme. There is an improvement of Sense 
as life advances. Although the child has the same 
sense-organs and the same fundamental modes of sensi- 
bility as the man, his sensations are more crude, vague, 
and ill-defined. The repeated exercise of the senses in 



t 

IMPROVEMENT OF THE SENSES. 105 

connection with attention leads to the gradual differen- 
tiation of sense-impressions, and the rendering of them 
definite in their character. This growth of sense involves 
two things: (a) an increasing power of sense-discrimi- 
nation, and (b) a growth in the power of identifying 
impressions through the cumulation of ' traces.' In 
other words, our senses become more delicate or acute 
in distinguishing impressions, and more quick or keen 
in identifying them. 

Improvement of Sense-discrimination. As has been said, 
the discriminative is the more important side of sense. 
The infant's sensations at first run together, and are not 
distinguished. The first distinctions (next to that of 
the pleasurable and painful) are those of degree" or 
quantity. Thus, the impressions of light and darkness, 
of a bright and a dark surface, are distinguished before 
those of colors. As the senses are exercised, and traces 
of impressions stored up in the mind, discrimination im- 
proves. With respect both to degree and to quality, 
this improvement is gradual, beginning with the detec- 
tion of broad and striking contrasts, and proceeding to 
that of finer differences. Thus the contrast of loud and 
soft, of heavy and light is arrived at long before nice 
differences of loudness or weight. Similarly, the contrast 
of the reds with the blues is arrived at before the finer 
differences between the several sorts of red. In this 
way, the senses become more acute with exercise. It is 
found that practice in the experiments referred to above, 
for example, those which aim at measuring the limits of 
local discrimination, considerably increases the capa- 
bility of discrimination. 



106 SENSATION". 

Differences of Sense-capacity. Striking differences of 
sense-capacity present themselves among different indi- 
viduals. These are of several kinds. Thus A may be 
superior to B in respect of absolute sensibility or the 
quickness of response to stimulus. The tendency to re- 
spond to a very weak stimulus, coupled with good 
retentive or identifying power, would constitute a sense 
quick or keen in the full meaning of the word. This 
may be illustrated by the case of an eye that detected 
a very faintly shining star. Again A and B may differ 
in the range of their sensibility as measured by the 
strength of stimulus to which the organ can respond. 
What is commonly called a ' sensitive ' person is one 
whose sense-organs cannot go on responding as the 
stimulus increases in strength, but become fatigued. 

From these differences, we must carefully separate 
inequalities in discriminative power. This is the truly 
intellectual side of sense-capacity. It is found to char- 
acterize the more educated and intellectual classes. It 
stands in no constant relation to the preceding differ- 
ences. A may be more quickly responsive to a stimulus 
than B, and may have a wider range of sensibility, and 
yet not be more discriminative. 1 

These inequalities are partly native and connected 
with differences in the organs engaged. General dis- 
criminative power probably implies from the first a fine 
organization of the brain as a whole, whereas good 
special sensibility is connected rather with original 
structural excellence of the particular sense-organ con- 
cerned. On the other hand, not a small part of the 

iSee Mr. Galton's new work, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its 
Development, Section ' Sensitivity,' and following. 



EXEECISE OF THE SENSES. 107 

superiority of certain individuals (and races) over others 
in respect of discriminative sensibility is the result of 
exercise. This is strikingly illustrated in the exceptional 
delicacy attained by those who have occasion to employ 
a sense much more than other people. In this way, we 
account for the fine tactual sensibility of the blind, the 
delicate gustatory sensibility of wine or tea tasters, and 
so on. It must be remembered, however, that exercise 
does not improve capacity to the same extent in all 
cases. Capability of growth is one of the distinguishing 
features of individuals. 

Eefebences. 

A fairly complete account of the physiology of the Senses is contained 
in Prof. Bernstein's Five Senses of Man. A detailed classification of the 
Sensations is to be found in Prof. Bain's Compendium of Mental Science, 
or the larger work, Senses and Intellect (" Movement Sense and Instinct"). 
With this may be compared the resume of the facts of Sensation in M. 
Taine's work, On Intelligence, Pc. I., Book III. 



APPENDIX. 

SUGGESTIONS. 

1. The following are the important terms used in the preced- 
ing chapter. By reference to the dictionary fix carefully in mind 
their general meaning, then study their special use by our author 
in the preceding chapter: sensation, sense-impressions, stimulation , 
in-carrying nerve, sensibility, medium of sensation, organic sensation, 
special sensibility, degree, quality, and duration of sensations, dis- 
crimination, traces of past sensations, and retentiveness. 

2. Find out what is meant by the following assertion: ' All 
knowledge takes its rise in the senses.' Find out, if you can by 
careful study and inquiry, why such statements have given rise 
to bitterly contested disputes in the history of philosophy. 



108 SENSATION. 

3. Consider the following quotation, from. J. S. Mill, Logic, 
Bk. VI. , Chap. IV.: 

"It is usual, indeed, to speak of sensations as states of body, 
not of mind. But this is the common confusion, of giving one 
and the same name, to a phenomenon and to the approximate 
cause or conditions of the phenomenon. The immediate antece- 
dent of a sensation is a state of body, but the sensation itself is a 
state of mind." 

Is sensation a power of the mind or a power of the body ? Is 
it the eye that sees, or the mind ? Is it the ear that hears, or the 
mind ? 

4. Ask yourself ' what goes on when a nerve is stimulated ? ' 
For example, the olfactory nerve by the odor of a rose. 

This is the answer of G. H. Lewes : 

"What takes place in the nervous system under stimulation 
and reaction is neither demonstrable to Sense, nor discernible by 
Intuition; it is, and will long remain, mere guess-work. This 
may seem a hard sentence to those who have been relying on the 
hypothesis of vibrations, wave-movements, chemical or electrical 
processes, cell-functions, seats of sensation, seats of emotion, 
seats of volition, seats of thought. But it is a sentence which 
will be confirmed by every one who has seriously investigated 
the evidence of such hypotheses." {The Study of Psychology, 
chap. XI.) 

5. Study up, as far as possible, the physiology of the brain 
and nervous system. 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. Are the senses powers of mind or of body ? How many 
senses are there ? How many sense-organs ? Why are they 
called the inlets of knowledge ? Why would the addition of a 
new sense add largely to our knowledge ? 

2. Why can not sensation be denned ? What is meant by 
sensibility ? What is meant by the eye being the medium of sen- 
sation of sight ? 

3. In what does all knowledge take its rise ? What kind of 
knowledge is the first knowledge of a young child ? What is the 



REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 109 

relation of abstract knowledge to sense knowledge ? Which 
chapters in this work treat of the passage from a knowledge of 
sensible things to the knowledge of general terms ? 

4. What is the distinction between the organic sense and 
the special senses ? What is meant by localizing a sensation ? 

5. Name the special senses. What are the sense-organs cor- 
responding to each ? Into how many classes may our sensations 
be divided ? Which of our mental operations are preceded by a 
change of body ? 

6. What is meant by a stimulus ? Which stimuli are appro- 
priate to the organ of sight ? Which to the organ of hearing ? 
To the organ of smell ? To the organs of touch ? To the organ 
of taste ? 

7. What is meant by intensity of a sensation ? By the quality 
of a sense-impression ? By the duration of a sensation ? Show 
by examples that sensations differ in these three respects. 

8. Name the senses in the order of their knowledge-giving 
power. Which of the senses enable us to participate in the 
knowledge contained in Language ? 

9. What is meant by the ' brain-centers reacting ? ' State 
this phrase in psychological language. 

10. What is meant by the discrimination of sensations ? 
Among which class of sensations is it possible to discriminate 
most sharply ? 

11. Show how a 'clear sensation' involves past sensations. 
Show how they involve a germ of retentiveness. 

12. Show what is meant by the differentiation of sense-impres- 
sions. Show how the power of discrimination is improved by 
the accumulation of past impressions. What connection has great 
discriminative power with high intellectuality ? 



CHAPTER VI. 

PERCEPTION. 

Sensation and Perception. Sensations, even when 
discriminated and classed, are not knowledge, but only 
its raw-material. They become elements of knowledge 
when the mind refers them to some region of space, 
that is to say, localizes or externalizes them. In its 
complete form, this external reference implies the attri- 
bution of an impression, as a quality, to a particular 
object situated somewhere in space; which object is 
regarded as external to, or distinct from the mind which 
perceives it. Thus we refer a sensation of sound of a 
certain kind to a particular direction in space, say to 
the right of us, and to a particular object, say to a bell, 
and in doing so we attribute the quality (or state) of 
sounding to this object. 

This process of localizing sensations and referring 
them to definite objects is known as Perception. 
Whenever we perceive a thing, we are thus attributing 
some sensation received to an object. To perceive an 
orange, for example, is to refer a number of sensations 
of light and shade and color to an object called an 
orange. The result of this process, that is to say, the 
completed psychical product, is called a Percept. 

It will at once be seen from this, that perception is 
much more of an act of mind than sensation. In sen- 



SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. Ill 

sation the mind is comparatively passive and recipient; 
in perception it not only attends to the sensation (or 
sensations), discriminating and identifying it, but passes 
from the impression to the object which it indicates or 
makes known. 

Intra-organic and Extra-organic reference of Sensations. All 
classes of sensations are in some way referred to external 
things or externalized. The lowest class, the organic 
sensations, are referred to a part of the organism itself, 
as when we localize a sensation of burning or tickling 
in a certain part of the skin. This may be called intra- 
organic reference of a sensation. It is known as the 
localization of sensation. In the case of the special senses, 
there is a further extra-organic reference, as when we 
say we taste sugar, smell a rose, hear a sound to the 
right of us, and so on. Here the mind does not attend 
to the sensation as such and localize it, or apprehend its 
seat, but passes from the subjective phenomenon, the 
sensation, to the object qualified by the sensation. 
What is commonly called Perception is this reference of 
impressions of light, sound, touch, etc., under the form 
of qualities, as brightness, hardness, to things external 
to, that is lying outside the organism. 

Perception the Invariable Accompaniment of Sensation, In 
adult life there never occurs a sensation which, provided 
it is discriminated from others, is not at once referred to 
an object in space. The reference may be more or less 
definite and complete. Thus a sound may be referred 
to a particular object, as a belfry, or only to some un- 
known object vaguely localized in space. But in a 



112 PERCEPTION. 

perfect or imperfect form, such a reference always takes 
place. And it takes place so automatically (that is to 
say without any intention or wish on our part), and so 
instantaneously, that it is difficult for the student at 
first to distinguish the act of perception from the mere 
sensation. 

Perception the result of Acquisition. There is every 
reason to suppose that this simple act of referring im- 
pressions to things or objects in space is the result of a 
long process of acquisition or learning from experience. 
An infant in the first weeks of life betrays no signs of 
recognizing the bodily seat of his sensations of heat and 
cold, pressure, and so on. Nor does he show by an 
appropriate turning of the head that he perceives the 
direction of a sound, the impression of which he evi- 
dently receives. Perception is probably aided from the 
first by definite inherited tendencies; but it is only fully 
developed by the aid of individual experience. 

Perceptual Process Analyzed. When on hearing a par- 
ticular sound, we say, 'A bell is sounding in such or such 
a direction,' we discriminate and identify the sensation. 
This is obviously the first stage of the process. If we 
had never had an impression before similar to this in 
some respect, we could not now refer it to a particular 
portion of space or to a definite kind of object. 

The second stage, that of perception proper, involves 
the recalling of other sense-impressions besides that of 
the bell-sound. As will be shown more fully by and by, 
when we say (on the ground of an auditory sensation 
alone) * we hear a bell,' it is because in our past experi- 



PERCEPTION INVOLVES REPRESENTATION. 113 

ence this particular sensation of hearing has become 
conjoined, co-ordinated, or associated with other unlike 
sensations, more particularly touch and sight sensations, 
passive and active. If we had never handled or seen a 
bell before, the present sensation would not be referred 
to such an object. The percept is thus the result of a 
process of grouping. It is a complex psychical phenom- 
enon, of which the parts or elements are sensations. 

It is to be noticed that this grouping of sense-elements 
involves a germ of representation. The tactual and visual 
sensations, answering to the feel and look of the bell, 
are not actually present when we hear it and recognize 
it by the sound. They are revived, recalled or repro- 
duced. In referring the impression of sound to the bell, 
we are mentally representing, picturing or imagining 
the look and feel of the bell. A part at least of our 
meaning in saying that we hear a bell in such a direction 
or at such a distance is that we know we might move 
in a particular way, say to the right, and come in view 
of, and into contact with, the bell, that is to say, renew 
these visual and tactual experiences. Hence, perception 
has been described as "a presentative representative 
process " ] It contains not only a presentative element, 
the actual sensation of the moment, but also a mass of 
representative elements, picturings of sights and 
touches. 

Definition of Perception. By aid of the foregoing brief 
analysis, we may define perception as follows. Percep- 
tion is a complex mental act or process, involving pre- 

iBy Mr. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., Part VIII., Chap. 
II., p. 513. 
H 



1 1 4 PERCEPTION. 

sentative and representative elements. More particularly, 
perception is that process by which the mind, after 
discriminating and indentifying a sense-impression 
(simple or complex), supplements it by an accompani- 
ment or escort of revived sensations, the whole aggre- 
gate of actual and revived sensations being solidified or 
' integrated' into the form of a percept, that is, an 
apparently immediate apprehension or cognition of an 
object now present in a particular locality or region of 
space. This definition may be accepted provisionally. 
We shall be better able to judge of its appropriateness 
after we have analyzed the perceptual process more 
fully. 

Touch and Sight as Sources of Knowledge. Touch and 
Sight are marked off from the other senses by having 
local discrimination and an accompaniment of muscular 
sensation. Owing to these circumstances, these two 
senses supply us with a wider and more varied know- 
ledge of objects than the other senses. In smelling a 
flower, I can only apprehend one aspect or quality of a 
thing, its odor: in looking at it, I instantly take in a 
number of aspects, as its color, shape, and size. 

The additional knowledge gained by means of local 
discrimination and movement is moreover of a most 
important kind. To begin with, what we mean by 
perception in its simplest form is externalizing or 
referring a sensation to a point in space. Now it is 
only touch and sight which give us any direct knowledge 
of space, the situation of objects with reference to one 
another and to ourselves. In hearing, as we shall see 
by and by, we find out the direction and distance of an 



THE SENSES SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 115 

object (so far as we find them out at all) in a circuitous 
way. 

Again touch and sight directly make known to us the 
space-qualities of bodies, figure and size, and this they 
do by help of local discrimination supplemented by 
movement. With these ' geometrical ' or space proper- 
ties of bodies must be coupled the 'mechanical' or force 
properties, resistance under its several forms of hardness, 
weight, etc., as made known by active touch. 

These qualities are of much greater importance than 
those made known by the other senses, such as the taste 
or flavor of a substance and the sound or sonorousness 
of a body. We know more about an object when we 
hav T e ascertained its shape or size than when we have 
heard its sound. 

Tactual Perception. Although, as has been observed, 
we commonly mean by perception visual perception, 
touch (by which we mean active touch) must be regarded 
as an important channel of perception, especially in 
early life. As we have seen, we obtain by means of 
this sense the largest amount of important knowledge 
respecting objects. The bulk, figure, hardness, weight 
of a thing are directly known to touch. Hardness and 
weight are known only to this sense, and these qualities 
are obviously an important part of what we call material 
objects, or bodies. Hence, touch seems to bring us into 
the closest relation to external things. It is for all of 
us the sense to which we make appeal when we want to 
be certain of a thing being present. We call a thing, of 
whose reality we are sure, something ' tangible.' In 
order to understand what we can know of things 



116 PERCEPTION. 

through touch alone, we must, of course, suppose sight 
away as in the case of the blind. 

Perception of Single Things and of a Number. At first 
there would be no clear discrimination between a single 
object and a number of objects. Continuous quantity 
or magnitude, and discrete quantity or number, would 
impress the child's mind in much the same way. The 
one perception would be gradually differentiated from the 
other by the recognition of certain marks. One and the 
same surface would allow of a continuous movement 
accompanied by touch, and of continuous simultaneous 
series of tactual sensation (when the hand was spread 
over it). A plurality of objects, as a row of bricks, 
would be distinguished by an interruption of the tactual 
sensation in the case of movement, and by the discon- 
tinuity of the series of sensations of contact in the case 
of the hand at rest. 

Perception of Moving Objects. Along with the percep- 
tions of space, and of one and many objects in space, 
the child would gain the perception of things as moving, 
or as changing their position. This would take place by 
following the moving object with the hand. The per- 
ception of ' objective,' as distinguished from ' subjective 
movement' (that is to say, of the movement of the 
object, and not simply of the hand), would be based on 
the persistence of one touch-sensation (as distinguished 
from a series of unlike ones, as in the case of moving 
the hand over a surface) ; and also ,on the recognition 
that the direction and velocity of the movement were 
determined for him but not by him. The full recogni- 



PERCEPTION OF TEMPERATURE. 117 

tion of the movement as such, would only arise after 
the tactual space-perception had been developed. It 
would then be recognized as a movement in space, from 
one point to another. 

Perception of Temperature. By means of Touch, we 
obtain a knowledge not only of the situation of an 
object in space, its form and its magnitude, but also of 
other qualities. Of these, temperature is the simplest 
quality. By touching a stone, a piece of cloth, a human 
hand, and so on, a child distinguishes degrees of temper- 
ature and refers corresponding degrees of heat (or 
1 cold ') to the objects. The knowledge of ' objective ' 
temperature, however, gained in this way, is very un- 
certain. Our sensations of temperature vary consider- 
ably according to the e subjective ' temperature, that is, 
the degree of heat of the part of the body which 
touches, or (more correctly) the relation of this to the 
temperature of the surface touched. We have continu- 
ally to verify our subjective impressions of temperature 
by comparing them with those of others, and by resort- 
ing to physical tests. 

Perception of Hardness and Softness. Of more import- 
ance than the knowledge of this secondary and highly 
variable quality is that of hardness and softness, elasticity 
and inelasticity, weight, and roughness and smoothness, 
in their varying degrees. The recognition of these 
qualities, unlike that of temperature, involves a variety 
of sensations. They are perceptions reached by way of 
Active Touch. Thus, it is plain that a child learns the 
several degrees of hardness of objects by exerting mus- 



118 PERCEPTION. 

cular energy in pressing, squeezing, and pushing against 
them. In so doing, however, he receives touch-sensa- 
tions proper as well. The recognition of a certain de- 
gree of hardness or inelasticity is based on the relation 
between these experiences. If the substance is a soft 
one, as clay, the exertion of force is followed by little 
increase of sensation of pressure: it yields to the force, 
and there is a certain amount of movement. On the 
other hand, if the substance is a harder one, as wood, 
increase of exertion is followed by increase in the 
intensity of the sensation of pressure, and little if any 
movement. 

Perception of Weight. In like manner, the perception 
of weight involves experiences of Active Touch. 1 We 
usually estimate the weight of a substance by lifting it 
in the hand. The heavier the body, the greater will 
be the degree of nervous energy expended in sustaining 
it, and the greater the attendant tactual sensation 
of pressure. The co-operation of this last with 
muscular sensation is seen conspicuously in lifting a 
body by means of a string, when the difference of pres- 
sure makes itself felt by distinctly painful sensations of 
various intensities. 

Perception of Roughness and Smoothness of Surface. Lastly? 
we have the perception of roughness and smoothness of 
surface in their various degrees. The roughness of a 

i This is usually the case, though when the objects are not very 
heavy their weight may be appreciated by sensations of pressure alone, 
as when the hand is laid on the table and light weights placed on the 
hand. 



PERCEPTION OF SURFACE QUALITIES. 119 

surface, as that of a piece of undressed stone, may be 
recognized to some extent by merely laying the out- 
spread hand on the surface. In this case, the percep- 
tion of roughness arises by means of the different inten- 
sities of the sensations of pressure received by way of 
different points of the hand, and definitely localized in 
these points. This experience at once suggests inequal- 
ities of surface, projecting and receding points. But 
the perception is much more distinct when the hand 
moves over the surface. In this case all the little un- 
evennesses are made known as impediments to move- 
ment. Such a rough surface offers resistance to 
movement, whereas the hand glides easily over a smooth 
surface as that of marble. 

It is to be observed that the essential nature of per- 
ception as a presentative-representative process is illus- 
trated even in these apparently direct perceptions. 
Thus after appreciating weight by active touch, the 
passive tactual experience will be enough to call up the 
corresponding muscular experience. Similarly, after 
gaining a complete perception of roughness or smooth- 
ness by the aid of movement, mere contact of the hand 
with the surface will suggest this fuller active experi- 
ence. Thus throughout, in respect of qualities like 
hardness, weight, etc., as well as of geometrical qualities 
(figure and magnitude), tactual perception involves an 
element of representation. 

Tactual Intuition of Things. By means of these several 
tactual perceptions, a blind child is able to obtain dis- 
tinct intuitions of things. Thus in handling a piece of 
iron, he has one group of sensations (of temperature, 



120 PEECEPTION. 

weight, roughness, etc.), while in taking up a piece of 
wood, he has another group. The several sensations of 
each group must be first distinguished one from 
another, and the corresponding perceptions of definite 
qualities (smoothness, weight, etc.) arise in the mind; 
after this the group as a whole is distinguished from 
other groups. By ascertaining the shape, magnitude, 
weight, temperature, etc., of each individual object, 
and each kind of object, as an orange, a key, a blind 
child would acquire a wide grasp of its distinctive char- 
acters or qualities. 

The perception of the object as a thing persisting in 
space implies repeated tactual perceptions. Every time 
a blind child handles a particular object, as his toy-horse, 
his cat, and so on, he has the same aggregate of sensations 
or perceives the same assemblage of qualities. And it 
is this recurrence*of a perfectly similar group of tactual 
experiences which would supply him with a basis for 
the recognition of the thing as persisting, as remaining 
one and the same (whether or not in the same locality), 
A lesser amount of resemblance in the group of tactual 
experiences supplies the ground of recognizing a thing 
as one of a kind, as of an orange, or a book. 

Finally, in thus identifying the group of tactile prop- 
erties the child would apprehend the presence of a whole 
object with its other qualities not directly presented to 
sense at the moment. Thus in touching an orange, he 
would, by means of the complex of touch-experiences, 
identify the object as an orange, that is to say, an object 
with a particular taste; in touching a bell, he would 
similarly identify the object throughout, in respect of 
its sound as well as its tactile qualities. Observation of 



IMPORTANCE OF SIGHT. 121 

the blind shows that these tactual intuitions of things 
are capable of being highly developed in respect of dis- 
criminative fineness and of rapidity. 

Tactual and Visual Perception. The above brief account 
of tactual perception may suffice to indicate its peculiar 
character. It is the most direct mode of apprehending 
things. The presentative element is large in proportion 
to the representative. On the other hand, it is limited 
in its range at any one moment. A blind child would 
only be able to seize with his mind directly at the same 
time a small portion of the external world, namely only 
such objects as were within his reach and capable of be- 
ing simultaneously touched. 

Visual perception stands in marked contrast to this 
direct but limited mode of apprehension. In normal 
circumstances, seeing is, as has been remarked, the dom- 
inant mode of perception. It greatly transcends touch- 
ing in the range of its grasp of external things. Thus 
in vision we apprehend objects not only near us, but at 
vast distances from us, such as the heavenly bodies. 
Again, by sight we are capable of apprehending in a 
single moment a wide group of objects in different 
directions and at different distances from us, that is to 
say a whole region of the external world. 

The full significance of sight is brought out by the 
modern theory of vision, named after its founder Bishop 
Berkeley, the Berkeleian. According to this view, this 
sense derives much of its apparently direct knowledge 
of external things from touch. That is to say, the 
visual perception of space is representative in that it 
gathers up and symbolizes the more direct tactual per- 



122 PEKCEPTION. 

ception. This characteristic of vision, though often 
regarded as a defect, may be viewed as its peculiar 
excellence. It is only because it can thus embody and 
signify the results of active touch that sight is fitted to 
take the lead as the channel of perception. 



Perception of Space. Here, as in the case of 
touch, the local discriminative sensibility (of the retina) 
would not suffice to give us a knowledge of space. 
This must be supplemented by experiences of move- 
ment. 

Visual Intuition of Number. Closely connected with the 
development of the perception of things in space having 
figure and magnitude is the growth of the visual intui- 
tion of a multitude or multiplicity of things. A plural- 
ity of objects is recognized in the case of the eye, as in 
that of the hand, by the local separateness or discreteness 
of the impressions. This holds good whether we pass 
the eye over them or embrace them by a single glance. 
In vision we are able to take in in one view a considerable 
number of objects, seeing them together as a 4 collection 
or assemblage of things. 

Resume. Visual perception though an instantaneous 
automatic operation in mature life, is the result of a 
slow process of acquisition involving innumerable ex- 
periences in early life. It is probable that in connection 
with the inherited nervous organism, every child has an 
innate disposition to co-ordinate retinal sensations with 
those of ocular movement, and visual sensations as a 
whole with experiences of active touch. But individual 



ASSOCIATIONS OF SIGHT AND TOUCH. 123 

experience is necessary for the development of these 
instinctive tendencies. 

A moment's thought will show that the experiences 
of early life must tend to bring about the closest pos- 
sible associations between sight and touch, and to favor 
that automatic interpretation of " visual language " 
which we find in later life. The child passes a great 
part of his waking life in handling objects, in walking 
to and from them, and at the same time looking at them 
and noting the changes of visual impression which 
accompany these movements. Thus in countless instances 
be notices the increase of the * apparent magnitude' of 
a body when he moves towards it: the dissimilarity of 
the two visual impressions received from a solid body 
while he is handling it, and so on. In this way, an 
inseparable coalescence of signs and significates takes 
place at a period of life too far back for any of us to 
recall it. 

"When this stage of automatic visual perception is 
reached, reference to touch in all cases is no longer 
necessary. Sight has completely absorbed the touch- 
elements, and is now independent. In the large 
majority of cases, we recognize distance, real magnitude, 
and solidity, without any appeal to movement and touch. 
Seeing has now become the habitual mode of perception. 
It is only in doubtful cases that we still go back to 
touch to test our visual perceptions. 

While, however, vision is thus in a manner based on 
tactual perception, it far surpasses this last in respect of 
discriminative fineness as well as in comprehensive range. 
Seeing is more than a translation of touch-knowledge 
into a new language, and more than a short-hand ab- 



124 PERCEPTION. 

breviation of it. It adds much to this knowledge by 
reason of its more perfect separation and combination 
of its sense-elements. 1 

Intuition of Things. In looking at an object, as in 
touching it, we apprehend simultaneously (or approxi- 
mately so) a group of qualities. These include its degree 
of brightness as a whole, the distribution of light and 
shade of its parts, its color (or distribution of colors), 
the form and magnitude of its surface, and its solid 
shape. These seemingly immediate intuitions involve, 
as we have found, tactual as well as visual elements. 2 
This may be called the fundamental part of our intui- 
tion of a particular object. In looking at a new object, 
as a gem in a cabinet, we instantly intuit or take in this 
group of qualities, and they constitute a considerable 
amount of knowledge concerning the nature of the 
object as a whole. In proportion to the distinctness 
with which these qualities are discriminated both 
-severally (e. g., the color blue from violet, the oval form 
from the circular) and collectively (e. g., the aggregate 
of properties of one mineral or plant from that of 
another), will be the clearness and accuracy of our per- 
cejrtion of the thing as a whole. 

The recognition of any individual object, as a partic- 
ular toy or cat, or of one of a class of things, as an 

iA rough analogy is suggested by the phrase 'visual symbols.' Just 
as the use of symbols in mathematics and logic (owing to their very 
nature) helps us to reach ideal results which only remotely represent 
actual facts, so the addition of the visual symbols to tactual perception 
allows of a kind of idealizing of onr experience of active touch. 

2 It may be remarked that the distribution of light and shade on the 
surface of an object as an orange, suggests not only the curvature of the 
surface, but its roughness or pittedness. 



IDENTIFYING OBJECTS. 125 

orange, presupposes a repetition of this assemblage of 
qualities. In this case, the group is not ouly discrimi- 
nated bu identified. Thus ont seeing an orange, a child 
at once ' classes ' the aggregate of qualities (yellow color, 
roundness of form, etc.), with like groups, previously 
seen. 

Not only so, in thus classing a particular group of 
qualities (visual and tactual), a child takes up along 
with these other conjoined qualities. Thus, in recogniz- 
ing an object as an orange, he invests it more or less 
distinctly with a particular weight, temperature, taste, 
and smell. In this way, visual perception (embodying 
important tactual elements) suffices for the full appre- 
hension of an object clothed with its complete outfit of 
qualities. 

Identifying Objects. The recognition of a thing as 
identical with something previously perceived is a com- 
plex psychical process. It involves not only the identifica- 
tion of the group of impressions, but also the germ of a 
higher intellectual process, namely the comparison of 
successive impressions and the detection of similarity 
amid diversity or change. Thus a child learns to iden- 
tify a particular object, as his hat, or his dog, at differ- 
ent distances and under different lights (in bright 
sunlight, evening dusk, etc.). Of these changes of 
aspect, one of the most important is that due to the 
position of the object in relation to the spectator. The 
difference of impression in looking at a hat * end on,' or 
foreshortened, and from the side, or in having a front 
or side view of a face, is considerable. Children require 
a certain amount of experience aud practice before they 



126 PERCEPTION. 

recognize identity amid such varying aspects. Finally, 
there are the changes which take place in the objects 
themselves, such as alterations of form due to accident, 
or to movements of certain parts, and of magnitude due 
to growth. It is not surprising, then, that the clear 
recognition of the identity of the individual objects 
belongs to a comparatively late period of child life. 1 

Finally, it is to be observed that the identification 
of objects is greatly aided by the social environment 
and by language. A child learns to perceive and recog- 
nize objects in association with others. From the first 
the mother or nurse is pointing out objects to him; 
describing their characteristics, and naming them. By 
these interchanges of impressions and this social guid- 
ance, he learns that others see things as he sees them, 
that external things are common objects of perception. 
And by hearing them again and again called by the 
same name, he learns more quickly to regard them as 
the same.- 

Perception of our own Body. In close connection with 
the perception of external objects, the child comes to 
know the several parts of his own body. As has been 
said, sensations when not referred to external bodies are 
in adult life localized in some part of the organism. Thus 
all organic sensations, as skin-sensations of " creeping," 
burning, or tickling, are definitely localized in some 

i The recognition of a particular substance, as wood, iron, or glass, 
illustrates the mere process. The similarities of color, texture, and lus- 
tre, are detected amid differences of form. The assimilation of very 
unlike things, as oranges, grapes, etc., under the head of a wide class of 
objects, fruits, involves a higher exercise of the assimilative function to 
be illustrated by and by. 



BODILY OEGANISM AND SELF. 127 

region of the arm, foot, and so on. Even in the per- 
ception of external objects, there is more or less distinct 
reference to the sense-organ concerned. In the act of 
hearing a sound, and even of seeing an object, we are 
vaguely aware of receiving the sensation by way of the 
ear or eye. In touching objects, this reference to the 
organ becomes much more distinct. In grasping a thing, 
as a spoon, a child is directly aware (by the local char- 
acters of his touch sensations and by muscular sensa- 
tions) of the locality or position on the surface of the 
hand of the several impressions received. The recogni- 
tion of the form and magnitude of the spoon is indeed 
based on this localizing of his sensations of touch in 
certain definitely represented portions of the hand. 

Bodily Organism and Self. To a child his bodily organ- 
ism is marked off from all other objects by the fact 
that it is connected in a peculiar way with his conscious 
life, and more particularly his feelings of pleasure and 
pain. The experience of touching his foot with his hand 
differs from that of touching a foreign body inasmuch 
as there is not only a sensation in the hand, but an addi- 
tional one in the foot. The contact of a soft or agree- 
able, or of a hard and painful substance with the skin is 
an (immediate) antecedent of a pleasurable or painful 
sensation. His pleasures and pains are largely bodily 
feelings. And these, whether due to external influences 
(as a blow or caress), or to internal changes {e.g., in 
the circulation or temperature), are always found to be 
connected with some part of the organism. Hence, his 
body is regarded as a part of himself, and in early life 
probably makes up the chief part of the meaning of the 



128 PERCEPTION. 

word ' self.' It is contrasted with all other and foreign 
objects on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with 
all other like human organisms. 

The child has little power of abstraction and cannot, 
therefore, turn his attention inward or reflect on his own 
thoughts and feelings. What is known by the term 'in- 
ternal perception,' or 'reflection,' that is to say, the obser- 
vation of the mind's own states, is a comparatively late 
attainment. The young have, of course, some little 
knowledge of their feelings, but this is of a very vague 
character. The reason of this is that they cannot attend 
to their mental states in themselves and apart from the 
objects which excite them and the bodily organism 
with which they are connected. And the same is true 
of their knowledge of the feelings of others. Thus the 
antithesis of self and not-self, the internal mind and 
external things is imperfectly developed in the first 
years of life. The recognition of things as external, so 
far as a child attains to this knowledge at all, seems to 
imply outness in relation to the bodily orgauism. 1 A 
knowledge of externality iu the sense of detachment 
from and independence of percipient mind is only 
attained much later, in connection with that of the per- 
manence of objects; though, as we have seen, the child 
at an early period begins dimly to descry this relation. 

Perception and Observation. All perception requires 
some degree of attention to what is present. But we 

i In the case of all of us this reference to the bodily organism is 
always present. The very word ' externality ' implying relation in space 
points to this. The most abstract of philosophers never succeeds alto- 
gether in projecting his own body into the external world and regarding 
it as a part of the not-self. 



PERCEPTION AND OBSERVATION. 129 

are often able to discriminate and recognize an object 
by a momentary glance which suffices to take in a few 
prominent marks. Similarly, we are able by a cursory 
glance to recognize a movement or action of an object. 
Such incomplete fugitive perception is ample for rough 
everyday purposes. On the other hand, we sometimes need 
to throw a special degree of mental activity into percep- 
tion so as to note completely and accurately what is 
present. This is particularly the case with new and 
unfamiliar objects. Such a careful direction of the 
mind to objects is known as Observation. To observe 
is to look at a thing closely, to take careful note 
of its several parts or details. It implies, too, a 
deliberate selection of an object or action for special 
consideration, a preparatory adjustment of the atten- 
tion, and an orderly going to work with a view to see 
exactly what takes place in the world about us. Hence, 
we may call observation regulated perception. 1 

Distinctness and Accuracy of Observation. Good observa- 
tion consists in careful and minute attention to what is 
before us. Thus in order to observe nicely a particular 
flower or mineral, we must note all the individual char- 
acteristics, the less conspicuous as well as the more 
prominent. Similarly, if we wish to observe a pro- 
cess such as evaporation, or the movements of expression 
in a person's face, we must carefully seize all the steps of 
the operation. By such a close effort of attention, we 
give distinctness to our observations, and accurately 

i Observation commonly means a prolonged or extended act of atten- 
tion to things with a view to note the relations of objects to their sur- 
roundings, and of events to succeeding events. 

I 



130 PERCEPTION. 

mark off what we are looking at from other and partially 
similar objects or processes with which they are liable 
to be confused. 1 It is to be added that accuracy of 
observation implies freedom from prepossession. We are 
apt to think we see what we strongly expect to see, and 
in this way we fall into illusory perception. To observe 
accurately is to put aside prepossession, to restrain the 
imagination, and to direct the mind with singleness of 
purpose to what is actually present to the senses, 2 

Development of Perceptual Power. Our analysis of per- 
ception has suggested the way in which our percepts are 
gradually built up and perfected. In the first weeks of 
life, there is little if any recognition of outer things. 
Impressions are made on the child's mind, but at best, 
they are only vaguely referred to an external world. 
It is by the daily renewed conjunctions of simple sense- 
experiences that the little learner comes to refer any 
impression, when it occurs, to an object in space. Of 
these conjunctions the most important are those of touch 
and sight. By continually looking at the objects han- 
dled, the visual perception of direction becomes per- 
fected, as also that of distance within certain limits. 
The child learns to put out its hand in the exact direc- 
tion of an object, and to move it just far enough. 3 The 

i We often distinguish between a ' clear ' and a distinct perception. 
Thus we may see an object distinctly, in the sense tbat it is discriminated 
from its surroundings, without seeing it clearly, in the sense that it is 
well lit and so distinct in its parts or details. 

2 On the nature and sources of illusory perception see the author's 
work, Illusions, Chapters III. -VI. 

3 A child known to the present writer was first seen to stretch out his 
hand to an object when 2Y 2 months old. The hand misses the exact 
point at first, passing beside it, but practice gives precision to the move- 



DEVELOPMENT OF PEKCEPTION. 131 

perception of the distance of more remote objects 
remains very imperfect before locomotion is attained. 
The change of visible scene, as the child is carried about 
the room, impresses him no doubt, but the meaning of 
these changes only becomes fully seized when he begins 
to walk about, and. so find out the amount of locomo- 
tive exertion answering to the different appearances of 
things. It is some years, however, before he begins to 
note the signs of distance in the case of remote objects. 1 

After many conjunctions of impression, the child 
begins to find out the nature of objects and the visible 
aspects which are their most important marks. That is to 
say, he begins to discriminate objects one from another 
by means of sight alone, and to recognize them as they 
reappear to the eye. Sight now grows self-sufficient. 
What may be roughly marked off as the touching age 
gives place to the seeing age. Henceforth the growth 
of perception is mainly an improvement of the visual 
capability. 

At first this power of discerning the forms of objects 
with the eye is very limited. 2 The child notes one or 

ment. The same child at 6 months knew when an object was within 
reach. If a biscuit or other object was held out of his reach, he made 
do movement, but as soon as it was brought within his reach he instantly 
put out his hand to take it. On the other hand, Prof. Preyer says his boy 
tried to seize the lamp in the ceiling of a railway compartment when 58 
weeks old {Die Seeh cles Kindes, p. 38) . 

i The same remark applies to the perception of solidity. A good 
many experiences of picture-books, etc., are necessary before a child 
distinguishes a flat surface from a solid body. 

2 The first objects to be recognized are, of course, those of most inter- 
est to the child, that is to say, most directly connected with his pleasura- 
ble (or painful) sensations. Prof. Preyer says that of inanimate objects 
bottles were among the first which his child carefully observed and recog- 
nize. I {Die Seele ilea Kindes, p. 42). 



132 PERCEPTION. 

two prominent and striking features of a thing but 
overlooks the others. Thus in looking at real animals, 
or at his toy or picture imitations, he will distinguish 
a quadruped from a bird, but not one quadruped from 
another. Similarly, he will distinguish a very big dog 
from a small one, but not one dog from another of sim- 
ilar size. 

The progress of perception grows with increase of 
visual discrimination, that is to say, of the capability of 
distinguishing one color, one direction of a line, and so 
on, from another. It presupposes further the growth of 
attention. As experience advances, the child finds it 
easier to note the characteristic aspect of things and to 
recognize them; and he takes more pleasure in detecting 
their differences and similarities. In this way his obser- 
vations tend gradually to improve in distinctness and 
in accuracy. Not only so, an increased power of atten- 
tion enables him to seize and embrace in a single view a 
number of details. In this way his first ' sketchy ' per- 
cepts get filled out. Thus a particular flower, or animal, 
is seen more completely in all its details of color, and 
its relations of form. At the same time, he acquires the 
power of apprehending larger and more complex objects, 
such as whole buildings or trees. 

Waitz remarks that the apprehension of forms by the 
child takes its start, not from the periphery or coutour 
of the object, but from some striking detail (e. g., the 
trunk of the elephant). Little by little he acquires the 
power of taking up into his view the other adjacent 
parts of the figure. Finally, by following the contour 
(in alternation with this simultaneous apprehension) he 
comes to grasp the whole form in its unity and its dis- 



TRAINING OF THE SENSES. 133 

tinctness from its surroundings. {Allgemeine Pcedagogik, 
l er Theil, § 8, p. 108). 1 

The observing powers may develop in different direc- 
tions according to special natural capabilities, or special 
circumstance. A particularly good color-sense, accom- 
panied by a lively interest in colors, will lead to a more 
careful observation of this aspect of things. Thus the 
painter will observe the delicate tints of objects of which 
others are hardly sensible. A naturalist has a keen eye 
for details of form which escape the common eye. 
Objects may thus be said to acquire a different content 
for different individuals according to the habitual direc- 
tion of their observing powers. And this applies not 
only to the perception of the visible aspects, but to that 
of others as well. Thus to a man accustomed to handle 
and so test the quality of woollen stuffs, the sight of 
these objects will convey more than they do to another 
who is without these experiences. The visual impression, 
which a piece of furniture makes on the mind of a car- 
penter, is supplemented by a peculiarly rich accumula- 
tion of tactual and muscular associations. 

The Training of the Senses. 

Clear sense-impressions the necessary condition of accurate 
knowledge. If the senses give us the materials of knowl- 
edge, the proper use of them constitutes an important 
element in the economy of mind. To exercise the 

i Progress in power of perception and observation may be roughly 
measured by the rapidity with which the forms of familiar objects are 
recognized, as in looking at drawings of animals, etc., at some distance: 
also the rapidity with which complex groups or numbers are distinctly 
apprehended; and the rapidity with which similar forms are distin- 
guished. 



134 PERCEPTION. 

senses in the best way so as to accumulate the richest 
store of clear impressions, is the first step in the attain- 
ment of wide and accurate knowledge about the world 
in which we live. An eye uncultivated in a nice detec- 
tion of form, means a limitation of all after-knowledge. 
Imagination will be hazy, thought loose and inaccurate, 
where the preliminary stage of perception has been hur- 
ried over. The best modern theories of Education have 
grasped this truth, and tried to impress it on teachers* 
minds. Yet practice is, alas, far behind theory, and 
teachers make haste to build up the fabric of ideas in 
the young mind without troubling about a solid, firm 
foundation of sense-knowledge. 

Sense-knowledge a matter of personal experience. The exer- 
cise of the senses implies the voluntary direction of 
attention on the part of the child to what is present. 
Sense-knowledge is gained by the young mind coming 
into contact with things immediately, and not mediately 
by the intervention of another mind. Hence, the func- 
tion of the teacher in this first stage of the growth 
of knowledge is a limited one. A good part of the 
exercise of the senses in early life goes on, and it 
is fortunate that it does so, with very little help 
from mother or nurse. 1 The child's own activity, if he 
is healthy and robust, will urge him to use his eyes, his 
hands, and other organs in exploring things about him. 

Nevertheless a good deal may be done indirectly to 
help on this process of acquisition. The mother has the 

i Of course a good deal is done undesignedly in training the senses of 
the child. Thus he tends from the first to follow the lead of others, to in- 
spect what they are looking at and talking about. 



EXEECISE OF THE SENSES. 135 

control of the child's surroundings, and may do much 
to hasten or retard the development of sense-knowledge 
by a wise attention to them or an indolent neglect of 
them. To supply children from the first with suitable 
materials for the exercise of their sense-organs, more 
especially those of touch and sight, is the first and prob- 
ably most important part of what is meant by training 
the senses, at least in very early life. Next to this 
comes the more direct co-operation of mother, nurse, or 
teacher in directing their attention to unobserved points 
in objects, and in arousing interest in things by appeal- 
ing to the impulses of curiosity, and so on. It may be 
added that a large part of the gain of such co-operation 
is realized independently of any methodic procedure. 
There are no rules of good observation which would 
enable one to teach it as an art. A child will profit 
more by daily companion ship with an acute observer, 
be he teacher or playfellow, than by all systematic 
attempts to train the senses. A boy privileged to be 
the companion of his naturalist father in his daily walks 
will insensibly fall into the way of attending to the phe- 
nomena of nature, of being on the look-out for things. 

Intuitional instruction should precede formal school instruc- 
tion. The training of the senses ought to begin very 
early in life, and a good part of it should be got over 
before the child comes under the more systematic disci- 
pline of the schools. In the nursery he should have his 
discriminative sensibility exercised by the supply of a 
sufficient number and variety of sense-impressions. Thus 
a number of colored objects should be placed before 
him, so that he may gradually distinguish shades of 



136 PEKCEPTKW. 

color. The differences must first be wide and striking, 
smaller ones being introduced as the discriminative 
power of the sense advances. And here the mother 
will do well to bring the colors to be distinguished into 
juxtaposition, so that the attention may easily pass from 
one to the other, and the differences be carefully 
marked. 1 With variety should go a certain repetition 
of previous impressions, so that they may become fa- 
miliar and be easily identified. All the senses should 
be exercised according to their relative importance. 
And this means that the child should be allowed the 
utmost possible liberty of action in handling things, 
examining their surface, their internal structure, and so 
on, and also in moving about so as to bring the muscu- 
lar sense into full exercise. As we have seen, an im- 
portant part of the knowledge of material objects is 
directly gained through the exercise of the muscles. 
The young child delights to exercise his, and finds a 
large part of his pleasure in investigating by his own 
active experiments the qualities of bodies. Not only 
so, the very play of the child may be turned to good 
account in furthering sense-knowledge. There is no 
toy he tires of less rapidly than a box of bricks. And 
the manipulating of these with a view to construction, 
is au excellent means of ascertaining the form of objects. 
By thus supplying food for his active impulses as 
well as his senses, we are putting the child in the way 
of co-ordinating his experiences of movement and 
touch on the one hand, and of sight on the other, and 

i A special chart of colors suitable to the education of the eye has 
been published by H. Magnus, of Breslau, under the title, Tafel zur Er- 
ziehung des Farbensinnes. 



CONCENTRATION NECESSARY. 137 

so of arriving at a rapid automatic recognition of things 
by sight alone. As has been said, sight takes the lead 
in observation, and when once the visual signs of posi- 
tion, solid figure, and magnitude and nature of surface 
have been learnt, the training of the observing powers 
will consist mainly in exercising vision. 

Too great variety of sense-impressions harmful. Objects 
must be brought before the child's eye in sufficient vari- 
ety, so that the stimulus of change and novelty may be 
introduced, and the power of readily discriminating one 
thing from another may be strengthened. On the 
other hand, there must be a certain measure of perma- 
nence in the young inquirer's environment, in order 
that the deeper sort of curiosity may be awakened, the 
observation of things grow in depth, and the power of 
rapidly identifying objects be exercised. A young child 
may easily have a redundance of good things in 
the shape of new toys, new picture-books, etc. In like 
manner, he may easily be taken about too much and 
shown too many sights. A habit of close inspection 
presupposes a certain measure of familiarity with things, 
and a certain depth of interest which only comes of 
daily companionship with them. 

The School training of the Senses. The school may be made 
a field of exercise for the senses in a number of ways. 
In the regulated play of the Kindergarten, the senses 
are rightly the thing most attended to. Frcebel has 
built on solid psychological ground in maintaining that 
knowledge and activity are closely related; that the 
child's spontaneous activity is the force that sets the 



138 PERCEPTION. 

mechanism of the senses in movement; that perception 
includes the employment not only of the eye but of the 
hand; and that a nice perception of form is only gained 
in [connection with the device of manual reproduction. 
The well-known active employments of paper-folding, 
stick-building, and better still, modelling, train the sense 
of form by compelling a close attention to it in a way 
that no mere presentation of an object to passive con- 
templation could do. 1 Nor is this all: the execution of. 
the required manual movements in all such simple con- 
structive employments helps to bring out more promi- 
nently the correspondence between the visual and tactual 
experiences concerned in the perceptions of form. 'The 
same line of remark applies too to drawing. An experi- 
enced draugetsman reads more than another man into 
the forms submitted to his eye. 

The eye should be trained to a fine perception of form. The 
vast importance of a fine perception of form may sug- 
gest that every child should undergo a systematic train- 
ing of the eye in this particular. Such training would, 
of course, begin in the nursery by presenting a variety 
of concrete forms to the child's notice, as those of ani- 
mals, plants, etc. Striking differences, as that between 
an elm and a cedar, would be at first selected, and then 
finer differences, as that between an oak and a beech, 
introduced. Uncolored drawings, supplementing the 
objects themselves or models, would be useful here, as 
removing the more interesting feature of color. After 
a sufficient amount of exercise in discriminating concrete 

i In the same way the color-sense is best trained by painting, the 
sense of pitch in sound by singing. 



INTUITIONAL INSTRUCTION. 139 

forms, and when the powers of attention were strong 
enough, the more abstract considerations of form by 
observing the less striking form-elements should he en- 
couraged. Lines, curves, and their simpler combinations 
would now be learnt. Finally, this synthetic treatment 
of form should go on hand in hand with an analytic 
treatment of concrete forms of objects. The pupil 
should be led on to discover the vertical line, the spiral 
curve, the triangular figure, etc., in natural or artificial 
objects, as the tree-stem, the coiling vine tendril, the 
house-gable. In this way, the perception of concrete 
forms would grow in distinctness. 1 

In every study the first thing is an appeal to the faculty of 
intuition. An appeal to children's own observation is 
now rightly resorted to as much as possible in every 
branch of instruction. The teaching of Natural Sci- 
ence sets out with the object lesson, which in its simplest 
form is a mere exercise of the pupils' observing powers 
in noting the properties of a thing. Whatever the dif- 
ficulties of the object lesson, nobody really doubts that 
a large amount of valuable knowledge about simple sub- 
stances, as chalk and coal, natural forms, as those of 
plants and animals, as well as art products, can be 
given to a number of children in this way. This first- 
hand knowledge of things through personal inspection 
is worth far more than any second-hand account of them 
by description. Hence the desirability of using models 
and maps in teaching geography, of pictures in teach- 
ing history, and of such an apparatus as Mr. Sonnen- 

1 Mr. Spencer insists on beginning with concrete forms, even in teach- 
ing the child to draw, Education, Chap. II., p. 80. 



140 PERCEPTION. 

schein's in teaching the elements of number. Yet 
while the senses may thus be appealed to in almost 
any branch of instruction, they are far more concerned 
in some departments than in others. It is now generally 
admitted that the careful and thorough study of one or 
more of the natural sciences supplies the most efficient 
training in sense-observation. It is plain, for example, 
that a wide observation of the characters of plants, as 
required by botany, must tend greatly to sharpen the 
sense of color and form. 

References. 

For a fuller account of the way in which we learn to localize impres- 
sions and perceive objects, the reader is referred to Prof. Bain's Senses 
■and Intellect, under ' Sense of Touch,' Sect. 13, etc. ; under ' Sense of 
Sight,' Sect. 12, etc.; and later, under 'Intellect,' Sect. 33, etc.; also to the 
excellent analysis in Mr. H. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., 
Pt. VL, Chaps. IX. to XVIII. With these may be compared M. Taine's 
interesting chapter on External Perception and the Education of the 
Senses, On Intelligence, Pt. II., Bk. II., Chap. II. 

On the practical side of the subject, the training of the Senses, the 
reader will do well to consult Mr. Spencer's Essay on Education, Chap. 
II., and Miss Youmann's little work on the Culture of the Observing Pow- 
ers of Children. The difficult subject of the Object Lesson is dealt within 
a suggestive way by Dr. Bain, Education as a Science, Chap. VIII., p. 247, 
etc. ; and by Mr. Calkins, New Primary Object Lessons (Harper & Broth- 
ers), p. 359, etc. 



APPENDIX. 

SUGGESTIONS. 

1. By reference to the preceding chapter and to the una- 
bridged dictionary, fix in mind the meaning of each of the 
following terms: Sensation, Perception, Percept; discrimination 



EDUCATION OF THE SENSES. 141 

of sensations, identification of sensations, localization of sensa- 
tions, reference of sensations to outward objects. 

2. Do not forget how important is the use of the dictionary- 
while reading. Even learned scholars, trained in the strictest 
schools of thought, do not omit this. Fix, therefore, thoroughly 
in mind the meaning and use of all the important terms in each 
chapter: you will notice each new discussion introduces its own 
peculiar words, and only by a careful mental effort will they 
reveal to you their full content of knowledge. Note what the 
author says of the perils of empty words, in Chapter IX. 

3. To your definitions of each one of the important words 
mentioned above, affix in thought an example; remember a term 
is only known when we can illustrate its application. 

4. Consider carefully how perception is related to sensation. 
Which comes first in the order of experience ? Are they both 
matters of gradual acquisition ? Can you distinguish clearly any 
given sensation from the accompanying act of perception ? On 
the question of the gradual acquisition, in the early stages of ex- 
perience, of the powers of sensation and perception, note the fol- 
lowing quotation, from G. H. Lewes {Biographical History of 
Philosophy, p. 525): 

"Our senses have to be educated, i. e., to be drawn out, de- 
veloped. We have to learn to see, to hear, and to touch. Light 
strikes upon the infant retina, waves of air pulsate on the infant 
tympanum: but these as yet produce neither sight nor hearing: 
they are only the preparations for sight and hearing. Many hun- 
dred repetitions are necessary before what we call a sensation 
(that is, a distinct feeling corresponding to that which the object 
will always produce upon the developed sense). Many sensa- 
tions are necessary to produce a perception : a perception is a 
cluster of sensations with an ideal element added." 

5. Show that any sensation, as the sound of a bell, recalls 
other sense-impressions, and in its completed form becomes a 
perception. 

6. Consider carefully the completed provisional definition of 
perception. What is meant by perception being a ' presentative- 
representative process?' 



142 PERCEPTION. 

7. One very important term introduced in this chapter is 
Intuition. By the faculty of intuition is to be understood the 
power the mind has of getting knowledge in the immediate pres- 
ence of the object of thought. Intuitions are sense-knowledges: 
intuitions form the basis of the whole superstructure of knowl- 
edge. 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. What is meant by saying that a percept is a psychical pro- 
duct ? What is meant by perceiving an orange ? Which is the 
more subjective, the act of sensation or the act of perception? 
Which is a testimony to the existence of the me? Which to the 
not-me ? 

2. Give an example of intra organic reference of sensations: 
of extra-organic reference. In the case of the special senses 
which is the more attended to — the subjective sensation or the 
reference of the sensation to some object ? What is the relation 
between the sensations and the qualities of the object which gives 
Tise to the sensations ? 

3. Into what two stages can the process of perception be 
analyzed ? Describe the first stage ; the second stage. Show that 
in the second stage, there is a representative element ? What is 
represented ? By what is represented ? Give examples. 

4. Which of the special senses are pre-eminent as knowl- 
edge-giving senses ? What is meant by Touch and Sight having 
a 'local discrimination?' By having an 'accompaniment of 
muscular sensation ? ' Illustrate. 

5. What sensations give rise to the perception of plurality; 
of temperature; of elasticity; of roughness; of weight? 

6. What perceptions are involved in the intuition of a globe? 
Which sensations represent or recall others ? What qualities 
not present to sense at the moment would be involved in the per- 
ception ? 

7. Show that looking at an object we apprehend, at once, a 
group of qualities. Does this immediate sight-intuition involve 
any tactual elements ? By what are they suggested ? Show that 
in such cases there is a reference of the object to a class. 



REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 143 

8. What kind of a psychical process is the identifying of 
one object of perception with its perception at a previous time ? 
Illustrate. 

9. What is the distinction between perception and observation ? 
What is meant by saying that observation is regulated perception? 
What is meant by distinctness of observation ? What state of 
mind is implied in accurate observation ? 

10. Trace the way in which, in a young child, his percepts 
are gradually built up. 

11. Why is the proper training of the senses so important in 
education ? What will be the educational result of hazy and 
imperfect perceptions ? 

12. What is the result of communicating ideas before the 
corresponding perceptions have been developed ? What is the 
value of Pestalozzi's great principle of From Intuition to Notion? 
What is meant by notion in this sense of the word ? 

13. Which of the two kinds of knowledge — Immediate or 
Mediate — Presentative or Representative — is given directly by 
the senses ? What degree of Attention is desirable in sense-obser- 
tion ? 

14. What are the proper materials for the exercise of the 
senses ? What are the direct perceptions — the intuitions, which fit 
a student to understand a description of natural scenery ? What 
are the intuitions necessary to the comprehension of geography 
as a science ? To the understanding of the language of geome- 
try ? Why should there be in every study, in the preliminary 
stage, an appeal to the senses ? 

APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO TEACHING. 

1. The dictum of Psychology that ' All Knowledge takes its 
rise in the Senses,' gives rise to several important doctrines in 
Pedagogics. 

To illustrate : 

a. Impressions or sensations being incapable of resolution 
Into anything simpler than themselves are the fundamental ele- 



144 PERCEPTION. 

ments of all knowledge. The development of mind begins with 
the reception of sensations. — Joseph Payne. 

b. All our knowledge of the material world is derived 
through the senses. — Tate. 

c. Through sensation the immaterial (mind) comes into con- 
tact with the material, and springs (through its own inherent 
energies) into all the various forms of developed intelligence. 
Without sensation, the mind could not germinate; and without 
the reflex power, which the mind exercises over these sensations, 
intelligence could not exist. — Tate. 

d. Development begins with the perceptions of sense. 

e. Pestalozzianism is education to spontaneous activity, by 
means of knowledge acquired by the perceptions. — Diester- 
weg. 

2. The consideration of the nature of the process of percep- 
tion, and the doctrine of the complex character of our visual in- 
tuitions of things suggest the importance of what is called intu- 
itional instruction, i. e., that fundamental exercise of the senses 
which, alone, can give a basis to instruction through language. 
Some of the pedagogical doctrines and maxims are as follows: 

a. Intuition is the power the mind has of getting immediate 
knowledge, i. e., directly from the object of knowledge, whether 
that object be thing, act, or state of mind. — Mansel. 

b. It is to be noted that the term intuitions includes all 
direct experiences gained through the senses, and through 
the power of self-consciousness revealing to us all the phases of 
our inner experience. The faculty of intuition, then, includes 
the Special Senses and self-consciousness. Intuitional instruction 
is instruction in seeing, hearing, etc., and in the inner perceptions, 
i. e., of space, time, number, motion, duty, reverence, beauty, 
love, friendship, fidelity, etc. 

c. The faculty of Intuition has two sides ; one is turned 
toward the outer, and the other toward the inner world of mind. 
The former is first unfolded, and leads to the development of the 
latter. Hence, the child in school, as in the natural world, must 
open his senses to outward impressions, in order that the quali- 






145 

ties and objects of the outward world may be reflected in pictures 
upon his mental retina, and become to inner intuitions the 
foundation of all later mental culture. — Diesterweg. 

d. The faculty of intuition is the basis of all intellectual cult- 
ure. — DlESTERWEG. 

e. All the materials of perfect intelligence exist in the pri- 
mary or primitive intuitions, but they have to be reduced to defi- 
nite forms and consistent combinations. — Tate. 

/. Our intuitive perceptions are, of all our forms of intelli- 
gence, the most vivid and comprehensive. They give us all the 
elements of our subsequent knowledge, not in signs, or abstract 
representations, but immediately in our self-consciousness. — 
Tate. 

g. But what are books ? They, in themselves, furnish 
nothing more than a guidance to the treatment of the intuitions. 
Where, then, are the intuitions themselves ? These are, not in 
lifeless books, but only in life. To this, then, must we refer the 
teacher. Look into life, into nature, into society, into the world 
of small and great men, into yourself; ' keep your eyes open ! ' — 

DlESTERWEG. 

h. From Intuition to Notion. This is declared by Pntf 
C. W. Bennett to be the ground principle of the whole philosoph- 
ical system of Pestalozzi. 

3. The psychologic dicta that ' all perception requires some 
degree of attention,' that 'observation implies a deliberate selec- 
tion of an object or action for special consideration, a preparatory 
adjustment of the attention, and an orderly going to work to see 
exactly what takes place in the world about us,' give rise to 
several maxims and rules. 

The following may be instanced : 

a. The child, then, must be made to observe accurately, and 
to reflect on its observations. — Quick. 

o. Unfolded is the world only to the observing mind ; the 
only avenues to the mind are the Senses. — Feuerbach. 

c. Therefore, whenever it is possible, there should first be 
observation of life and nature, and afterwards reflection till every 



146 PERCEPTION. 

perception is brought into the realm of a clear consciousness. — Dies- 

TERWEG. 

d. No perception without attention. — Carpenter. 

e. The entire course of observation must be accompanied 
with suggestion, question, and information by the teacher. Mere 
sensation will not of itself lead to the result we aim at; a sense 
may continue sluggish, where circumstances present the most 
abundant materials for its exercise — Currie. 

/. The teacher's art consists mainly in the depth of emotion, 
of which he can make the child conscious in the act of percep- 
tion; and the surest test of his success is the unsolicited obser- 
vation by the pupil of the qualities of things which may not be 
the immediate subject of the lesson, or, which may not be in 
school at all. — Currie. 

REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

1. On all knowledge acquired by sensation and observation, 
see Quick on Pestalozzianism, Educational Reformers, p. 188; for 
Comenius on knowledge of things to be communicated together 
with the knowledge of words, see the same, p. 60; for Rousseau 
on perfecting the senses first, see the same, p. 109 ; and for Locke's 
similar view, see p. 95. 

2. On the exercise of the senses as not mere use of the senses, 
but learning, judging, and knowing through them, see Rousseau 
quoted, Quick, p. 112; on perception as the first stage of intelli- 
gence, see Tate, Philosophy of Education, Part I., chap. III., 
under Primitive Intelligence, p. 69; on nature's education of a 
child through his perceptions, see Payne, Science and Art of Ed- 
ucation, Lectures, p. 29; for Dr. John Brown, on necessity of 
knowledge as self-experience, see the same, p. 39; and on an 
appeal to the senses, as the first thing in instruction, see Tate, 
Part I., chap. IV., Principle VI., p. 114. 

3. On observation as a compound faculty, see Tate, Part I., 
chap. III., nnder Classification of the Intellectual Faculties, p. 79; 
on the order of observation, memory, reflection, and speech, see 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 147 

Quick, pp. 30 and 188; on reflection as following accurate obser- 
vation, see the same references; on the need of a systematic cul- 
tivation of the perceptions, see Spencer's Education, p. 138; on 
the way to the understanding through the senses, see Fitch's 
Lectures on Teaching, p. 193; and on the unseen as imaged to the 
mind only through the seen, see Parker, Talks on Teaching, 
p. 127. 

4. On Pestalozzi's object-lessons, see Quick, p. 190; on the 
proper conduct of object-lessons, see Spencer, p. 136, and Tate, 
Part I., chap. IV., Principle VI., p. 118; for Rousseau's view on 
this, see Quick, p. 109 ; for Comenius', p. 60, and for Basedow's, 
p. 145; on the mother's object-lessons, see Spencer, p. 133. 

5. On the knowledge of external things to be taught by com- 
parison and contrast, see Tate, as last referred to, p. 116; on 
things at first not so much objects of thought as of feeling and 
sentiment, see the same authority, Part I., chap. III., p. 80; on 
Froebel and the Kindergarten, in relation to development of per- 
ceptive faculties, see Payne, Fmbel and the Kindergarten, Lec- 
tures, p. 264, also Fitch, p. 195 and 199; on what children learn 
at their games, see Tate, Part I., chap. IV., under Infant School 
System, p. 138, 

6. On the claims of natural sciences to a place in the school 
curriculum, see Fitch, p. 396, Spencer, p. 85, and the following: 
also Payne, True Foundation of Science-teaching, Lectures, p. 211 ; 
and for a careful criticism of Mr. Spencer's argument for the sci- 
ences, see Quick, p. 231. 



CHAPTER VII. 
REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION (MEMORY). 

After-effects of Perception. Perception is the great 
primal source of knowledge. But the act of perception 
is momentary, and there would be no enduring knowl- 
edge of things if we were limited to sense-cognition. 
The existence of such lasting knowledge depends on the 
fact that the impression made on the mind in the act of 
perception persists after the removal of the object. 1 In 
other words, the percept is in a manner retainable. The 
form in which it appears after the removal of the 
object is known as a mental image or representative 
image. 2 

Every vivid and distinct impression begets a mental 
image, properly so called, which endures for a much 
longer period. Thus after seeing a friend, the image 
of his face lingers in consciousness awhile, and contin- 
ues for some time to revert of itself as soon as other 

i * Percept ' and ' impression ' are used much in the same sense in 
reference to this after-effect. 

2 The term image in psychology points to a double distinction. On the 
one hand, it is representative whereas a percept is presentative (or largely 
so); on the other side, it is a representation of a concrete object, or a 
mental picture, and is thus distinguished from a concept or general notion 
which typifies a class of things. The term ' idea ' is commonly used to in- 
clude both images and concepts, marking off the whole region of the 
representative from the presentative. But like the term notion, it tends 
now to be confined to concepts. 



WHAT IS MEANT BY IMAGINATION. 149 

objects of attention are removed. This temporary 
image may be observed to become little by little blurred 
and indistinct. There is thus a gradual subsidence or 
dying away of percepts. 

Persistence and Revival of Impressions. This temporary 
* echo ' of impressions is, however, of little account for 
knowledge. When we talk of picturing or mentally 
representing an object, we imply a mental capability of 
having permanent images, as distinguished from the 
temporary ones just spoken of. That is to say, we sup- 
pose an ability to recall, revive or recover a past impres- 
sion after an interval. All such revival of percepts is 
known in Mental Science as Imagination. Thus we 
imagine when we call up a mental picture of a person's 
face or of a particular church, when we recall some par- 
ticular word, or the taste of a certain fruit. Since vis- 
ual perceptions constitute the most important kind of 
sense-knowledge, visual images form the chief part of 
our mental representations. Hence the employment in 
psychology of the term ' image ' for all varieties of 
representation. 

Speaking generally, we may say that the revival of 
an impression is more perfect soon after its actual occur- 
rence, and becomes less perfect as the interval increases. 
We can commonly recall with ease, and in a consider- 
able degree of distinctness, a face or a tune that im- 
pressed us a few days before, though after the lapse of a 
month or six months, the mind loses its hold on the 
impression. Images may be said (roughly) to lose in 
vividness and distinctness in proportion to the remote- 
ness of the corresponding percepts. 



150 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

Reproductive Imagination. The simplest kind of imagi- 
nation is that in which the several parts of the repre- 
sentation follow the order of perception. This is known 
as Reproductive Imagination. What is commonly 
understood by Memory, that is to say the recalling of 
particular impressions and pieces of knowledge (as dis- 
tinguished from the retention of general truths) thus falls 
under the head of reproductive imagination, Another 
variety of imagination which answers more closely to 
the popular use of the term will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 

Retention and Reproduction. It is customary to distin- 
guish the stage intervening between the perception and 
the representation as that of Retention or Conservation; 
and the process of representation itself as that of Re- 
production. Impressions, it is commonly said, must be 
laid up in * the store-house,' or the \ pigeon-holes ' of the 
mind before they can be brought forth and made use of 
by the reproductive faculty. 1 It is a point of dispute 
as to what the retention as distinguished from the repro- 
duction, of an impression involves. Without discussing 
this question, we may distinguish retention from actual 
representation as the capability of representing. If a 
child retains an impression for a week, this implies that 
he has been capable of representing it at any time dur- 
ing this interval. 

Images how distinguished from Percepts. We have no 
difficulty in general in distinguishing between an actual 

i For an account of the various ways of conceiving and describing the 
fact of retention, see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. 
XXX. 



IMAGES INVOLVED IN PERCEPTS. 151 

perception and an imagination of a thing. We instantly 
feel the difference between looking at an objects as a 
horse, and forming a mental picture of it when it is 
absent. We roughly define the difference by saying 
that the image is the copy of the percept, that it is less 
vivid, and less distinct in its parts. 

Images involved in Percepts. Just as in mature life we 
rarely or never have a sensation without some admixture 
of the representative element which constitutes it a per- 
cept, so we rarely, if ever, have a percept in which an 
image is not embodied. Since to recognize an object is 
to identify it with some object previously seen, it is 
plain that all recognition involves the co-operation of 
an image, the product of the previous act of perception. 
When a child sees a familiar person, as his nurse, the 
percept is overlaid with a whole series of images. That 
is to say, there coalesce with the percept the residua or 
traces of previous percepts. 

Such a nascent, undeveloped state of an image must, 
however, be distinguished from an image proper, that 
is to say, one distinct and fully developed. We are 
often able to identify an object, as a face, when we ac- 
tually see it, without having any corresponding power 
of imaging it when it is absent. A dog will recognize 
his master after years of separation, but it is doubtful 
whether he could distinctly picture his appearance in his 
absence. The power of identifying objects is independ- 
ent of the power of picturing them, and is often 
found in great perfection where the latter is very im- 
perfect. 



152 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

Distinctness of Images. The chief merit or excellence 
of a representative image consists in its distinctness or 
clearness. By this is commonly meant that the image 
be definite and not vague, that the several parts or fea- 
tures of the object be distinctly pictured in their rela- 
tions one to another. Thus we have a distinct image of 
a person's face when we call up its several features, as 
the outline or contour of the whole, the shape of the 
mouth, and the color of the eyes. On the other hand, 
the image is spoken of as indistinct, obscure, or vague, 
when instead of all the details or lineaments of the ob- 
ject being pictured with sharp definition, only a few are 
represented, or when the details are pictured in a vague 
or hazy manner, as in the case of a blurred or half- 
effaced portrait. 

Closely connected with the distinctness of images as 
just defined, is their distinctness in relation to other im- 
ages. The expression, " a distinct mental picture," 
seems often to imply detachment from other pictures. 
Thus we are said to represent a face " distinctly " when 
we do not confuse it with another face. 

Our mental imagery shows all degrees of distinctness. 
Many of our representations are vague, blurred, and in- 
distinct, and as a consequence tend to be confused one 
with another. 

Befiniteness and Accuracy of Images. From the distinct- 
ness of an image we must, carefully distinguish its 
accuracy. By this is meant its fidelity as a copy, or its 
perfect correspondence with the original, the percept. 
Want of distinctness commonly leads to inaccuracy, if 



CONDITIONS OF [REPRODUCTION. 153 

in no other way, in that of deficiency. But what we 
ordinarily mean by an inaccurate image includes more 
than this. It implies the importation of some foreign 
element into the structure of the image. Thus we have 
an inaccurate image of a face, when we ascribe a wrong 
color to the eyes, etc. It is probable that all images 
tend to become inaccurate, by way not only of loss, but 
of confusion, of elements, with the lapse of time. It is 
to be added that though there is confusion here, there 
need be no sense of confusion as there is in what we 
commonly call a ' confused image.' 

Conditions of Reproduction. The capability of represent- 
ing an object or event some time after it has been 
perceived depends on two conditions. In the first place, 
the impression must be stamped on the mind with a 
certain degree of force. This circumstance may be 
called the depth of the impression. In the second 
place, there is needed, in ordinary cases, the presence of 
something to remind us of the object or to suggest it to 
our minds. This second circumstance is known as the 
force of association. 

(a) Depth of Impression : Attention and Retention. In the 
first place, then (assuming that there has been only one 
impression), we may say that a distinct image presup- 
poses a certain force and distinctness of the impression. 
A loud sound will, in general, be recalled better than a 
faint one; a bright object distinctly seen, better than a 
dull one obscurely seen. For this reason, actual im- 
pressions are in general much better recalled than pro- 
ducts of imagination. We recall the appearance of a 



154 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

place we have actually seen better than one that has 
been described to us. The habit of repeating words 
audibly when we want to remember them is based on 
this principle. 

Again, the permanence of an impression is determined 
not merely by its external character, but by the attitude 
of the mind in relation to it. If our minds are preoccu- 
pied, a brilliant object may fail to make a lasting 
impression. Hence we have to add that the permanence 
of an impression depends on the degree of interest 
excited by the object and the corresponding vigor of 
the act of attention. Where a boy is deeply interested, 
as in watching a cricket match, he remembers distinctly. 
Such interest and direction of attention ensure a clear 
discrimination of the object, both in its several parts or 
details, and as a whole. And it is on the fineness of the 
discriminative process that retention appears directly to 
depend. 

The interest determining the force of attention may, 
as we have seen, arise directly out of some aspect of the 
object, as its novelty, beauty, its suggestiveness, and so 
on. A pleasurable feeling springing up in the very 
process of perception is the best guarantee of close at- 
tention and fine discrimination. 1 The events of early 
childhood which are permanently retained commonly 
show an accompaniment of strong feeling (wonder, 
delight, awe, and so forth). Where this powerful in- 

i This is true within limits only, for, as has been remarked above, 
strong emotional excitement is unfavorable to nice discrimination . Power- 
ful feeling seems to stamp impressions on the mind simply by the added 
strength it gives to attention, and independently of the degree of intel- 
lectual (discriminative) activity called forth. Such a state of mind would 
be favorable to subsequent vividness of reproduction. 



EFFECTS OF REPETITION. 155 

trinsic interest is wanting a vigorous effort of voluntary- 
attention may bring about a permanent retention. But 
this is hardly as effective as the first. We find it hard 
to retain an impression, however closely we attend to it, 
if it fails to arouse some degree of pleasurable interest. 
Finally, it is to be observed that our minds are not 
always equally susceptible to this process of stamping in 
impressions. Much will depend on the degree of mental 
vigor and brain vigor at the time. A fresh condition 
of the brain is an important element in the retention 
of impressions. 

Repetition and Retention. We have just assumed that 
the object or event represented has been perceived but 
once only. But a single impression rarely suffices for a 
lasting representation. Every impression tends to lose 
its effect after a time. The surviving image grows faint 
and indistinct unless it be re-invigorated by new impres- 
sions. Most of the events of life are forgotton just 
because they never recur in precisely the same form. The 
bulk of our mental imagery answers to objects which we 
see again and again, and events which repeatedly occur. 
Here then, we have a second circumstance determining 
the depth of an impression. The more frequently an 
impression is repeated the more enduring will be the 
image. Where the repetition of the actual impression 
is impossible, the repeated reproduction of it serves less 
effectually to bring about the same result. We are able 
to remember permanently a few events of early life by 
going back to them from time to time and so freshening 
the images of them. 



156 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION". 

Frequency of Repetition. It is important to add that it 
is not the mere number of repetitions which determines 
the final depth of the impression; it is the frequency 
of the repetitions. As has been remarked, every im- 
pression loses its effect after an interval. In order then 
that a second impression A 2 should add something to the 
effect of the first A l5 it must occur before this interval 
has expired. Only in this way can there be a cumula- 
tive effect. In learning a new language, we may look 
up in a dictionary an uncommon or rarely occurring 
word, and a common or a frequently recurring word 
exactly the same number of times, and at the end retain 
the latter but not the former. The process may be 
likened to that of damming a stream with stones. If we 
throw in the stones with sufficient rapidity, we may suc- 
ceed in fixing a barrier. But if we throw in one to-day, 
and another to-morrow, the effect of the first throw will 
be obliterated by the force of the stream before the sec- 
ond is added. 

These two conditions, a certain amount of attention 
and a certain frequency of repetition, are both necessary 
to permanent retention. As we have just seen, repeti- 
tion is commonly needed to supplement attention. And 
on the other hand, mere repetition without attention is 
ineffectual. We cannot distinctly represent even such 
a familiar object as a friend's face unless we have care- 
fully attended to its several features. 

(b) Association of Impression. When an impression 
has been well stamped on the mind, there remains a pre- 
disposition or tendency to reproduce it under the form 



EFFECTS OF ASSOCIATION. 157 

of an image. The degree of facility with which we 
recall any object always depends in part on the strength 
of this predisposition. 1 Nevertheless, this predisposi- 
tion will not in ordinary cases suffice in itself to effect a 
restoration after a certain time has elapsed. There is 
needed, further, something present to the mind to suggest 
the image, or remind us of the event or object. Thus 
the sight of a place reminds us of an event which hap- 
pened there, the hearing of a person's name, of that per- 
son, and so on. Such a reminder constitutes the 'exciting' 
as distinguished from the 'predisposing' cause. The 
reason why so many inpressions of our life, including 
our deeply interesting dream-experiences, appear to be 
wholly forgotton is that there is nothing to remind us 
of them. 

Now we are reminded of an impression by some other 
impression (or image) which is somehow connected in 
our minds or 'associated' with it. Thus the event is 
associated with the place which recalls it, and the per- 
son with his name. Hence we speak of association as 
the other great condition of reproduction. 

Association by Contiguity. Of these kinds of association 
the most important is that known as contiguous associa- 
tion, or Association by Contiguity. By this is meant the 
association of two or more impressions through, or on 
the ground of, their connection in time. Its principle 
may be stated briefly as follows: Presentations or im- 
pressions which occur together, or in immediate succes- 

i The strength of this predisposition will, of course, be greatest in the 
case of recent impressions. 



158 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

sion, will afterwards tend to revive, recall, or suggest 
-one another. 

It is obvious from this bare statement of the principle 
of Contiguous Association, that it implies two facts and 
a relation of dependence between them. First of all 
we have a fact of the external order, the presentation, 
simultaneously or in close succession, of two objects. 
This is marked off as the conjunction of impressions. 
Secondly, we have a fact of the subsequent internal 
order, the appearance or occurrence together of the cor- 
responding images. The term ' association ' properly 
applies, not to the conjunction of impressions in itself, 
but to the connection of images resulting from this. 1 

We see at once that this kind of association covers 
not only the connection of contemporaneous or succes- 
sive events, such as the flash and the sound of an explo- 
sion, the flow and ebb of the tide, but also that of cause 
and effect, and of objects in space as co-existent. For 
the relation of cause and effect clearly makes itself 
known through a connection in time. And it is easy to 
see that we observe the local relations of objects by re- 
peated successions of percepts. Thus we know the situ- 
ation of a building in relation to its surroundings by 
successive acts of attention : we know the situation of 
a town or of a river relatively to adjacent places by 
moving from one to the other. 

Law of Contiguity. In order to understand more pre- 

i The reader should note the ambiguity in the current phrases ' asso- 
ciation of impressions,' or ' of objects.' As the classical phrase • associa- 
tion of ideas ' shows, the term association refers directly to the resulting 
relation of the representations. ' 



LAW OF CONTIGUITY. 159 

cisely what is meant by the Law of Contiguous Associ- 
ation, we may let A and B stand for two impressions 
(percepts) occurring together, and a and b for the two 
representations answering to these. Then the Law 
asserts that when A (or a) recurs, it will tend to excite 
or call up b ; and similarly that the recurrence of B (or 
b) will tend to excite a. Thus the actual sight of a per- 
son or the mental picture of that person calls up the 
image of the place where we last saw him. It is to be 
added that the actual impression A will tend to call up 
b more powerfully than the representation a. Seeing a 
place will bring back an occurrence that happened there 
much more certainly and forcibly than merely imagining 
that place. 

Finally, what is true of two percepts or impressions is 
true of any number. Of a whole group of contempo- 
raneous events, any one may call up the image of any 
other. In the case of a series of events, each link tends 
to call up the adjacent links, the consequent more forci- 
bly than the antecedent. 

Degrees of Associative lorce. The Law of Contiguity 
speaks of a tendency to call up or suggest. This means 
that the suggestion does not always take place, that A is 
not always followed by i, and that in some cases it is 
much more prompt than in others. We may easily see 
by observation that this is so. Thus we sometimes hear 
names of persons and places without representing the 
corresponding objects, in other words, the names do not 
call up the appropriate images. In other cases, again, 
the revival is certain and rapid, as when a familiar word 
in the native tongue, as 'home,' 'father,' calls up its im- 



160 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

age. Indeed, in a certain class of cases the revival is so 
rapid that the mind is hardly aware of a transition from 
antecedent to consequent. Such are the suggestions of 
a vocal action by the connected sound (articulate or 
musical), of a manual movement by a visible sign or 
signal, and of a feeling, say of anger, by the visible ex- 
pression. We express this fact by saying that there are 
various degrees of associative or suggestive force. 

On what Associative Force depends. The associative force 
in any case depends mainly on the same two circum- 
stances as we found governing the persistence of im- 
pressions regarded as single or apart. These are first 
the amount of attention given to the impressions A and 
B in conjunction; and secondly the frequency of their 
concurrence. After what has been said as to the effect 
of these circumstances on single impressions, a word or 
two will suffice to illustrate their effect on conjunctions 
of impressions. 

(a) Connective Attention. Two (or more) impressions 
may become closely associated with one another by a 
special act of conjoint attention at the time. Thus, a 
child sees a stranger and hears his name, and by attend- 
ing closely to the two things together, and in their con- 
nection, his mind in a manner makes one object of them, 
so that the recurrence of the one suggests the other. 
A place vividly recalls some pleasurable or painful inci- 
dent which happened there, just because the mind being 
greatly excited at the moment threw a special force of 
attention into its perceptions, seizing the several parts 
of its surroundings in one comprehensive glance. A 



FORCE OF ASSOCIATION. 161 

voluntary concentration of mind on a plurality of 
objects or events in their connection one with another 
will, to some extent, effect the same result. The greater 
the force of attention directed to two objects, and 
the more closely the mind connects them by one act of 
attention, the stronger will be the resulting association. 
It follows from this that the order of our representa- 
tions is not wholly determined by the external order. 
We ourselves determine this order to some extent by 
the direction we give to our attention. Our interest in 
the objects presented is an important factor in fixing the 
special mental connections formed. This may be seen 
by comparing the dissimilar internal results of the same 
external order of impressions on different minds. Two 
persons, say an uneducated and an educated man, will 
give very unlike accounts of an incident which they 
have witnessed, or of a speech w T hich they have heard. 
In the former case, the path followed by the attention 
in watching the event or listening to the discourse 
(which in this instance is determined largely by external 
forces, or degrees of impressiveness), shows itself in the 
want of any logical connection in the several parts of 
the recital. In the latter case, the path of attention 
(here largely voluntary and determined by a desire to 
piece together and understand) show T s itself in the 
presence of such a logical connection in the narration. 

(b) Repetition and Association. It is, however, but rarely 
that a single conjunction of two experiences effects a 
permanent association. Repetition of the original ex- 
periences is necessary in the great majority of instances. 
All our enduring knowledge about the things around 

K 



162 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

us, such as the persoDS and places we are familiar with, 
the permanent natural objects, sun, moon, and stars, 
together with their movements, actions, or changes, 
owes its persistence to a number of recurring conjunc- 
tions of impressions. The more frequent the conjunc- 
tion of two percepts or impressions, the stronger the 
resulting bond of association between them. The 
closest associations, such as those between vocal actions 
and the resulting sounds, words and the things named, 
the movements of expression and the feelings expressed, 
are the result of innumerable conjunctions extending 
throughout life. 

It is to be observed that the order of our presenta- 
tions varies greatly at different times. Thus we find 
the same animal form with different colors : we en- 
counter persons in different places ; and we come across 
words and phrases in different connections. So far as 
this is the case, no firm associations are possible. The 
dissimilarities of the concomitants tend to counteract 
one another, and the image of the object is not associ- 
ated with any one of them. On the other hand, the fixed 
order of nature, and of human life, implies uniformity 
in variety, a certain amount of repetition, along with 
much variation, of concomitants. This is illustrated 
in the uniform relation between natural phenomena 
and their conditions, between human actions and cer- 
tain corresponding circumstances and motives, and 
between words and their grammatical connections. It 
is by the aid of this cumulative effect of many repeti- 
tions that the mind comes gradually to disentangle 
these uniformities of connection among things. 



REPRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE. 163 

Trains of Representations. All that has been said re- 
specting pairs of representations applies also to a whole 
series. A good part of our knowledge consists of 
trains of representations answering to recurring and 
oft-repeated series of presentations. Thus, our knowl- 
edge of a street, and of a whole town, consists of a 
recoverable train of visual images. In like manner, we 
are able to recall a series of visible movements or 
actions, as those of a play, and a succession of sounds 
as those of a tune. Our knowledge of every kind is 
closely connected with language, and is .retained to a 
considerable extent by help of series of words. Again 
our practical knowledge, our knowledge how to perform 
actions of various kinds, such as dressing and undress- 
ing, speaking and writing, is made up of numerous 
chains of representations. 

All such chains illustrate the effects of attention and 
of repetition. The more closely we have attended to 
the order of a dramatic action, the better will the sev- 
eral links of the chain be connected. And the more 
frequently we have seen a play, or heard a musical 
composition, or written out a sentence, the easier will it 
be for the mind afterwards to run over the series. It is 
to be noticed that in the case of all such recurring trains, 
the effect of repetition is to beget a powerful tendency 
to pass from one number of the series to the following 
numbers. The attention here moving in a habitual path, 
cannot easily arrest or fix any member of the series, but 
tends to be carried off to its successors. The full 
effect of this repetition is to reduce the required amount 
of attention to a minimum. We take in a familiar tune, 



164 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

and repeat a familiar train of words in a semi-conscious 
or automatic way. 

At tirst these trains of representation are not self- 
supporting. They are bound up with, and dependent 
on, actual presentations. Thus a child learning a tune 
is able at first only to recall the successive notes step by 
step, as he hears the tune sung (or plays it himself). 
That is to say, revival is still dependent on the stronger 
suggestive force of actual impressions. Gradually the 
series of representations becomes independent. The 
child's mind, on the recurrence of the first notes, can 
move on in advance. Not only so, when the train is 
perfectly built up, he will be able to recall it as a whole 
without any aid from external impressions. 

Composite Trains. Again, in nearly all cases of repre- 
sentative trains, we have to do not with a single series 
of elements, but with a number of concurrent series. 
For instance, our representation of a play is made up of 
a visual series, answering to the several scenes, move- 
ments of the actors, etc, and an auditory series, answer- 
ing to the flow of the dialogue. The repetition is here 
to bind together the several elements of each successive 
complex experience into one whole, and each of these 
wholes to succeeding ones. Thus each visible situation 
is firmly associated with the corresponding words, and 
this composite whole associated with what precedes and 
follows it. Frequent repetition tends here to consolidate 
each successive group into one mass, so that the whole 
series approximates to a single series. At the same 
time, a certain independence of the several concurrent 



SYMBOLIC SERIES. 165 

series remains, since the attention is able to fix itself 
according to circumstances, now on one series, now on 
another. Thus in recalling a familiar play, sometimes 
the series of visual images is the prominent one, at other 
times, the series of auditory representations. 

Symlolic Series. An interesting variety of such com- 
posite trains is that of symbolic series. Here we have 
a chain of presentations or impressions of no interest in 
themselves, but employed as marks of other things. The 
visual symbols answering to musical or articulate sounds 
may be taken as an example. Here the first step in the 
process of association is to knit together firmly the sev- 
eral symbols or signs with the symbolized objects or 
significates. The degree of perfection attained here 
will depend on the careful discrimination of each sign 
and of each significate from other members of its 
respective class, and the connection of the two members 
of each couple by repeated acts of conjoint attention. 
When this point is attained, the mind is able to recog- 
nize each symbol rapidly and with the slightest amount 
of attention, and to pass from this to the representation 
of a significate. Thus after thoroughly learning her 
notes a girl at once recalls the sound on seeing a visual 
symbol So rapid does this process of interpreting 
symbols tend to become that at last the mind is hardly 
aware of attending to the symbols at all. 

When this process of firmly coupling the separate 
symbols with their meanings or contents has been com- 
pleted, there is a further process of association in binding 
together numbers of these couples in series. Learning 



166 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. • 

the scale of printed notes, or the printed alphabet, may 
be taken as illustrating the process. 

By the frequent repetition of such a train, each mem- 
ber at once calls up, and leads the mind on to, the suc- 
ceeding one. Every successive going over the scales of 
note-symbols and sounds concurrently confirms this 
tendency, so that the learner gradually becomes inde- 
pendent of the presentations, and finally on the rein- 
statement of the initial members of the train, anticipates 
the whole succession. 

Series of Motor Representations. Another group of these 
recuring composite trains of representation, closely re- 
lated to the last, are those answering to our repeated 
or habitual actions. Every voluntary movement pre- 
supposes a representation of that movement, or a motor 
representation. Before we stretch out the hand to take 
something we rapidly represent this action. Hence the 
performance of a series of actions is immediately sup- 
ported by a series of motor representations. Not only 
so, along with this series there goes one or more series 
of sensory representations, namely, those of the sense- 
impressions immediately resulting from the several 
movements. Thus in walking, there is not only the 
series of images answering to the muscular actions, but 
that answering to the sensations of contact due to the 
bringing of the feet alternately to the ground, and in 
most cases, too, that corresponding to the visual sensa- 
tions arising from the changing appearances of the 
moving organ, and of the ground. So in singing or 
speaking, the series of vocal representations is bound up 
with one of auditory images. 



VERBAL ASSOCIATIONS. 167 

Verbal Associations. Among the most important of 
our associations are those of words. Language is the 
medium "by which we commonly recall impressions. 
This arises from the circumstance that we are social 
beings, dependent upon communications with others. 
A word is at once a passive impression and a vocal 
action. And this points to the two-sided function of 
language as the medium of imparting and of receiving 
knowledge. The conditions of social life have, as their 
result, the intimate association of verbal signs and 
images generally. Hence words play a most important 
part in the revival of impressions. If, further, it is 
remembered that language is the medium by which all 
the higher products of intellectual activity are retained 
and recalled, its importance will be still more apparent. 

It follows from this brief account of words that verbal 
associations will illustrate the characteristics of sym- 
bolic association and motor combination just described. 
The building up of verbal associations begins with the 
knitting together of the several elements entering into 
each verbal complex or word. Here the first step is the 
linking of the vocal action to its respective sound. To 
this must be added, in the case of the educated, the com- 
bining of this pair with a visual symbol, more particu- 
larly the printed word. 1 Not only so, since words are sym- 
bols of interest only as representing ideas, the building 
up of these verbal aggregates is completed by the firm 
attachment of the word-complex to the corresponding 
image or idea. Here, too, the general conditions of 
association hold good. The better the several elements, 

i The other visual symbol, the written word, is only of importance in 
connection with the action of writing. 



168 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

sounds, vocal actions, visual symbols arid, finally, ideas, 
are discriminated from other members of their respect- 
ive classes; and the closer and more frequent the act of 
attention to the different constituents of each group or 
complex in their relation one to another, the firmer 
will be the association. 

When this process of association is complete, any 
member of the verbal aggregate tends instantly to call 
up the others. But all the elements are not called up 
with equal distinctness in every case. To begin with, 
since the words are symbols, interesting only as standing 
for ideas, words tend in general to call up ideas more 
powerfully than these last to call up words. The sound 
or sight of a word, instantly carries the mind on to some 
image of an object. But we may have images of per- 
sons, places, etc., with only a very faint verbal accom- 
paniment. 1 

Not only so, all the elements of a verbal aggregate 
are not always called up with equal distinctness. Thus 
when listening to the words of another, the mind (if 
interested) is instantly carried on from the sounds to 
the ideas, and there is only an incipient resurgence of 
the images of the vocal actions. On the other hand, in 
speaking, in reading from a book, the vocal representa- 
tions become much more distinct. 

The verbal groups or complexes just described are 
capable of becoming associated in definite series, 2 and 

i The strong tendency of words to call up ideas is, however, counter- 
acted in certain cases. Like human representatives, words tend to 
become the substitutes of that for which they stand. This will be touched 
on by and by. 

2 Strictly speaking a word is a (short) series of sounds, vocal actions, 
and visual symbols. 



MEMORY AND EXPECTATION. 169 

it is by the aid of such series that our knowledge of 
things in their order of time and place is largely built 
up. The general conditions of the formation of such 
highly composite series are the same as before. The 
more closely the several elements (sounds, vocal actions, 
etc.), have been attended to in their succession, and the 
more frequently the series had been run over, the firmer 
the bond of connection. 

It follows from what we said just now, that in learn- 
ing a train of words together with its accompanying 
ideas, all the elements of the complex are not commonly 
presented. Thus when a child is learning a poem out 
of a book, and repeats the words audibly, there is the 
full operation of the different associative agencies (the 
linking of one visual symbol, of one vocal action, etc., 
to its successor) at work. On the otter hand, in com- 
mitting to mind what has been said to us, the retention 
turns principally on the knitting together of the suc- 
ceeding sounds; and in learning a passage from an 
author the process of acquisition depends, to some con- 
siderable extent, at least, on firmly binding together the 
visual symbols. 

Memory and Expectation. Our images and trains of 
images are commonly accompanied by some more or less 
distinct reference to the corresponding presentations, 
and to the time of their occurrence; in other words, by 
some amount of belief in the corresponding events. In 
some eases, no doubt, this accompaniment is of the 
vaguest kind. In a state of listless reverie, we may 
have a series of images without any distinct reference 
to the corresponding experiences. We simply picture 



170 EEPE0DUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

the objects, without reflecting where or when we have 
seen them or shall see them. In other cases, however, 
we distinctly refer the images to some place in the time- 
order of our experience. This reference assumes one of 
two well-marked forms: (a) a reference to the past or 
Memory, or more fully, Memory of Events; and ( h) a 
reference to the future, or Expectation. 

Both memory and expectation involve a series of 
images ordered in time, and both illustrate the action of 
association. Thus in remembering the events of a par- 
ticular day, the mind retraces the (principal) steps of a 
succession of experiences, the images following in the 
order of the events, and being ' localized ' in this order. 
Similarly in anticipating the succession of the events of 
a journey similar to one already performed, the mind 
passes over a succession of images having the same time- 
order as the events of which they are copies, and held 
together by the bond of contiguity. 

Again, both memory and expectation are modes of 
belief; but they are perfectly distinct modes. In mem- 
ory we have to do with a reality which is over, which is 
no longer. 

Representation of Time. The mental states marked off 
as memory and expectation plainly involve the repre- 
sentation of time. To recall an event is to refer to a 
past, to expect one is to refer to a future. Both ex- 
pectation and memory are developed in close connection 
with the growth of this representation of time. 

It is difficult for us at first to conceive that a child 
could ever have had a succession of unlike experiences 
and not instantly referred these to their positions in the 



REPRESENTATION OF TIME. 171 

time-order, as before and after. Yet there is every 
reason to think that the knowledge of time is a late 
acquisition. In its developed form, the representation 
of events in their temporal order is attained much later 
than that of objects in their spatial or local order. The 
genesis of the former is intimately connected with the 
process of reproductive imagination, whereas the origin 
of the latter is connected with that of sense-perception. 
Children attain very clear ideas about the position of 
objects in space, the relations of near and far, inside and 
outside, &c, before they have any definite ideas about 
the succession and duration of events. Thus a child of 
three and a-half years, who had a very precise knowl- 
edge of the relative situations of the several localities 
visited in his walks, showed that he had no definite 
representations answering to the terms ' this week,' 
1 last week,' and still tended to think of ' yesterday ' as 
an undefined past. 

Sow Representation oj a Past arises. The simplest form 
of time-apprehension would seem to arise in the follow- 
ing way. A child is watching some interesting object, 
say the play of the sunbeam on the wall of his nursery. 
Suddenly the sun is obscured by a cloud and the marvel 
of the dancing light vanishes. In place of the golden 
brilliance, there now stands the dull commonplace wall- 
paper. This cessation, however, as we saw above, does 
not imply an instantaneous sinking of the presentation 
below the level of consciousness. The image persists, 
and attracts the attention by reason of its interesting- 
ness. At the same time there is the actual present, the 
sight of the sunless wall. Here, then, the contrast 



172 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

between presentation and representation, the actual ex- 
perience of the present, and the represented experience 
which is not now, would disclose itself. The antithesis 
of now, and not-now would be reached. 

Personal Identity. It is only as memory is developed 
in this distinct and complete form that there arises a 
clear consciousness of personal identity, that is to say 
an idea of a permanent self continuing to exist in spite 
of the numberless changes of its daily experience. 
Since the consciousness or knowledge of self thus pre- 
supposes a considerable development of representative 
power, it is attained much later tham a knowledge of 
external things. 

Association by Similarity. Although the principle of 
contiguity covers most of the facts of memory, it is 
usual to lay down other principles of association as well. 
Of these the most important is Association through 
Similarity. This principle asserts that an impression 
(or image) will tend to call up an image of any object 
previously perceived which resembles it. Thus a new 
face suggests by resemblance another and familiar one, 
a word in one language as the Italian toro, a word in 
another as the Latin taurus, and so on. The more con- 
spicuous the point of resemblance between two things, 
and the greater the amount of their resemblance com- 
pared with that of their difference, the greater the sug- 
gestive force. 

This kind of association is strongly marked-off from 
the first. Contiguity associates things which are adja- 
cent in our experience, that is to say events which are 



LAW OF SIMILARITY. 173 

contemporaneous or immediately successive in time, and 
things contiguous in place. Similarity, on the other 
hand, brings together experiences widely remote in the 
time order. Thus a face seen to-day in Loudon may 
remind us of one seen years ago in a distant part of the 
globe. 

Influence of Law of Similarity. The force of similarity 
exerts a wide influence on the flow of our representa- 
tions. When it is impossible by an act of reflection to 
find a link of contiguity connecting an antecedent im- 
age and its consequent, the thread of connection can be 
found in some likeness or analogy. Among these links 
of similarity must be included what has been called the 
'Analogy of feeling.' One thing is apt to remind us of 
another and disconnected thing by reason of its similar 
emotional effect. Disparate sensations, as those of 
color and of tone, have certain similarities in their 
emotional accompaniment. Hence, the transference of 
the language proper to one class to another, as when we 
talk of a ' harsh tone ' in a picture, or of the ' rich 
coloring ' of an orchestral accompaniment. We have 
classical authority for likening a trumpet note to a 
brilliant scarlet color. The strange associations formed 
by some, as the now famous brothers Nussbaunier, 
between certain sounds and certain colors may be due in 
part to such an analogy of feeling. 1 

Acquisition is greatly aided by this ' attraction of 
similars ' as it has been called, or the tendency of like 
to call up like. If everything we had to learn, whether 

i For an account of these curious associations of colors and sounds, 
see G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, Prob. III., Chap. IV.; F. 
Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty : Color Associations, p. U5, &c. 



174 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

by actual observation or by books, were absolutely new, 
the labor would be colossal. When we study a new 
language, for example, the similarities very greatly 
shorten the labor. Thus, when the German word Vogel 
calls up the familiar name fowl, its meaning is at once, 
fixed. The new acquisition is permanently attached to 
the pre-existing stock of acquisitions through a link of 
similarity. Or as we commonly express it, the new is 
assimilated to the old. 

Association hy Contrast. In addition to the principle of 
Similarity, another principle of association known as 
Contrast is commonly laid down. By this is meant that 
one impression, object, or event tends to call up the 
image of its opposite or contrast. Thus it is said that 
black suggests white, — poverty, wealth, — a flat country 
a mountainous, and so forth. 1 

Contrast plays only a limited part in memory or 
acquisition. Its chief use is to arouse attention and 
thereby to stamp deeper on the mind what is unusual, 
exceptional, and in contrast with the ordinary run of 
experience, such as the sight of a giant or a dwarf, the 
roar of Niagara, and so on. In some cases, it appears 
to co-operate with contiguity in bringing about an as- 
sociation between the images of two objects or events. 
The impression made on the memory by the juxtaposi- 
tion of barren mountains and fertile valleys, by the 
combination of a high-sounding name and a very 

i Drobisch adds that, in all cases of suggestion by contrast, the sug- 
gestive force resides in the likeness, and not in the contrast. Thus when 
a drawing of a group of laughing faces reminds us of another of a group 
of weeping faces previously seen, the revival "takes place manifestly 
only through the similarity of the faces in their juxtaposition." (Empiri- 
sche Psycliologie, § 32, p. 85.) 



COMPLEX ASSOCIATION. 175 

insignificant-looking person,or by the succession of a 
prosperous and an adverse reign in English history, 
illustrates the effect of contrast in confirming a contigu- 
ous association. 1 

Complex Association. So far, it has been assumed that 
association is simple, that one and the same image only 
enters into a single associative combination. But this 
does not correspond with the facts. Association is highly 
complex. One element may enter as a member into a 
number of distinct combinations. Thus the image of 
the Colisseum at Rome is associated with that of events 
in my personal history, of pleasant days passed at Rome, 
of historical events, such as the gladiatorial combats of 
the empire, its conquests and luxury, etc. The threads 
of association are not distinct and parallel, like the 
strings of a harp, but intersect one another, forming an 
intricate network. 

Convergent Associations. One result of this complexity 
is that different threads of association converge in the 
same point; so that the recall of an image may take 
place by a number of suggesting forces. This co-oper- 
ation of associative forces is involved in the composite 
trains of images described above. The process may be 
very well illustrated by the case of a succession of 
words. 

A verbal series committed to memory consists, as we 
have seen, of series of auditory, vocal, and visual repre- 
sentations; and this composite series is supplemented by 

1 For an historical account of the different views held as to the Laws 
of Association, see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. 
XXXI. 



176 REPKODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

a series of object images. The whole series is thus a 
highly intricate sort of cord in which a number of 
threads are intertwined. Hence in recalling a series of 
words, as those of a poem, the mind may travel along 
any one of the ])arallel series of images. Thus it may 
move now along that of the sounds, now along that of 
the visual signs, and now along the picture-series cor- 
responding to the objects described and events narrated. 
It follows, that if the members of one series are not 
firmly knit together, the mind can pass by one of the 
other series. 

Association of Numbers. The advantage to memory of 
such parallel and connected threads of association seems 
to be shown in the fact that many young persons visual- 
ize numerals in certain number-forms, or geometric 
schemes, more or less elaborate, and in some case highly 
colored as well. 1 The explanation seems to be as fol- 
lows. The learning of numbers illustrates the associating 
of a series of sound-representations with a series of vis- 
ual images. In the case of the lower numbers, the 
sound tends to call up a concrete image of the number, 
e. g., the arrangement of the dots on a domino or card. 
But in the case of the higher numbers no such image is 
possible. Here all that is called up (in the way of a con- 
crete object) by the number-sound is the visual symbol 
(as 100, 1000, etc.). Thus the association of the double 
series of auditory and visual symbols is the main process 
in learning numbers. What the child requires, indeed, 
in manipulating numbers, whether working out a sum 

i Nearly one in four of the Charterhouse boys was found to visualize 
numbers in some form. 



CO-OPERATION OF ASSOCIATIONS. 177 

on a slate, or mentally calculating, is a clear representa- 
tion of these visual symbols. 

This co-operation of associations is seen in another 
form in those cases where one and the same image is 
attached to a number of quite disconnected images or 
series of images. In this case, the mind may return to 
a particular point by a number of paths, not running 
side by side as in the case of composite trains, but start- 
ing from widely remote points. 

In most of our acquisitions, there is this form of com- 
bination of associative forces. Thus the date of an 
historical event is associated with that of simultaneous 
events at home or abroad, and of preceding and 
succeeding events. And it may be recalled by way 
of any one of these channels. These combinations 
include associations by similarity as well as by con- 
tiguity. A person's name may be recalled not only 
by recalling his appearance, the book of which he is the 
author, and so on, but also by hearing another name 
which resembles it. The succession of the Saxon kings 
is aided by the similarity of their names. So the learn- 
ing of the verses of a poem is aided by the similarities 
of metre and rhyme. 

Divergent Associations. While looked at from one point 
of view, the fact of the complexity of association is an 
aid to memory, looked at from another, it is an obstruc- 
tion. If an image is associated with a number of other 
and disconnected images, then the mind in setting out 
from this image may move along any one of a divergent 
series of paths. Accordingly it is less likely to strike 
upon any one particular path that is required at the 



178 EEPEODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

moment. It is like being in a town and having to find 
one's way out in a particular direction, instead of being 
outside and having to find the way into it. The multi- 
plicity of paths which was an advantage in the one case, 
is a hindrance in the other. The errors of confusion to 
which we are liable in repeating a poem, or playing a 
tune from memory, are due to the fact that certain 
members of the series enter into other associations, and 
so lead us astray. This aspect of association has been 
marked off as Obstructive Association. 

Passive and Active Memory : Recollection. The reproduc- 
tion of presentations is a passive or mechanical opera- 
tion. It is independent of -the will and controlled by its 
own laws. When there is perfect retention, the flow of 
images goes on automatically without the least inter- 
vention of the active mind. In many of our idle 
moments, as in taking a walk in the country, we thus 
give ourselves up to the unimpeded flow of images. 

In this passive process of reproduction, the particular 
sequence followed at any time will be the resultant of 
all the forces of revival acting at the time. The actual 
impressions of the moment, or of recent events, will con- 
stitute the starting points. These will call up images 
of other objects and events associated with them, ac- 
cording to the degree of firmness of the associative 
bonds and the strength of the general tendency of the 
images to recur. 1 The continual incursion of new and 

i It follows from our exposition of the laws of the revival of images, 
that every revival is the resultant of two forces : (a) the disposition of 
the image to recur which depends on the whole number of repetitions of 
this impression (whatever its accompaniments), and which is greatly 
strengthened by recency of impression; and (b) the degree of cohesion 
between the image and the antecedent which excites it. 



ATTENTION AND EECOLLECTION. 179 

disconnected impressions, which start new trains of 
images, as well as the co-operation of similarity with 
contiguity, and the frequent calling off of the mind from 
one train by divergent paths, will serve to give to such 
a purely passive flow of images the appearance of a dis- 
orderly chaotic impression. 

In contrast to this passive reproduction, there is an 
active reproduction in which the will co-operates. Here 
the succession of images is still ultimately determined 
by the laws of association. The will cannot secure a 
revival of any impressions except by the aid of these 
laws. That is to say, a person cannot recall a thing by 
directly willing it. All that he can do is to put himself 
in the mental attitude suitable to remembering it. But 
this ability to look out for, and aid in the revival of, an 
image, tends greatly to modify the passive flow of im- 
ages described above. Hence we say that the process 
of reproduction, though an automatic process, is sus- 
ceptible of being controlled by the will. This active 
side of memory is best marked off as Recollection. 1 

Attention and Recollection. In order to understand this 
co-operation of the will in the processes of reproduction, 
we will first examine the case in which its activity 
is present in a marked degree, viz., in the process known 
as * trying to remember ' a thing. The will works here, 
as in the case of all other intellectual operations, 
through the attention. To try to remember is to con- 
centrate the mind on the operation, to shut out disturb- 
ing influences. The very bodily expression of the 

iSir W. Hamilton, following Latin writers, gives to it the name Rem- 
iniscence. 



180 REPKODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

attitude, the fixed look, compressed lips, and so on, 
shows that there is a special effort of concentration. 

The effect of this effort of attention is to give greater 
distinctness and persistence to what is before the mind. 
Thus if a child is asked the date of a certain battle, he 
may by an act of attention give clearness and fullness 
to the representation of the battle. And by so doing 
he helps to give effect to the associative force connect- 
ing the event and the date. Not only so, the will 
accomplishes an important work in resisting obstructive 
associations, turning away from all misleading sugges- 
tions, and following out the clues. The revival of an 
impression, as of a name, or an event, is a gradual pro- 
cess. We are often dimly aware beforehand of the 
character of the image we desire to call up clearly. 
And so we know well enough whether we are on our 
way to it, or are going away from it. 1 

It is obvious that this process of trying to remember 
a definite fact shows deficient memory, absence of per- 
fect associative ' cohesion.' And at best it can but 
poorly compensate for the want of a firm mental con- 
nection. Yet its value is not to be under-estimated. 

In the case of the most tenacious memory, there must 
be many loose associations which need the co-operation 
of attention. It may be added that even where trying 
to recollect seems futile, it may effect something. The 
sudden return of a name after many efforts to recollect 
it, points to the conclusion that the revival of the image 
had been, in a measure, furthered, by these acts of con- 
centration. 

i On this partial consciousness of what we want in recalling, see Dr. 
Maudsley, The Physiology of Mind, Chap. IX., pp. 519, 520. 



COMMAND OF IMAGES. 181 

Commanding the Store of Images. It is, however, not in 
this form of severe effort to aid in the revival of some 
particular image, that the co-operation of the will is 
chiefly important. It enters, in a less marked manner, 
into all our ordinary processes of revival. Even in 
repeating a familiar poem the will, by an effort so slight 
that we are scarcely aware of it, steadies the whole op- 
eration, securing the due succession of the several mem- 
bers of the train, and the avoidance of misleading 
suggestions. 

This ability to control the reproductive processes 
reaches its highest development in a habit of going over 
the contents of memory, and following out, now one 
path, now another, according to the purpose in hand. 
Thus when a poet needs a simile, or a scientific teacher 
an illustration of some kind, he is able to inspect the 
store of his accumulations in so far as it bears on the 
purpose in hand. This ready command of images by 
the will presupposes that there has been an orderly ar- 
rangement of the materials, that when new acquisitions 
were made, these were linked on (by contiguity and 
similarity) to old acquisitions. It is only when there 
has been the full co-operation of the will in this earlier 
or acquisitive stage, that there will be a ready command 
of the materials gained in the later stage of reproduc- 
tion. 

Degrees of Recollection: Forgetfulness. Our ability to 
recall impressions varies indefinitely from total inability 
up to the point at which all sense of effort vanishes and 
the reproduction is certain and instantaneous. At one 
extreme, we have total forgetfulness or oblivescence; at 



182 KEPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

the other, perfect recollection and perfect knowledge as 
determined by retentiveuess. 

Perfect recollection at any time embraces but a very 
few of the impressions recalled by the mind. The con- 
ditions of such facile recall are too complex to allow of 
its realization in the large majority of cases. Interest, 
repetition, association with what is near at hand and so 
offers a starting point in the process of recovery, are all 
necessary to this result. What we can recollect instantly, 
and without mental exertion is either included in, or 
firmly attached to, our permanent surroundings, dom- 
inant interests, and habitual pursuits. Thus w r e can at 
any time recall without effort the scenery of our home, 
or place of business, the sound of our friends' voices, the 
knowledge we habitually revert to and apply in our 
daily actions, our professions, amusements, etc. 

Next to this perfect recollection comes that which 
involves a greater effort and is less uniform and certain. 
This applies to a good many of our acquisitions which 
have been firmly built up at the outset, but to which 
we have had little occasion to go back of late. Our 
knowledge of many striking events of the more remote 
past, much of our school knowledge, as that of classics 
or mathematics, not turned to practical account in later 
life, is an illustration of such imperfect recollection. We 
can only recall by a prolonged effort and by the help 
of special circumstances, e. g., talking with some old ac- 
quaintance, or steeping our minds for a while in a Latin 
or Greek author. 

Partial OMivescence. Here, it is obvious, we reach the 
first stage of Forgetfulness or Oblivescence. There is 



FORGETFULNESS — PAETIAL AND TOTAL. 183 

partial or temporary oblivescence, yet not total forget- 
fulness. The mind has evidently retained, but an 
exceptional strength of reviving or resuscitative force 
is needed to call up the image. This temporary forget- 
fulness may be momentary only, and due to the condi- 
tion of the brain and mind at the instant, as fatigue, 
emotional agitation, * absence of mind,' or preoccupation. 
Or the inability to recall may extend over a longer period. 
For instance, our difficulty in speaking a foreign lan- 
guage which we learnt some years ago and have not 
recently had any occasion to make use of, may require 
for its removal a day or two's sojourn in the country. 

Total OMivescence. The first stage of perfect oblives- 
cence is reached when no effort of will, and no available 
aid from suggestive forces succeeds in effecting the re- 
production. This holds good of the large majority of 
our impressions. After a short interval they fade into 
complete oblivion. Reproduction in their case is prac- 
tically impossible. 

Divisions of Memory. Although we speak of memory 
as if it were a simple indivisible faculty, we must bear 
in mind that it is really made up of a number of distinct 
parts, as the retention of sights, sounds, and so forth. 
It is one thing to recall a musical sound or a series of 
such sounds, another to recall a group of visible objects. 
There are as many compartments of memory as there 
are kinds of impression. Thus there is a memory for 
visual impressions, and another for auditory impressions. 
Within the limits of one and the same sense, too, there 



184 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

are distinct differences of memory. Thus the memory 
for colors is different from the memory for forms, the 
memory for musical sounds, from the memory for artic- 
ulate sounds. In addition to these retentions of passive 
impressions, there are retentions of active experiences, 
as our various manual movements and vocal actions. 

Speaking generally, and disregarding for the present 
individual differences, we may say that the higher the 
sense in point of discriminative refinement, the better 
the corresponding memory. We appear to recall sights 
best of all; then sounds, tastes and smells. Further, 
since the muscular sense is characterized by a high 
degree of refinement, the retention of our active expe- 
riences is in general relatively good. It must be remem- 
bered, too, that our muscular experiences are uniformly 
attended with passive impressions, and that these serve 
materially to support the retention. Thus the mechanic 
recalls his manual performances partly by representing 
the visual appearance of the moving hands; similarly, 
the orator recalls a string of vocal utterances by help of 
the images of the sounds which immediately follow 
them. 

Remembering Things and Remembering Words. Of all im- 
pressions visual percepts are the most important. As 
has been shown above, visual perceptions, gathering up 
as they do the results of our sense-experience as a whole, 
make up the chief part of sense-knowledge. And since 
sight is the most discriminative of the senses we find 
that visual percepts are better recalled than any others. 
Visual images or pictures of objects thus constitute the 



REMEMBERING WORDS. 185 

staple of our ordinary recallings. In representing a par- 
ticular object, as the interior of a room, Westminster 
Abbey, John Smith, and so on, we picture its visible 
aspect, and represent other qualities (even though the 
most interesting, as the taste of an orange) only vaguely 
in the back-ground. To remember a thing is thus pre- 
eminently to recall its look or visible aspect. 

Next to visual images come those of words. Owing 
to the importance of verbal signs pointed out just now, 
representations of these constitute a large fraction of 
our mental reproductions. So close, indeed, is x the as- 
sociation between words and things that we rarely 
represent an object without, at the same time, more or 
less distinctly reproducing its name. Not only so, the 
retention and reproduction of all the higher products 
of intellectual activity, general notions, judgments and 
trains of reasoning, are effected by way of language. 

To remember a name, however, is not necessarily 
to remember the corresponding object (or idea). We 
may distinctly recall the name of a particular place or 
person, and yet possess only a very vague and indistinct 
representation of the visible object denoted. In order 
to preserve distinct images in connection with words, 
it is necessary first of all to have deep impressions, or 
clear precepts of the objects, and secondly to associate 
these closely with the corresponding names. 

Growth of the Reproductive Faculty : Beginning of Memory. 
Memory presupposes Sensation and Perception. Im- 
ages do not appear till sense-knowledge has reached a 
certain stage of development. Retentiveness in the 



186 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

early period exists only as the power of recognizing 
objects when they are present. A child less than three 
months old will remember the face of his nurse or 
father for some weeks. The first images only appear 
later as the result of many accumulating traces of per- 
cepts. They are such as are immediately called up by 
the actual impression of the moment. The interesting 
experiences of the meal, the bath, and the walk are the 
first to be distinctly represented. As the interest in 
things extends and the observing powers grow, distinct 
mental pictures of objects are formed. M. Perez tells 
us of a child of eight months who had been accustomed 
to watch a bird singing in a cage, and who on seeing 
the cage without the bird showed all signs of bitter dis- 
appointment. 

Repetition of Experience. As experiences repeat them- 
selves and traces accumulate, representations become 
more distinct, and are more firmly associated ; also, the 
number of representations and of associative links in- 
creases. The learning of the meaning of words, which, 
as is well known, may precede the actual employment 
of them by several months, greatly enlarges the range 
of suggestion. After this the mother or the nurse is 
able to call up the image of absent objects, such as per- 
sons or animals, by talking of them. The repetition of 
conjunctions of experience further brings about whole 
groups and series of representations. The child's mind 
is able to pass not only from the actual impression of 
the moment to the image of something immediately ac- 
companying it, but from this last to another image, 



HOW MEMORY IMPROVES. 187 

and so on. Thus a child of eighteen months will men- 
tally rehearse a series of experiences, as those of a 
walk : " Go tata, see gee-gee, bow-wow," etc. 

New Experiences. The child's experience is not a mere 
series of repetitions. There is a continual widening of 
the range of presentations, an addition of new experi- 
ences. This extension of the area of impression is due 
in part to the expansion of his interest in things, and 
in part to the changes in his environment. In this way, 
fresh materials are being stored up in the memory. To 
some extent these displace the old. The temporary im- 
pressions of last week are dislodged by the temporary 
impressions of this week. But the growth of memory 
means an increase in retentive capacity. The progress 
of the child is marked by the fact that the new dis- 
places the old less and less, that there is a gradual en- 
largement of the store of permanent acquisitions. 

How Memory Improves. This process of growth, this 
continual increase in the store of acquisitions, implies 
an improvement in the power of seizing and retaining 
new impressions. By this is meant that any particular 
acquisitive task will become easier, and that more diffi- 
cult feats of retention will become possible. 

The progress of retentive and reproductive power 
may be viewed under three aspects. First of all im- 
pressions will be acquired or stored up more easily 
(for a given time). Less concentration is needed for 
the stamping in of an impression. Or to put it other- 
wise, a given amount of concentration will lead to a 



188 KEPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

storing up of more material, that is, more complex 
groups of impressions. Secondly, impressions are re- 
tained longer. A given amount of effort in the acquis- 
itive stage will result in a more enduring or permanent 
retention. This aspect maybe marked off as an increase 
in the tenacity of memory. Thirdly, this progress im- 
plies a more perfect form of revival. That is to say, 
impressions will be recalled more readily and in a higher 
degree of distinctness and fidelity than formerly. The 
details of the mental image will be fuller, and the whole 
image or group of images better separated from other 
like images or groups. 

The three characteristics of a good memory here 
touched on are not wholly independent one of another. 
The memory may develop under one aspect and not to 
the same extent under the other. Thus there may be 
a growth of acquisitive skill in the shape of a quickness 
of mind in seizing new impressions and retaining them 
for a short time. This, however, would only amount to 
an improvement of temporary retention. Similarly, 
there may be an improvement of tenacity without any 
commensurate increase in readiness of reproduction. 
Different individuals show these aspects of memory in 
very unequal degrees. 1 

i On the essentials of a good memory, see D. Stewart, Elements of the 
Philosophy of the Human Mind, Pt. I., Chap. VI. Drobisch recognizes 
lour characteristics of a good or ' strong ' memory : (1) Facility of appre- 
hension or acquisition ; (2) Trustworthiness, or fidelity of conservation 
and reproduction; (3) Lastingness or permanence; and (4) Serviceable - 
ness, i. e., readiness of recollection, Empirische Psychologie, § 35. Locke 
points out that the two main defects of memory are oblivion, i. e., want 
of tenacity, and slowness (want of readiness in reproduction), Essay on 
the Human Understanding, Bk. II., Chap, X., Sect. 8. 



GROWTH OF MEMORY. 189 

Causes of Growth of Memory : Plastic Power of Brain. 
This increase in retentive power is due to some consid- 
erable extent to the spontaneous unfolding of the brain 
powers. All mental acquisition appears to involve cer- 
tain formations or structural changes in the brain. The 
capability of the brain of undergoing these chauges, or 
what has been called its plastic power, increases rapidly 
during the early part of life. Impressions of all sorts 
stamp themselves more deeply on the mind of a child 
ten years old than on that of a child three or four years 
old, owing to this greater plasticity of the brain. This 
condition explains the precocity of memory. It is 
commonly said that the power of storing up new im- 
pressions reaches its maximum in early youth, and the 
fact is undoubtedly connected with the physiological 
fact that later on the structure of the brain is more set, 
or less modifiable. 

Just as memory is one of the first faculties to be de- 
veloped, so it is one of the first to be impaired by age. 
The loss of the power to build up new acquisitions, as 
the names of new acquaintances, marks the proximity 
of the culminative point of mental development. The 
decline of memory, like its development, shows well 
marked stages. The weakest associations {e. g., between 
proper names and their objects) corresponding to the low- 
est stage of nervous organization, are the first to give 
way. The same order of decliue is seen in mental disease. 
Thus in disorders involving loss of memory for words, 
those classes of words which answer to the lowest degree 
of cohesion or nervous co-ordination disappear first. 1 

1 For an account of the physical changes involved in the decline of 
memory with old age, see Dr. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, Book II., 



190 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

Improvement of Memory by Exercise. Yet allowing its 
full weight to this fact, we can easily see that a large 
part of the improvement of memory is due to exercise. 
The successive changes in the plastic power of the brain 
assign limits to acquisition : but the actual amount of 
retention reached is determined (within these limits) by 
the amount of exercise. 

New Acquisitions aided hy Old. In one sense all acquisi- 
tion renders further acquisition easier by offering more 
points of attachment. A student of 25, well versed in 
languages, will master a new language in much less 
time than a boy of 12 or 15, even though the plastic 
power of his brain is less. All fresh acquisition, in so 
far as it is assimilating new to old material, is assisted 
by the results of past acquisition. In this sense exercise 
improves memory, and enables it to go on developing 
long after the plastic age has been past. 1 

Habits of Memory. Not only so, memory is strength- 
ened by exercise in a narrower and stricter sense. In- 
crease of facility in acquiring and reproducing new 
knowledge is aided by the formation of intellectual 
habits. By these are meant close concentration of mind 

Chap. X., § 351. The order of failure of words in mental disease (aphasia) 
is said by M. Ribot to be from the particular to the general. Thus proper 
names are lost before common, substantives before adjectives. This 
corresponds according to M. Ribot, with the range of the uses of these 
classes of words, and so with the degree of co-ordination involved. See 
his work, Les Maladies de la Memaire, Chap. III., p. 132, etc. 

i It follows that there is a reciprocal benefit in linking on new to old 
knowledge. The new is attached to what is already in our grasp, and 
this last, being revived in connection with the new acquisition, is kept 
fresh. 



KINDS OF MEMORY. 191 

on the subject-matter learnt, searching out and noting 
all its points of attachment to previously acquired im- 
pressions or facts, repetition or going over the new 
impression, and finally concentration of mind at the 
moment of recall. The more perfect these habits, the 
higher will be the capacity for seizing and retaining 
new knowledge. 

Varieties of Memory, General and Special. There is prob- 
ably no power which varies more among individuals 
than memory. The interval which separates a person 
of average memory from one of the historical examples, 
as Joseph Scaliger or Pascal, seems enormous. 1 There 
is every reason to think that some excel others in their 
power of memory as a whole, by which is meant their 
capability of retaining and reproducing impressions 
generally. 

More commonly, however, the observed differences 
appear in some special direction, or with respect to 
some particular class of impressions. Thus one person 
has a good retentive power for visual or auditory im- 
pressions as a whole ; or for those of some variety of 
these, as impressions of color, or of musical sound ; or, 
finally, for a circumscribed group of objects, as faces. 
In this way arise what are known as the pictorial 
memory, the musical memory, the local memory, etc. 



i Casaubon says of Scaliger— "He read nothing (and what did he 
not read ?) which he did not forthwith remember." Pascal says he never 
forgot anything which he had read or thought. For other examples of 
capacious memory, see D. Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind, Pt. I., Chap. VI., §3; and Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on 
Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. XXXI. 



192 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

As illustrations of such exceptional retentive power in 
particular directions, may be mentioned Horace Ver- 
net and Gustave Dore who could paint a portrait from 
memory, Mozart who wrote down the Miserere of the 
Sistine Chapel after hearing it twice, Menetrier who 
could repeat three hundred disconnected words after 
once hearing them. 1 

Even differences in general power of memory prob- 
ably turn to a considerable extent on special differences, 
namely in verbal retention. Although, as we have seen, 
to recall words is not the same as to recall things, the 
latter operation cannot be carried on to any consider- 
able extent apart from the former. Hence a good 
memory for impressions generally has, in all cases, been 
largely sustained by an exceptional verbal memory. 2 

The differences of memory among individuals are 
numerous, and by no means easy to classify. To begin 
with more general points of inequality, persons may 
differ from one another with respect to the relative 
degrees of prominence of the aspects of memory dis- 
tinguished above. For instance, some boys are quick 
in acquisition but not tenacious : they can carry im- 
pressions for a short time, but not for a long period. 
Others again are tenacious but not correspondingly 
ready to call forth and apply what they know. Again, 
if we look to more special differences, we find that 
minds vary not only with respect to the particular im- 

i For other instances, see Taine, On Intelligence, Pt. I., Bk. II., 
Chap. I. 

« This is amply illustrated in the historical instances given by Hamil- 
ton, as well as by the well-known case of Macaulay. 



DIFFERENCES OF MEMORY. 193 

pressions which are best recalled, but also with respect 
to the particular mode of grouping which is most suc- 
cessful. Thus some appear to connect visible objects 
locally better than others ; whereas these last may have 
a better power of linking together successive pictures 
answering to events. The former would have a better 
local, pictorial, or geographical memory, the latter a 
better historical memory. 1 Closely connected with 
these differences are those due to the habitual way of 
committing things to memory, or arranging acquisitions 
in the mind. We have already touched on the fact 
that some minds tend to connect things with their 
adjuncts of time and place, whereas others order or 
arrange facts according to their relations of similarity, 
cause and effect, etc, In the same way different minds 
adopt different habits of ' memorizing ' verbal material. 
Hence the threefold division of memory emphasized by 
Kant : (a) the Mechanical memory, which is satisfied 
with linking together the words (auditory or visual 
symbols) in series; (b) the Ingenious memory which 
calls in the aid of series of pictures somehow resemb- 
ling the series of sounds, visual symbols, or the ideas 
signified ; and (e) the Judicious memory, in which the 
understanding takes part, and the logical relations of 
the ideas are made the connecting bond. 2 

i This difference would affect the retension of scientific facts, such as 
the coexistences (in place) of physiography, astronomy, etc., and the 
successions in time of the action of forces as dealt with by mechanics. 

2 See Drobisch, Empirische Psychologie, §36. As an example of in- 
genious memorizing, he gives the following : we remember the date of 
Charlemagne's death, 814, by regarding the first cipher as an hour glass, 
the symbol of death, the second as a spear, the symbol of war, and the 
M 



194 KEPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

Causes of Differences. These differences are plainly 
due either to native inequalities or to differences in the 
kind and amount of exercise undergone in the course of 
the past life. There are probably native differences of 
retentive power generally. One child is from the first 
capable of retaining impressions of all kinds more 
easily than another. Such inequalities are no doubt 
connected with differences in the degree of structural 
perfection of the organs as a whole, including the 
brain. l There are also special differences to start with, 
which are connected with the varying degrees of per- 
fection of particular sense-organs. Thus a child with a 
good natural ear for musical sounds would be likely to 
retain these impressions better than another child want- 
ing this sense-endowment. And this for a double rea- 
son : (1) because such a superiority would imply a finer 
discriminative capacity in respect of sound (and reten- 
tiveness varies roughly with the degree of discrimina- 
tion) ; and (2) because this natural superiority commonly 
carries with it a special interest in the impressions 
concerned. A child with a good ear for musical 
sounds will in general take special pleasure in noting 
their peculiarities. 

third as a plough, the symbol of peace. D. Stewart has some good re- 
marks about the distinction between a ' Systematical ' or • Philosophical' 
memory, which connects things according to their deeper resemblances, 
their relations of cause and effect, etc., and the Casual Memory which 
links them together only by their more superficial resemblances, and 
their accidental juxtaposition in time and place, Op. cit., Chap. VI., 
Sect. 2. 

i Prof. Bain emphasizes this degree of natural retentiveness or plas- 
tic power of the brain as setting limits to each individual's memory as 
a whole. See Mind and Body, Chap. V., p. 93, etc. 



IMPROVEMENT OF MEMORY. 195 

On the other hand, these differences are due in part 
to the differences of circumstances, exercise, and edu- 
cation. While each individual has in his amount of 
1 natural retentiven ess' or degree of 'brain plasticity' 
limits set to his memory as a whole, much may be done 
to improve the memory within these limits by exercise. 
Speaking roughly we may say that the educated have, 
as a rule, a better memory than the uneducated. 

It is, however, in the improvement of memory in spe- 
cial directions that the effects of exercise are most con- 
spicuous. The habitual direction of the mind to any 
class of impressions strengthens the retentive power in 
respect of these. Each mind thus becomes specially 
retentive in the direction in which its ruling interest 
lies, and its attention is habitually turned. Thus every 
special employment, as that of engineer, linguist, or 
musician, tends to produce a corresponding special re- 
tentiveness of memory. 

It is to be added that the growth of general and of 
special memory are in a measure connected. While 
everybody's retentive power is limited, while a special 
development of memory in one direction precludes an 
equal development in others, the exercise and improve- 
ment of the memory in one direction tends, to a certain 
extent, to the strengthening of the memory as a whole. 
For the growth of memory takes place by the formation 
of certain habits (concentration, repetition, arrangement 
of materials) ; and these habits will stand a person in 
good stead when he goes on to commit new kinds of 
material to memory. 



196 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

Training of the Memory. The training of the memory, 
though it is not the whole of intellectual education, is 
certainly an important portion of it. " Tantum scimus 
quantum memoria tenemus." To know a thing implies 
the rememberance of it. Only when the memory is 
well stored with distinct images and series of such 
images, can the higher operations of the understanding 
be carried out. As Kant observes, "The understanding 
has as its chief auxiliary the faculty of reproduction." 2 

The culture of a child's memory may be said to begin 
with the use of language by the nurse and mother in 
naming to him the various objects of sight. The syste- 
matic training of the memory should be first carried out 
in close connection with observation. The meaning of 
words should be taught by connecting them with the 
real objects, that is to say, by simultaneously naming 
and pointing out an object. And as supplementary to 
this, the child should be exercised in recalling by means 
of words the impressions directly received from external 
objects. 

After a sufficient store of first-hand knowledge has 
thus been accumulated, the memory should be trained 
in the acquisition of knowledge about things at second- 
hand, that is to say through the medium of verbal (oral 
and literary) communication. The early period of 
school life is commonly said to be the most favorable 
one for the building up of such verbal acquisitions. It 
costs less effort in this early stage of development to 

2 Ueber Pcedagogik, p. 492 (Werke Ed n - Hartenstein). The relation of a 
good memory to intellectual power as a whole is discussed by both 
Stewart and Hamilton in the works referred to. 



TRAINING THE MEMORY. 197 

learn the concrete facts of history, geography, or lan- 
guage, than it would cost at a later date. Hence it has 
been called the ' plastic period.' ' 

Two Branches of Mnemonic Training. The training of 
the memory by the teacher falls into two parts: (a) the 
calling forth of the pupil's power of acquisition, or stor- 
ing up knowledge; (b) the practising him in recalling 
what he has learnt. In respect of each part a judicious 
and effective training will proceed by recognizing the 
natural conditions of retention, and the particular stage 
of development reached. 

Exercise in Acquisition. In this stage the first rule to be 
attended to is to take the child at his best. Committing 
anything to memory is a severe demand on the brain 
energies, and should so far as possible be relegated to 
the hours of greatest vigor and freshness. Then every- 
thing must be done to arouse the attention by making 
the matter as interesting as possible. The teacher should 
aim at exciting a pleasurable state of mind at the time 
in connection with the object of acquisition. Sometimes 
a painful experience may have to be resorted to. A 
boy who has made a ridiculous error in history, e. g., by 
confounding Sir Thomas More and the poet Tom Moore, 
and has been well laughed at, is little likely afterwards 
to forget the difference. Further, the subject learnt 
must be put before the mind again and again, so that 
there be a sufficient deepening of the impression. The 

i Prof. Bain regards the period of maximum plasticity as extending 
from about the 6th to the 10th year. (Science of Education, p. 186.) 



198 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

writing out of a lesson is a familiar aid in fixing in the 
mind a piece of new knowledge. And the child should 
be encouraged to dwell on the subject committed to 
memory, and to go back to it, so that the full force of 
repetition may be realized. Lastly, the teacher must be 
careful to point out the relations between one part 
and another of the subject-matter, and between this as 
a whole and previously acquired knowledge. In this 
way, the binding forces of association will be brought 
into play. Thus in narrating an event in history, as the 
Norman Conquest, the several incidents with their 
relations of dependence should be pointed out, and the 
points of similarity and of contrast between this and 
other invasions (those of the Romans, and Saxons) set 
in a clear light. 1 

Learning by Rote. Hardly anything requires to be said, 
perhaps, at this time of day on the necessity of learning 
things not simply words. The cardinal doctrine of the 
modern theory of education is that all knowledge has 
to do with real objects, and that language is simply the 
medium by which such knowledge is conveyed, and by 
which it can be recalled. The insistence on the adequate 
exercise of the senses and the powers of observation 
points clearly to the idea that knowledge has to do with 
sensible realities. As has been already pointed out, 
cultivation of the memory should at first, to a consider- 
able extent, proceed hand in hand with the exercise of 

i The connecting of events in their relations of dependence, etc. 
clearly involves an appeal to the higher faculties of Understanding and 
Reason. To explain a thing is one way of fixing it in the memory. 



ART OF MNEMONICS. 199 

observation. Not only so, when the age is reached for 
acquiring large additions of second-hand knowledge, or 
book-lore, it is of the highest consequence that the 
realities underlying the words should be distinctly 
realized by means of clear and vivid representations. 1 It 
is only when the facts of history, geography, and the 
images of poetry are fully grasped by the mind that 
the subjects can be said to be truly learnt. 

Art of Mnemonics. In ancient times great importance 
was attached to certain devices for aiding memory and 
shortening its work, which devices were called Mne- 
monics. This idea of relieving memory was connected 
with the exploded theory that the main business of 
learning is to commit words to memory. 2 When this 
theory obtained, learning was necessarily a dry occupa- 
tion, and the pupil's mind was wearied by excessive 
tasks in verbal acquisition. Hence the eagerness to 
find devices for shortening the toil. Now that this 
theory is abandoned, less importance is attached to a 
mnemonic art. The inventions of rhyme, alliteration, 
and so on, obviously help the mind to retain a series of 
rules. But when things are taught only in so far as they 
can be understood, it is held that the relations between 
the facts, or the ideas learnt, should form the main 
basis of acquisition. In other words, the more things 

i How such representations are to be formed will be explained in the 
following chapter. 

2 We are apt to treat this theory too contemptuously, perhaps, by 
forgetting that when the written records of knowledge were less easily 
accessible, the verbal memory was a matter of much greater consequence 
than it is now. 



200 REPKODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

are connected in their natural relations, the less will be 
the task imposed on the verbal memory. 1 

Although there are no definite rules for aiding the 
memory which are valid in all cases, there is such a 
thing as a skilful management of the memory. This 
will include the formation of habits, not only of concen- 
tration and repetition, but of selecting and grouping or 
arranging. Memory-labor is greatly economized by de- 
tecting what is important and overlooking what is 
unimportant; and children should be exercised in such 
selection. It is furthered, too, by finding appropriate 
' pegs' on which to hang new acquisitions. 2 Here indi- 
vidual differences must be studied. Some children will 
remember ideas better by the aid of visual pictures, 
others better by series of sound-representations. The 
young are wont to help themselves out of the difficulty 
of retaining what is difficult, e. g., letters, numbers, 
dates, by the aid of visual forms (geometrical schemes, 
and so on). And teachers would do well to find out 
these spontaneous tendencies of children's minds and 
to aid them in the process of economizing intellectual 
labor. 3 



i For a fuller inquiry into the value of mnemonics see James Mill's 
Analysis of the Human Mind, pp. 324, 5; Dugald Stewart's Elements of the 
Philosophy of the Human Mind, Chap. VI., § VII. 

2 Among these pegs must be reckoned the places in which informa- 
tion can be found. To associate book-knowledge with particular books, 
and places in these, other kinds of knowledge with particular persons 
(experts), is a great saving of memory-labor. 

s Compare what was said above on the different modes of memoriz- 
ing. Kant thought lightly of the • ingenious ' memory, as involving an 
unnecessary loading of the mind. But this is to overlook the fact pointed 
out in dealing with the co-operation of associations, that the addition of 



EXERCISES IN RECOLLECTION. 201 

Exercize in Recalling, The mere act of taking in new- 
facts and truths is not enough. The teacher aims, or 
should aim, at keeping fresh and clear in the pupil's 
mind what is learnt, or in other words, at rendering the 
memory quick and accurate in reproducing what has 
been learnt. This result can only be secured by renewed 
exercises in reproduction. Here again it is important to 
seize the right moment. To recollect is to concentrate 
the mind on itself, to ' reflect,' as we commonly say, and 
implies a higher effort of attention than external obser- 
vation. In this way, a habit of going back on what has 
been learnt may be gradually induced. 

A considerable element in the art of teaching is skill 
in putting questions to children so as to exercise their 
power of recalling and reproducing what they have 
learnt. It is only by frequent going back that the 
meaning or content of verbal knowledge is preserved 
fresh. In order to test the knowledge of things, the 
teacher must call on the pupil to give out what he has 
learnt in his own words. By such skilful questioning, 
he will find out how far the learner has seized and 
retained the distinctive features of the subject-matter 
attended to, so as to keep his mental images clear and 
distinct. Not only so, by this same practice of ques- 
tioning the manifold ramifications and connections of 
each piece of knowledge are more clearly brought into 



a new series of elements often lightens the labor, provided first that the 
new series can be better retained than the other which it is the special 
object to retain and secondly that it is firmly attached (by the force of 
analogy or otherwise) to this series. The importance of noting individual 
peculiarities with a view to determine the most advantageous medium of 
reproduction in any given case is well brought out by Dr. Mortimer 
Granville in his little work, Secret of a Good Memory. 



202 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

view. It is impossible to point out all, or even most of 
these at the moment of acquisition: they can only be 
found out gradually by repeated processes of repro- 
duction. 2 

Subjects which Exercize the Memory. All branches of 
study exercise the memory in some measure. The 
student of the higher mathematics remembers the prin- 
ciples and the demonstrations of his science, and this 
largely by the aid of language or other visual symbols. 
But when we talk of a subject exercising the memory, 
we mean more (or less) than this. We refer to those 
subjects which have to do mainly with the particular 
and the concrete, and which appeal but little to the 
understanding. Such subjects are Natural Science, in 
its simpler or descriptive phase, Geography, History, 
Language, and the lighter departments of Literature. 
Arithmetic, though now recognized as a subject which 
necessarily calls forth the child's powers of generalizing 
and reasoning, also makes a heavy demand on the 
verbal memory. 

Training of Memory but a part of Education. It cannot 
too clearly be borne in mind, that to acquire any amount 
of knowledge respecting the particular and concrete is 
not to be educated. Perfect knowledge implies the 
taking up of the particular or concrete into the general, 

2 The importance of exercises in reproduction in training the memory 
is well illustrated by Mr. Landon in his volume, School Management. 
Chap. IV., p. 75, etc. The two branches of memory-exercise here distin- 
guished should of course be carried on together. Linking on new know- 
ledge to old is at once an exercise in acquisition and in reproduction. 



OVER-STIMULUS OF THE MEMORY. 203 

the connecting of a variety of particulars under a uni- 
versal principle. It follows that memory may be over- 
stimulated. A certain knowledge of the concrete, a 
certain store of images, is undoubtedly necessary to the 
exercise of the higher intellectual faculties: but if the 
teacher aims simply at mass or volume of details, the 
higher powers of the mind will be unexercised. Such a 
course would involve growth, or bare increase in the bulk 
of mind, but not development. 

The danger of over-stimulating the memory is all the 
greater owing to the great natural inequalities among 
children. It may be necessary that every child should 
have a certain minimum of knowledge in subjects like 
geography and history; but it is neither necessary nor 
desirable that a child with a poor retentiveness for 
languages should be made to study a number of foreign 
tongues. To judge in a given case how much time and 
energy should be given to pure memory work is one of 
the nicest problems in the art of Education. 



References. 

The reader who has the time may follow Prof. Bain through his 
detailed illustrations of the Law of Contiguity {Senses and Intellect or 
Compendium). An interesting account of Memory, its varieties and the 
means of improving it, may be found in Dugald Stewart's Philosophy of 
the Human Mind, Part I., Ch. VI. With this may be compared Sir W. 
Hamilton's account of Memory, Lectures on Metaphysics, especially 
Lectures XXXI. and XXXII. The German reader may with advantage 
consult a small work, Ueber das Qeddchtniss, by Prof. J. Huber. 

On the practical side the reader will do well to consult Locke, Some 
Thoughts on Education, especially § 176; Maria Edgeworth, Essays on 
Practical Education, Vol. II., Ch. XXI. : J. G. Fitch, Lectures on Teaching, 
Chap. V.; Beneke (Erzieh und Unterrichtslehre, Vol. I., §§ 20-22) aud 
Waitz {Allgem. Posdagogih, 2nd Part, 3rd Sect.) There are some good 
remarks on the cultivation of Memory in Kant's Essay, Ueber Poedagogik. 



204 EEPEODUCTTVE IMAGINATION. 



APPENDIX. 

SUGGESTIONS. 

1. In your review of the argument of this chapter on Repro- 
ductive Imagination, there are certain very important words to 
be carefully noted. Seek to understand the import of these 
words, as terms in psychology. 

First, there is, arranged in the natural history order, i. e., the 
order of the ' natural history ' of the human mind, this series : 

a. Sensation, perception, imagination. 

What are each of these respectively as acts of mind ? Can I 
define them ? Can I give examples ? Do I clearly discriminate 
the one from the other ? What is the necessary and logical de- 
pendence of these several acts of mind upon each other ? Such 
questions as these may very properly be asked as helps to an ac- 
curate knowledge of the words in question. 

There are other words which should be studied in connection; 
for example, 

o. Sense-impression, percept, image. 

c. Presentation, Representation. 

d. Reproductive imagination, constructive imagination. 

e. Reproduction, Laws of Association, Trains of Represen- 
tation. 

Discriminate the different meanings of the terms above re- 
ferred to; fix very thoroughly in mind the use of each. 

2. Consider carefully what is meant in mental science by 
imagination; note how extended and yet how well defined is the 
meaning of the term, including both the revival of percepts in 
the order in which they were originally perceived, (reproductive 
imagination) and also the imaging of these percepts to the mind 
in new forms (constructive imagination.) 

Note how closely connected with the acquisition of knowl- 



REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 205 

edge are the acts of imagination, how all instruction and all 
learning implies the active exercise of this power of mind. 

3. Verify the statements in the text, by examples from your 
own experience. Some of the most interesting exercises in inter- 
spection may be had by seeking the answer to the following 
question with regard to any unexpected image, or idea coming 
into consciousness: What suggested this thought to my mind ? 
What was I thinking of before ? And what before this ? Why 
did these three thoughts succeed each other ? 

4. Trace carefully the logical connection between the princi- 
ples of psychology set down in this chapter, and the educational 
data expounded therewith. Consider closely how one depends 
on the other; how if the psychological doctrine were different, 
the maxims of education would be different. Note that both 
theory and rules may be deduced from the psychological princi- 
ples unfolded. 

5. Look up in cyclopaedia or elsewhere the history and the 
value of the educational authorities quoted in this appendix. 

EXAMINATION AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. What would be the state of our minds if our mental pro- 
cesses were limited to sense-cognition ? What is meant in Mental 
Science by an image ? What is the difference between a percept 
and an image? Why are images called representative images? 
Of what are they the representatives ? 

2. How many sensations conspire to make a percept ? (See 
quotation from Mr. Lewes, p. 141). How many percepts con- 
spire to make an image ? Why is every kind of representation 
called an image ? 

3. What is Reproductive imagination? What is Constructive 
imagination ? What is the distinction between Retentiveness and 
Reproduction? How are images to be distinguished from percepts? 
In what does the distinctness of images consist ? In what, the 
accuracy of an image ? 

4. What is the connection between Attention and Retention? 
What two circumstances determine the permanence of an impres- 



206 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

sion ? What is the connection between Repetition and Retention? 
Is there any limit to the deepening influence of Repetition ? 
What is the effect of Repetition without attention ? 

5. What is meant by the predisposition or tendency of an 
impression or a precept to be revived ? Distinguish between the 
* reminding ' or • exciting ' cause, and the predisposing cause of 
the recurrence of an image. Why are so many impressions never 
recalled ? 

6. What is meant by the association of ideas ? Is this ' asso- 
ciation ' (here referred to) an association of objects of thought or 
of impressions of these objects, or of images of these percepts ? 
Is this association of ideas a subjective or an objective relation ? Is 
this association a matter determined by our will or by circum- 
stances ? Is the fact that there is an associative link binding 
together two impressions, one, of which, we are at the time of the 
impression, conscious ? 

7. Give the Law of Contiguous Association. Why should 
this law be expressed as a tendency f Is it the external order of 
objects which is alluded to in the Law of Contiguity or the inter- 
nal order of images ? Is the contiguity referred to a contiguity of 
time or of place ? Show that the relation of cause and effect may 
be included in the law of contiguity. 

8. Upon what does the ' degree of associative force ' depend? 
Show, by examples, how a simultaneous Attention to two or 
more impressions makes a bond or link between ideas. Show 
how Attention modifies the order of representations. 

9. Show the importance in the acquisition of knowledge of 
a Repetition of* associative acts. 

10. What is meant by a train of representations? Compare 
this with the common phrase — train of thought. 

11. Why are verbal associations so important? What is the 
first step in this association? Why is a word here called a word- 
complex? 

12. What is the distinction between Memory and Expecta- 
tion? Show how each illustrates Association. 



PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION. 207 

13. What is meant by Association by Similarity? To what 
tendency does this law refer? Give instances of what is called in 
psychology the 'Attraction of similars. ' Show what educational 
use may be made of Contrast. 

14. What is meant by the automatic succession of images? 
Why is this called a 'passive reproduction' ? Distinguish Recol- 
lection from passive Reproduction. Show how Attention aids 
Recollection. Which are more easily recalled, visual images or 
images of words? 

15. Give a resume of the facts of the growth of memory. Ex- 
plain what is meant by the plastic power of the brain. Illustrate 
good habits of memory; state their importance. Should the 
memory be specially trained, or only incidentally, in the process 
of accquisition and using of knowledge ? 

CONNECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY WITH THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF EDUCATION. 

From the preceding statement of the conditions of reproduc- 
tion, discussed under the general heads of Depth of Impression 
and Association of Impression, it follows that the educational 
doctrine of Retention and Recollection (Memory) resolves itself 
almost wholly into a discussion of proper methods of acquiring 
knowledge, — the secret of a good memory being right acquisition, 
—good teaching, good supervision of the learning process being 
almost sufficient of itself to solve the question of Retention and 
Recollection. It is the doctrine of the text that Retention has 
two conditions, Attention and Repetition (see p. 161). 

1. Attention. The very act of Attention to any mental ex- 
perience imparts immediately a certain vividness and distinctness 
to this experience, and ' These two conditions are a certain amount 
of attention and a certain frequency of repetition. Logically con- 
nected with the first part of this principle are the following max- 
ims of education : 

(1) The vividness and distinctness of knowledge is in pro- 
portion to the intensity of the act of attention, and, 



208 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

(2) The fewer objects we consider at once, the clearer and 
more distinct will be our impressions of them; and, 

(3) The more clear and distinct our impression, the more 
permanent will be our hold upon it: therefore, if you wish your 
pupils to retain permanently their acquisitions, 

(4) Secure their concentrated attention to the subject matter before 
them ; Let the learning process be a matter of strenuous energy. 

It of necessity follows that, 

(5) Habits of attention and concentration are the great main- 
springs of education.— Tate. 

The careful reader will refer this maxim to (1) and (2) as 
above; that is, will connect habits of attention with (1) and refer 
the necessity for concentration to the principle mentioned in (2). 

(6) The habit of directing the undivided force of the facul- 
ties to a given subject is the great main-spring of self -education. 
—Tate. 

(7) The great problem in education is, therefore, how to in- 
duce the pupil to undertake and go through with a course of 
exertion, in its result good and even agreeable, but immediately 
and in itself, irksome. There is no royal road to learning. — Sir 
Wm. Hamilton. 

Having now heard from two great English writers on Educa- 
tion, let us consider the following noble words from the great 
Frenchman, Malebranche : 

(8) ' The discovery of truth can only be made by the labor of 
attention; because it is only the labor of attention that has light 
for its reward.' 

(9) ' The attention of the intellect is a natural prayer by which 
we obtain the enlightenment of reason; ' 

(10) ' Without the labor of attention, we shall never compre- 
hend the grandeur of religion, the sanctity of morals, the little- 
ness of all that if not God, the absurdity of the passions and of 
our internal miseries. ' 

But attention and consequent permanence of impression de- 
pend largely on the degree of interest excited. Hence follow 
the following maxims : 



PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION. 209 

(11) Instruction should give pleasure to children and where 
this is not the case there is something wrong as regards either the 
mode of instruction, or the subject-matter selected for instruc- 
tion.— Tate. 

The highest pedagogical as well as the highest psychological 
doctrine on the connection between ' interest ' and attention is 
that of Sir Wm. Hamilton. 
First the pedagogical doctrine: 

(12) • Besides placing his pupil in a condition to perform the 
necessary process the instructor ought to do what in him lies to 
determine the pupil's will to the performance. But how is this 
to be effected? Only by rendering the effort more pleasurable than 
its omission.' 

This undoubtedly meets the case. But what kind of effort is 
pleasurable? What is pleasure? The psychological answer is as 
follows : 

1 Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of 
a power, of whose energy we are conscious. ' 

' The more perfect an energy is, the more pleasurable.' 

The conclusion is, 

That as the pupil is often of an age at which present pleasure 
is more persuasive than future good, therefore, 

(13) The pain of exertion must be overcome by associating 
with it some passion in the cause of improvement; we must 
awaken emulation, and allow its gratification only through a 
course of vigorous exertion. Without the stimulus of emulation, 
what can education accomplish? — Hamilton. 

(14) The principle of emulation and a judicious system of 
rewards are two of the most powerful supplemental aids in the 
cultivation of habit. — Tate. 

On the relation of curiosity to attention, Archbishop Whately 
has a good maxim : 

' Curiosity is as much the parent of attention as attention is of 
memory; therefore, the first business of the teacher— first, not 
only in point of time but of importance— should be to excite 
not merely a general curiosity on the subject of study, but a par- 
is, 



210 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

ticular curiosity on particular points in that subject. To teach 
one who has no curiosity to learn, is to sow a field without 
plowing.' 

2. If we consider the doctrine of Association of Impressions 
with a view of deducing the proper maxims of educational. pro- 
cedure, we come to the same conclusion as before, that the doc- 
trine of Recollection is fundamentally the doctrine of right ac- 
quisition. The manner of acquisition determines the principles 
on which knowledges shall be associated. It is the teacher who 
meditaes between the pupil and the idea, and also between ideas 
themselves, that is to say, who determines what shall be re- 
membered and which impressions shall be remembered together, 
and whether they shall be associated on arbitrary or on rational 
principles. On this general point, we have the following educa- 
tional maxims: 

(1) Children should be accustomed to examine, analyze, and 
inspect every object of interest around them, — the flowers and 
minerals by the wayside, the animals of the fields, the warblers 
of the forest, the various household utensils, etc., all present 
excellent subjects for exercising the faculties. — Tate. 

(2) Never teach by rules, when you can teach by principles; 
never get a child to learn anything by rote until he understands 
the subject-matter. When he understands it, then he will readily 
learn it by heart and not by rote; the subject will have pene- 
trated his soul, — he will love it because it has become a part of 
himself, — it will be engraven on his mind as with a pen of iron, 
and there it will remain, unchanged and unchangeable, forever. 
—Tate. 

(3) Attend carefully to the logical sequence of ideas, trace 
cause into effect, place one fact that it may in part suggest the 
next, connect the various parts of your teaching. — Landon. 

(4) Cultivate habits of observation, inquiry, comparison, and 
steady perseverance ; exercise the faculties, not independently, but in 
relation. — Landon. 

(5) A conspectus, a survey of the science as a whole, ought, 
therefore, to precede the study of its parts ; we should be aware 
of its distribution before we attend to what is distributed ; we 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 211 

should possess the empty frame work before we collect the mate- 
rial with which it is to be filled. — Hamilton. 

(6) Readiness in recalling our knowledge depends greatly 
upon philosophical association. We must form the habit of 
referring facts to the laws on which they depend, and of tracing 
out laws to the facts by which they are exemplified. — Wayland. 

(7) There should first be observation of life and nature, and 
afterwards reflection till every perception is brought into the 
realm of a clear consciousness. — Diesterweg. 



REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

1. On the application of the doctrine of founding associa- 
tions to teaching reading, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, Talks 
III., IV., V. ; on the use of the spoken word as assisting acts of 
association between the idea and the written word, see Talk VI. ; 
on different forms of association, see Fitch's Lectures on Teach- 
ing, chap. V., page 126, Johonnot's Principles and Practices of 
Teaching, page 37, and Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part II., 
chap. IV., p. 236; on the law of similarity and its relation to the 
phonic method, see Parker, p. 50, and Johonnot as above; also 
Payne, Lectures, p. 159. 

2. On learning and remembering, see Fitch, chap. V., p. 
124; on how knowledge is gained and how retained, see Johon- 
not, chap. II. ; on the power of memory as limited by one's 
predilections, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part II., chap. 
IV., p. 212; on Jacotot's doctrine that we should learn so as to 
remember forever, see Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 212; 
also Payne, Educational Methods, Lectures, p. 144. 

3. On associations of resemblance and contrast, see Tate, 
Part II., chap. IV., p. 225; on philosophical associations, seethe 
same chapter, p. 219; on geographical and historical contrasts, 
see the same reference, p. 230. 

4. On importance of repetition, see Payne, Educational Meth- 
ods, Lectures, p. 144; for Jacotot's doctrine, 'learn one thing and 



212 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

refer everything to that, ' see the same reference ; on impressions 
as secured by repetition and interest, see Fitch, p. 131. 

5. On concrete and abstract, verbal and rational memory, see 
Fitch, chap. V., p. 131; on the error of emphasizing the culture 
of memory at the expense of the higher faculties, see Tate, Part 
II., chap. IV., page 208; for an extended consideration of meth- 
ods of memorizing, see Johonnot, chap. X., p. 168; for the three 
ways of reading a model book, see Quick, page 212 ; on the value 
of having learned what has been forgotten, see the same, page 
214 ; for Basedow on importance of reducing the wretched exer- 
cises of memory, see the same, page 146 ; on science as the best 
instrument for training the memory, see Spencer's Education, p. 
87; on the doctrine that only that which is understood may be 
committed to memory, see Payne, Lectures, p. 130, and Quick, p. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

Reproductive and Constructive Imagination. Memory is 
the picturing of objects and events in what are called 
images, and is thus a form of imagination. In memory, 
however, the images are supposed to be exact copies of 
past impressions. In other words imagination is here 
reproductive. But what is popularly known as imagin- 
ation implies more than this. When we imagine an 
unfamiliar coming event, or a place which is described 
to us, we are going beyond our past personal experience. 
The images of memory are being in some way modified, 
transformed, and recombined. Hence this process is 
marked off as Productive or Constructive Imagination. 
And the results of the process may be spoken of as 
secondary or derivative images, in contradistinction to 
the primary or radical images of memory. 

Modes of Imaginative Activity. Imagination works in 
different ways altering or modifying the products of 
retention. Thus it transforms by omitting certain ele- 
ments. The mind pictures an object as a house or tree 
apart from its usual local surroundings, or leaps over a 
number of links in a chain of events. We can imagine 
an object reduced in size, or wanting one of its features. 
In addition to this isolating activity of imagination, 
there is the combining. By this is meant connecting 



214 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

parts of different wholes, whether juxtapositions in 
space or sequences in time, in new combinations. Thus 
the mind of the child adds new features to an object, or 
pictures its size greatly enlarged, and interposes new 
incidents in a series of events. And by this double 
process of separating and adding, imagination weaves 
together portions of unlike experiences into new com- 
binations. This is the perfect form of imaginative 
activity commonly known as Construction. 

What Imagination includes. We may see at once from 
this definition that imagination is much wider than 
poetic imagination or phantasy, that is to say the pictur- 
ing of the unreal. It stands in an intimate relation to 
knowledge. In anticipating what is going to happen 
from moment to moment, in picturing the aspects of 
new objects before actual inspection, the child's imagin- 
ation is ever coming into play. Still more widely is it 
exercised in learning about things from others. Every 
time he listens to his mother's narratives and descriptions 
he is working up the images supplied by his own past 
observation into new forms. To learn is thus to employ 
the imagination as well as the memory. Further, 
imagination is concerned in interpreting the signs of 
others' thoughts and feelings. To ■ read ' the mind of 
another is to represent a new mental state by aid of the 
memory of our own past states. Finally, construction, 
which is the essential thing in imagination, enters into 
action, in the discovery and mastering of new combin- 
ations of actions. In this form it is known as Invention. 
Every new sentence which the child utters, every new 
manual movement which he executes, takes place by 



WHAT IMAGINATION INCLUDES. 215 

bringing together in a new form representations of 
actions previously performed. 

Analysis of Constructive Process. (1) Reproduction of 
Images. — This process of construction may be said 
roughly to fall into two stages. Of these the first is the 
revival of primary images, or images of memory, ac- 
cording to the laws of association. Thus the poet in 
imagining scenes and events of his ideal world sets out 
by recalling the facts of his experience, the images of 
which serve as the elements out of which the new 
image-structure is to be built up. 

It follows that the excellence of the constructive 
process is limited by the strength of the reproductive 
faculty. Unless memory restore the impressions of our 
past experience we cannot picture a new scene, or a new 
event. Thus unless a child recalls, with some measure 
of distinctness, one or more of the blocks of ice which 
he has actually seen, he cannot imagine an iceberg, or a 
glacier. The same applies to practical construction or 
invention. The elementary movements must first be 
mastered and retained before there can be the process 
of building up new combinations. 

(2) Elaboration of New Images. — The images of memory 
being thus recalled by the forces of suggestion or as- 
sociation, they are worked up as materials into a new 
imaginative product. This is the formative or construc- 
tive act or process proper. The process resembles that 
of building a new physical structure out of old materials. 
Certain of these are rejected, others are selected and 
held before the mind. Some materials are available 



216 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

after a process of lopping off or breaking up. Finally 
the approved materials are joined together into a new 
whole. 

This active process is controlled by a representation 
of the result aimed at, and a sense or judgment as to 
what is fitting for the purpose in hand. And it is on 
the quality of this guiding sense that the excellence of 
the constructive process mainly depends. According as 
a poet, for example, has a clear and discriminating, or 
a dull and obtuse, seDse of what is aesthetically valua- 
ble, congruous, harmonious, etc., his constructive work 
will be well or ill performed. 

The result aimed at and the corresponding guiding 
sense of fitness, will differ in different cases. In read- 
a book of travels or a poem we seek to frame clear 
mental pictures which fit in with the rest of the series- 
We know when we have hit on the right combination 
of images in this case by the feeling that we understand 
what we read. Again in combining movements in 
order to bring about a wished-for practical end, we are 
guided by the representation of this end. The child 
combining words in order to express a want, knows he 
has succeeded when his want is understood and relieved. 

Receptive and Creative Imagination. The constructive act 
assumes one or two unlike forms which it is a matter of 
some practical importance to distinguish. Sometimes 
the direction of the activity is determined by definite 
external suggestion. Thus in reading a poem and form- 
ing a mental picture of the object described the mind 
of the reader is tied down to the particular combination 
originated by the poet and expressed by a particular 



LIMITS TO IMAGINATION. 217 

order of words. This may be called receptive imagina- 
tion, and is a comparatively simple operation. The 
imagination of the poet, on the other hand, which cre- 
ated the combination had no such framework within 
which to confine its activity. The act of construction 
in this case is of a higher order, involving more com- 
plex processes of reproduction, rejection, and selection, 
and direction solely by an internal sense of what is 
beautiful or harmonious. Hence we commonly mark 
this off as original imagination. In the region of 
practical construction, again, the same difference is 
illustrated in imitative movements, such as those of drill 
exercises, and free inventions, where the child hits out 
new combinations of movement for himself. 

Limits to Imagination. All imaginative activity is lim- 
ited by experience. To begin with, it is confined to 
breaking up or separating and re-combining experiences. 
There is no such thing as a perfectly new creation. 
The greatest imaginative genius could not picture a 
perfectly new color. Again the processes of separation 
and combination are limited. When two things have 
always been conjoined in our experience it is impossible 
to picture them apart. Thus we cannot picture the 
surface of an object having no color (including under 
' color' black, white, and gray). 

The more uniformly two things are conjoined, the 
more difficult it is to separate them. Thus it is much 
easier to picture a moving object, as a man, apart from 
local surroundings than a stationary one, as a church. 
On the other hand the mind finds it difficult to combine 
images as new wholes when experience suggests that 



218 CONSTUCKTIVE IMAGINATION. 

the elements to be combined are incompatible. The 
Oriental king could not picture solid water or ice. We 
all find it hard to imagine persons on the other side of 
the globe with their feet towards ours, and yet not 
falling downwards. Just in proportion to the uniform- 
ity or invariability of our experience is the difficulty of 
breaking up and regrouping its several parts. Hence 
the reason why we so easily imagine objects greatly 
increased in size, as a giant, or greatly altered in color, 
as a gold mountain: for in respect of apparent magni- 
tude and color our experience is highly variable. 

Various Forms of Construction. It has been remarked 
that the essential process in imagination enters into a 
variety of mental operations. These may be grouped 
under three heads: (1) Construction as subserving 
knowledge about things; (2) Practical construction as 
aiding in the acquisition of knowledge how to do things, 
or to adapt means to ends; and (3) Construction as 
satisfying the emotions. The first may be called the 
Cognitive Imagination; the second, the Practical Im- 
magination or Invention ; and the third, the ^Esthetic 
or Poetic Imagination. 

(a) Cognitive Imagination. It must be evident that the 
expansion of knowledge beyond the bounds of personal 
experience and observation involves imaginative activ- 
ity. This is seen alike in the acquisition of new knowl- 
edge from others respecting things, places, and events, 
and also in the independent discovery of new facts by 
anticipation. The first illustrates the receptive, the 
second, the creative kind of imaginative activity. 



COGNITIVE IMAGINATION". 219 

Imagination and Acquisition. The process of recalling, 
selecting, and regrouping the traces of personal experi- 
ence is illustrated in every case of acquisition. What 
is ordinarily called 'learning' whether by oral commu- 
nication or by books, is not simply an exercise of mem- 
ory; it involves an exercise of the imagination as well. 
In order that the meaning of the words heard or read 
may be realized, it is necessary to frame clear and' dis- 
tinct pictures of the objects described or the events nar- 
rated. Thus in following a description of a desert the 
child begins with familiar experiences called up by the 
words 'plain,' 'sand,' and so on. By modifying the 
images thus produced by memory he gradually builds 
up the required new T image. 

It may be noted that here as elsewhere knowledge 
consists in discriminating and assimilating. The child 
has to assimilate what is told him in so far as it is like 
his past observations, and at the same time to note how 
the new scene differs from the old ones. The formation 
of a distinct and accurate image will greatly depend on 
the degree of perfection attained in this part of the 
process. In following a description children are too apt 
to import too much into their mental picture, and take 
up the adjuncts of the images and ideas corresponding 
to the words. That is to say, the process of selection 
is incomplete. 

On the success of this imaginative effort what is 
known as the understanding of the description will depend. 
If, for example, the mind of a child, in following a 
description of an iceberg, pictures a mass of ice, but 
does not distinctly represent its magnitude, he will not 
understand the dangers arising to ships from these float- 



220 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

ing masses. Here we see the close relation between 
clear imagination and clear thinking, a relation to be 
spoken of again by and by. 

Imagination and Scientific Acquisition. The activity of 
imagination enters not only into the study of subjects 
like geography and history, which have to do in the main 
with concrete objects and events, but to some extent also 
into the study of Science. Science has to do with the gen- 
eral. Yet before the mind can seize the general it must 
have clear images of concrete examples. These must of 
course be based as far as possible on perception ; but this 
cannot be the case always. The movements of the 
planets, the circulation of the blood, are things which 
we are called on to a great extent to imagine by aid 
of analogies with objects of perception. Even the ob- 
jects and processes which escape the observation of the 
senses, as the vibrations of light and heat, the conjunc- 
tions and disjunctions of atoms and molecules in chemical 
changes, have in a way to be pictured by the mind, and 
so the understanding of these may be said to exercise 
the imagination. 1 Only when clear pictures of the par- 
ticulars are first formed can the subsequent operations 
of generalization and reasoning be well carried out. 

Reducing the Abstract to the Concrete. This kind of im- 
aginative work, so far from being easy, is exceedingly 
difficult. It must be remembered that language is in its 
nature general and abstract. Hence all verbal descrip- 

i That is, pictured up to a certain point by the aid of analogous sense- 
experiences, though, as we shall see later on, there can in this case be no 
perfect imagination of the objects thought about. 



COGNITIVE IMAGINATION. 221 

tion involves a gradual process of qualification or indi- 
vidualization. That is to say, the general name has to 
be supplemented by a number of qualifying terms, each 
of which helps to mark off the individual thing better. 
Thus the historian depicts a particular king or statesman 
by progressively enumerating his several physical and 
mental qualities. Now each of these qualifications, 
again, is in itself nothing but an abstraction. Thus the 
terms, ''tall,' 'handsome,' and so on, applied to a per- 
son are abstract terms, and each applicable to a number 
of persons. The process of realizing the description 
turns on the combination of these into a concrete object. 
The scientific description of a new animal or plant by 
means of a highly technical terminology illustrates the 
difficulties of this process of l concreting the abstract ' 
in a yet more marked manner. And a still greater 
strain is imposed by the description of the ' extra-sensi- 
ble ' world of atoms and molecules, with their intricate 
interactions. To ' visualize ' or see with the internal 
eye what is thus described implies a considerable exer- 
tion of the imaginative power. 

Imagination and Discovery. The discovery of new 
knowledge is largely a matter of careful observation 
and patient reasoning from ascertained facts and truths. 
Yet the scientific imagination materially assists in the 
process. The inquiring, searching mind is always pass- 
ing beyond the known to the unknown in the form of 
conjecturings which cannot be reduced to a process of 
conscious reasoning. The power of thus divining un- 
observed facts is known as imaginative insight into 
things. The child shows this capability when picturing 



222 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

to himself the make of his toys, the way in which plants 
nourish themselves and grow, and so on. 

Not only does imagination thus reach out in anticipa- 
tion of unobserved facts, it is busy devising hypotheses 
for the explanation of them. A scientific hypothesis 
when fully developed assumes the form of a general 
truth. But it is reached by the help of a process of 
constructive imagination. That is to say, the mind pic- 
tures to itself the action of the forces at work by aid 
of past observations. Thus the undulatory movements 
of sound and light were at first 'visualized' by the 
help of certain visible undulations, as for example those 
of the sea. 

Imagination has thus a close connection with scientfic 
curiosity. Each reacts on the other. The desire to 
know stimulates the imagination to frame pictures of 
unexplored realities; and the activity of imagination, 
leading to conjectural prevision, quickens the desire to 
investigate in order to verify the conjecture. It is true 
that imagination, if not controlled by a critical spirit, 
may take the place of patient investigation. But when 
duly restrained by judgment, it is a great aid to investi- 
gation. 

* Imagination of Untried Experiences. Our knowledge has 
to do not simply with the outer world, but with the in- 
ner world of feeling and thought. And this knowledge, 
too, implies in addition to memory, a process of imagin- 
ative construction. Our knowledge of ourselves consists 
not merely in recalling what we have actually felt and 
done, but in representing how we should feel, think, and 
act in new circumstances. In anticipating the future, 



PRACTICAL CONTRIVANCE. 223 

we are continually representing to ourselves the effects 
of new surroundings on our emotional susceptibilities 
and our active inclinations. 1 

(b) Practical Contrivance. 2 A process of construction 
enters into practical acquisition, learning how to do 
things, as talk, dress, write, draw, and so forth. The 
child's movements are being continually modified, sep- 
arated, and recombined in conformity with new cir- 
cumstances and new needs. He is by nature endowed 
with plentiful active energy, and this of itself leads con- 
tinually to new tentatives, new experiments. A good 
part of the child's mental energy thus finds its natural 
vent in the direction of practical imagination. 

Imitative Construction. Much of this new motor acqui- 
sition is guided by others' actions. The impulse of imi- 
tation leads a child to attempt all sorts of action which 
he sees others perform. This is seen plainly enough in 
his play, which is largely a mimicry of the serious 
actions of adults. This is the receptive side of practical 
imagination. The exercises of the school, such as sing- 
ing and writing, illustrate the same process. The sim- 
pler actions of the voice or of the hand which are 
already mastered are combined in more complex opera- 
tions under the guidance of an external model. 

i The imagination of others' experiences, their feelings and doings, 
illustrates the same process. This will be shown more fully when we 
come to deal with sympathy. 

2 Although the exercise of constructive activity in practical invention 
is related to the growth of will, there is some convenience in anticipating 
and treating it here along with imaginative construction in the narrow 
sense. 



224 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

Such combinations are rarely hit on precisely at once. 
The child's first attempts at vocal imitation are often 
wide of the mark. 1 The same applies to the manual 
actions involved in drawing, or writing. In many cases, 
moreover, the new combination implies a separation of 
movements previously associated, and such separation 
adds to the difficulty of the operation. Thus we may 
observe that the child in building up new vocal combi- 
nations is apt to be clogged by irrelevant associations. 
Hence it is only by repeated trial and gradual approxi- 
mation that the required combination is effected. Pro- 
gress in such acquisition depends on his previous com- 
mand of the muscles in simpler movements, and on 
concentration of mind and perseverance. 

Original Construction: Invention. While new practical 
acquirements are thus learnt by imitation and instruc- 
tion, they are also being gained by individual origina- 
tion and invention. Children find out many new com- 
binations of movement for themselves. Their strong 
active impulses find a satisfaction in manual and other 
experiments. The pleasure of doing a thing, of over- 
coming difficulty, is an ample reward for many an effort 
in practical construction. Such activity is, moreover, 
closely connected with the impulse of curiosity, the 
desire to find out about things, their structure and less 
obvious qualities. In this way practical invention assists 
in the discovery of facts and truths. A considerable 
part of the knowledge of things is thus gained, experi- 

i This is by no means always the case. Indeed, one is often surprised 
at the readiness of a young child endowed with a good ear and a good 
articulation in giving back a new grouping of sounds. 



AESTHETIC IMAGINATION. 225 

mentally, that is to say, by means of actively separating, 
dividing, combining, and otherwise manipulating ob- 
jects. 

(c) JEsthetic Imagination. ^Esthetic or Poetic Imagin- 
ation is not subservient to the pursuit of knowledge, 
whether knowledge about things or knowledge how to 
attain results. It aims at immediate enjoyment. This 
applies alike to the receptive and to the creative side of 
the process. The child listening to a story, or inventing 
a story for himself, is in each case impelled by the desire 
for the enjoyment which the images afford. It is this 
mode of constructive activity which answers to the 
popular conception of imagination. 

Imagination and Feeling. ^Esthetic Imagination is thus 
distinguished by the presence of feeling or emotion. 
This gives a peculiar vividness to imagination, and also 
directs it in certain channels which answer to the feeling. 
Any feeling may thus stimulate the activity of imagin- 
ation. Thus when fear is excited in the mind the 
imagination is swayed and bent in the direction of what 
answers to the feeling, that is to say, the terrible and 
horrible. The pleasurable emotions, such as love, the 
emotion of power, the sentiment of beauty, are wont to 
indulge themselves, or seek a certain mode of satisfaction 
or gratification through the activity of imagination. 
Thus the mother dwells on the future of her child: the 
boy dreams of great achievements: the poet shapes 
forms which thrill the mind with wonder and yield the 
pure delight of beauty. In this way the mind adds what 
is called 'ideal,' to its real satisfactions. The mother 
o 



226 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

by dwelling in fancy on the possibilities of the future, 
gains a measure of the same enjoyment which the actual 
realization of her wishes would bring. The imaginary 
scenes and actions of poetry afford something of the 
same delight which the actual perception of such objects 
would supply. 

Transcending the Real. We have seen that imagination 
is able (within certain limits) to vary or transform the 
actual events of our experience. Under the stimulus of 
an emotion, such as the feeling for the beautiful, or the 
sublime, imagination is wont to rise above the ordinary 
level of experiences and to picture objects, circumstances, 
and events surpassing those of every day life. The 
ideal creations of the imagination are thus apt to trans- 
cend the region of sober fact. Hence the realm of 
romance and fairyland. 

Imagination opposed to Intellect. The indulgence in these 
pleasures of imagination is legitimate within certain 
bounds. But it is attended with dangers, moral and 
intellectual. A young person whose mind dwells long 
on the wonders of romance may grow discontented with 
actual life. Or he learns to find his satisfaction in such 
ideal indulgence; and so by the habitual severance of 
emotion and volition, ceases to feel the presence of 
every day motives, a result illustrated by the history of 
Coleridge and other 'dreamers.' This constitutes the 
moral danger. The intellectual danger is that by an 
excessive activity of imagination the regions of fact and 
fiction may become confused. All vivid imagination 
appears, as was suggested above, to be attended with a 



INTELLECTUAL VALUE OF IMAGINATION. 227 

measure of belief. Children of very lively imagination 
easily drift into the belief that their dream-images and 
their waking fancies answer to realities. 

Intellectual Value of Imagination. We have now seen 
that the imagination stands in a double relation to in- 
tellection or knowing. On the one hand, when controlled 
by the will and directed to the ends of truth it is an 
important ancillary in the acquisition and discovery of 
knowledge. On the other hand, when uncontrolled, or 
when subjected to the powerful sway of emotion, it 
easily opposes the progress of knowledge. 

Writers on the imagination have been wont to dwell 
rather on this second aspect, and to overlook the function 
of the imagination in thinking and understanding. The 
old opposition of imagination and understanding rested 
on an inadequate apprehension of its operations. No 
doubt imagination and thought are broadly contrasted, 
since the former has to do with the concrete in its 
fulness of detail, while the understanding has to do with 
the general in its bareness and simplicity. 1 Yet there 
is a connection between the two, which recent psycholo- 
gists have come to see. When duly controlled imagin- 
ative activity prepares the way for the higher processes 
of thinking. By giving mobility and flexibility to the 
images of memory it is an essential preliminary to the 
activity of thought. Thus by breaking up or dissolving 
complex images and series of images into their parts 
and allowing the isolated picturing of objects and 

i The broad contrast between the two has been illustrated in a very 
interesting way by Mr. Galton. As he justly remarks, " our bookish and 
wordy education tends to repress this valuable gilt of nature.'" Inquiries 
into Human Faculty, p. 113. 



228 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

events, it facilitates the processes of abstraction (turning 
the mind from the complexities of individual things). 
And by combining mental pictures in new wholes it 
paves the way for the synthetic activity of thought in 
combining thought-elements (notions) in new relations. 

Development of Imagination. Just as memory only be- 
gins to develop when the faculty of perception has been 
exercised up to a certain point, so imagination only 
distinctly appears when memory has attained a certain 
stage of perfection. This applies alike to construction 
as concerned with objects and with actions. The 
child must be able to recall distinctly a number of pre- 
vious sense-experiences before he can build up new 
pictures of what is going to happen, or strike out new 
combinations of movement. 

Germ of Imagination. Although the infant shows the 
germ of imagination under the form of anticipating 
what is new, it is not till language is mastered that its 
activity becomes well marked. It is in listening to the 
simple narrations and descriptions of the mother or 
nurse that the power of framing new pictures is first 
exercised. It is noteworthy that the child will only 
manifest interest in such narrations after he has been 
accustomed to a verbal recital of his own personal expe- 
riences. The capability of representing a new series of 
events depends on the exercise of the reproductive im- 
agination in recalling old successions. In this way the 
child's knowledge of things gradually widens, passing 
outwards from the narrow circle of his individual obser- 
vations, and embracing larger and larger regions of space 
and time. 



children's fancy. 229 

Children's Fancy: Nature of Play. After a certain 
amount of exercise of constructive power in this simple 
receptive form, the child shows a spontaneous disposi- 
tion to build up fancies on his own account. The feel- 
ing of possessing a new power seems to act as a motive 
here. At first this activity of fancy manifests itself in 
close connection with the perception of actual objects. 
This is illustrated in children's play. Play offers as we 
have seen ample scope for practical ingenuity: it is the 
natural vent of active impulse, the liking to do things, 
and to find out new ways of doing them. But it owes 
its interest to another circumstance, namely that it is a 
mimicry and kind of make-believe of the actions of 
adults. When at play the child realizes by an exercise 
of fancy the objects and actions which he is mimicking. 
The actual presentations supply a basis of fact on which 
the imagination more easily constructs its fabric. 1 By 
the alchemy of imagination the doll becomes in a man- 
ner transformed into a living child, the rude stick into 
a horse, and so on. A very rough basis of analogy will 
suffice for these creations of fancy: hence a boy will 
derive as much pleasure from a broken and shapeless 
hobby-horse as from the most life-like toy. Play thus 
illustrates in a striking manner the liveliness of children's 
fancy. In their spontaneous games they betray the 
germs of artistic imagination: they are in a sense at 
once poets and actors. 

Children' 8 Fictions. A child of three or four years who 
has heard a number of stories will display great activity 

i The aid rendered by the presence of an actual object to the activity 
of imagination is illustrated in the fact quoted by Mr. Galton that chess- 

g layers can think out a game better when they have the empty chess- 
oard present. 



230 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

in modelling new ODes. 1 These fabrications show the 
influence of the child's own experience and observation 
as well as of the narratives of others. At this period 
original fancy often assumes extravagant shapes. A 
strong susceptibility to the excitement of the marvellous, 
often supplies the impelling force in these constructions. 
Young children are wont to project themselves in- fancy 
to distant regions of space and to transform themselves 
into other objects. Thus a child barely three years was 
accustomed to wish she might live in the water with 
the fishes, or be a beautiful star in the sky. The daring 
of these combinations is to a considerable extent ac- 
counted for by the child's ignorance of what is impossi- 
ble and improbable in reality. To the young mind to 
fly up into the sky is an idea which has nothing absurd 
about it. The riotous activity of children's fancy is 
thus due in part to their want of experience and judg- 
ment. 

Imagination brought under Control. The progress of ex- 
perience and the growth of knowledge lead to a moder- 
ation of childish fancy. From the first spontaneous 
form in which it is free to follow every capricious 
impulse, it passes into the more regulated form in which 
it is controlled by an enlightened will. That is to say, 
its activity becomes directed by the sense of what is 
true, life-like, and probable. The old nursery stories 
cease to please. Narratives based on real life, histories 

i These fanciful creations are often built up on a slender basis of ob- 
servation. Thus a little girl (5% years) once found a stone with a hole in 
it, and set to work to weave a pretty fairy tale respecting It. To her fancy 
it became the wonderful stone, having inside it beautiful rooms, and 
lovely fairies who dance, sing and live happily. 



TRAINING OF THE IMAGINATION. 231 

of children, their doings and experiences, take their 
place. In this way the earlier impulses, the love of the 
marvellous, the liking for the grotesque and ridiculous, 
are replaced by higher motives, a desire to learn about 
things, and a regard for what is true to nature and life. 

Training of the Imagination. The side of imaginative 
activity which will chiefly interest us here is the cogni- 
tive side. The peculiar position of the faculty in rela- 
tion to Intellect on one side and Emotion on the other 
gives rise to problems of peculiar difficulty. As we 
have seen, the power of picturing what has never been 
actually seen is of the utmost value for knowledge. And 
yet this same power if indulged in to excess may give 
rise to illusions, and so frustrate the purposes of intellect. 

Restraining Immoderate Fancy. That imagination requires 
restraining nobody will doubt. " Nothing is more 
dangerous to reason than the flight of imagination. . . 
Men of bright fancies may in this respect be compared 
to those angels whom the Scriptures represent as cover- 
ing their eyes with their wings." ] In the case of 
children of very vivid imaginations the treatment of the 
faculty is often a matter of some difficulty. Wild, dis- 
concerting, and injurious fancies must, it is plain, be 
dispelled. And the vividness of fancy must not be 
carried to the point of confusing fiction and reality. In 
such a case the immediate object of training should be 
to strengthen concurrently the powers of judging and 
reasoning as a make-weight against a too lively imagin- 
ation. 

i Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I., Pt. IV., §7. 



232 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

Guiding the Fancy. It seems probable, however, that 
the perils of indulging children's fancy have been some- 
what exaggerated. In the case of healthy children who 
are kindly treated the exercise of fancy rarely leads to 
bad moral or intellectual consequences. Children appear 
to dream vividly, yet as a rule they soon distinguish 
between their dreams and their real waking experiences. 
A strong native bent to imaginative activity requires to 
be guided rather than resisted and frustrated. By a 
judicious course of training it may be transformed into 
the germ of a tine historical, scientific, or poetic 
imagination. 

Stimulating the Imagination. Not only so, in average 
cases it is desirable to stimulate the imaginative power 
by supplying appropriate objects. The habitual narration 
of stories, description of places, and so on, is an essential 
ingredient in the rudimentary stages of education. The 
child that has been well drilled at home in following 
stories, will, other things being equal, be the better learn- 
er at school. The early nurture of imagination by means 
of good wholesome food has had much to do with 
determining the degree of imaginative power, and, 
through this, of the range of intellectual activity ulti- 
mately reached. 

Conditions of Sound Training. In order to train the 
imagination wisely we must attend to the natural laws 
of its operation. Thus it is obvious that the constructive 
tasks imposed should be adapted to the experiences of 
the child. The first rule then is to see that the child has 
command of the necessary materials. By these are 



STIMULATING THE IMAGINATION. 233 

meant not only the images which supply the elements 
or details of the mental picture, but a representation or 
representations which may serve as a rough model for 
the composition. Thus, to take a simple example, a child 
will be aided to form a mental picture of a snow mount- 
ain not only by recalling the mountain form and the 
white snow, but also by referring to some familiar 
object which shall serve as type or model, as a loaf of 
sugar. The second rule is to awaken an adequate interest 
or motive. The materials provided for constructive 
activity, the scene described, or the action narrated, 
must be interesting and attractive, as well as within the 
child's grasp. Here the study of the emotional side of 
child-nature, and of its many variations is necessary. 

Gradation of Exercise. The imaginative faculty, like 
every other faculty, must be called into play gradually. 
Not only must the constructive operation be adapted to 
the growing experience of the child, and the natural 
order of unfolding of his feelings, it must be suited to 
the degree of imaginative power already attained. Thus 
descriptions and narrations should increase in length 
and intricacy by gradual steps. The first exercises of 
the imagination should be by means of short accounts 
of interesting incidents in animal and child life. Such 
stories deal in experiences which are thoroughly intel- 
ligible and interesting to the child. The best of the 
traditional stories, as that of Cinderella, are well fitted 
by their simplicity as well as by their romantic and 
adventurous character to please and engross the imagin- 
ation. And fables in which the moral element is not 
made too burdensome, and in which the child's charac- 



234 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

teristic feelings, e. g., his love of fun, are studied, will 
commonly be reckoned among his favorites. When new 
feelings of curiosity unfold, and the imaginative faculty 
gains strength by exercise, more elaborate and less 
exciting stories may be introduced. 

Children^ Literature. It may be safely said that a 
good part of the so-called children's literature offends 
by inattention to the obvious conditions of success. It 
is not needful to dwell on the ' night mare ' stories 
which injure children by disposing them to images of 
the terrible, though examples of this are not wanting in 
classical collections of fairy-tales. Nor need one refer 
to the ' goody ' books which commonly weary them 
(when they succeed in engaging any measure of their 
attention at all). It is enough to touch on the common 
error of describing experiences, situations, impressions 
and feelings, quite out of their mental reach. The 
writers of children's books but too rarely have the art 
of looking at the world with the eyes of a young person. 
His powers of understanding and his emotional capa- 
bilities are alike over-rated. He is expected to under- 
stand intricate motives, to appreciate delicate touches 
of humor which would escape many an adult, and to 
manifest an aesthetic taste on a level with the latest 
refinements. Anybody who will take a little trouble to 
scan the so-called ' popular' children's stories of the 
present day, and what is more, carefully observe how 
children read them, will satisfy himself that even in this 
prolific age the stories which really come home to young 
minds are few enough. 



IMAGINATION IN TEACHING. 235 

Exercise of the Imagination in Teaching. As we have seen, 
the imagination is called into activity in all branches of 
teaching. In some branches, as History and Geography, 
it is more especially exercised. Here then a knowledge 
of the laws of operation of the faculty will be a matter 
of great importance to the teacher. A word or two 
must suffice on this head. 

To begin with, since new images can only be formed 
out of old materials, it is desirable to call up past im- 
pressions in the most vivid way. This end will be 
secured to some extent by a wise selection of words. 
These must be simple and familiar, fitted to call up 
images at once. More than this, the teacher should 
remind the child of facts in his experience the represen- 
tations of which may serve as the elements of the new 
image, or as its model. Thus in describing an historical 
event the several features must be made clear by parallel 
facts in the child's small world and the whole scene 
made distinct by the help of rough analogies. In doing 
this, however, the teacher must be careful to help the 
child to distinguish the new from the old and not to 
import into the new image the accidental and irrelevant 
accessories of his experience. 

Once more, the teacher must seek to follow the nat- 
ural order in exercising the imagination. He should 
remember that clear images are built up gradually. 
There is first a dim outline, a blurred scheme, and 
this gradually grows distinct by additions of detailed 
features. Thus the description of a country best begins 
with a rough outline of its contour, its surroundings, 
and its larger features, as mountain-chains, etc. Simi- 
larly historical narrative best sets out with some general 



236 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

outline of events which may serve as a time-scheme for 
the particular incidents to be dealt with. Not only so, 
the teacher should progress by steps from the known to 
the unknown and from the simple to the complex. The 
method in teaching geography, of setting out with the 
child's immediate surroundings, and gradually passing 
to more distant regions, illustrates the importance of 
the first condition. The practice in the teaching of 
history, of giving a biographical account of a sovereign 
with the least possible reference to social circumstances, 
illustrates the importance of the second condition. Fi- 
nally, the imagination may be greatly aided by sense- 
presentations. It has been remarked above that fancy 
builds up its creations most easily when there is a basis 
of actual observation at the moment. And this condi- 
tion is complied with by a judicious use of maps, models, 
pictures, etc. 

References. 

The processes of constructive imagination have not been fairly dealt 
with by English psychologists. The accounts given by D. Stewart and 
Sir W. Hamilton are slight and inadequate. Prof. Bain deals more fully 
with the theme in his own manner under the head of ' Constructive Asso- 
ciation ' (Senses and Intellect : Intellect, Chap. IV.). 

There are some good remarks on practical constructiveness in Miss 
Edgeworth's Essays, Vol. II., Chap. XXI. (On Memory and Invention). 
The application of the psychology of the imagination to the teaching of 
History and Geography is well illustrated in Mr. Fitch's treatment of 
these subjects, Lectures on Teaching, Chaps. XII. and XIII. 



APPENDIX. 

SUGGESTIVE AND TEST EXERCISES. 

1. Give exact examples from your own mental experiences 
or those of your pupils, of each of the following acts of mind. 



REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 237 

That is to say, select some past mental operations which may- 
serve as illustrations of the general acts of mind here set down : 
Reproductive Imagination, constructive imagination, the isolating 
'activity of the imagination, the combining activity of the imagination, 
receptive imagination, original imagination, cognitive construction, 
practical construction, and poetic construction. 

2. Set down in thought also examples of the following men- 
tal operations : 

(1) A learning process which is purely reproductive. 

(2) A learning process which is both reproductive and con- 
structive. 

(3) A learning process which is almost purely inventive. 

(4) A learning process of motor acquisition. 

(5) A learning act of constructive imagination resulting in the 
full understanding of subject-matter. 

3. As an exercise in the practical study of mind, consider 
exactly what mental processes a child goes through in reading 
for the first time the following sentence. Suppose him to be 
well prepared to read the sentence but never to have seen the 
particular collocation of words before: 

John's hat is in the well. 

4. Make a special study, in connection with these chapters 
on imagination, of the 'psychology of learning to compose,' that 
is, of the mental operations involved in the framing of a new 
oral sentence. 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. In what respects is Memory a form of imagination? 
What is the difference between an act of reproductive and an act 
of constructive imagination? Which is the more simple process, 
and why? Which is the higher form of energy, and why? How 
are the images of memory modified when we picture an unfamil- 
iar coming event? 

2. Show how large a part of our mental processes involves 
imagination. How is it related to the acquisition of knowledge? 
In what way does imagination enter into our study of the minds of 



238 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

others? Show that in every new word or sentence learned by 
the child there is a new form of imagination. 

3. What are the two stages of the constructive process?^ 
Which of these is logically first? What determines the perfec- 
tion or excellence of the constructive process? Illustrate. 

4. How do we know that we have the thought or contents of 
what we read? How do we know that we understand the 
desires and thoughts of a pupil? In what way can we know the 
student comprehends our teaching? Show how imagination 
enters into all the learning and teaching processes just referred to. 

5. What is the distinction between receptive and creative im- 
agination? Is this distinction the same as that of reproductive 
and constructive imagination? Show the difference. Which is the 
higher form of energy, reading Enoch Arden or composing a simi- 
lar imaginative sketch? Which is the higher form of learning, 
perfecting one's knowledge of the definitions of physics or invent- 
ing new forms of physical apparatus ? 

6. Show how the acquisition from others of new knowledge of 
things, places, and events involves receptive imagination. Show 
how design in drawing is related to imagination. How does sim- 
plifying the construction of apparatus involve the same form gf 
activity? 

7. What is learning? What does it involve besides memory? 
Show from the standpoint of constructive imagination that all 
learning must be based on previous knowledge. What intuitions 
must a child possess in order to follow a description of a desert ? 
To understand the relation of the planets to the sun? Show the 
connection between clear imagination and clear thinking. 

8. How is the acquisition of historical knowledge related to 
imagination? What are the intuitions which fit the mind for 
understanding a description of a siege? Of the opening of parlia- 
ment? Of Luther at the Diet of Worms? AVhat class of intu- 
itions — images of what concrete objects and events — fit a student 
for the exercise of an historical imagination? 

9. Show how the acquisition of a knowledge of Astronomy 
involves constructive imagination. Of Physiology? Of Physics? 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 239 

Of Chemistry? What sensible intuitions are the necessary prep- 
aration for the study of each of these sciences? 

10. What is meant by 'visualizing' a description? What by 
' idealizing ' an historical event, or a geographical climatic condi- 
tion? What is meant by 'concreting the abstract'? In what 
way is Language here involved? Show that these processes of 
'visualizing,' 'realizing,' and 'concreting' are the necessary con- 
ditions of all learning through oral teaching as well as from 
books? Is there any substitute for language as the medium of 
instruction and culture? 

REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

1. For Reading as mental action, as constructive imagination 
in getting the thought of the printed page, see Parker's Talks on 
Teaching, p. 29. On the importance of perfecting the construct- 
ive imaginative process in reading before proceeding to expres- 
sion, see the same, pp. 38 and 69. On oral reading as a means of 
knowing whether the reader has perfectly imaged to himself the 
thought of the writer, see the same, pp. 38-39. 

2. On Intuition (Anschauung) — the power of gaining knowl- 
edge by direct experiences — as the basis of reproductive and con- 
structive imagination — as the basis of all knowledge, see Pesta- 
lozzi as quoted by Payne, Pestalozzi, Lectures, pp. 243 and 250; 
also Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 188; on Comenius's doc- 
trine as to this, the same, p. 60; see also Tate's Philosophy 
of Education, Part I., chap. III., Primitive Intelligence; on 
Locke's reference to real knowledge, Quick, p. 88; on Rous- 
seau's anticipation of Pestalozzi's object-lessons, the same, pp. 
109-113. On the things of the world to be known first directly 
through the senses and then more extendedly through imagina- 
tion as in pictures, see the same, p. 146, and on the general use 
of pictures, p. 267. 

3. On the importance of the cultivation of the imagination, 
see Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part II. , chap. V. ; on the 
• picturing out' method of teaching, see same chapter; also Lan- 



240 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. 

don's School Management, Part I., chap. V., p. 86; on poetry, 
drawing, music, and art in general, in relation to education, the 
same, also Landon, as above. 

4. On imagination as the only means of teaching Geography, 
see Parker's Talks on Teaching, Talk XVIII., near the beginning; 
on the fact that all that we remember must be imaged in space, 
and on the true imagination-method in geography as illustrated 
in the method of modern historians and novelists, see the same 
chapter; on the intuitions — sense-products — which are the neces- 
sary preliminary to geography, see Talk XIX,, near beginning; 
on geography as the best means of cultivating imagination, see 
the same; for 'home-geography' as the best means of imaging to 
the mind the distant and new, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, 
chap. XII. 

5. On common school education as heretofore tending to 
crush imaginative development, see Parker, p. 127; oa all knowl- 
edge of the unseen as dependent on imagination, p. 126. 

6. On Invention — constructive imagination — as a part of 
self-instruction, see Payne, The Practice or Art of Education, 
Lectures, pp. 98 and 101; for Burke quoted on the method of 
discovery in teaching, the same, p. 101 ; see also Page's Theory 
and Practice, chap. V., section III., near the end. 

7. On Diesterweg's distinction of Elementary and Scientific 
methods of teaching, see Payne, Pestalozzi, Lectures, p. 247 ; the 
elementary method as inventive, and the ' scientific method ' as 
opposed to invention, the same, p. 249. 

8. On the danger of didactic instruction when the imagination 
does not respond, see Rousseau, quoted by Quick, Educational 
Beformers, p. 133, also Payne, True Foundation of Science Teach- 
ing, near the end, Lectures, p. 225. 



CHAPTER IX. 

CONCEPTION. 

Particular and General Knowledge : Thought. The intel- 
lectual operations hitherto considered have had to do 
with individual things. To perceive, remember, and 
imagine has reference to some particular object, as the 
River Thames, or a particular occurrence, as the open- 
ing of the New Law-Courts. But we may reflect and 
reason about rivers or ceremonies in general. When 
we do so, we are said to think. All thinking is repre- 
sentation like imagination, but it is a different sort of 
representation. It is the representation not of individ- 
ual things (e. g., John Smith), but of classes (e. g., Eng- 
lishman, human being). In thinking we are concerned 
not with single objects in their ' concrete ' fulness of 
individual peculiarities or characteristics (e. g., this tree 
with all its individual peculiarities of form, color, etc.), 
but with certain of their ' abstract ' qualities, that is to 
say, aspects common to them and many other things 
(e. g., the possession of life). This higher province of 
intellectual activity broadly marks off human from ani- 
mal intelligence. 

Thinking Defined. Thinking may be roughly defined 
as a going over, sorting, and arranging the store of par- 
ticular cognitions gained by sense-perception and re- 
tained by memory. Like the simpler forms of cognition 



242 CONCEPTION. 

it consists in discrimination and assimilation, in detect- 
ing differences and agreements. It differs from these 
in the mode of exercise of these fundamental functions. 
Thinking is discrimination and assimilation performed 
on the results of sense-perception and reproduction. 
Not only so, as we shall see presently, it is assimilation 
and discrimination of a higher kind, involving much 
more activity of mind. 

Thinking and Understanding. Thinking is closely re- 
lated to Understanding, and indeed the two words are 
ofteu used to mark off the same region of intellectual 
operation. When we view an object as a concrete 
whole, we apprehend it: when, however, we regarfl it 
under some common aspect, we comprehend it. The 
child apprehends this particular building, that is to say, 
as an individual thing distinct from surrounding things, 
having a particular shape, size, etc.: he comprehends it 
when he recognizes it as a church. Similarly he under- 
stands an event when he assimilates it to other and 
already familiar events on the ground of a common 
cause. Thus he understands the fall of snow when he 
takes a lump into his hand and finds out that it has 
weight To understand things is thus to assimilate 
them to other things, and this is just what we mean by 
thinking. 

Thinking based on Comparison. All thinking implies 
comparing one object with another. By an act of com- 
parison is meant the voluntary direction of attention to 
two or more objects at the same moment, or in immediate 
succession, with a view to discover their differences or 



STAGES OF THINKING. 243 

their agreements. The objects may be both present to- 
gether, and placed in juxtaposition, as when a teacher 
compares the handwriting of a child with the copy; or, 
as often happens, may be (either wholly or in part) rep- 
resented, as when we recall a person's face in order to 
compare it with another which we are now observing. 

Thinking and Language. It is allowed by all that there 
is an intimate connection between thinking and language. 
Man is distinguished from the lower animals by the at- 
tribute of speech as well as by that of understanding. 
The thinking powers of the several races of mankind 
vary with the degree of complexity and elaborateness of 
their language. The child's power of thought grows 
step by step with his power of speech. Much of our 
thinking is plainly carried on by the aid of spoken lan- 
guage, namely all that is connected with conversing or 
exchanging ideas. And even in the case of solitary or 
silent thought, internal observation at once tells us that 
an inaudible or suppressed speech co-operates. 

Language is in its very nature a system of general 
signs or symbols which may be applied to an indefinite 
number of objects. And it is only by the help of lan- 
guage (or some other equivalent set of signs) that we can 
think, in the strict sense of the word, that is to say, con- 
sider things under their general or common aspects. 

Stages of Thinking. We commonly distinguish three 
stages of thinking. First of all there is the formation of 
general notions or concepts, which may be said to con- 
stitute the elements of thought, such as ' material body', 
'weight.' This is called conception. Next to this 



244 CONCEPTION. 

comes the combining of two concepts in the form of a 
statement or proposition, as when we say ■ material bod- 
ies have weight.' This is termed an act of Judgment. 
Lastly, we have the operation by which the mind passes 
from certain judgments (or statements) to certain other 
judgments, as when from the assertions ' material sub- 
stances have weight,' 'gases are material substances,' 
we proceed to the further assertion i gases have weight.' 
This process is described as Reasoning, or drawing an 
inference or conclusion. 

These distinctions have been fixed by logicians and 
not by psychologists. The mental process in each case is 
substantially the same. Not only so, as we shall see 
presently, these operations are not carried on separately, 
but are involved one in the other. Nevertheless, since 
they roughly mark off the more simple and the more 
complex modes of thinking, and products of thought, it 
is convenient ?to the psychologist to adopt the distinc- 
tions. We shall accordingly in the present chapter deal 
with the process of conception, or concept-formation, and 
in the following chapter consider the processes of judg- 
ing and reasoning. 

Definition of General Notion or Concept. A concept, 
other-wise called a general notion or a general idea, is 
the representation in our minds answering to a general 
name, such as soldier, man, animal. There has been 
much discussion concerning the nature of these general 
representations, or ' abstract ideas ' as they are some- 
times called. It is clear that they are related to con- 
crete images of particular objects. Thus the concept 
' soldier ' is connected in my mind with the representa- 



HOW CONCEPTS ARE FORMED. 245 

tions of various individual soldiers known to me. But 
when I use the word 'soldier' I do not fully represent 
any individual soldier with his particular height, style of 
uniform, etc., nor do I distinctly represent a succession 
of such individuals. What is in my mind is a kind of 
composite image formed by the fusion or coalescence of 
many images of single objects, in which individual dif- 
ferences are blurred, and only the common features stand 
out distinctly. Thus my representation of a soldier cor- 
responds to a rough sketch of the soldier figure with some 
kind of uniform and carrying some kind of weapon. 
This may be called a typical or generic image. 

How Concepts are formed. The more concrete concepts or 
' generic ' images are formed to a large extent by a pas- 
sive process of assimilation. The likeness among dogs for 
example is so great and striking that when a child already 
familiar with one of these animals sees a second he re- 
cognizes it as identical with the first in certain obvious 
aspects. The representation of the first combines with 
the presentation of the second, bringing into distinct re- 
lief the common dog-features, more particularly the 
canine form. In this way the images of different dogs 
come to overlap, so to speak, giving rise to a typical 
image of dog. 1 Here there is very little of active direc- 
tion of mind from one thing to another in order to dis- 
cover where the resemblance lies: the resemblance 
forces itself on the mind. When, however, the resem- 
blance is less striking, as in the case of the more abstract 

iMr. Galton compares these generic images to composite pictures 
formed by the overlapping or superimposing of a number of photographic 
impressions on a plate. See Inquiries into Human Faculty, Appendix, 
1 Generic Images,' p. 349. 



246 CONCEPTION. 

concepts (e. g. y animal), a distinct operation of active 
comparison is involved. This is the operation which we 
have now especially to investigate. 

Comparison, Abstraction, and Generalization. The active 
mental process by which concepts are formed is com- 
monly said to fall into three stages, comparison, abstrac- 
tion, and generalization. These are however very 
intimately related, and are only distinguishable aspects 
of the same mental operation. 

First of all it is needful that a number of objects 
having a certain degree of likeness should be somehow 
brought before the mind. As already pointed out, these 
objects may be actually present or may be called up by 
the representative imagination. We then compare them, 
that is regard them by a special act of attention in their 
mutual relation, in order to see how far, and in what 
respects, they resemble one another. 

Now when things are widely unlike one another, as 
for example different fruits, as a strawberry, a peach, 
and so on, we must in order to note the resemblance 
turn the mind away from the differences of form, color, 
etc. This is the difficult part of the operation. Great 
differences are apt to impress the mind, and it requires 
a special effort to turn aside from them and to keep the 
mind directed to the underlying similarity. This effort 
is known as abstraction. It implies a high exercise of 
the power of voluntary attention acting in opposition to 
what is impressive or interesting (see p. 79). 1 The greater 

i Abstraction means etymologically the active withdrawal (of atten- 
tion) from one thing in order to fix it on another thing (Lat. db and trdho). 
Although we commonly speak of abstraction in reference to turning away 
from differences to similarities the same process shows itself in other 



CONCEPTION AND NAMING. 247 

the vigor of mind thrown into this act of abstraction, 
the clearer or more perfect will be the detection of the 
common features (e. g., the fruit marks or traits). 

Finally, having thus seized by an effort of abstraction 
the common traits of the several individual specimens 
of fruit, the child generalizes, that is to say forms a notion 
of a class of things which have the qualities detected. 
That is to say out of the images thus brought together 
and compared he forms a general notion of a class of 
things. 

Conception and Naming. This process of conception 
takes place in immediate connection with naming. For 
the sake of simplicity we will first suppose that the child 
begins to use the name when he compares a number of 
objects, and seizes the points of resemblance among 
these; just as a scientific discoverer invents a name to 
mark off some newly-discovered class of things. He 
applies the term fruit to the various objects compared 
and found to have certain common characters or marks. 
The name is thus given not to one object but to a 
number; and it is given to them with special reference 
to their points of similarity. That is to say, by being 
given to the several objects, pears, oranges, etc., the 
name serves in a peculiar way to indicate, define, and fix 
this relation of similarity among them. But for the 
appending of a name the recognition of points of simi- 
larity would be vague and momentary only. 

forms. Thus in looking at a face we may withdraw attention from the 
eyes and fix it on some less impressive feature. If two things (e. g., two 
sheep) are very like we need to make an effort of abstraction in order to 
overlook the similarities and attend to the differences. 



248 CONCEPTION. 

Our observer will be henceforth disposed to apply the 
name fruit to any object (familiar or unfamiliar) in 
which he discovers the marks or characters specially 
associated with the name. Thus on seeing a lemon or a 
fig, he will call the object a fruit. That is to say just 
as on meeting with the name the concept or typical idea 
will be called up, so on meeting with any of the corres- 
ponding things the name will be called up. The name 
has thus become a class-name, denoting a number of 
objects resembling one another in certain particulars; 
and connoting these common characters by virtue of 
which the objects are mentally connected and called by 
one name. 

We must now, however, abandon the supposition that 
the child fashions his concept at one time and in the 
systematic way described above. The process of ab- 
straction is a slowly progressive one. Thus the notion 
fruit is only gradually extricated from percepts and 
images after many successive comparisons, each of which 
adds an element of exactness to the growing concept. 
And this implies that words are not at first used as 
general signs. Thus the name fruit might at the outset 
be applied to one kind, or at most to two kinds, of fruit. 
At this stage it would call up a blurred image, or a 
nascent or rudimentary concept only. The growth of 
the concept progresses step by step with the extension 
of the name to new objects. 

Discovering the Meaning of Words. One other correction 
of the above account of the conceptual process remains 
to be made. We have supposed that the child brings 
objects together and compares them on his own account 



NOTIONS WHICH INVOLVE SYNTHESIS. 249 

without any guidance from others. This process does 
actually take place. Children discover resemblances 
among things and call them by the same name quite 
spontaneously and without any suggestion from others. 
At the same time it is obvious that the greater part of 
their concepts are formed (in part at least) by listening 
to others and noting the way in which they employ 
words. The process is in this case very much the same 
as before. A child finds out the meaning of a word, 
such as ' man,' ' good boy,' and so forth, by comparing 
the different instances in which it is used, abstracting 
from the variable accompaniments and fixing the atten- 
tion on the common or essential circumstance. 

Notions which involve Synthesis. Many of our notions 
involve, in addition to a process of abstraction and 
analysis, a process of combination or synthesis. That 
is to say, we require to regroup the results of abstrac- 
tion in new combinations. Thus in the study of history 
we have to build up out of the results of observation 
and abstraction such notions as * Roman Emperor,' 
* feudal system,' etc. 

This process, the synthetic formation of complex 
concepts, goes on in many cases hand in hand with a 
process of constructive imagination. By this last an 
image, or a number of images, are first elaborated, 
which give the peculiar form or structure to the con- 
cept. In this way we should form an idea of a Roman 
consul, of a volcano, and so forth. In other cases, 
however, this accompaniment of constructive imagination 
is wanting. Conception passes beyond the limits of 
distinct visual representation. 



250 CONCEPTION. 

Ideas of Magnitude and Number. This process of trans- 
cending the limits of imagination is illustrated in the 
formation of ideas of all objects of great magnitude and 
of these magnitudes themselves. Our ideas of objects 
of small size, as a single building, a troop of soldiers, a 
yard-measure or a bushel, as well as of small durations, 
as a second, are all based on percepts and images. On 
the other hand, our notions of objects or collections of 
vast size, as a city, a planet, a nation, the distance from 
the earth to the sun, and of vast durations, as a century, 
do not correspond to any distinct images. These ideas 
are reached by a process of continued summation or 
addition of magnitudes which are themselves intuitable 
and picturable. Thus in forming an idea of the earth 
we have to take some familiar magnitude, say that of a 
school globe, and to perform a prolonged process of 
piling up quantity on quantity, or measure on measure. 

Notions of Geometry. This synthetic activity is illus- 
trated in a somewhat different way in the formation of 
another class of notions. Our idea of a mathematical 
line, a circle, and so forth, does not exactly answer to 
any observable form. No straight line, for instance, 
discoverable in any actual object, perfectly answers to 
the geometric definition. Even the most carefully drawn 
line would be found on closer inspection to deviate to 
some extent from the required type. It follows that 
these notions involve more than a simple process of ab- 
straction, such as suffices, for example, for the detection 
of the quality color or weight. They presuppose in 
addition to this a process of idealization. The student 
of geometry in thinking about a perfectly straight line 



ACCURACY OF CONCEPTS. 251 

has to frame a conception of something to which certain 
actual forms only roughly approximate. The notion 
thus represents, like that of a large number, the result 
of a prolonged mental process which surpasses the limits 
of distinct imagination. 

Accuracy and Inaccuracy of Concepts. As in the case of 
images, so here we have to distinguish between the mere 
indistinctness of a concept, and its positive inaccuracy. 
A distinct notion depends on our clearly representing 
the marks we take up into our notion: an accurate 
notion depends on our taking up the right elements. By 
this is meant that we include the common characters of 
the class, or more exactly, all those included in the cur- 
rent meaning of the word, and no others. Or, to express 
the same thing in different language, an accurate con- 
cept is such that the word in which it is embodied will 
cover or *tand for all the things commonly denoted by 
that name, and for no other. 

Notions which are too Narrow. In the first place, a 
notion may be formed on too narrow an observation of 
things, the consequence of which is that accidental fea- 
tures not shared in by all members of the class are taken 
up into the meaning of the word as part of its essential 
import. For example, a child that has only seen red roses 
is apt to regard redness as a part of the meaning of rose. 
Similarly an uneducated Englishman is apt to think of 
government as implying the existence of a monarch. 
Such notions are too narrow. 

Notions which are too Wide. In the second place, a no- 
tion may be inaccurate by being too wide. If the ob- 



252 CONCEPTION. 

nervation of things is superficial and hasty, only a part 
of the common traits or marks are embodied in the 
name. The notions of children and of the uneducated 
are apt to be too wide. They pick up a part, but only 
a part, of the significance of the words they hear 
employed. Thus they observe among different fish the 
conspicuous circumstance that they live in the water, 
and so they are disposed to call seals, dolphins, and so 
on, fish. In a similar way a child will call all meals 
' tea,' overlooking the fact that ' tea ' connotes besides 
the characters of ' meal,' that of taking place towards 
the close of the day. 

Revision of Notions. It follows from the above that 
perfect concepts commonly presuppose not one process 
of comparison an'd abstraction simply, but a succession 
of conceptual processes, by the aid of which the first 
crude concepts are perfected, and also the tendencies in 
words to lose their significance are counteracted. De- 
fective conception at the outset (whether ending in a 
vague or a positively erroneous notion) can only be 
made good by more searching inspection of the things 
submitted to examination, and also by a wider and 
more varied observation of objects in their similarities 
and dissimilarities. 

Not only so, even when the concepts have been prop- 
erly formed they can only be kept distinct, and conse- 
quently accurate, by going back again and again to the 
concrete objects out of which they have in a manner 
been extracted. Only when we do this shall jwe avoid 
the error of taking empty names for realities, and keep 
our representations fresh and vivid. Conception is in 



RELATION OF CONCEPTION TO IMAGINATION. 253 

this way continually renewed by contact with actual 
concrete fact by way of perception and imagination. 
The frequent application of names to individual things 
is thus a condition of preserving vitality in our con- 
cepts. Thinking is not the same thing as imagining,, 
yet it is based on it and cannot safely be divorced from 
it. Clear concepts imply images of particular objects 
in the back-ground, ready to come into the full light of 
consciousness as occasion requires. We only attach a 
definite meaning to a name when we are in a position to 
recall a concrete example, or rather a variety of concrete 
examples. 

Relation of Conception to Imagination. The above remarks 
help to bring out still more distinctly the relation be- 
tween imagination and thought. As we have seen, a 
notion differs from an image in that it contains a repre- 
sentation of common features only, and not of individ- 
ual peculiarities. 

At the same time, notions are formed out of images. 
Thinking is thus based on imagination (both reproduc- 
tive and constructive). The meaning or content of a 
word is wholly derived from the inspection of concrete 
things. Hence a notion in order to be full, distinct, and 
stable must be continually supported by images. To every 
word there ought to correspond several tendencies to 
form images; though since the images are often very dif- 
ferent, these tendencies should in general counteract one 
another. Only when there is this vital connection be- 
tween thought and imagination can the mind steer clear 
ol the perils of empty words. 



254 CONCEPTION. 

On Defining Notions. Our notions are rendered distinct 
and accurate not merely by going back to concrete 
facts or examples, but by a number of supplementary 
processes which may be roughly grouped under the 
head of definition. To define a word in the logical 
sense is to unfold its connotation, to enumerate more or 
less completely the several characters or attributes which 
make up its meaning. As we have seen, we form many 
concepts, such as 'metal,' 'man,' 'civilized country,' 
before we are able to represent distinctly the several 
attributes which compose the connotation of the words. 
It is only when the mind's power of abstraction in- 
creases that this higher stage of analysis becomes possi- 
ble. When it has been performed the mind will be 
able to retain the essentials of the concept by means of 
the verbal definition. When for example the child has 
learnt that glass is a transparent substance, composed of 
certain materials, brittle, easily fused by heat, a bad 
conductor of heat, and so on, the string of properties 
stored up by aid of the verbal memory will serve to 
give distinctness to the concept. 

Finally our notions may be defined or rendered more 
sharp in outline by a reference to a classification of 
things. Logicians say tfiat the best way to define a class 
name (especially when the qualities are too numerous, 
and many of them too imperfectly known, for us to 
enumerate them completely) is to name the higher class, 
or ' genus,' and add the ' difference,' that is the leading 
features which mark off the class from co-ordinate 
classes. Thus we may define a parallelogram by saying 
that it is a four-sided figure (higher class) having its 
opposite sides parallel (difference). 



GEOWTH OF CONCEPTUAL POWER. 255 

Growth of Conceptual Power. As we have seen, the 
power by which the mind frames general notions is 
merely an expansion of powers which show themselves 
in a germinal form in the earlier intellectual processes 
of perception. The essential mental process is seizing 
similarity in the midst of diversity. This the child does 
in the first year of life. To recognize the mother's voice, 
for example, as one and the same amid all the changes 
of loudness and softness, and all the variations of 
pitch, clearly implies a certain rudimentary power of 
abstraction. 

Early Notions. The gradual development of the 
power of comprehending things or classes, or of form- 
ing general notions is one of the most interesting phases 
in the mental history of the individual. By a careful 
observation of children at the time when they begin to 
understand and use words we may learn much as to the 
way in which this power grows. 

In studying this phase of intellectual progress we 
must be on our guard against a source of error. As has 
been pointed out before, children do not learn to speak 
as the race may be supposed to have acquired language, 
that is to say inventing new names to express the 
similarities of things which they first notice. The child 
finds a language ready made for him, and through the 
force of imitation and the need of making himself 
understood, he is impelled to adopt the signs employed 
by others. Now it would be absurd to suppose that 
when he first understands and reproduces a name he 
attaches to this sign the same general meaning that 
adults attach to it. Such names as ' puss,' ' bow-wow,' 



256 CONCEPTION. 

and so on, when first used have not the full force of 
concepts (or generic images) as they will afterwards 
have. The growth of the conceptual power at this early 
stage is best illustrated perhaps by means of the child's 
own unaided extensions of the application of words to 
new cases. 

As might be expected, the first notions to be formed 
correspond to narrow classes of objects having a number 
of striking points of resemblance; and, further, to those 
varieties of things which have a special interest for the 
child. Thus he readily recognizes particular objects of 
diet, as milk and pudding. In like manner he soon 
learns to assimilate certain kinds of toy as -tops, and 
other objects having well-marked resemblances, as 
watches and clocks. For the -same reason, he at once 
extends the term ' bow-wow ' or l puss ' to a number of 
dogs or cats, and the name 'papa' to other male adults. 

Growth of Conception and of Discrimination. It is to be 
noted that the child's concepts grow in clearness and 
definiteness with the power of noting differences as well 
as likenesses. At first there seems to be no clear dis- 
crimination of classes from individuals. The name is 
used for a number of objects as seen to be alike, but, so 
far as we can see, without any clear apprehension 
whether they are the same thing or different things. 
This is probably true of the extension of the word papa 
to other men besides the father. The concept becomes 
definite just in proportion as differences are recognized 
and the images of individual objects, this and that 
person, this and that dog, and so on, acquire separate- 
ness in the mind. This same circumstance explains 



FORMING ABSTRACT CONCEPTIONS. 257 

another fact, namely, that the child often uses the 
names of genera (if not too large classes) before those 
of species. Thus he lumps together animals resembling 
dogs, as goats, under the name ' bow- wow.' In like 
manner he will apply a word like apple to fruit generally 
or a variety of fruits as apple, pear, orange, etc. Simi- 
larly, he will understand in a rough way the meaning 
of the word flower before he comprehends the names 
1 daisy,' or * rose.' 

Formation of more Abstract Conceptions. A higher step 
is taken when the child forms classes founded on a single 
property. The first examples of this higher power of 
abstraction occur very early in relation to aspects of 
objects of great interest to him. He first displays a 
considerable power of generalization in grouping to- 
gether edible things. Mr. Darwin in his interesting 
account of the early mental development of one of his 
children tells us that when just a year old he invented 
the word 'mum' to denote different kinds of food. He 
then went on to distinguish varieties of food by some 
qualifying adjunct. Thus sugar was ' shu-mum.' At- 
tention to common visual features comes later. A little 
boy known to the present writer when in his eighteenth 
month extended the word ' ball ' to bubbles which he 
noticed on the surface of a glass of beer. This implied 
the power of abstracting from color and size and at- 
tending to the globular form. 

As experience widens and the power of abstraction 

stregthens less conspicuous and more subtle points of 

agreement are seized. Children often perplex their 

elders with their use of words just because the latter 

Q 



268 CONCEPTION. 

cannot seize the analogy between things or events which 
the young mind detects. By degrees the young mind 
advances to the formation of more abstract ideas. One 
of the earliest of these is that of disappearance, or the 
state of being absent, commonly expressed by the sign 
' ta-ta ' or some similar expression. 

Period of Fuller Development. The power of abstraction, 
of analyzing things and discovering their common as- 
pects, qualities and relations, only attains a considerable 
strength in the stage of youth as distinguished from that 
of childhood. The earlier period is pre-eminently that 
of concrete knowledge. During this time the number of 
concepts formed is comparatively small, and these are 
such as involve the presence of numerous or obvious re- 
semblances. But from about the fourteenth year on- 
wards a marked increase in the power of abstraction 
is observable. In cases where the powers observation 
and of imagination have been properly cultivated we 
may notice at this stage a marked disposition to assim- 
ilate particular objects and occurences. The language 
becomes more general and more abstract. 

Training of Power of Abstraction. The problem of ex- 
ercising the power of abstraction and generalization is 
attended with peculiar difficulties. Children, it is com- 
monly said, delight in the concrete, and find abstraction 
arduous and distasteful. Nevertheless it is certain that 
the young are much given to discovering resemblances 
among things and to a certain kind of generalization. 
There is indeed a distinct intellectual satisfaction in dis- 
covering similarities among things. A young child's 



TRAINING OF POWER OF ABSTRACTION. 259 

face may be seen to brighten up on newly discover- 
ing some point of similarity. 1 And to some extent 
this pleasure may be utilized in training the child's 
powers. His lack of interest in generalities is often due 
to the fact that his mind is not supplied with the neces- 
sary concrete examples out of which the notions have to 
be formed. 2 

When this training should begin. The training of the 
conceptual powers should begin in connection with sense- 
observation. Objects should be laid in juxtaposition 
and the child invited to discover their similarities of 
form, etc. And here his active impulses may be appealed 
to, by giving him a confused multitude of objects and 
inviting him to sort them into classes. By such a direct 
inspection of a number of examples together notions of 
simple classes of natural objects, as species of animals 
and flowers, as well as of geometric forms and numbers 
may be gained. The process of generalizing may be 
still further aided by a judicious selection of particulars 
for inspection. It is well, as a rule, to set out with good 
average specimens of the class, in which the common 
characters are conspicuous and not disguised by striking 
individual peculiarities of color, etc. These would serve 
as typical specimens. After this, extreme instances may 
be introduced. A sufficient variety of instances must 
be supplied in every case, but the number required will 

1 E. g., when a boy (26 months old) watching a dog panting after a 
run, exclaimed with evident pleasure, * Dat like a puff puff ' (locomotive). 

2 " There is nothing the human mind grasps with more delight than 
generalization or classification, when it has already made an accumula- 
tion of particulars ; but nothing from which it turns with more repug- 
nance in its previous state of inanition."— Isaac Taylor. 



260 CONCEPTION. 

differ according to the character of the notion to be 
formed. 1 Throughout this process of calling into play 
the power of abstraction the teacher should seek to com- 
bine the exercise of discrimination with that of assimi- 
lation. He should invite the child to contrast one 
chemical substance, one class of plants or animals with 
another. The essential marks of a triangle are brought 
out by a juxtaposition with quadrangles, etc. This 
operation of comparing and classing should be supple- 
mented by naming the objects thus grouped together, 
and pointing out in the form of a definition the more 
important of the traits they have in common. 2 

In these exercises of the conceptual power the mother 
or teacher must be satisfied in the first instance with the 
discovery of the more prominent points of likeness among 
the things examined, and the naming of these. It would 
be absurd for example to expect a child at the outset to 
point out all the structural differences which character- 
ize a particular species of plant. The definitions mnst 
gradually increase in fulness and. precision as the power 
of abstraction grows. 

Development of Notions removed from Seme. The special 
difficulty in this branch of intellectual training arises in 
connection with the formation of these notions which 
cannot be reached by direct inspection of objects. The 

i As Dr. Bain points out, a child may obtain a notion of a single prop- 
erty as weight by the aid of one or two instances only, whereas he re- 
quires a good many examples of the classes metal, plant, etc. (Education 
as a Science, Chap. VII., p. 197.) 

a It is evident that this exercise of the child's powers of comparing 
different objects with a view to classification should arise naturally, and 
by insensible gradations, out of the earlier exercise of inspecting single 
objects already illustrated (p. 188). 



EXACT USE OF WORDS. 261 

child is continually hearing words which he does not 
understand. Many of these lie out of his reach, and it 
is well to let him know it. But all instruction involves 
the unfolding of the meaning of general terms. Id the 
most elementary lesson in geography or history general 
terms are necessarily employed. Here the learner will 
be called on to perform a process of synthesis, to recom- 
bine the results of abstraction practised on objects of di- 
rect personal observation. His success will depend on 
the degree of perfection of these first efforts, as well as 
on the force of his imagination. 

Cultivation of exact use of words. There is perhaps no 
part of intellectual training which requires so much 
careful attention as the control of the child's use of 
words. It is vain to expect him from the first to seize 
the exact meaning of all the terms which he employs* 
He must discourse with others, and the improvement of 
his conceptions progresses partly in connection with his 
employment of words. On the other hand, the mind is 
only too prone to be satisfied with loose and vague no- 
tions about things, and this intellectual indolence is the 
most fatal obstacle to clear and accurate knowledge. 
The dangers can only be averted by seeking to form in 
the pupil's mind from the outset a habit of making his 
notions as clear and distinct as possible. He should be 
exercised from the first in explaining the words he em- 
ploys. It is a good rule never to let a child employ a 
word without attaching some intelligible meaning to it. 
He should be questioned as to his meaning, and prove 
himself able to give concrete instances or examples of 



262 CONCEPTION. 

the notion, and (where possible) to define his term 
roughly at least. The meaning which he attaches to 
the word may be far from accurate to begin with. But 
the teacher may be satisfied with a rough approximation 
to accuracy as long as the meaning is definite and clear 
to the child's mind. As knowledge widens the teacher 
should take pains to supplement and correct these first 
crude notions, substituting exact for rough and inexact 
definitions. At the same time he should aim at giving 
greater precision to the pupil's notions by encouraging 
him in the discrimination of closely allied words, includ- 
ing proximate synonyms. 

When to take up the abstract sciences. The problem when 
to take up the subjects requiring a considerable meas- 
ure of the power of abstraction, such as the physical 
sciences, grammar, and so on, is one of the most perplex- 
ing ones in the art of education. It is probable that 
individuals differ so much in respect of the rapidity of 
this side of intellectual development that no universal 
rule can be laid down. What is certain is that subjects 
which mainly appeal to the memory and imagination like 
geography and history should precede these which make 
a large demand on the powers of abstraction and gener- 
alization. There is a psychological error in attempting 
to teach the generalities of grammar before the mind 
has been well stored with particulars. It is probable 
that even the rudimentary branches of mathematics, 
namely arithmetic and geometry, though deriving so 
much aid from sense-intuition, are apt to be begun too 
soon for the most economic management of brain-power. 



APPENDIX. 263 

But in the case of arithmetic at least the recognition of the 
paramount utility of the study is likely to override purely 
theoretical considerations. 



References. 

On the nature of abstraction, see Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Meta- 
physics, Lect. XXXIV. Compare jProf. Bain's chapter on abstraction, 
M ental Science, Book II., Chap. V.; and M. Taine's account of general 
notions in his work on Intelligence, Part II., Book IV. For an account of 
the development of the generalizing power the student may consult the 
articles already referred to in Mind (1877) by Mr. Darwin and M. Taine. 
On the practical side of the subject the reader may read Locke's valuable 
chapters on the Imperfection and Abuse of Words, Essay, Book III., 
Chap. IX.-XI. The difficulties of exercising the powers of abstraction 
and the best means of alleviating these are dealt with by Dr. Bain, Edu- 
cation as a Science, Ch. VII., pp. 191-197. In connection with this subject 
the teacher should read those chapters in Logic which deal with terms 
and their distinctions, and with division and definition (e. g., Jevons, Ele- 
ementary Lessons in Logic, III.— V. and XII.). 



APPENDIX. 

1. Study carefully in relation to the art of questioning the doc- 
trine of revision of notions and of Classification and Division. 
Learn by persistent practice of the art of questioning to detect 
any failure to seize the meaning of a general term. Look up 
what is meant by the extension and intension of terms. As an 
exercise in classification make a list of the acts of the human 
mind, i. e., to perceive, to imagine, to recollect, etc., and then clas- 
sify them. Turn these verbs into their corresponding verbal 
nouns, — for example, perception, imagination, recollection, etc., 
— then compare the notions which these names represent, co- 
ordinating and subordinating them into a series of notions. 

2. Take the term ' instruments of labor ' and divide into 
species and sub-species. Proceed in the same way with the 



264 CONCEPTION. 

notions, 'mental phenomenon, ' 'school- exercise,' 'method of 
teaching,' 'school.' 



REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. Show that imagination and thinking are both representa- 
tive acts, and not presentative. How does the representative act 
differ in the two cases? Which of the two processes is subord- 
inate, Thinking or Perception? What is the logical order of 
the three following processes: thinking, perception, imagina- 
tion? 

2. What is the difference as a learning process between ap- 
prehending and comprehending ? Show that understanding involves 
assimilation. That thinking is based upon comparison. When 
does comparison involve reproduction ? 

3. Show that analysis and synthesis are involved in thinking. 
Show that analysis and synthesis are involved in forming a per- 
fect notion of the number 10. What is the connection between 
thinking processes and language? What does Hamilton mean by 
saying that ' Speech is an analytic process? ' 

4. What are the three stages of thinking ? Are children cap- 
able of performing each of these processes? What common men- 
tal process is implicit in each? Which of the three stages 
indicates the highest order of mental energy? Which is the low- 
est? 

5. What is meant by a general notion ? What is the differ- 
ence between notions and general names? How are concepts 
formed, that is, what is the natural history of the process? What 
are the three stages of the process? What does a class name 
denote? What does it connote ? What is the distinction between 
the extension and intension of class-names? 

6. Are general terms general to the child-mind? What is 
the natural way of discovering the meaning of words? What is 
the only true way of finding the sense in which an author, say in 
an aucient manuscript, uses a term? How do students learn such 
notions as 'Revival of Learning,' 'Pre-Raphaelitism,' etc.? 



REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 265 

7. How do our ideas of large and small numbers differ in 
origin? What is the proper method of teaching small numbers? 
What takes its place in the teaching of large numbers? 

8. In what sense of the word are the simple geometrical con- 
ceptions abstractions ? Do the general terms of physics transcend 
the limits of distinct imagination? 

9. What is meant by the classification of notions? What is 
the advantage of classification? What is meant by saying a 
class is a species? What by saying it is a genus ? Show what is 
meant by co-ordination of notions. What by the subordination of 
classes. 

10. Which sciences furnish the best illustration of a perfect 
system of classification ? Which subjects can be most satisfactor- 
ily taught, those in which the phenomena have been thoroughly 
classified or those in which this has been but imperfectly realized? 
What is the educational value of having the student make his 
own classifications? 

11. Show what is meant by the distinctness of concepts. Il- 
lustrate this by the terms ' enr oiled-student, ' ' average-attendance, ' 
' learning, ' ' attending, ' pedagogics, psychology, knowing, feeling, 
willing, sensation, perception, imagination, conception, notion, con- 
cept. 

12. What is the best test of the distinctness (in the mind of a 
learner) of a concept? What is the best evidence of distinctness 
of conception in the case of the following terms: 'transitive verb,' 
'figure of speech,' 'sentence-method,' 'word-method,' 'teaching,' 
'educating,' 'training,' 'reading,' 'recitation,' 'declamation,' 
'instruction,' 'examination'? 

13. What is meant by the definition of notions? Show why 
the construction of definitions is a difficult art. Show why 
the acquisition of verbal definitions comes late in the course of 
instruction. How can we avoid teaching empty terms instead of 
real notions? What results when thinking is divorced from con- 
crete objects? From what, in the last analysis, is the meaning of 
a word derived? What degree of mental cultivation is implied 
in the accurate use of such terms as 'action,' 'life,' idea?' What 



266 CONCEPTION. 

are the evidences of a student's progress in the power of forming 
conceptions? 



REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

The intimate connection between thinking and Language, the 
fact that all Representative Knowledge, as distinguished from 
Presentative, is gained through Language, and the further con- 
sideration that language — oral or written — is the universal 
medium of instruction will justify the following extended 
references : 

1. On the power of using written language as the highest 
evidence of development of the representative faculty, see Tate's 
Philosophy of Education, Part I, chap. III., pages 82, 83; od all 
true education as the development of thought, see Parker, 
Talks on Teaching, page 84; on the general connection of thought, 
language, and mental power, see Tate, Part II, chap. III., near 
the end ; on the place of Language as a faculty in the order of 
mental development — as the faculty of learning, see the same, 
Part II., chap. I., p. 169. 

2. On the true mode of cultivating the faculty of Language, 
see Tate, Part II, chap. II, at the end, page 185; the reason for 
making language-training the main part of education, see Fitch, 
Lectures on Teaching, Chap. VII, near the beginning, pages 226-7; 
for Mr. Spencer's protest against an exclusively literary educa- 
tion, see Education, chap. I, What Knowledge is of Most Worth; 
for Milton's similar protest, see Quick's Educational Reformers, 
pages 41, 42 and 303; for Mr. Spencer's argument for scientific 
as against literary education, see as last referred to; for Spen- 
cer's argument answered, see Quick, pages 227-242 inclusive. 

3. On words never to be taught before the things signified, 
Pestalozzi's statement, see Quick, p. 190; on a knowledge of 
things to be communicated with a knowledge of words (Come- 
nius), see the same, p. 60; for Rousseau's doctrine as to this, see 
the same, page 114. 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 26 7 

4. On the understanding of a subject to be taught previous 
to the exercising of the memory and the speech on it (Comenius), 
see Quick, p. 57; on much so-called teaching as consisting in the 
training of expression without regard to thought, see Parker's 
Talks on Teaching, page 89 ; on the mistake of too didactic teach- 
ing, see Rousseau quoted, Quick, page 114; and Wilson quoted 
by Payne, Educational Methods, near the middle, p. 140. 

5. On general forms of expression as mystifying to children, 
see Tate, Part I, chap. IV, Principle IX, page 124; on the folly of 
beginning scientific instruction with definitions and abstractions, 
see Payne, The Practice or Art of Education, near the end, p. 108; 
for how to teach abstract terms and abstract propositions, see 
Tate, Part I, chap. IV, Principle VIII, p. 121 ; for how to teach 
definitions of terms, see the same, Part II, chap. II, near the end, 
page 182. 

6. On the difference between the simplest and the more 
abstract conceptions, see Tate, Part I, chap. Ill, under Nature 
of the faculties, — page 87; on the child's first abstractions, the 
same reference. 



CHAPTER X. 

JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 

Higher Stage of Thinking: Judging and Reasoning. Think- 
ing as we have seen includes besides Conception, or the 
process of forming concepts, the operations commonly- 
marked off as judging and reasoning. Having a concept 
we may go on to apply this to some individual thing or 
class of things, as when we decide that a particular piece 
of stone is granite, or that diamonds are combustible. 
We are then said to judge. And having framed given 
judgments we may pass from these to other judgments, 
as when we conclude that air has weight because all 
material substances have weight. We are then said to 
reason. These two remaining processes of thinking, 
which are closely connected one with the other, are to 
be the subject of the present chapter. 

Judgment Defined. In everyday discourse the word 
judge is used to express the process of coming to a 
decision about a thing, when we do not reason out a 
conclusion explicitly or formally, but apply in a rapid 
and automatic manner the results of past experience to a 
new case. Thus we judge that a man is sincere or in- 
sincere, that a plan is good or bad, and so forth. In 
Mental Science we greatly extend the application of the 
term. Whenever we connect two representations one 
with another under the form of a statement we perform 



JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION. 269 

an act of judgment. It does not matter by what mental 
process we reach the assertion, whether directly by 
observation, as when we say ■ This rose is blighted,' or 
by a process of inference, as when we conclude from 
certain signs iu the sky that it is going to rain. 

Judgment and Proposition. The result of an act of judg- 
ment is a verbal statement or proposition. The connec- 
tion between judging and asserting in words is quite as 
close as that between forming a concept and naming. 
An infant or an intelligent brute may probably form a 
few rudimentary judgments (e.g., I am going to be fed) 
without language. But in later life we rarely if ever 
judge without making a verbal statement or proposition 
externally or internally. Every proposition is made up 
of two principal parts: (1) the subject or the name of 
that about which something is asserted, (2) the predicate, 
or the name of that which is asserted. Thus when we 
affirm ' This knife is blunt,' we affirm or predicate the 
fact of being blunt of a certain subject, namely 'This 
knife.' Similarly when we say 'Air corrodes,' we assert 
or predicate the power of corroding of the subject ' air.' 

Judgments about Individuals and Classes. It is evident 
from these examples that the predicate of a judgment 
is always some general notion. On the other hand, the 
subject may be either a representation of an individual 
thing, that is, a representative image, or a general notion 
about a class of things. Thus I can assert something 
about a particular flower, or a particular man, as when I 
say ' This flower is faded '; 'John Smith is an industrious 
man '. These are known as Singular Judgments. They 



270 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 

are the first to be formed by the child, and constitute a 
very important step in the development of thought. 

In addition to these Singular Judgments we have 
what are known as Universal Judgments, that is to say, 
statements about classes. The propositions ' Laurels are 
evergreens,' 'Wise men are not dogmatic,' are such 
general or universal statements. These Universal Judg- 
ments stand in much the same relation to others as 
general names to names of individuals (proper names.) 
They gather up in a succinct form our knowledge 
respecting an indefinite number of individual objects. 
Concepts are formed by means of a succession of judg- 
ments. In mentally bringing objects together on the 
ground of their likeness we ' judge ' them to be similar. 
So, too, in separating things on the ground of their 
dissimilarity. Not only so, our concepts are built up 
gradually, by successively discovering new points of 
likeness among things. Thus a child after knowing the 
more obvious properties of iron, as its color, weight, and 
hardness, finds out less conspicuous properties, as that 
it is softened by great heat. And every such addition 
to his knowledge about iron takes the form of a judg- 
ment. 

Judgment and Belief. If we look at the process of 
judging a little more closely we shall see that it is' 
accompanied by the mental state known as belief. As 
was pointed out above, in connecting two representations 
we are representing the corresponding things as connec- 
ted with, or related to, one another. And this repre- 
sentation or apprehension of a relation between things 
involves belief. When I represent iron as capable of 



BELIEF AND DOUBT. 271 

being softened by heat, I believe in its possessing this 
property. A mere joining of two representations cannot 
constitute an act of judgment if this element of belief 
is wanting. When, for example, in a state of idle reverie 
there is a chaotic conflux of ideas, there is no belief at- 
tending the momentary combinations. We only believe 
when we look on our ideas on their objective or repre- 
sentative side, that is to say, view them as representative 
of real things, and make some relation between the 
things the object or matter of distinct thought. 

Affirmation and Negation. Judgment begins in affirma- 
tion, in combining two representations, and in deciding 
that there is a connection between the corresponding 
things. But all our judgments are not affirmative. We 
deny as well as affirm. We declare that things are not, 
as well as that they are. Negation presupposes affirma- 
tion. To say ' It is not going to rain ' implies that the 
corresponding affirmation ('It is going to rain') has 
actually been made by somebody, or has somehow been 
proposed or suggested to the mind (e. g., by a question, 
1 Is it going to rain ? '). Negation is the rejection of an 
affirmation as untrue or false. Our minds refuse to 
perform the process of synthesis required. 

Belief and Doubt. So far, it has been assumed that the 
mind either accepts or rejects a statement, that it must 
come to some decision about the matter. But this is 
not the only alternative. We may waver between ac- 
ceptance and rejection, and suspend our judgment. 
This is a state of doubt. 



272 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 

Sources of Belief. Our beliefs, and along with these 
our doubts, are products, having their conditions. We 
cannot at will bring any two ideas together in the mind 
and entertain belief or doubt respecting the correspond- 
ing external relations. We say that our belief has been 
generated or produced in a certain way, as by observa- 
tion of facts, reasoning, tradition, etc. The psycholo- 
gist seeks to group these conditions or sources of belief 
under the most general heads. 

(1) ^Experience and Association. The most obvious con- 
dition or generative antecedent of belief is experience. 
The combination of presentations in our experience de- 
termines, as we saw above, the association of representa- 
tions. And the force which commonly determines the 
combination of representations in the act of judgment 
is this force of association. This was illustrated in the 
simplest types of belief, memory, and expectation. In 
both cases the belief is determined by the order of 
experiences. 

(2) Verbal Suggestion. Experience is not the only 
agency which effects a combination of representations 
in the form of a judgment. Other influences play a 
considerable subordinate part in generating and mould- 
ing belief. Of these the most important is verbal sug- 
gestion. The close connection between the act of 
belief and its expression in a verbal statement or propo- 
sition has already been pointed out. The proposition is 
the external embodiment of the internal belief. Hence 
the closest possible association between the two. Hence, 



SOURCES OF BELIEF. 273 

further, the tendency to accept another's statement 
quite apart from any process of ' weighing testimony. 
The combination of words strongly excites in the hear- 
er's or reader's mind the combination of ideas and a 
nascent belief in the corresponding connection of things. 
We see this in the momentary disposition to believe 
another's statement, even when this is made in a playful 
manner. It is seen, too, in the reflex effect of our own 
utterances in fixing our beliefs. As Hartley has ob- 
served, a person by the mere act of repeating a story 
which he does not at first credit, comes in time to 
believe in it. 

(3) Effect of Feeling. Once more, our beliefs are greatly 
influenced by our feelings and wishes. As was pointed 
out when dealing with the influence of feeling on imag- 
ination, emotional excitement gives greater vividness to 
the images called up, and determines the order of their 
combination. By bringing together ideas and dwelling 
on them under the sway of strong feeling, the mind 
tends strongly to believe in the corresponding realities. 
This is seen in the strength of belief attaching to the 
wild dreams of youth. Commonly, of course, the com- 
bination has some support in the order of experience. 
What the feeling does is to keep a certain suggestion 
or class of suggestions before the mind, and to exclude 
others which, but for the feeling, would be much more 
powerful than the first. This is the state of mind known 
as bias or prejudice, in which strong likings and dislik- 
ings exert a powerful control over the trains of thought, 
interfering with the proper action of the intellectual 
forces. 



2 74 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 

What a sound judgment involves. A sound judgment 
presupposes a combination of many conditions. An act 
of judgment is the outcome of our whole experience, 
and involves the processes of observation, reproduction, 
comparison, etc. It is only when these processes are 
perfectly performed that the judgment will be free from 
imperfections. A sound judgment implies, too, a con- 
siderable development of the power of controlling the 
thoughts and the feelings, or fixing the mind on the 
matter in hand, and of resisting the forces of bias. 

Nature of Reasoning. To reason is, as we have seen, to 
pass from a certain judgment or certain judgments to a 
new one. This implies that the mind accepts the con- 
clusion on the ground of the premises. In other words, 
the resulting belief is in this case due to a recognition 
of the relation between the new and the old judgments, 
of the fact that the premises carry with them or neces- 
sitate the conclusion, or that the latter follows from the 
former. What, it may be asked, is th essential 
intellectual process here? What relation does the mind 
detect between premise and conclusion in thus passing 
from a belief in the one to a belief in the other ? 

In order to ascertain this, let us take a simple example 
of reasoning: 'The barometer is falling, therefore it is 
going to rain '. In drawing this conclusion we identify 
the present state of the barometer with past states which 
we have observed or heard about. But we do not simply 
identify this phenomenon as an isolated fact: we identify 
it in respect of its accompaniments or attendant circum- 
stances (altered state of the atmosphere, and results of 
this, rain). From this it appears that reasoning is only 



NATURE OF REASONING. 275 

a higher and more complex process of assimilation, 
identification, or classing. It differs from perception 
(the recognition of a single object), and from conception 
(the assimilation of many objects) inasmuch as it is the 
assimilation of things in their connection with certain 
other things, or, briefly, the identification of relations 
among things. 

Inference and Proof. While we thus assume that in 
reasoning the mind consciously passes from premise to 
conclusion, we must remember that this does not answer 
to the actual order of mental events in many, and per- 
haps, the majority of cases. The conclusion presents 
itself first, and the ground, premise, or reason, when it 
distinctly arises in the mind at all, recurs rather as an 
after- thought, and by the suggestive force of the 
similarity between the new case and the old. The 
distinct reference to the antecedent judgment is rather 
a part of the final re visional process of proof, than of 
the first process of inference. Here again we must be 
on our guard against taking the logician's account of 
how our processes of thought may be carried on as rep- 
resenting faithfully the manner in which they actually 
take place in ordinary cases. 

Implicit Reasoning. This operation of passing from one 
or more judgments to another may assume one of two 
well-marked forms. In the first place we may pass 
directly from one or more singular judgments to another 
singular judgment without clearly setting forth to our- 
selves or to others the ground of our conclusion under 
the form of a general truth or principle. Thus a boy 



276 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 

having observed on one or more past occasions that 
particular pieces of wood float in water will conclude 
directly in a new instance that this piece of wood will 
float. This has been called reasoning from particulars. 
It may also be called implicit reasoning, because the 
general ground or principle is implied and not explicitly 
set before the mind. 

Explicit Reasoning. It is evident when we reflect on 
these reasoning processes that we do implicitly assume 
a general statement. The boy in our example tacitly 
assumes that ' All wood floats '. If he were not sure of 
this he would have no business to conclude, ' This piece 
of wood will float'. And as soon as he is asked to give 
the ground of his conclusion, or to 'prove' his assertion, 
he sets forth this general statement. 

Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. The full explicit 
process of reasoning by way of a universal judgment is 
commonly said to fall into two parts or stages. Of 
these the first (a) is the operation of reaching a general 
judgment or assertion. This is known as induction. The 
second (b) is the operation of applying the truth thus 
reached to some particular case (or class of cases). This 
is know as deduction. Induction is an upward movement 
of thought from particular instances to a general truth, 
principle, or law: deduction, a downward movement 
from some general statement to a particular statement, 
or at least a statement less general than the first. 

Nature of Inductive Reasoning. The psychological 
process in passing from particulars to a general truth 



INDUCTIVE REASONING. 277 

illustrates the essential process of all thinking, the 
detecting of similarity amid diversity. Let us examine 
an instance of inductive reasoning. The child observes 
that his toys, spoons, knives, he himself, and a vast 
multitude of other objects when not supported fall. He 
gradually compares these facts one with another and 
seizes the essential feature of them or the general truth 
implied in them. He discovers that what all these 
things have in common is that they are material bodies. 
He then extricates this general conception, and along 
with it the circumstance (falling to the ground) which 
has invariably accompanied it. That is to say, he judges 
that all material bodies (when unsupported) fall to the 
ground. The operation is a process of reasoning or 
inference because his mind in making the universal 
assertion passes beyond the limits of the observed cases. 
'All ' includes not only all the instances he has examined, 
however numerous these may be, but all unobserved 
cases. 

Spontaneous Induction. The child has a natural tendency 
to generalize from experience. A single instance often 
suffices to beget the inference to a general rule. One 
experience of the burning properties of fire is enough 
to produce the belief that all fire burns. This natural 
impulse leads in early life to hasty induction. 

Regulated Induction. This natural impulse to generalize 
on a narrow and precarious basis becomes corrected by 
wider experience, as well as by education. Thus the 
child who generalizes that all nurseries have a rocking 
horse like his own, that all dogs take to the water, and 



278 JUDGMENT AND SEASONING. 

so on, learns either by his own observations or from 
what others tell hirn that his conclusion is hasty and 
inaccurate. Pulled up, so to speak, in his early attempts 
to generalize, he grows more cautious. The impulse to 
generalize is not arrested, it is simply guided and con- 
trolled. Induction now proceeds in a more circumspect 
and methodical manner. The young inquirer takes pains 
to collect a wider variety of observations. He examines 
the instances he thus collects more closely in order to 
ascertain their essential, as distinguished from their 
accidental, resemblances. Thus, for example, he finds 
out that the fact of growth is connected with those 
properties of things which we call life, and he will con- 
sequently restrict the idea to living things. 

Deductive Reasoning. By Induction the child reaches a 
large number of general or universal judgments. These 
are supplemented by all the general statements made to 
him by others in the way of instruction. Having these 
universal statements he is able to pass on to the second 
stage of explicit reasoning, namely, Deduction. By 
this is meant reasoning downward from a general truth 
or principle to some particular case or class of cases. 
Thus a child who has been told that all persons are 
liable to make mistakes, is apt to apply the truth by 
arguing that his mother or his governess makes mistakes. 
The type of deductive reasoning when fully set forth is 
known as a syllogism, and is as follows: 

All M is P. Everything made by labor costs money. 
All S is M. Toys are made by labor. 
Therefore All S is P. Therefore Toys cost money. 

Or for negative arguments: 



ACTIVITY OF MIND IN REASONING. 279 

No M is P. No naughty children are loved. 
All S is M. This is a naughty child. 
Therefore No S is P. Therefore he will not be loved. 

It is evident from this that the nature of the mental 
process is substantially the same as in the case of induc- 
tive reasoning. The essential fact is still assimilation. 
We recognize an identity between the particular case 
(S) and a class of cases (M) in respect of its possessing 
(or not possessing) a certain adjunct or concomitant (P). 
Thus in the first of the above examples we assimilate 
toys to other things as products of labor, and by so 
doing we further assimilate them as having the peculi- 
arity of costing money. 

Here, again, we must distinguish between the logical 
order, required for purposes of proof, and the actual 
psychological order of the process of inference. We 
rarely (if ever) proceed in the formal way here set 
forth from premises to conclusion. In some cases the 
conclusion first distinctly presents itself to the mind, 
and the other judgments rise into distinct consciousness 
later; and in other cases the mind does not at any stage 
distinctly represent more than one of the two truths 
making up the premises. 

Activity of Mind in Reasoning. From this brief account 
of the chief varieties of the reasoning process the reader 
will see its close dependence on the earlier intellectual 
processes, observation, and reproduction. To carry on 
a process of reasoning it is necessary that the mind be 
well stored with facts gained either by personal obser- 
vation or by instruction. It is further necessary that 
the mind have a firm hold on truths or principles fitted 



280 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 

to explain new facts. To this must be added facility in 
construction, in forming new notions and hypotheses. 

Nor will all this avail without a proper development 
of voluntary attention and the power of concentration. 
To reason out a thing implies intense and prolonged 
activity of mind. Not only so, when the process is 
perfect the will is called on to resist the tendencies to 
confusion, and the influences of feeling and bias, which 
have been spoken of above. The greater the concentra- 
tion, the more perfectly the representation of the desired 
result dominates all the mental processes of the time, 
compelling them to converge on this result, the higher 
will be the quality of the reasoning. 

First Reasonings about Cause. By the end of the third 
year a child is wont to perplex his mother by asking the 
'Why?' of everything. He now looks at things as 
occurring for a purpose, and can only understand them 
in so far as they present some analogy to his own pur- 
posive actions. 

As the child's mind expands the real relations of 
things are more clearly detected and set forth in the 
shape of inductive conclusions. He now begins to 
apprehend the true nature of causation, to understand 
the working of the forces of nature about him. But it 
is probable that no adequate discrimination of the region 
of human action and of natural causes is reached in 
average cases till the period of youth is entered on. 
And it is only in this later stage of development when 
the powers of abstraction are acquiring strength that the 
higher inductions which we call the laws and principles 
of science can be fully grasped. 



VARIETIES OF REASONING POWER. 281 

Varieties of Reasoning Power. There are well marked 
differences of reasoning power among individual minds. 
One person has a greater aptitude in discovering simi- 
larities among things and their relations, in seizing and 
applying a principle, than another person. Thus of two 
men in view of the same group of facts, one will leap 
quickly to the general law or principle underlying them, 
while another will fail to detect it. Similarly one man 
much more readily brings new facts under old truths 
than another. Superiority of reasoning power is roughly 
measurable by the facility with which new principles 
are thus discovered and old ones applied to new cases. 

These differences, like those in the case of the other 
faculties, are general or special. A may be a better 
reasoner all around than B. But.it usually happens that 
A will show his superiority in some special direction. 
To begin with, there may be a special leaning to one 
kind of reasoning process. There is the ' inductive mind,' 
quick in the observation and analysis of facts, and de- 
lighting to trace out the laws of phenomena. Such a 
mind is wont to refer from principles to facts, and to be 
sceptical of assertions not grounded on observed facts. 
On the other hand, there is the deductive or demonstra- 
tive mind given to dwelling on abstract truths rather 
than on concrete facts, and skilful in combining these 
into an orderly argument. The first type is that of the 
physical inquirer, the second that of the mathematician. 
A third type is the practical reasoner, apt at seizing all 
the principles bearing on a complex case, and balancing 
one reason against another so as to arrive at a just or 
probable conclusion. 



282 



JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 



Training of the Powers of Judgment and Reasoning. To 
train a child's power of judging is to exercise him in 
framing judgments by inviting him to observe and de- 
scribe an object, to narrate something which has happened 
to him, to repeat carefully what he has heard, to submit 
propositions for his acceptance and rejection, and so on. 
Here the mother or teacher should aim at caution and 
accuracy of statement. The tendency of children to 
exaggerate needs to be carefully watched and counter- 
acted. The child should be accustomed to think well 
about the words he uses, to see all that is implied in 
them, as well as all that is contradicted by them. And 
here a knowledge of the logical processes called opposi- 
tion, conversion, and ob version will prove serviceable to 
the teacher. All this regulation of judgment is however 
a matter of some delicacy. Children delight in vivid 
and picturesque statement, and a touch of exaggeration 
is perhaps pardonable. A too strict insistence on pre- 
cision in the early stages may discourage confidence, and 
lead to an untimely hesitation in judgment. 

Authority and Individual Judgment. A perplexing problem 
in the training of the judgment is to draw the line 
between excessive individual independence, and undue 
deference to authority. The power of judgment is, as 
we have seen, more fully exercised when the child forms 
an opinion for himself than when he passively receives 
one from his mother or teacher. To exercise the 
judgment is thus to draw out his power of judging for 
himself. And this can be very well done in certain 
regions of observation, as for example in judging about 



REASONING OF CHILDREN. 283 

the beauty of natural objects and works of art. On the 
other hand, it is obvious that with respect to other 
matters the child's liberty of judging must be curtailed. 
It would not do to allow a young child with his limited 
experience to decide what is possible or probable in a 
given case; and still less to permit him to pronounce on 
the rightness or wrongness of an action. To combine 
the ends of authority and of individuality in respect of 
judging requires much wisdom and skill in the trainer 
of the young. Differences of children's temperament 
(sexual and individual) must here be taken account of» 
To train a boy's power of judgment is in general a dif- 
ferent process from that of training a girl's. A timid 
child disposed to rely on others requires another regime 
from that suitable to a rash and confident child disposed 
to question all authority and to set up dogmatically his 
own views of things. 

Reasoning and judgment. The training of the Reason- 
ing Powers must go on hand in hand with that of Judg- 
ment. In the earliest stage (from about the beginning 
of the 4th year) the mother is called on to satisfy the 
child's curiosity or desire for explanation. This period 
is an important one for the subsequent development of 
the child. Parents are apt to think that children not 
infrequently put questions in a half-mechanical way, 
without any real desire for an explanation, and even for 
the sake of teasing. Without as yet going into the 
question" of the nature of children's impulses of curi- 
osity, we may say that so far as their questionings 
involve a genuine desire for knowledge, it is well in 
general to heed and satisfy them. It seems a good 



284 JUDGMENT AND SEASONING. 

rule to give an explanation wherever a simple one is 
possible, provided of course that the knowledge is not 
attainable by the child's own intellectual exertions. 
This is Locke's advice: 'Eucourage his Inquisitweness all 
you can, by satisfying his demands, and informing his 
Judgment, as far as it is capable {Some Thoughts concern- 
ing Education, § 122) V It may be even well at first to 
descend to the child's level, and to look at the world 
through his anthropomorphic glasses. The forces of 
nature may be personified and so her simple processes 
(e. g., the exhaltation of vapor and its condensation in 
rain) presented to the child in a form which is not only 
intelligible but which is certain to interest him by its 
picturesqueness. 2 

Reasoning to he trained by questioning. But the training 
of the reasoning powers includes more than the answer- 
ing of the spontaneous questionings of children. The 
learners must be questioned in their turn as to the 

i Of course children's questions are often unanswerable. Thus a lit- 
tle girl of 4% years once drove her mother to one of the most difficult 
problems of philosophy— thus : She sees a wasp on the window pane and 
wants to touch it. Her mother says, ' No, you must not, it will sting you'. 
Child: 'Why doesn't it sting the glass?' Mother: 'Because it can't 
feel'. Child: 'Why doesn't it feel?' Mother: 'Because it has no nerves'. 
Child : ' Why do nerves feel ? ' The young must be exercised in taking 
some truths on trust, and not asking the ' why ? ' of everything. George 
Eliot says somewhere: 'Reason about everything with your chiid, you 
make him a monster, without reverence, without affections'. The prob- 
lem how to deal with children's questions is thoughtfully handled by M. 
Perez, L'Education des le Berceau, Chap. II., p. 45, seq. The solution of 
the problem clearly turns largely on our view of the nature of children's 
curiosity, a subject to be touched on by and by. 

2 This way of presenting simple scientific facts and truths to children 
has been attempted with eminent success by Miss A. Buckley in her 
pleasant volume, The Fairyland of Science. 



TRAINING OF THE REASONING POWERS. 285 

causes of what happens about them. A child cannot 
too soou be familiarized with the truth that everything 
has its cause and its explanation. The mother or 
teacher should aim at fixing a habit of inquiry in the 
young mind by repeatedly directing his attention to 
occurrences, and encouraging him to find out how they 
take place. He must be induced to go back to his past 
experiences to search for analogies, in order to explain 
the new event. 

The systematic training of the reasoning powers must 
aim at avoiding the errors incident to the processes of 
induction and deduction. Thus children need to be 
warned against hasty induction, against taking a mere 
accidental accompaniment for a condition or cause, 
against overlooking the plurality of causes. This sys- 
tematic guidance of the child's inductive processes will 
be much better carried on by one who has studied the 
rules of Inductive Logic. In like manner the teacher 
should seek to direct the young reasoner in drawing 
conclusions from principles, by pointing out to him the 
limits of a rule, by helping him to distinguish between 
the cases that do, and those that do not fall under it, 
and by familiarizing him with the dangers that lurk in 
ambiguous language. And here some knowledge of 
the rules of Deductive Logic will be found helpful. 

All studies train the reasoning power. The training of the 
powers of judgment and reasoning should be com- 
menced by the mother and the elementary teacher in 
connection with the acquisition of common everyday 
knowledge about things. Its completion, however, 
belongs to the later stage of methodical school instruc- 



286 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 

tion. There is no subject of study which may not in 
the hands of an intelligent and efficient teacher be 
made helpful to this result. Thus the study of physical 
geography should be made the occasion for exercising 
the child in reasoning as to the causes of natural phe- 
nomena. History, again, when well taught, may be 
made to bring out the learner's powers of tracing 
analogies, finding reasons for events (e. g., motives for 
actions) and balancing considerations so as to decide 
what is probable, wise, or just in given circumstances. 

Science the great agency for development of Reasoning. The 
teaching of science is however the great agency for 
strengthening and developing the reasoning powers. 
Science is general knowledge expressed as precisely as 
possible,, and the study of it serves to give accuracy to 
all the thinking processes. Science is further an orderly 
arrangement of knowledge according to its dependence. 
It sets out with principles gained by induction, and then 
proceeds in a systematic way to trace out deductively 
the consequences of these principles. It thus serves to 
train the reasoning powers in an orderly and methodi- 
cal way of proceeding. 

Some sciences exhibit more of the inductive process, 
others more of the deductive. The physical sciences 
are all, to some extent, inductive, resorting to observa- 
tion, experiment, and proof of law by fact. And some 
of these, as for example chemistry and physiology, are 
mainly inductive. In these the inquirer is largely con- 
cerned with observing and analyzing phenomena, and 
arriving at their laws. On the other hand, the mathe- 
matical sciences are almost entirely deductive. Here 



INSTRUCTION AND DISCOVERY. 287 

the principles are simple and self-evident, and the stress 
of the reasoning is the combining of these and arriving 
at new results by deduction or demonstration. Hence 
physical science offers a better training in inductive 
reasoning, whereas mathematics supplies the better ex- 
ercise in deductive reasoning. 

All sciences grow deductive. All sciences as they progress 
tend to grow deductive. That is to say, deduction 
plays a larger and larger part in them. This is illus- 
trated in the growing application of mathematics or the 
science of quantity to the physical sciences. It holds 
good, however, of all branches of science. Thus, for 
example, it applies to grammar and the science of lan- 
guage. At first men had to observe and analyze the 
facts, the various forms and connections of words, as 
used in every-day speech, and to discover the laws which 
govern them. But the laws once reached, the science 
takes on a deductive form, that is, sets out with defini- 
tions and principles and traces*out their results. 

Method of Instruction and Method of Discovery. This be- 
ing so, it follows that the proper order of exposition, or 
the method of teaching, may deviate from the natural 
order of arriving at knowledge by the individual mind 
left to itself. In other words, the 'Method of Instruc- 
tion ' differs from the ' Method of Discovery.' ' Yet 
the natural order ought never to be lost sight of. Prin- 
ciples cannot be taught before some examples are given, 
though it may be unnecessary to retravel over all the 
inductive steps by which the race has arrived at these 

i See Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, Lesson XXIV. 



288 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. 

principles. Even such 'self-evident' truths as the axi- 
oms of geometry require, as mathematical teachers are 
well aware, a certain amount of illustration by concrete 
instances. 1 Thus the right method of teaching a subject 
illustrates in a manner the order of discovery. 

Order of Subjects. Much the same kind of considera- 
tions as apply to the best order of expounding a single 
subject apply to the best order of dealing with different 
subjects. This is broadly determined by psychological 
principles, the laws of the growth of faculty. Psycho- 
logy tells us that subjects appealing mainly to memory 
and imagination (e. g., geography and history) should 
precede subjects exercising the reasoning powers^ (math- 
ematics, physical science). But within these broad 
limits the special arrangement has to be determined by 
logical considerations. That is to say, we have to con- 
sider the relative simplicity of the subjects, and the 
dependence of one subject on another. By such con- 
siderations we arrive at the rule that applied mathemat- 
ics should follow pure, and that physiology should come 
after chemistry. 2 

i What applies to practical principles applies to those of Science : 
" Longum iter est per praecepta: 
Breve et efficax per exempla." 

2 In connection with this subject the reader should read Prof. Bain, 
Education as a Science, Chap. VI., ' Sequence of Subjects— Psychological,' 
Chap. VII., 'Sequence of Subjects— Logical'; also his appendix on the 
classification of the Sciences in his Manual of Logic. 



REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 289 



APPENDIX. 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. What are the three stages of Thinking? How does Judg- 
ment differ from conception ? What is the difference between 
conception and reasoning ? 

2. What is the distinction between a judgment and a propo- 
sition ? What is the difference between singular and universal 
judgments ? Show that concepts are formed by a succession of 
judgments. Show that each addition to a child's knowledge 
takes the form of a judgment. 

3. Distinguish between judgment and belief. Name the 
three general sources of belief. Under which is to be classed be- 
lief on the testimony of another ? 

4. What is the difference between an intuitive and a reasoned 
judgment ? Between inference and proof ? Between implicit 
and explicit reasoning ? Between inductive and deductive rea- 
soning ? 

5. Distinguish the various forms of intellectual activity im- 
plied in reasoning ? Why is the training of the reasoning faculty 
intimately connected with precision of expression ? In what 
way does the authority of the master tend to interfere with in- 
dependence of judgment ? What is meant by warning children 
against hasty inductions ? 

6. Which of the school studies give the best opportunities 
for development of the reasoning powers ? Which are to be pre- 
ferred in this respect, arithmetic and geometry, or physical geog- 
raphy and history ? Why are the physical sciences so valuable 
in this regard ? What is the chief point of difference between 
the Method of Instruction and the Method of Discovery ? 

s 



290 JUDGMENT AND EEASONING. 

REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

1. On Logic as part of the professional knowledge of the 
teacher, see Payne, The Theory or Science of Education, Lectures, 
pages 75 and 83; and Page, Theory and Practice, chap. IY., page 
59; on the inductive method of inquiry applied to the general 
question of educational method, see Tate, Philosophy of Educa- 
tion, Part I., chap. II., p. 35. 

2. On inductive and deductive methods of learning and 
teaching, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, chap. XL, p. 315, also 
Tate, Part I. , chap. III. , pages 85 and 89 ; on mathematics as a 
school training in logic, see the same, p. 318; on Arithmetic as 
logic, see the same, p. 320, and Parker's Talks on Teaching, pages 
92 and 99 ; on the superiority of natural science for disciplining 
the judgment, see Herbert Spencer's Education, p. 88, also Fitch, 
chap. XIY. ; on the sciences as constantly appealing to the learn- 
er's individual reason, see Spencer, p. 89; on the true method of 
teaching the natural sciences, see Payne, Educational Methods, 
page 140, note, and 220 ; also the same, The True Foundation of 
Science, Lectures, page 211; on geography as an instrument for 
the development of reasoning power, see Parker, pages 129 and 
130, and Fitch, page 345. 

3. On Education as like all other sciences based on induc- 
tion, see Tate, Part I., chap. III., page 39; on the peculiar nature 
of children's reasonings, see the same, page 88; and on the com- 
parative complexity of reasonings, see the same, page 89; on 
exercising the minds of children first in easy processes of reason- 
ing, the same, Part I., chap. YL, page 256; on the mistake 
in teaching of setting out with 'first principles' see Quick, 
p. 250. 

4. On the elementary method as inductive and the scientific 
method as deductive, see Payne, Pestalozzi, Lectures, page 248 ; on 
the method of investigation, see Quick, page 225 and Payne, 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 291 

pages 140 and 220; on the student's own method of study as the 
true method of science, see Payne, True Foundation of Science 
Teaching, near the end, Lectures page 223; and on text-book work 
in the sciences as almost worthless, see the same reference ; on 
the other hand for disciplinary failure of practical instruction 
in chemistry, see Dr. Volcker quoted by Payne, The Curriculum 
of Modern Education, near the end, (English edition, page 278). 



CHAPTER XL 

FEELING. 

Having now briefly reviewed the growth of intellect, 
we may pass on to trace the second great phase of men- 
tal development, the growth of the feelings. 

Feeling defined. By feeling is meant any state of con- 
sciousness which is pleasurable or painful. Every 
feeling is either pleasurable or painful, agreeable or 
disagreeable in some degree. At the same time there 
are many mixed states of feeling, such as grief, anger, 
and so on, which are partly the one and partly the 
other, and it is sometimes difficult to say which element 
preponderates. Thus the term covers first of all those 
simple mental effects which are the direct result of 
nerve-stimulation, and which are commonly marked off 
as ' sensations ' of pleasure and pain, such as the pains 
of hunger and thirst, and the corresponding pleasures. 
In the second place, the term feeling comprehends the 
more complex effects which depend on mental activity of 
some kind, and which are marked off as emotions, such 
as fear, hope, admiration, and regret. 

Importance of studying the Feelings. As we have seen, 
the feelings constitute a distinct, well-marked phase or 
division of mind. Our pleasures and pains make up 
the interesting side of our experience. The objects of 



RELATION OF FEELING TO KNOWING. 293 

the external world only have a value for us in so 
far as they touch our feeling. The life of feeling, of 
joy and sorrow, is in a peculiar sense our own inner life. 
Our knowledge has to do with external things, our 
actions when carried out are external events, but our 
feelings belong to the inner subjective world. On the 
one hand, feeling is connected with intellectual growth, 
since it supplies the interest of study. Hence no theory 
of intellectual culture can be complete without some 
reference to the emotional susceptibilities. On the 
other hand, feeling stands in intimate connection with 
action and will. The incentives and motives to action 
are represented feelings (anticipations of satisfactions 
of various kinds). The habitual directions of conduct 
follow the lead of the dominant feelings. Hence the 
study of the feelings is of great practical moment as a 
preparation for the theory of moral culture, and the 
formation of character. 

Relation of Feeling to Knowing. In the first place, feel- 
ing and knowing are in a manner opposed. The mind 
cannot at the same moment be in a state of intense emo- 
tional excitement and of close intellectual application. 
All violent feeling takes possession of the mind, masters 
the attention, and precludes the due carrying out of the 
intellectual processes. Even when there is no strong 
emotional agitation present, intellectual processes may 
be interfered with by the subtle influence of the feelings 
on the thoughts working in the shape of bias. Thus a 
child that finds a task distasteful is apt to reject the 
idea that the study is useful. His feeling of dislike 
prejudices his mind and blinds him to considerations 



294 FEELING. 

which he would otherwise recognize. Hence the spe- 
cial difficulties which, as every teacher knows, are con- 
nected with the intellectual training of children of a 
highly emotional temperament. 

On the other hand, as we saw above, all intellectual 
activity, since it implies interest, depends on the pres- 
ence of a certain moderate degree of feeling. It may 
be said, indeed, that all good and effective intellectual 
work involves the presence of a gentle wave of pleasura- 
ble emotion. Attention . is more lively, images recur 
more abundantly, and thought traces out its relations 
more quickly when there is an under-current of pleas- 
ure. Hence rapid intellectual progress is furthered by 
lively intellectual feelings. 

It would appear to follow from this that the growth 
of intellect itself in all its higher phases implies the 
strengthening of certain feelings. In order that there 
may be an interest in study and a motive for intel- 
lectual effort certain emotions must be developed in the 
child's mind, such as the pleasure of gaining reward, 
affection, and the ' intellectual emotions ' of curiosity 
and love of knowledge. 

The highest feelings of all, such as reverence for 
truth and the sentiment of justice, presuppose a process 
of abstract thought, and consequently a considerable 
measure of intellectual development. Hence the changes 
of emotional life attending changes of intellectual pur- 
suits, and the progress of intellectual culture. This 
dependence of feeling on intellectual activity makes it 
convenient that the exposition of the Emotions should 
follow that of the Intellect. 

We thus see how the cultivation of intellect and of 



LAW OF PLEASURABLE ACTIVITY. 295 

emotion involve one another in a measure. In order 
to exercise the intellectual powers to the utmost, we 
must aim at making study pleasurable. And if we wish 
to strengthen the higher emotions, such as the moral 
sentiment and the love of truth, we must seek to exer- 
cise the intellectual powers. 

Law of Pleasurable Activity. Pleasurable activity lies 
between two extremes of excessive or strained, and de- 
fective or impeded exercise. It is important to add that 
the terms moderate, excessive, and defective are rela- 
tive to the customary amount of activity answering to 
the natural strength, and the acquired habits of the 
organ. The moderate degree of activity is, further, re- 
lated to the temporary condition of an organ as fresh 
and vigorous, or feeble. An amount of muscular exer- 
cise which is pleasurable to a vigorous child will be 
painful to a weakly one. We may say then that pleas- 
ure depends on a due balance between the process of 
stimulation on the one hand, and that of reinvigoration 
on the other, or between the expenditure and the ac- 
cumulation of energy. 

Change in Degree of Activity. Activity is pleasurable 
in so far as it is a transition from a previous state of 
inactivity or of less activity. Thus we greatly enjoy 
fresh air after being deprived of it for a while. Similarly 
the full enjoyment of health, liberty, and so on, depends 
on a temporary loss and sense of need of these posses- 
sions. 

Again, a transition from a state of excessive to one of 
moderate activity is a common condition of pleasure. 



296 FEELING. 

When a task either bodily or mental is beyond our 
powers, anything which lightens it gives a pleasant sense 
of ease. The removal of hindrances or impediments 
which have necessitated a painful effort brings pleasure 
by allowing activity to proceed at its natural pace. 

Change in the Kind of Activity. What are known as the 
pleasures of Novelty are but one illustration of this law 
of change or Variety. What is new, unfamiliar, or rare, 
acts, as we have seen, as a very powerful stimulus to 
the attention, and the mental activity as a whole: it 
involves a marked change from customary modes of 
activity. A novel experience in early life, such as the 
first party, the first visit to the Pantomime, the first 
journey abroad, calls out new activities of mind, or 
exercises the faculties in a fresh and unaccustomed way. 
Hence the peculiar intensity of enjoyment belonging to 
these first experiences of life. Where the perfect en- 
joyment of novelty is precluded a modest substitute for 
it is found in the rarity or infrequency of an experience. 
The coming holidays are always a pleasant excitement 
to a boy or a girl at school. Any experience which is 
disconnected with preceding events, and so comes upon 
us unexpectedly has something of the same effect. 

Two Opposing Principles. The craving for change, and 
the clinging to what is customary, are two great opposed 
principles in our emotional life. The new ceases to 
delight when it implies a rupture of continuity with the 
past, the customary type of experience. Our happiuess 
depends on a due adjustment of these conditions. It 
may be added that different minds have by nature these 



CLASSES OF FEELING. 297 

two tendencies in very unequal measure. Some children 
are by temperament fond of excitement, variety, novelty. 
They delight in seeing new faces, in being taken to new 
houses, and so on. Others cling tenaciously to the old 
and familiar. 

Classes of Feeling: Sense-Feelings and Emotions. Feelings 
of pleasure and pain fall into two main divisions. The 
first (popularly marked off as bodily feelings) involve 
processes in the outlying parts of the organism and may 
be briefly called sense-feelings. The second being con- 
nected with central nerve-processes (in the brain) may 
be described as centrally excited feelings or as Emo- 
tions. 

(a) Importance of Sense-Feelings. We may dismiss this 
class of feelings at once with a word or two. They are 
of great importance for our happiness and misery. 
More particularly in early life before the emotions are 
developed they constitute a chief part of the life of 
feeling. The pains of indigestion, of cold, of hunger, 
and so on, make up a chief part of the infant's misery. 
On the other hand, the pleasures of eating and drinking, 
of warmth, of contact, light and sound, make up most 
of his happiness. 

It is to be remarked further that owing to the close 
connection between body and mind, the organic feelings 
have a far-reaching effect on the higher emotional life. 
An uneasy attitude of body, the pressure or chafing of 
a garment, or the chilliness of a limb, is quite enough 
to depress the mental powers, to induce irritability of 
temper, a disposition to pevishnesss, and to outbreaks 



298 FEELING. 

of angry passion. On the other hand, pleasurable states 
of the body lead to a cheerful, hopeful state of mind. 

(b) Emotions and their Classes. The higher feelings 
or emotions clearly fall into certain well-marked varie- 
ties of pleasurable, together with the corresponding 
painful, susceptibility, such as the pleasures and pains 
of Self-esteem, Love, and so on. It is the object of 
mental science to discover the deepest or most essential 
resemblances and differences among these commonly 
recognized groups of feeling, and to classify them ac- 
cording to these. No very satisfactory classification 
has as yet been settled on, and we must content our- 
selves with taking a few of the best marked varieties 
and grouping these roughly according to some principle. 

Order of Development of the Emotions. As has been re- 
marked, the emotions appear to unfold themselves in 
the order of increasing complexity and representative- 
ness. Thus fear and anger precede the feelings of 
benevolence and justice, because they are much more 
simple in their composition, and involve a smaller 
amount and an easier kind of representative activity. 
Although we cannot trace out the order of growing 
representativeness into all the details of the emotional 
history, we may show that it is the order of develop- 
ment when looked at as a whole, or in its broad outlines. 

Three orders of Emotion. Looking, then, at emotional 
development in this way, we may conveniently distin- 
guish between three groups or orders of emotion, con- 
stituting successive stages in the progress of the 
emotional life. First of all comes what may be called 



ORDERS OF EMOTION. 299 

the Individual or Personal Emotions. By these are 
meant those emotions which are confined to the indi- 
vidual, depending on some special personal experience 
or relation to an object. 

In the second place we have the Sympathetic Feel- 
ings. By these are meant participations in others' 
pleasurable and painful experiences, and kindliness or 
benevolence of disposition generally. These are purely 
representative feelings. In sympathy or fellow-feeling 
with another we have to imagine or represent how 
another feels. And the sympathetic feelings follow the 
personal feelings because they presuppose some amount 
of 'first-hand' emotional experience. 

In the third place we have a group of highly com- 
plex feelings known as sentiments, such as patriotism, 
the feeling for nature, for humanity. These are com- 
monly brought under three heads, the Intellectual Senti- 
ment, or the attachment to Truth, the ^Esthetic Senti- 
ment or admiration of the Beautiful, and the Moral 
Sentiment or reverence for Duty (including the worship 
of moral excellence and the feeling for humanity). 
These emotions in their developed form attach them- 
selves to certain qualities in things or abstract ideas, 
truth, beauty, moral goodness. In admiring a beauti- 
ful painting, or in feeling delight at some new scientific 
truth we are not thinking of ourselves or our own indi- 
dividual interests. The mind is turned wholly away 
from self and its concerns, and is engaged in a disinter- 
ested contemplation of an object. And these senti- 
ments can be participated in by a number. Knowiedge 
or Truth, Beauty and Human Goodness, are common 
objects of contemplation or thought. 



300 FEELING. 

Social Feelings of Childhood. Children are from the 
first social beings. The pleasure in the infant's face 
when he gazes at the mother attests this. A child goes 
to his mother for companionship, for the expression of 
interest and sympathy in his doings and concerns. A 
boy of sixteen months showed this desire for sympathy 
in his pleasures. When he saw anything which de- 
lighted or amused him, he used to touch his mother's 
face, and try to turn it in the direction of the object. 
The proximity of the mother or nurse evidently gives 
pleasure. He is happy when at her side engaging as 
much of her attention as possible, and occasionally in- 
dulging his young love by a warm caress. On the 
other hand, he is miserable when long away from her, 
whether alone or with strangers. The very dependence 
of childhood on parental care forms a bond that binds 
the child to his mother. But this early affection is 
largely a personal and interested feeling. The child 
feels the mother or playmate to be necessary to him. 
He values them as sources of pleasure to himself. He 
has as yet hardly any disinterested feeling for their 
concerns, and as little appreciation of what they are in 
themselves, and out of relation to himself. 

Love of Approbation. One of the most valuable traits 
of childhood is its strong love of others' recognition, 
good opinion, and approbation. This is not a non- 
personal or disinterested feeling. When a child finds 
pleasure in another's approval he is obviously think- 
ing of himself. It is thus a form of self-love or 
self-appreciation. The child is pleased (according to 
the principle of harmony) when others' opinion is 



SELF-ESTEEM, ETC. 301 

favorable, chiming in with his instinctive disposition to 
think well of himself. 

At the same time this feeling is distinct from other 
personal feelings in one impprtant respect, that it in- 
volves a reference to others. To set store by the good 
opinion of others means that we respect others. Not 
only so, it implies a vague reference to the feelings of 
others. It is another's pleasurable feeling which is the 
ground of the self-gratulation in the case, anothers* 
painful feeling which is the basis of the self-humiliation 
or sense of shame. Hence the moral and educational 
value of this feeling. It is, to use Mr. Spencer's ex- 
pression, an ' ego-altruistic ' sentiment which serves to 
bind the child to others, and prepares the way for a 
purely disinterested type of social feeling. 

Self-Esteem, etc. As however a child's powers unfold 
themselves, a,nd he learns to reflect about himself and 
his concerns, distinct feelings of self-satisfaction and 
self-approval arise. The very instinct of self-preservation 
would, as just remarked, further the growth of self- 
esteem. And where circumstances are favorable and 
the child succeeds in accomplishing his daily objects, 
there grows up in the way already explained a mass of 
agreeable feeling in relation to himself and his surround- 
ings. The boy feels abreast with his surroundings: he 
is conscious of progressing in physical power, knowledge, 
and the accumulation of material possessions. And so 
there arises in connection with the persistent conscious- 
ness of self, a customary mode of agreeable feeling 
which, viewed in slightly different ways, we call 
pride, self-complacency, or self-esteem. The customary 



302 FEELING. 

strength of this pleasurable feeling serves to determine 
to a considerable extent the amount of the individual's 
happiness. 

Cultivation of Emotion. The practical problem of 
cultivating the emotions is beset with peculiar difficulties. 
The means of stimulating the intellectual powers of the 
child lie in the teacher's hand. He can set objects 
before his eye, communicate knowledge by means of 
words, and so directly act upon his faculties. But how 
is he to work on the feelings of the child? It is plain 
that much less can be done in the way of commanding 
results in the case of the feelings than in that of the 
intellect. Moreover the vast differences in emotional 
temperament among children complicate the problem of 
cultivating emotion in a peculiar manner. Let us see 
what resources Education has with respect to the culture 
of feeling. 

The culture of the emotions falls into two well-marked 
divisions, (a) the negative culture, and (b) the positive 
culture. 

Repression of Feeling. There are emotions which are 
apt to exist in excess, such as fear, and the anti-social 
feelings, anger, envy, etc. These must to a certain 
extent be repressed, and kept within due bounds. The 
problem of subduing the force of feeling in the young 
is in some respects a peculiarly difficult one. As we 
have seen, their emotional outbursts are marked by 
great violence. Moreover, the great agency by which, 
as we shall see by and by, the force of emotion is checked 
and counteracted, namely an effort of self-restraint, 



STIMULATION OF EMOTION. 303 

cannot be relied on in the case of young children, owing 
to the feebleness of their wills. On the other hand, the 
very mobility of the child's mind is favorable to an easy 
diversion of his attention by a skilful educator from 
the exciting cause of the passion. 

In addition to seeking to subdue the force of undesir- 
able feelings when actually excited, the wise teacher 
will aim at weakening the underlying emotional sensi- 
bilities. In some cases he has to take care that feelings 
needing repression are not too powerfully excited. A 
timid child should be shielded to some extent from 
circumstances likely to excite terror. An envious child 
ought not to be placed in a situation which is pretty 
certain to excite this feeling. An emotional suscepti- 
bility may to some extent be weakened and even 'starved 
out' through want of exercise. Again, feelings may be 
weakened by strengthening the intellectual side of the 
child's mind, adding to his knowledge and exercising 
his powers of reflection and judgment. In this way, for 
example, groundless terror will be undermined, and the 
violence of grief and anger mitigated. Finally, the 
weakening or deadening of an undesirable feeling may 
often be most effectively carried out by exciting some 
opposed or incompatible feeling. Thus, every exercise 
of a feeling of regard for others' good qualities tends to 
enfeeble a child's conceit. Every exercise in kindness 
and consideration for others helps to weaken the impulses 
of anger and envy. 

Stimulation of Emotion. What we call the culture of 
feeling is, however, largely concerned with the problem 
of awakening and strengthening desirable and useful 



304 FEELING. 

emotions, such as affection, the sense of duty, and so on. 
Speaking roughly we may say that as the egoistic feel- 
ings require to be weakened, sympathy and the higher 
sentiments need to be strengthened. Since feeling 
grows by exercise the problem is how to call forth an 
emotional susceptibility into full and vigorous play. 
There are two things which the educator can do here. 

(1) First of all the child may be introduced to objects, 
circumstances, modes of activity, which are fitted to 
excite a particular feeling. Thus objects may be pre- 
sented, e.g., in a pathetic story, which are fitted to excite 
his sympathy. Beautiful objects of nature and art may 
be submitted to his notice, and so the aesthetic feeling 
of admiration awakened. Noble actions may be narrated 
to him, and so the moral sense stimulated. Finally, by 
inducing him (by the application of any motive) to put 
forth his activities we set him in the way of acquiring 
experiences, and discovering new modes of pleasure. In 
this mariner an indolent, unambitious child may be 
roused to activity by a first taste of the pleasures of 
success, and the delight of well-earned commendation. 

(2) In the second place, much may be done by the 
habitual manifestation of a particular feeling by those 
who constitute the child's social environment. Children 
tend to reflect the feelings they see expressed by their 
parents, teachers, and young companions. This fact 
will be touched on again when we come to the subject 
of sympathy. Here it is enough to name it as affording 
one of the great instrumentalities by which (the teacher 
may to some extent mould or give shape to the growing 
emotional nature of the child. 

In seeking to stimulate the feelings the Educator 



MANAGEMENT OF THE EGOISTIC FEELINGS. 305 

needs to be on his guard lest he repress what he seeks 
to foster. This risk is peculiarly great in education 
owing to the frequent need of stimulating sensibility 
on its painful side, for purposes of deterring. As was 
pointed out above, the oft-repeated wounding of any 
emotional susceptibility tends to deaden it. This is 
specially the case with a delicate feeling like shame, 
which as Locke points out "cannot be kept and often 
transgress'd against". 1 

The Management of the Individual or Egoistic Feelings. 
The problem of the Educator with respect to the egois- 
tic feelings is partly one of repression, partly one of 
development. There is no doubt that they are apt to 
exist in excess in children. The mother and teacher 
have to seek to restrain the violent painful emotions as 
terror and grief. More particularly the anti-social feel- 
ings, angry passion, antipathy, envy, and other unlovely 
feelings have to a great extent to be stamped out. 

Yet the problem is not merely a negative one. The 
emotions which grow up about self are needful for the 
child's continued existence and success in the struggle 
for life. We cannot eradicate them even if we would, 
and it would not be well to do so if we could. The 
egoistic impulses may even be deficient and require 
positive stimulation. There are listless and lethargic 
children whom it is well to try and rouse to self-asser- 
tion. In their case it may be desirable to seek to 
quicken the feelings of pride, ambition, and (in extreme 
cases) even the distinctly anti-social feeling of antago- 
nism and delight in beating others. On the otber hand, 

i Thoughts concerning Education, §60. 
T 



306 FEELING. 

an over-rash child may require a strengthening of the 
emotion of fear. 

Even when there is no natural deficiency in these 
feelings the educator has not so much to repress them as 
to direct them to higher objects or aspects of objects. 
He seeks to transform them by refining them. Thus he 
aims at leading the child up from the fear of physical 
evil to the fear of moral evil; from the enjoyment of 
bodily contest to that of mental competition; from pride 
in the possession of material objects (personal beauty, 
etc.) to pride in the possession of intellectual qualities, 
and so forth. This process goes hand in hand with the 
exercise of the higher and disinterested emotions. 

Emulation in Education. The difficulties of the educa- 
tional problems connected with the management of the 
egoistic feelings come out clearly enough in current dis- 
cussions respecting the proper motives to be appealed to 
in intellectual education. The way to deal with the 
feeling or impulse of emulation or rivalry is one of the 
puzzles of educational science. In its pure form this 
emotion is an egoistic and anti-social feeling and there 
is no doubt that among school-competitors it often 
develops into genuine hatred. A boy from habitually 
regarding another as his rival, as one who may obtain 
the prize he covets, and with whom he is called on to 
measure his strength, comes unconsciously, perhaps, to 
cherish a special dislike or antipathy towards his oppo- 
nent. Hence the impulse must be checked. 

At the same time, the feeling is far too powerful, as 
well as too necessary a force to be dispensed with in 
education. Provided it be kept within due limits, and 



SYMPATHY. 307 

tempered by kindly generous feelings under the form of 
a friendly rivalry, it is unobjectionable. The great 
practical objection to it is its limited range. Rivalry 
comes into full play in competition for prizes and other 
honors. Hence slow and backward children come little 
under the influence of this feeling. And since clever 
children may in general be supposed to derive more 
pleasure" from study itself than stupid ones, the applica- 
tion of the stimulus of reward for absolute attainment, 
looks very much like giving "to him that hath." This 
points to the need of habitually exercising another 
feeling, the love of approbation. This acts on all alike, 
and as a semi-social feeling is of a higher moral value 
than the feeling of rivalry. Hence the more the educa- 
tor can appeal to this feeling in the early stage of school- 
life the better. By uniformly recognizing effort made, 
and progress attained, in other words, relative as dis- 
tinguished from absolute proficiency, the teacher is 
helping to build up a feeling of self-reliance and self- 
esteem, which when sufficiently developed will make 
the intellectual industry of the pupil independent of all 
external stimulus. 

Sympathy. The transition from the lower level of per- 
sonal Emotion to the higher plane of non-personal 
Sentiment, is, as we have seen, affected to a large extent 
by the development of the capacity for sympathy. By 
sympathy is meant, as the etymology of the word sug. 
gests ( $w, with, and TtaQoS, feeling), fellow-feeling or 
feeling along with others. It is the great force which 
binds the individual to his social environment (family, 
school, or nation). In its perfect form it constitutes 



308 FEELING. 

disinterestedness, or altruistic feeling, a readiness to 
sacrifice personal comfort and happiness for the welfare 
of others. 

Growth of Sympathy. Sympathy in its complete con- 
scious form, fellow-feeling, first appears as a feeling of 
pity or commiseration for others. The pains first sym- 
pathized with are of course the familiar bodily feelings, 
such as cold, fatigue, injury, together with the simple 
emotional states as fear and disappointment. A very 
young child will show unmistakably the signs of dejec- 
tion and sorrow at the actual sight or narration of 
another child's sufferings. And the lower animals with 
their simple and easily apprehended emotional experi- 
ences come in for a considerable share of this early pity. 
To give an instance, a boy of 21 months on seeing a 
drowned dog taken out of a pond and buried, burst 
into tears, and continued for days to talk in plaintive 
tones of the unfortunate quadruped. Every mother 
knows how much the interest of nursery stories depends 
on a gratification of the impulses of pity. 

Uses of Sympathy in Education. The impulses of sym- 
pathy are a matter of prime concern to the teacher. 
The fundamental fact of sympathy, that feeling tends to 
propagate itself, is fraught with important educational 
consequences. The maxim that the teacher should ex- 
hibit good feeling himself, and cultivate a healthy tone 
of sentiment in his class or school, depends on this cir- 
cumstance. In its fuller and more complete form, too, 
sympathy is a matter of supreme interest. The teach- 
er's success with a pupil will turn largely on his ability 



CULTIVATION OF SYMPATHY. 309 

to cultivate and maintain a relation of mutual sympathy 
between himself and his charge. His object should be 
to stimulate the young learner to enter to some extent 
into his own feeling of enthusiasm for knowledge, into 
his tastes, and so on; and for this purpose he should 
know something of the way in which sympathy is 
excited. Finally sympathy plays a prominent part in 
moral development. The child grows moral to some 
extent by unconsciously imbibing the moral feelings of 
those about him. But, more than this, sympathy with 
others is, as we shall see presently, an essential ingredi- 
ent in the moral sentiment. The disinterested love of 
right presupposes the capacity and habit of representing 
and realizing the interests and claims of others. It fol- 
lows from all this that the cultivation of sympathy will 
occupy a prominent place in intellectual and moral 
training. 

Cultivation of Sympathy. The problem of cultivating 
sympathy is complicated by the very great differences 
of native temperament among children. Leaving these 
out of sight we may lay down one or two general con- 
siderations for the guidance of the mother or teacher. 
To begin with, the capacity for sympathy must be sup- 
plied with appropriate stimuli. Objects may be sup- 
plied, either in actual life, or, in default of these, in 
fiction, for the purpose of exciting sympathy. 1 The 
child should from the first be made familiar with the 

i As a part of moral training, that is, the exercise of the will in action 
for the relief of others' distress and the promotion of their happiness, the 
presentment of ideal objects is of far less efficacy. It tends, when re- 
sorted to in excess, to beget the habit of feeling for others without acting 
on the feeling. 



310 FEELING. 

experiences of others. Since want of sympathy is often 
due to inadvertency, it behooves the teacher to exercise 
the child in a habit of attending to others' feelings. 
More particularly he should be prompted to note the 
effects on others of his own actions. Thus he should be 
led to see how he wounds and hurts others by his acts 
of folly and insubordination, by his propensity to self- 
indulgence. And on the other hand he should be 
encouraged to note the happy results of good conduct, 
the comfort and satisfaction he confers on others. Fi- 
nally the child should be exercised in the following out 
of sympathetic impulses, that is to say, in benevolent 
actions. He should be encouraged to relieve distress 
whenever he is able, and to confer happiness on others 
by giving up his toys, books, and so on. This exercise 
should be gradual, beginning with the sharing of a pos- 
session with another, and going on to the more difficult 
feat of self-denial. In this way he will reach an experi- 
ence of the delights of sympathy, and have the disposi- 
tion to sympathize fixed as a ruling motive to conduct. 
An important auxiliary agency in the cultivation of a 
child's sympathy is the manifestation of sympathy with 
him. Children are at first egoistic and cannot rise to 
the height of pure unrewarded disinterestedness. Their 
first outgoings of sympathy are a kind of exchange for 
similar favors received. Hence they first confer their 
sympathy on those (as mother and nurse) who are kind 
and sympathetic towards them. The more the teacher 
shows kind consideration for his pupil, enters into his 
special difficulties, troubles, and his favorite interests, 
the more likely is he to evoke a responsive sympathy. 
If the teacher wishes his pupil to step up to his level of 



PLEASURES OF KNOWLEDGE ANALYZED. 311 

feeling, he must first descend to his humbler level. In 
addition to showing sympathy to the particular child, 
the teacher will help to cultivate his capacity of sym- 
pathy by showing a kindly disposition in general. 
Sympathy, like other modes of feeling, is acquired in 
part through the influence of example. Children brought 
up in the midst of those who are considerate are them- 
selves likely to grow considerate. 

The Intellectual Sentiment : Love of Knowledge. Having 
briefly considered the nature of sympathy, we pass to 
the consideration of those non-personal emotions or 
sentiments which gather about certain objects and ideas 
common to all. Of these the first is the Intellectual 
Sentiment or the pleasurable feeling which attaches 
itself to knowledge and truth, together with the corre- 
sponding painful emotion which connects itself with 
ignorance and error. This sentiment is developed in 
connection with the pursuit of knowledge. Viewed 
under slightly different aspects it is known as the satis- 
faction of curiosity, the pleasure of discovery, and the 
reverence for truth. 

Pleasures of Knowledge Analyzed : Delight in New Knowl- 
edge. All mental activity is as we have seen pleasurable 
provided it is suitable to the strength of the faculty 
and to the condition of the brain at the time. Intel- 
lectual occupation of all kinds is thus within certain 
limits agreeable. But the enjoyment only becomes con- 
siderable when the charm of novelty is added. To 
observe a familiar object, to recall a well-know fact, 
gives little enjoyment. On the other hand, to exercise 



312 FEELING. 

the powers of observation on a new object, or to recall 
an occurrence that seemed forgotten, yields keen enjoy- 
ment. Hence all acquisition and discovery of new 
knowledge is fitted to give pleasure, the enjoyment 
being greater when the facts or truths contrast strik- 
ingly with our previous knowledge. In this case we 
experience the pleasurable excitement of surprise or 
wonder. The first introduction of the young mind to 
the new world opened up by science (e. g., Astronomy, 
Chemistry) gives a thrill of delightful wonder. 

Pleasures of Discovering Knowledge. The full enjoyment 
of intellect is known only in those more prolonged 
operations when the mind is actively searching for some 
new fact or truth. The passive reception of a new piece 
of knowledge, even when the pains of ignorance or of 
perplexity have preceded, gives but little delight com- 
pared with the active discovery of it for oneself. A 
boy who works out unaided a problem in geometry has 
an amount of satisfaction wholly incommensurable with 
that of another who has the solution at once supplied 
him. In this case the full activity of the mind is 
awakened, trains of ideas pass rapidly through the 
mind, and there is the glow of intellectual excitement. 
In addition to this there is the pleasure of pursuing an 
end, the delight of intellectual chase. A certain amount 
of resistance only stimulates the powers further, and so 
adds to the zest. At the end there is the joyous feeling 
of successful attainment of difficulties overcome and of 
triumph. 

Pleasure in Possessing Knowledge. When the knowledge 
is attained its possession is accompanied by a pleasur- 



EARLIER STAGE OF INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENT. 313 

able consciousness of power. The mind is aware of 
being enriched by a new possession. And the new at- 
tainment is felt to be a source of strength. It has les- 
sened for us the region of the unknown and obscure, 
and adds to our self-confidence in confronting the world 
about us. In many cases, too, the new possession gives 
us a firmer hold on previous acquisitions. It throws 
light on facts which were once obscure, it serves to 
bind a number of fragments of knowledge under some 
uniting principle. Finally, the new acquisition gives us 
the pleasurable sense of increased active efficiency. 
Knowledge is power in the sense that it enables us to 
act or do things. The consciousness of knowing some- 
thing involves an agreeable confidence in our ability to 
act on it when the time comes. 

Other forms of Intellectual Sentiment : Logical Feelings. 
Besides the feeling of pleasure which springs up in con- 
nection with the pursuit and attainment of knowledge, 
there are other feelings incident to intellectual processes, 
which may be styled the Logical Feelings. As we have 
seen, all doubt is in a measure a painful state of discord, 
whereas belief is a state of agreeable repose. State- 
ments which run counter to our experience give the 
sense of contradiction, whereas those which chime in 
with it are wont to be assented to with a pleasurable 
sense of harmony. 

Earlier Stage of Intellectual Sentiment. In the early 
stages of school life the child's interest in knowledge is 
due to no small extent to the value which is put on it 
by others. The boy or girl finds that everybody else is 



314 FEELING. 

busy amassing knowledge. Progress is rewarded: the 
children who get up their lessons well are approved, and 
regarded with favor by their teacher and by their com- 
panions. Thus a reflected feeling of respect for knowl- 
edge is acquired, which will vary in intensity according 
to the susceptibility of the child to the pleasures of ap- 
probation and reputation. He is proud of knowing his 
lesson mainly because others hold knowledge in high 
esteem. Affection and Sympathy will, as we have seen, 
also play a part. The affectionate child takes to study 
because he wishes to please his teacher. Moreover he 
finds that his ignorance excludes him from the pleasures 
of companionship and sympathy, and that every ad- 
vance in knowledge brings him nearer his teacher. 
Finally knowledge will be valued for its practical 
utility. Children set store by those kinds of knowledge 
which they can turn to practical account. Where, as 
often happens, the usefulness of knowledge is not ap- 
parent they are apt to feel less concern about it. 

Here too we see the effects of habit in limiting the 
range of the feeling. The child comes to value knowl- 
edge of certain kinds only, namely, those which are 
most closely related to his natural tastes, or those which 
he has made a special object of pursuit. 

Later Stage of Intellectual Sentiment. A purely disinter- 
ested love of knowledge is more than this, and embraces 
a feeling of curiosity for knowledge of all kinds, that 
which lies outside our special region of observation and 
study, as well as that which lies within it. This wide 
impartial interest in knowledge is rarely developed in 
early life. It presupposes a considerable measure of 



CULTIVATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENT. 315 

intellectual culture. Even among adults it is one of 
the rarest attainmeuts. 

The development of the Logical Feelings, the senti- 
ment of consistency and accuracy, is a slow process 
which only begins in the ordinary period of school life. 
Children often show a certain quickness in spying out 
inaccuracies and inconsistencies in others' statements, 
but the interest here is rather the feeling of pleasure in 
"taking another down," than a genuine intellectual 
repugnance to contradiction. Such feelings in their 
keener form are rare, and presuppose a certain refine- 
ment of emotional nature to begin with. Their devel- 
opment is closely connected with intellectual progress 
and the growth of a love of knowledge. A keen desire 
for knowledge leads naturally to a deep respect for ac- 
curacy and consistency. This last is further promoted 
by a practical experience of the evils of inaccuracy and 
error. 

The Cultivation of the Intellectual Sentiment. The cultiva- 
tion of the emotions which grow up about knowledge 
goes on hand in hand with intellectual culture. The 
best kind of intellectual training necessarily involves 
the calling forth of a genuine interest in knowledge and 
of a habitual feeling of curiosity. Here the thing to 
attend to is to adapt as far as possible the work to the 
capabilities and natural tastes of the child so that the 
fullest enjoyment may be derived from it. The pupil 
must be led (at the outset by the help of adventitious 
motives) to make acquaintance with the pleasures of 
intellectual activity, of finding out things and of over- 
coming obstacles. A judicious use should be made of 



316 FEELING. 

the principle of association. All the accompaniments 
of study should be made as agreeable as possible, so 
that a pleasurable feeling may be reflected on to intel- 
lectual pursuits. The ' get up ' of a text-book may 
materially affect the child's liking for a particular 
study at this early period. And the more attractive 
the school surroundings, the more likely are the 
scholars to take kindly to learning. Further, in 
seeking to awaken a pleasurable interest in knowledge 
resort must be had to the principle of contrast. The 
pleasures of knowledge cannot in themselves be very 
keen at first; but by inducing beforehand a feeling of 
ignorance, of wonder and perplexity, we may be able 
to excite a strong impulse of curiosity, the satisfaction 
of which craving will greatly enhance the pleasure 
which attends the actual attainment of knowledge. 
Once more, whenever it is practicable the young should 
be invited to make their own discoveries in order that 
they may taste the full enjoyment of intellectual pur- 
suit. A skilful method of instruction will always man- 
age to leave some room for the play of the child's 
impulse to divine facts, and search out reasons. 

The JEsthetic Sentiment. The second of the three senti- 
ments to be now considered is known as the Esthetic 
Emotion, the Pleasures of Beauty or the Pleasures of 
Taste. These include a variety of pleasurable feelings, 
namely those corresponding to what is pretty, graceful, 
harmonious, sublime, ludicrous, in natural objects (in- 
cluding human beings) or in works of art. To these 
pleasures there correspond the disagreeable feelings 
excited by what is ugly, inharmonious, and so forth. 



ORIGIN OF AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT. 3l7 

Origin of JEsthetic Enjoyment. The whole effect of a 
beautiful object, so far as we can explain it, is a harmo- 
nious confluence of the delights of sense, intellect, and 
emotion, in a new combination. Thus a beautiful natural 
object, as a noble tree, delights us by its gradations of 
light and color, the combination of variety with symme- 
try in its contour or form, the adaption of part to part, 
and of the whole to its surroundings; and finally by its 
effect on the imagination, its suggestions of heroic 
persistence, of triumph over the adverse forces of winds 
and storms. Similarly a beautiful painting delights the 
eye by supplying a rich variety of light and shade, of 
color, and. of outline; gratifies the intellect by exhibiting- 
a certain plan of composition, the setting forth of a 
scene or incident with just the fulness of detail for 
agreeable apprehension; and lastly, touches the many- 
stringed instrument of emotion by a harmonious 
impression, the several parts or objects being fitted to 
strengthen and deepen the dominant emotional effect, 
whether this be grave or pathetic on the one hand, or 
light and gay on the other. The effect of beauty, then, 
appears to depend on a simultaneous presentment in a 
single object of a well-harmonized mass of pleasurable 
material or pleasurable stimulus for sense, intellect, and 
emotion. 

Good or Healthy Taste. By this is meant what answers 
to a perfect and healthy nature well adapted to its en- 
vironment. A normal aesthetic faculty presupposes the 
common human sensibilities and faculties. This idea 
would help us to say, in certain cases at least, whether 
any particular aesthetic judgment was sound, or whether 



318 FEELING. 

it indicated a good or healthy taste. Thus, for example, 
we could condemn the Chinese taste for pinched feet or 
the English taste for pinched waists as bad, because 
indicating a state of feeling out of harmony with the 
conditions of life. Similarly, we might pronounce 
against a preference for dingy over bright colors, because 
this is a sign of feebleness in the organ concerned. 

Refined Taste. We are apt to talk of a good and a 
refined taste as though these were the same; but this is 
not accurate. ' A good taste ' points to what is common 
to all (normal) men, 'a refined taste' points to what 
distinguishes a higher stage of development or culture 
from a lower, whether among individuals or races. Now 
we may assume perhaps that culture tends on the whole 
to the increase of well-being, to the better adaptation of 
nature to surroundings. So far as this is the case a good 
and refined taste coincide. Refinement as contrasted 
with coarseness of taste clearly involves this superiority. 

Varieties of Fine Art. The working out of this artistic 
impulse in its various forms has lead to the cultivation 
of the several Fine Arts. Of these the best recognized 
varieties are five, namely, Architecture, Sculpture, 
Painting, Music, and Poetry. These may be variously 
distinguished. Thus we may mark off (a) the Visual 
Arts, namely, those arts which appeal to the eye or make 
use of visual impression as their material (Painting, 
Sculpture, Architecture), from (b) the Auditory Arts, 
or those which appeal to the ear, or make use of auditory 
impression (Music and Poetry). Or we may divide 
them into (a) Imitative Arts, those which imitate natural 



THE EDUCATION OF TASTE. 319 

objects and are greatly controlled by the ends of truth 
(Painting, Sculpture, and Poetry) ; and (b) No n- Imitative 
Arts, those which are more free and in a peculiar sense 
creative (Music and Architecture). Id the imitative arts 
the element of suggestion or ideality prevails over the 
formal element: in the non-imitative arts beauty of 
form is the main thing aimed at. 

The Education of Taste. The full and healthy develop- 
ment of taste implies certain external influences. Among 
these, education or training plays an important part. 
Although a mother or teacher cannot implant a faculty 
of taste if this is wanting, they may do much to ' draw 
out ' and strengthen the natural aptitude. 

(a) The Environment of the child should be tasteful. To 
begin with, since the aesthetic faculty, like the other 
faculties, grows by exercise on suitable material, it is 
important to surround the child from the first with what 
is pretty, attractive, and tasteful. As far as possible he 
should be taken out into the fields and woods so as to 
become familiar with nature's beauties, both sights and 
sounds. It is only by such early companionship with 
nature that the most valuable associations which lend 
so deep a charm to stream, wood, and mountain side can 
be built up. And in the artificial surroundings of 
home, neatness and picturesqueness should be aimed at. 
First impressions produce the deepest effect in the edu- 
cation of taste as well as in that of the other faculties. 
The influence of a refined mother who studies grace in 
furniture, pictures, and in her own dress and manner, 
may be all-important in awakening the first feeling for 



320 FEELING. 

what is graceful and beautiful. Custom, as has been 
remarked, plays a great part in determining our stand- 
ard of what is correct in matters of taste. It is all-im- 
portant, therefore, to accustom the child at the outset to 
what, though simple and adapted to the child's sensibil- 
ities, is in good taste. By daily familiarity with exam- 
ples of what is becoming and harmonious in dress, 
house-decoration, gesture, modulation of voice, and 
generally what we call manners, a standard will be 
unconsciously built up by the child, by a reference to 
which he will afterwards judge as to what is aesthetically 
right. 

(b) The child's attention should be called to the beautiful. In 
the second place much may be done by the mother or 
other educator by way of directing the attention to what 
is beautiful, pointing out those aspects of objects which 
are fitted to please the eye and mind, and so calling the 
aesthetic faculty into exercise. The training of the 
sensuous side of the faculty is in itself a considerable 
work. We all tend to overlook the exact character of 
sense-impressions, the finer details of color and line in 
objects, owing to the superior interest of their sugges- 
tions, namely the objects themselves, and their uses, etc. 
A child looking at a tree-trunk overgrown with moss, 
or an old wall tinted with lichens and flowers is wont to 
think of the tree and the wall as wholes or things, to 
wonder how high they are, whether he could climb 
them, and so on. In order to see exactly what is pres- 
ent to the eye, a special interest in sense-impressions and 
a habit of close attention is necessary. A cultivated 
mother or teacher may do much to exercise the child's 



THE EDUCATION OF TASTE. 321 

faculty by repeatedly calling off his attention from 
ideas of doing things, and fixing it in quiet contempla- 
tion on some of the main beauties of Nature's sights and 
sounds. 

In addition to calling his attention to what is worthy 
in the sense-impressions of Nature, the educator should 
exercise him in noting the beauties of form of natural 
objects, the symmetry of the mountain, the serpentine 
windings of the stream, and the beautiful regularities 
and proportions of crystals, and of organic structures. 
Lastly, it is obvious that the cultivation of a feeling for 
art, for painting, music, and so forth, consists largely in 
this systematic direction of the child's attention to what 
is beautiful both in the elements (color, line, sound), in 
their combinations (symmetrical form, rhythm, etc.), 
and in the meaning of the whole (what it represents or 
expresses). 

(c) The (esthetic faculties should be actively exercised. In 
the third place, the faculty of taste should be exercised 
on its active side. A child's feelings for what is agree- 
able, refined, or elegant in vocal utterance and expres- 
sion, gesture, dress, etc., is only fully cultivated when 
he is led to take pleasure in producing these effects 
himself. A fine feeling for beauty of color, line, or 
sound, is best secured by exercising the child in repro- 
ducing what he sees or hears. The teaching of draw- 
ing, painting, singing, or other art is the only effective 
means of developing a fine and discriminative aesthetic 
faculty. 

Great care should be taken not to hurry the process 
of cultivation. Children who have too refined a stand- 
u 



322 FEELING. 

ard set before them are apt to affect a taste for what 
they do not really care about. Young persons should 
not only be allowed but even encouraged to relish 
simple aesthetic enjoyments, the charm of brilliant colors, 
and forcible contrasts of color, of simple symmetrical 
patterns, and so on. Great care must be taken not to 
over-refine their taste, to deaden the healthy instinctive 
feelings, and so unduly narrow the region of enjoyment. 
With respect to the exercise of the aesthetic judg- 
ment children should be encouraged to be natural, and 
to pronounce opinion for themselves. The teacher 
should never forget the great individual differences of 
sensibility and taste, and should allow a legitimate scope 
to independent judgment. Taste is the region which ad- 
mits of the greatest freedom of opiuion, and constitutes, 
therefore, the best field for the exercise of individual 
judgment. On the other hand, the child should be 
taught to express opinion modestly, to avoid dogmatism, 
and to respect the tastes of others. 

The Sentiment of the Beautiful in Practical Education. The 
cultivation of the aesthetic sentiment may enter into 
almost every department of education. On one side it 
stands in close connection with intellectual training. 
The feeling for what is graceful or elegant may be 
developed to some extent in connection with the seem- 
ingly prosaic exercises, learning to read and to write; 
and by this means a certain artistic interest may be 
infused into the employment. The teaching of the use 
of the mother-tongue in composition offers a wider field 
for the exercise of the aesthetic sense in a growing feel- 
ing for style. Physical geography may be so taught as 



^ESTHETIC AND MORALS. 323 

to elicit a feeling for the picturesque and sublime in 
nature, and history, so as to call forth a feeling of ad- 
miration for what is great and noble in human character 
and life. Even the more abstract studies, as geometry 
and physical science, may be made a means of evoking 
and strengthening a feeling for what is beautiful (e. g. y 
regularity, symmetry in geometric figure, the beauties 
of form and color of minerals, plants, and animals). 

JEsthetic and Morals. On another side the training of 
the aesthetic sense comes into contact with moral train- 
ing. To adopt and practise in mode of dress, in speech, 
and generally in manners, what is agreeable to the 
aesthetic feelings of others, is a matter of so much social 
importance that it is rightly looked on as one of the 
lesser moral obligations. Hence the stress laid in the 
early period of training on the cultivation of naturalness, 
ease, fitness, and grace in movement, tone of voice, 
selection of words, etc., 

The full systematic training of the aesthetic feeling 
will go beyond these exercises and make use of special 
modes of cultivation in connection with the Fine Arts. 
Singing, music, drawing and painting, and finally poetry 
and literature, are the most important instruments of 
aesthetic discipline. 

Study of art in School Instruction. The question how 
far the study of art should enter into the ordinary 
course of education, and what branches of art are of 
most educational value, raise important practical ques- 
tions which cannot be fully discussed here, bnt one or 
two considerations bearing on the question may be just 



324 FEELING. 

touched on. Among these, the most important is that of 
the place filled by aesthetic delight in the whole enjoy- 
ment of life. From this point of view the cultivation 
of music might be regarded as all-important, and this 
preference might be confirmed by a reference to the 
socialistic and moralizing effects of the art. On the 
other hand, an art like drawing might be preferred on 
the ground of its value in connection with intellectual 
discipline and practical training. Perhaps poetry might 
be placed highest in respect both of the amount of 
pleasure it brings immediately, and of its intellectual 
importance. A certain order of artistic culture should 
be adopted answering to the order of development of 
the special sensibilities and faculties concerned. Thus, 
for example, singing may be taught with advantage 
before drawing, and this again before literary composi- 
tion. 

fflhical or Moral Sentiment. We now come to the last 
of the three sentiments, that known as the Ethical or 
Moral Sentiment. This feeling is commonly spoken of 
under a variety of names, such as the Feeling of Moral 
Obligation or the Sentiment of Duty, the feeling of 
reverence for the Moral Law, the Sentiment of Moral 
Approbation and Disapprobation, the Love of Virtue. 

Sow the Moral Feeling is called forth. The Moral Senti- 
ment has for its proper object conduct or action of a 
certain kind. It is called forth by a perception of, and 
reflection upon, actions which we commonly distinguish 
as good and bad, and more narrowly as right and wrong. 
These actions may be our own or those of another. We 



THE MORAL STANDARD. 325 

approve what is right in ourselves and in others. Right 
action may be provisionally defined as that which con- 
forms to the moral law. This law seeks to define and 
determine the conditions of the common good. It is 
based on the recognition of the social relations, of the 
interdependence of individuals, and of the fact that each 
may in a number of ways further or retard the interests 
and happiness of others. 

It is important to add that the moral feeling is only 
pure when it is free from all personal reference. A 
child's regret at wrongdoing, if it means simply a fear 
of punishment, is personal and non-moral. Similarly his 
impulse to requite a wrong done by another to himself 
involves a feeling of personal resentment, and so is non- 
moral. A genuinely moral feeling approves what is 
right or good in itself, or merely as right or good, and 
not because of its bearing on our personal interests. 

The Moral Standard. Men's judgments as to what is 
right and wrong are not perfectly uniform. We find 
different standards set up in different communities or in 
the same community at different times. Thus among 
Oriental nations we find a standard of morals differing 
in several respects from our own. The same differences 
show themselves in smaller communities. In one school 
current ideas and feelings about what is mean, dishonor- 
able, and so on, may vary considerably from those 
reigning in another school. Yet in spite of numerous 
differences there is a large region of uniformity. All 
men agree (within certain limits at least) that it is wrong 
to kill, to rob, or to deceive others. The moralist com- 
pares different systems of morals with a view to find out 



326 PEELING. 

what is common to them. He then seeks by reflection 
on the highest and best interests of man to construct an 
approximately correct statement of the moral law. Such 
a construction supplies roughly at least a universal and 
correct standard of right and wrong. 

Origin of the Moral Sentiment. It has been long disputed 
whether the moral faculty is innate and instinctive, or 
whether it is the result of experience and education. 
Writers have been wont to suppose that the authority 
of conscience would be impaired if it were allowed that 
it could be developed out of simpler feelings. But this 
view is less common now than it was. It is recognized 
that the question of the validity of conscience is to some 
extent distinct from that of its origin. Even if it is not 
directly implanted in the child's nature, but has gradu- 
ally grown up as the result of a process of education, it 
may still possess all the authority ever claimed for it. 

That the moral sentiment is in part instinctive may 
be allowed. Yet supposing this to be so it remains 
indisputable that the moral faculty is to a large extent 
built up in the course of the individual life. 

The Training of the Moral Faculty. The problem of 
exercising the child's moral feelings is clearly connected 
with that of forming his moral character. As we have 
seen, the feeling of right and wrong is essentially a 
practical emotion, bearing directly on conduct, and the 
educator is chiefly concerned with it as a motive to right 
action. Here we are concerned with the preliminary 
problem of rendering the moral feelings quick and vivid, 
and the moral judgment sound and exact. 



TRAINING OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 327 

It is hardly too much to say that the whole influence 
of the parent and teacher on the child should be directed 
to the helping on of the growth of the child's moral 
faculty. The first thing here is to make the system of 
discipline under which the child lives as effective and 
beneficial as possible. Rules must be laid down abso- 
lutely, and enforced consistently, yet with a careful 
consideration of circumstances and individual differences. 
Only in this way will the child come to apprehend and 
respect the moral law as a fixed and abiding system, 
perfectly impartial in its approvals and disapprovals. 
Much too will depend on the spirit and temper in which 
discipline is enforced. A measure of calm becomes the 
judicial function, and a parent or teacher carried away 
by violent feeling is unfit for moral control. Everything 
like petty personal spite should be rigorously excluded. 

Training the Moral Faculty by self-reliance. The training 
of the moral faculty in a self-reliant mode of feeling and 
judging includes the habitual exercise of the sympa- 
thetic feelings together with the powers of judgment. 
And here much may be done by directing the child's 
attention to the effects of his conduct. The conse- 
quences of wrong- doing and the beneficent results of 
right-doing ought to be made clear to the child, and his 
feelings enlisted against the one and on the side of the 
other. Not only so, his mind should be exercised in 
comparing actions, in detecting similar moral character- 
istics in a variety of actions, and in distinguishing be- 
tween like actions under different circumstances, so that 
he may become ready and apt in pronouncing moral 
judgment. 



328 FEELING. 

Moral Training ly Examples of Duty and Virtue. What is 
called moral instruction should in the first stages of 
education consist largely of presenting to the child's 
mind examples of duty and virtue with a view to call 
forth his moral feelings and to exercise his moral judg- 
ment. His own little sphere of observation should be 
supplemented by the page of history and of fiction. In 
this way a wider variety of moral action is exhibited, 
and the level of every-day experience is transcended. 
Such instruction is moral education in the full sense, 
since it attracts (or repels) the feelings as well as en- 
lightens the judgment. On the other hand, the mere 
teaching of the parts of the moral law, the code of 
duties, the classification of virtues, and so on, while 
giving knowledge, and to some extent aiding the intel- 
lectual side of the moral faculty, does not call the feel- 
ings into exercise. 

Moral development aided by the whole social environment. It 
follows from the above account of the way in which the 
moral faculty grows that in order to a full and complete 
development, the influence of the parent and teacher 
must be aided by other influences. The companionship 
of other children is an important condition of a healthy 
growth of the moral feelings. The sense of justice 
grows up in connection with the interplay of a number 
of individual interests and claims. A single child 
brought up alone is commonly wanting in this feeling. 
The free region of activity, the nursery and play- 
ground, have a moralizing effect by accustoming each 
child to consider himself as one of a number, to see the 
reciprocity of good conduct (honesty, kindness, etc.), 



MORAL TRAINING THROUGH PUBLIC OPINION. 329 

and to limit his expectations in deference to others* 
claims. 

Not only so, this daily contact with a number of chil- 
dren is morally important as familiarizing the child with 
the non-personal character of the moral law. In the 
home he finds the germ of a public opinion in the com- 
mon sentiment of the family. But it is in the school 
that this new agent exercises its full power. Where 
there is a healthy moral tone in a school, a contempt for 
cowardice, meanness, cruelty, and an admiration for 
pluck, fidelity, generosity, it is a most valuable agency 
in fashioning the growing moral sentiment of the indi- 
vidual. It is in this wider experience that the boy 
comes to recognize that the distinctions of right and 
wrong are not the impositions of an individual, however 
good and wise, but are imposed and enforced by the 
common will; that the moral law is a universal law 
sustained by the collective voice of mankind. And it is 
by this ampler experience of membership of a society 
that he comes to realize fully his own part in represent- 
ing and enforcing the moral law. 

Moral Training through Public Opinion. It follows from 
this that the guidance and illumination of this common 
sentiment and public opinion is one of the main func- 
tions of the moral educator. Custom has an enormous 
force in determining our moral standard. Even adults 
are wont to think the fact that society allows a thing, a 
sufficient proof of its intrinsic tightness. And in early 
life we are strongly inclined to steer our individual 
judgment by the compass of the sentiment of the body 
to which we belong. If then a child falls into a com- 



330 FEELING. 

munity where unhealthy moral feelings exist, his moral 
development will be hindered. The head of a school 
must be careful to see that the force which is so valua- 
ble an aid to moral growth when it acts in the right 
direction is not working in the opposite direction, per- 
verting the moral faculty. 

Ebferences. 

On the cultivation of Sympathy in the young, see Miss Edgeworth, 
Essay on Practical Education, Chap. X. On the nature and growth of the 
Moral Sentiment, see Bain, The Emotions and the Will, L, Chap. XV, On 
the training of the moral faculty by discipline, etc., see H. Spencer, Edu- 
cation, Chap. III. 



APPENDIX. 

SUGGESTIONS. 

1. Realize to yourself the great importance, from an educa- 
tional point of view, of the application of right motives. Con- 
sider, in this connection, the Pestalozzian doctrine that ' the 
positive work in education consists in stimulation ; the science of 
education is a theory of stimulation, or the right application of 
the best motives.' How influential are such sentiments as the 
love of approbation, the love of knowledge, and the desire for the 
possession of knowledge! 

2. Consider how much is implied in the title of one of Cous- 
in's books, The True, the Beautiful and the Good. Compare this 
with the phrases: The Intellectual Sentiment, the ^Esthetic Sen- 
timent, and the Moral Sentiment. 

3. Make application of the dictum as to the development of 
the Logical Feelings— 'the sentiment of consistency and accur- 
acy.' A slow process — its perfected development rarely met 
with — but its eliciting in the young the triumph, intellectually 
considered, of the teacher's forceful art. 



REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 331 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. How is Feeling as a phase of mind to be distinguished from 
Intellect? In what respect does it differ from Will? Who first 
proposed this three-fold division of mind? 

2. When is a man in a 'predominant state of intelligence? * 
When in a predominant state of feeling? ' When in a ' predomi- 
nant state of action and determination? ' Can an act of knowing 
be performed without the will? Can an act of will be performed 
without the intellect? Can either of these take place without 
some feeling mingling in the process? Are all these operations of 
one mind? What is the unity of which intelligence, feeling, 
and will are the manifestations? What is meant by saying these 
are ' phases of mind? ' 

3. Why are the feelings said to be the elements of happiness 
or misery? What are the pleasures of * the intellectual life? ' On 
which phase of the three-fold division of mind is the theory of 
moral culture based? 

4. Show that feeling or emotion is at different times an aid, 
a necessity and a hindrance to close intellectual application. 

5. What is pleasure? (See p. 207.) How can the perform- 
ance of a task be made more pleasurable than its omission? 
Why is a change in the degree of activity pleasurable? Why is a 
change in the kind of activity an important principle in education? 

6. Name the three orders of Emotion. Show that they are 
successive stages of mental life. Show that they are progressive 
stages. Under which of these three classes would you place self- 
esteem? Love of home? Friendship? Love? Patriotism? Moral 
obligation ? 

7. Why is the love of approbation so important an emotion, 
educationally? Self-esteem? Love of knowledge? Show that 
love of knowledge involves three things: satisfaction of curiosity, 
pleasure of discovery and reverence for truth. What pleasurable 
emotions arise from the possession of knowledge? What is the 
educational importance of the development of the Logical feel- 
ings of the sentiment of logical consistency? 



332 PEELING. 

8. When does the aesthetic sentiment begin to develop? 
What are the conditions of its perfect development? What is the 
educational value of this sentiment? When does the moral senti- 
ment first manifest itself? Why is it pre-eminently a social sen- 
timent? How is the moral distinguished from the Intellectual 
and the aesthetic sentiment? Which of the three sentiments im- 
ply a law or command outside of us? Which hath the greatest 
authority ? 

REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS 
^READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

1. On sympathy as the crowning qualification of the teacher, 
see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, chap. I. , p. 25 ; for the dictum 
that the great ruling principle in a school should be love, see Tate's 
Philosophy of Education, Part I., p. 141; on the teacher's main- 
tainance of a cheerful, happy temper, see Fitch, as above, p. 15; 
on the teacher's sympathy with scholars, see Page's Theory and 
Practice, chap. XIV., Sect. II., pp. 307 and 315; on the corporate 
life — the esprit du corps— of the school, see Fitch, chap. IV., p. 98. 

2. On sympathy as sometimes a better reward than praise, 
see Tate, Part II, chap. III., p. 201; on importance of friendship 
between parents and children, see Spencer's Education, chap. III., 
p. 193 ; on importance of friendship between master and scholars, 
see Page, as above, p. 315; for Pestalozzi on the development of 
the social emotions, see Quick, p. 187; on Pestalozzi's sympathy 
for his scholars — the ' enthusiasm of humanity ' — see the same 
reference; on enthusiasm as a great motive power, see Spencer's 
Education, p. 165; on sympathy as leading to the adoption of the 
golden rule, see Tate, Part II., chap. I., p. 173; on the teacher's 
duty to guard himself against prejudice, chap. XIV., sect. I., p. 
292 ; on children's being as much as possible in company of their 
parents, see Quick, p. 82. 

3. On turning to account children's natural love of the won- 
derful, see Tate, as above, Part IV., p. 137; on Locke's dictum 
that all intellectual exertion should be made pleasurable, see 
Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 82; on the pleasure of learning, 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 333 

the chief motive in getting the attention of children, see Tate, as 
above, p. 133; on desire for knowledge the first thing, see Quick, 
p. 133; on dejection of scholar as fatal to learning, see the same, 
p. 80 ; on dejection of master fatal to teaching, see the same, p. 
287. 

4. On the love of the beautiful, see Tate, Part II., chap. L, 
p. 173; on aesthetic culture, see Johonnot's Principles and Prac- 
tice of Education, chap. XII., p. 216, and Spencer, p. 238; on the 
early development of Taste, see Tate, Part II., chap. I., p. 172. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE WILL. 

We may now pass on to the consideration of the devel- 
opment of the third side or phase of mind, namely the 
Active side or Willing. 

Phenomena included under Will. The term Will is used 
in Mental Science to include all active operations of 
mind. By active operations are meant not only ex- 
ternal actions or movements, but also internal acts of 
mental concentration, together with certain preliminary 
stages of action, as desiring a thing, reflecting or delib- 
erating about an action, and resolving to do a thing. 

Of these phenomena, completed external actions are 
the most important. What we commonly mean by a 
manifestation of will is some outward action or move- 
ment. Will is thus seen to stand in close relation to 
the motor side of the nervous system. As we popularly 
phrase it, the active organs (limbs, voice, etc.) are the 
instruments of the will. 

Actions or movements, though in a wide sense be- 
longing to the region of will, are not all commonly 
called voluntary. We distinguish between voluntary 
and involuntary, or better, non-voluntary movements. 
Warding off a blow with the hand is voluntary, blink- 
ing when an object is suddenly brought near the eye is 
non-voluntary. Some of these non-voluntary actions, 



NATURE OF WILLING. 335 

as we shall see presently, are scarcely mental operations 
at all, since consciousness enters very faintly into them. 
Others, again, though having a distinct mental accom- 
paniment are not consciously directed to any end. 
Voluntary actions in the full and complete sense may 
thus be marked off as actions accompanied by con- 
sciousness, and characterized by the presence of a pur- 
pose or end. Briefly they may be described as actions 
consciously directed towards some end. 

Relation of Willing to Knowing and Feeling, Voluntary 
action always includes an element of knowing and of 
feeling. The motive to voluntary action, the end or 
thing desired, is the gratification of some feeling (e. g., 
ambition, or the love of applause). And we cannot act 
for a purpose without knowing something about the 
relation between the action we are performing and the 
result we are aiming at. Thus it is feeling which ulti- 
mately supplies the stimulus or force to volition, and 
intellect which guides or illumins it. 

Nature of Willing. A voluntary action has been de- 
fined as an action consciously directed to some end. 
We have now to examine a little more closely what is 
involved in such an action. Let us take an example out 
of child life. A boy sees a flower growing on the wall 
above his head. He raises his body and stretches out 
his hand to pluck it. This is a voluntary act. What 
happens here ? The sight of the flower calls up to his 
mind a representation of the pleasure of smelling it or 
carrying it in his buttonhole. This at once excites a 
desire for or impulse towards the object. The desire 



336 THE WILL. 

again suggests the appropriate action which is recog- 
nized as the means which will lead to the desired end. 
In other words there is the belief (more or less distinctly 
present) that the action is fitted to secure the result 
desired. 

Take another case. A girl playing in the garden 
suddenly feels heavy drops of rain and hears the mur- 
murs of thunder. She runs into the bower. Here the 
action is similar, only that it is due rather to an impulse 
away from a disagreeable experience than to an impulse 
towards an agreeable one. We say that the force at 
work here is not a desire for something pleasurable, but 
an aversion to something painful. 

These simple examples may suffice to show that the 
fundamental element in willing is desire, either in its 
positive form, as desire for what is agreeable, pleasur- 
able, or in its negative form, what we best mark off as 
aversion. The inclination, or tendency of the active 
mind towards what is pleasurable and away from what 
is painful, is the essential fact in willing. Experience 
teaches the child what is pleasurable or painful, and 
what kind of actions are fitted to realize the one and 
avoid the other. But the impulse to seek pleasure and 
to avoid pain is primordial and instinctive. 

Relation of Desire to Feeling. It is to be noted that the 
relation between feeling and desire is a particularly 
close one. We mark off a pure feeling as a passive 
phenomenon. There is no ingredient of activity in an 
enjoyment, say that of a delicate flavor, that the whole 
state of desire is a mixed state in which a pleasurable 
element (the accompaniment of the representation) is 



HABIT AND ROUTINE. 337 

continually opposed and counteracted by a painful (the 
sense of deficiency, shortcoming). 

Element of Activity. Desire is essentially an active 
phenomenon. It is this characteristic which differences 
it at once from knowing and from mere feeling. It is 
in virtue of this characteristic that it constitutes the 
connecting point between knowing and feeling on the 
one side and willing on the other. In desiring, the mind 
is in a state of active tension, or active tending towards 
the realization of the feeling only represented at the 
moment. 

Willing and Attending. It is customary to distinguish 
between two branches of will the External, muscular 
action or movement, and the Internal, mental action, 
voluntary attention or concentration. These two phases 
are rightly distinguished. They answer roughly to two 
directions of will-development, illustrated in the man of 
thought and the man of action. 

Habit and Routine, In a measure all customary 
successions of movement illustrate the effect of the 
principle of habit. The performance of one action or 
chain of act-ions suggests and excites its usual successor. 
In this way much of our daily routine tends to take on 
a semi-automatic character. Thus the man of routine 
passes with only a faint or nascent volitional impulse 
from the meal to the walk, from the walk to the business 
of the day, and so forth. That this force of habit 
involves a process of physiological adjustment is seen in 
the fact that the due succession brings, a certain satis- 



338 THE WILL. 

faction to the mind, while any interruption of the 
customary sequence produces a feeling of distress ana- 
logous to that which accompanies the obstruction of a 
natural instinct. 

Strength of Habit. Habits (like associations between 
representations) are of very different degrees of strength. 
The degree of perfection of a habit may be estimated 
by the promptness, and uniformity of the active re- 
sponse to stimulus. Thus the soldier's response to an 
order is 'mechanically perfect' when it follows immedi- 
ately and in every case. 

Conditions of the Strength of Habit. The conditions on 
which the strength of a habit depends are (1) the amount 
of motive force brought to bear and of attention given 
at the outset in order to make the action perfect. The 
action must it is obvious be perfect as a voluntary one 
before it becomes habitual. The will must itself gain 
full possession of an action before it can hand it over to 
its subordinate, habit. (2) The frequency with which 
the action has been performed. Repetition is the great 
means of fixing movement in the channels of habit. 
(3) The uniformity or continuity of its performance in 
like circumstances. The importance of not intermitting 
the performance of an action is known to every parent 
and teacher. For example, a child may put away his 
toys after playing with them a good many times, and 
yet not acquire a habit of doing so, if he now and 
again omits to perform the action. A perfect habit 
presupposes a certain length of unbroken or unvarying 
experience. 



THE TRAINING OF THE WILL. 339 

Learning and Unlearning Halit. There is another reason 
why it is so much more difficult to form a new habit as 
life advances. It commonly involves the unlearning of 
an old habit. The problem is thus greatly complicated. 
A child that has acquired an awkward way of sitting, or 
unpleasant tricks of manner, gives special difficulty to 
the educator. In order to build up the new habit he 
has to work against; the resisting force of the old one. 
Movement tends to set in the old direction, and many a 
painful effort is needed to check the current. 

The Training of the Will and the Exercise of the Active 
Organs. The exercise of the muscular organs belongs in 
part to what is called physical education. It is carried 
on to a considerable extent for purposes of bodily 
health. The march and dance of the Kindergarten, the 
drilling lesson of the school have a direct reference to 
health, and are dictated by the rule ' A healthy mind in 
a healthy body.' Not only so, bodily practice is carried 
on to a large extent for the sake of attaining some 
distinctly physical excellence, a well developed physique, 
robustness and agility of limb. This applies to the train- 
ing of the Greek youth which had a military significance, 
the training of the modern runner, oarsman, and so on. 

On the other hand, the exercise of the active organs 
stands in a close relation to intellectual education. 
This applies more particularly to the hand and the 
voice. Teaching children to speak distinctly, to read, 
and to write, is commonly looked on as a part of intel- 
lectual instruction. It is obvious that these actions 
largely subserve the ends of knowledge, and are indeed 
necessary to the taking in and giving out of knowledge. 



340 THE WILL. 

While the special exercise of the active organs in 
particular directions seems thus to fall under physical 
or intellectual training, the general exercise of them 
comes more appropriately under the head of moral 
training. As we have seen, the growth of the will 
begins with the attainment of the power of command- 
ing the organs of movement. The outgoings of desire 
or active impulse first appear in connection with move- 
ment. It is in movement that clear purpose and inten- 
tion first display themselves. And it is here that 
perseverance in trial and resolution first manifest them- 
selves. Further, all the higher actions of life depend 
on the attainment of a general control of the bodily 
organs. Consequently the exercising of these capabili- 
ties involves a rudimentary training of the will. All 
practice in doing things, then, whatever its primary ob- 
ject may be, is to some extent a strengthening of voli- 
tional power. 

It should be borne in mind at the outset that children 
are disposed to activity and in their self-appointed occu- 
pations and play show that they are capable of making 
real x>rogress without any direct control from parent or 
teacher. The young child should from the beginning 
have ample opportunity for exercising his active organs. 
His nursery and his play-ground should be provided 
with objects fitted to call forth movement, manual and 
bodily. The important part played by imitation in the 
growth of voluntary movement suggests the advantages 
of companionship in these early occupations. A child 
is stimulated by the sight of others doing some new 
thing. 

The special province of the educator in the training 



THE TRAINING OF THE WILL. 341 

of the will in the performance of bodily movement 
begins with showing the child how to do things. This 
requires judgment. It is better for the child to find out 
the way to do a thing for himself where he can, just as 
it is better for him to discover a fact or a truth for him- 
self. Nothing is more fatal to growth of will than that 
indolence which shrinks from trial and experiment, and 
which comes helplessly to parent or nurse crying, 
* What shall I do ? ' or ( Do this for me.' But there are 
many things which the child obviously cannot do with 
the best of wills. Hence an occasional intrusion into 
children's play with new suggestions will often prove a 
useful stimulus and encouragement to renewed activity. 
From the first the child has to be taught to obey, to 
do things when he is told to do them. Thus he is 
required to sit at table and eat his food in a certain way, 
and so forth. Here the educator becomes in a new and 
more important sense the trainer of the child's will. 
As we have seen, movement under command is one im- 
portant stage in the growth of voluntary action. The 
exercise of a firm but wise discipline in this early stage 
of youth will do more than anything else to strengthen 
voluntary power. Hence the importance of making the 
connection between command and action as close as 
possible, so that the responses may be certain and 
prompt. Here it is desirable not only to observe the 
general conditions of a wise and effective authority, but 
to consult the child's powers, not to demand what is 
beyond these, and even to consider his varying degrees 
of readiness to act. When the mother or teacher has suc- 
ceeded in gaining a perfect control over the child's actions 
the power of educating the young will is greatly enlarged. 



342 THE WILL. 

Almost all school exercises involve the co-operation 
of the child's active powers to some extent. Even the 
oral lesson demands that children should take up a 
certain bodily attitude, and keep the head and the eyes 
fixed in a particular direction. The reading and writing 
lessons and the drilling lesson each call forth activity in 
their special way. The great agency here is still com- 
mand supplemented by example or showing the child 
how to perform the required movement. The impulses 
of imitation should be appealed to, so as to realize the 
full benefit of educating children in numbers. 

It must never be forgotten that the growth of the 
active powers, like other mental growth, is a gradual 
process. The ready command of the active organs is 
the result of a long series of experiences. The child 
may of course fail to execute the required movement 
because he is not concentrating his mind on what he is 
doing. Then the teacher is justified in blaming him. 
If, however, as often happens, the failure is the result of 
insufficient preparatory exercise of the organ concerned, 
the blame rather falls on the teacher for imposing an 
unsuitable task. The careful graduation of work ac- 
cording to capability is well illustrated in teaching deaf 
mutes to speak by a process of imitative movement. 
The teacher begins with movements of the external 
parts of the body which are distinctly visible to the 
child when he himself performs them. Only after a 
certain practice of the imitative capability in this simple 
form does he go on to call forth the more delicate and 
hidden movements of the organ of articulation by the 
aid of the sense or touch. 

A proper understanding of the principle of habit is a 



AIMING AT PERMANENT ENDS. 343 

matter of great importance to the teacher. Throughout 
the whole of practical training, from the acquisition of 
those simple actions which enter into good manners, up 
to the most elaborate manual and vocal performances, 
the force of habit is called into requisition. In teach- 
ing a child to talk, to write, to be well-behaved, and so 
on, the teacher aims at bringing about an easy, rapid, 
and quasi-mechanical mode of action. The conditions 
necessary to the formation of habit need to be attended 
to. A clear recognition of the truth that a perfect 
habit represents a long series of repetitions, will tend to 
make the teacher patient and hopeful. 

Aiming at Permanent Ends. As a further result of this 
development of intelligence and emotion the ends of 
action become greatly enlarged or expanded. The child 
comes to apprehend the existence of enduring interests, 
permanent conditions of pleasure which constitute hap- 
piness. In this way he learns to regard health, knowl- 
edge, reputation, and so on, as things which last, which 
are of value to-day and to-morrow alike, and which form 
parts of the enduring good of life. Similarly he comes 
to apprehend a larger or wider good than his personal 
happiness, the interests of his family, his school, his 
country, and of mankind at large. 

When his mind is able to seize these comprehensive 
and enduring ends his action becomes intelligent or 
rational in a new sense. He now acts with a reference 
not merely to immediate results in the present case but 
to the bearing of his action on this sum of permanent 
good. Thus he will be industrious in pursuing knowl- 
edge not only for the pleasure which every new acqui- 



344 THE WILL. 

sition of knowledge brings directly, but for the sake of 
the permanent value of this knowledge. Similarly he 
will seek to please his teacher not simply with a view 
to the immediate advantages which the action brings, 
but with the thought of improving his permanent rela- 
tions with his teacher, gaining a higher place in his 
esteem, and so on. 

When the child begins to view each individual action 
in its bearing on some portion of his lasting welfare, bis 
actions become united and consolidated into what we 
call conduct. Impulse as an isolated prompting for this 
or that particular enjoyment becomes transformed into 
comprehensive aim and rational motive. Or to express 
the change otherwise, action becomes pervaded and 
regulated by principle. The child consciously or un- 
consciously begins to refer to a general precept or max- 
im of action, as 'maintain health,' 'seek knowledge,' 
'be good,' and so forth. Particular actions are thus 
united under a common rule, they are viewed as mem- 
bers of a class of actions subserving one comprehensive 
end. In this way the will attains a measure of unity. 

Complex Action. Action, as we have seen, gains in re- 
presentativeness as the mind of the agent takes remote 
consequences into account. And this increase of repre- 
sentativeness implies an increase in complexity. By a 
complex action is meant here one which is not the result 
of a single impulse tending towards an immediate end, 
but involves a plurality of impulses, a representation of 
a number of objects of desire or aversion, and so an ex- 
pansion and complication of the internal representative 
process. 



CHOICE OR DECISION. 345 

This expansion of the representative stage of action 
assumes one or two very unlike forms. In the first 
place, the desires or impulses simultaneously called up 
may be harmonious and co-operative, converging to- 
wards the same action. In the second place, the desires 
may be discordant and opposed, or diverging into differ- 
ent lines of action. 

Choice or Decision. After duly weighing the pleasure 
and pain, the good and evil, resulting from any action 
the one is seen to preponderate over the other. Then the 
mind knowingly chooses or decides to act or not to act. 

Thus, to return to our illustration, the child finding 
that the probable evil of running out into the garden is 
greater than the good, abandons the wish, and decides 
not to act. This involves a dismissal of the alluring 
image from the mind. Similarly in the case of rival 
ends. Thus, to revert to our other example, the girl 
finding that on the whole the pleasure of remaining at 
home is greater than that of taking a walk decides on 
the former course, deliberately selecting it as the better. 
In like manner the mind chooses between different means, 
deciding which course of action is best fitted to bring 
about a desired end. 

It is to be added that the resulting decision is rarely 
of the perfect form here described. The force of activ- 
ity or the tendency to do something, aided by an 
impulse to escape from the painful state of conflict, fre- 
quently helps to resolve the point, both in choosing ends 
and choosing means, in a comparatively passive way. 
This is particularly true of the decisions of early life. 



346 THE WILL. 

Calmness and Strength of Will. The ability to check 
impulse or postpone action, and to deliberate and choose, 
is the characteristic of a calm enlightened and regulated 
will. Its development is a slow process and only com- 
mences in early life. The young child cannot defer act- 
ing. In cases of conflict the pressure of impulses, 
assisted by the pain of the" state of conflict itself, is too 
much for him, and he is unable to master the rival forces 
and reduce them to order. He wants too the intelligence 
for comparing and deciding. 

Disciplined strength depends on a combination of active 
vigor, strength of desire and impulse, on the one side, 
and of cautiousness on the other. 

Resolution : Perseverance. One other common accom- 
paniment of this higher and more reflective type of 
action remains to be touched on, namely, resolution. 
By this is meant the formation of a distinct determina- 
tion to perform an action which is seen to lead to a 
desired end. It is something more than deciding on an 
end, and an appropriate action, as good. Such decision 
often passes instantly into action, in which case the stage 
of resolution is not fully developed. Thus resolution 
has reference to an action not capable of being carried 
out at the instant. For example, a child breaks some- 
thing: decides that it is best to tell his mother: and 
finally resolves to do so when he next sees her. Resolu- 
tion is thus the internal equivalent of a complete volun- 
tary action (and so differs from a mere desire to act), 
though the completed mental process is debarred by the 
circumstances of the moment from issuing in the final 
stage, the external action. 



CONTEOL OF THE THOUGHTS. 347 

Control of Feelings. The growth of will thus manifests 
itself in checking and overpowering impulse or lower 
motive, and generally in curbing and governing move- 
ment. But this is not the only form of self-control. The 
will is called on to restrain and regulate other forces 
lying outside the region of action proper. 

Of these extraneous forces the first and most obvious 
is feeling, emotion or passion. Feeling as we have seen 
discharges itself in movement. The control of feeling 
is thus analagous in certain respects to that of impulse. 
The first thing a child has to do in checking the force of 
passion (anger, grief, etc.) is to inhibit the external 
actions, such as crying, and throwing the arms about. 

The control of feeling is a more difficult attainment 
than that of active impulse. Children's feelings are 
violent and all-subduing at the time, and the will is 
sometimes called on to stay a torrent. The first efforts 
at self-restraint only begin when the power of controlling 
active impulse has been exercised up to a certain point* 

Control of the Thoughts. A second group of forces 
against which the will has in a manner to work in order 
to subordinate them to its own ends, are those of intel- 
lect. By these are meant the tendency of all presenta- 
tions or representations when they occur to attract the 
attention, together with the tendency of these when 
present in the mind to suggest or call up other images 
or thoughts in any way associated with them. The in- 
hibitory action of the will in counteracting these forces 
is, as was pointed out above, immediately connected 
with a positive action, namely, the fixing and detaining 



348 THE WILL. 

of certain presentations or representations before the 
mind so as to secure their greatest measure of distinct- 
ness, and the aiding in the calling up of representa- 
tions of which the mind is at the time in need. 

As we have seen, intellectual growth and discipline 
imply at every stage the control of these forces or 
tendencies by the will. Observation means the ability 
to keep the attention concentrated on an object for a 
time, and to resist the natural tendency of the mind to 
flit from this to that object. Again, in learning or com- 
mitting something to memory, the will is called into 
play in the form of concentration on the subject of 
study. And in order to keep his mind steadily fixed on 
his lesson the child must have a certain power both of 
shutting out external impressions, and of excluding any 
associations with the words or facts he is committing to 
memory which happen to be foreign to the matter in 
hand. And this power of controlling the forces of sug- 
gestion is seen in 'trying to remember' something. 
Finally in the higher processes of constructive imagina- 
tion, of abstraction and reasoning, this power of turning 
the attention away from what is interesting and of resist- 
ing the forces of suggestion, is called into exercise in a 
much higher form. All calm and regulated thinking im- 
plies not only the power of turning away from external 
objects, of ' abstraction ' in the popular sense, but also the 
command of the intellectual trains themselves, the cap- 
ability of interfering with the natural flow or succession 
of the images or ideas, selecting those which are suita- 
ble and retaining them before the mind, and excluding 
those which are unsuitable. 



MORAL CHARACTER. 349 

Definition of Character. The character is used in every 
day language to mark off any sort of difference in 
mental or moral qualities. We speak of intellectual 
peculiarities, special tastes, and so on, as entering into a 
man's character. There seems, however, in all cases to 
be a special reference to qualities belonging to the active 
side of the mind. Willing or conduct being the final 
outcome and all-important result of mind as a whole, 
the word character has come to connote in a special 
manner active qualities, as ruling inclinations and 
degree of volitional energy, and emotional and intel- 
lectual peculiarities only so far as they are related to 
these. 

Moral Character. In addition to this everyday mean- 
ing the word character has acquired an ethical signifi- 
cance. It refers not to the variable peculiarities (original 
and acquired) of individuals but to certain common moral 
qualities which it is the businesss of social discipline and 
education to cultivate in all alike, In other words 
* character' has come to stand for 'good character.' 
And a good character means a moral and virtuous con- 
dition of mind, such a disposition of the will, and, in 
connection with this, of the feelings and thoughts, a& 
will subserve the ends of morality. We thus see that 
every good or moral man possesses a character in a 
double sense. He has certain peculiarities of feeling and 
motive, etc., which give his mind its special color. This 
is his individual character. Along with this he possesses 
certain virtuous tendencies which make up his moral 
character and assimilate him to other moral men. This 
moral character is largely acquired, being the product 



350 THE WILL. 

of circumstances and education supplemented by indi- 
vidual reflection. 

Training of the Will. By the phrase the training of the 
will we mean the exercising and strengthening of it by 
the various agencies of command, encouragement, and 
instruction. This educational influence and control 
include first of all the supplying of motives to good 
conduct (deterrents and inducements). The very rela- 
tion of educator and child allows of this extension of 
motive force. The parent or teacher holds out the 
prospect of penalties and rewards, and so alters the 
direction of action. But the discipline of the will is 
more than this. It includes the art of guiding the young 
mind in reflecting on the results of his action, of calling 
into play as motives feelings which are feeble and fitful, 
and apt therefore to be stifled in the surging of stronger 
inclinations. The training of the will thus includes in a 
measure the exercise of the intellectual powers, and the 
cultivation of the emotions. 

Need of Discipline. The need of authority, of com- 
mand, or what is more especially meant by discipline, 
arises as soon- as the child acquires by the growth of his 
bodily organs a wider scope for action, and by the devel- 
opment of intelligence is enabled to understand the 
meaning of words. Unless he were prohibited from do- 
ing this and that which his love of activity, curiosity, or 
other impulse, leads him to do, he would seriously injure 
himself and be a nuisance to others. It would not do 
in every case to let the child find out the natural results 
of foolish or wrong action. In many cases {e.g., in play- 



CONDITIONS OF DISCIPLINE. 351 

ing with fire, water, and so on) the experience would be 
disastrous. In other cases again the child's intelligence 
would be too weak to detect the relation between action 
and result. Thus he would not connect over-eating 
with its effect on his health. With respect to conduct 
affecting others again, it may be safely said that if 
children were permitted to tease and molest others, as 
they are often inclined to do, everybody would soon 
shun their society. 

Artificial restraints, the interposition of authority, are 
thus necessary. There must be commands laid down, 
and penalties attached to the breaking of these. And 
this system of discipline is a necessary condition of the 
early growth of character. As we have seen the moral 
sentiment presupposes some form of external constraint. 
The first stage in the growth of character is a habit of 
obedience. Consequently the first requisite in the form- 
ation of character is some system of authority, command 
or law. 

Conditions of Discipline. The effect of discipline depends 
on the fact that certain consequences, and more partic- 
ularly disagreeable consequences or punishments, are 
attached to actions of certain kinds. Where this 
association is wanting there is no moral force supplied. 
Thus when an impatient mother now scolds and slaps 
her child for doing a thing, now allows him to do it 
with impunity, according to her changing mood, there 
is no motive power applied to the young will. The very 
beginning of discipline is the institution of a rule or 
command of a general nature embracing a certain class 
of actions, and prohibiting these by definite penalties. 



352 THE WILL. 

Hence the most essential conditions of a good discipline. 
— (a) The rule must be intelligible, dealing with dis- 
tinctions in conduct which the child can understand. 
The actions prohibited must be simple classes of action, 
such as taking what belongs to another, saying what is 
false, and so forth, (b) The rule must be enforced 
uniformly, so that the child will closely associate the 
action with the consequence; in other words be certain 
of the evil result of disobedience. 

These are the most general or fundamental conditions 
of what we call discipline. We will now pass to more 
special considerations affecting the limits and proportion 
of punishment. 

Limits of Punishment. All punishment is suffering, and 
as such, an evil. More than this, it seems to estrange 
educator and child rather than bring them together. 
Finally it is repressive, checking and arresting, instead 
of evoking and encouraging activity. Hence it can only 
be inflicted when necessary either for the good of the 
offender himself or by way of example and warning to 
others. Vindictive punishment, blows and harsh words 
administered in temper and as a relief to feelings of 
annoyance, check the will without disciplining it. Pun- 
ishment cannot be justified except in cases where it is 
likely to be effective as a deterrent. Thus it ought 
never to be inflicted where it is likely to be inoperative 
through feebleness of will. Children have only a certain 
power of self-restraint, and of anticipating consequences. 
Hence to punish them for actions lying beyond their 
control, as for example crying, may be pure cruelty. 
Again it is inhuman to punish a child for actions which 



PROPORTIONING OF PUNISHMENT TO FAULT. 353 

are in no sense wrong. Trifling faults, such as obstrep- 
erousness in an active boy, are not meet subjects for 
punishment. Great care should be taken before punish- 
ing a child for an action to see that there has been an 
evil intention. Thus it would be immoral to punish a 
boy severely for breaking a vase the value of which he 
could not be supposed to know. Also the motive must 
be taken into account. Thus a child who plucks a 
flower in the garden in order to give pleasure to a sick 
brother or sister ought not to be punished. Finally 
where natural penalties can be counted on artificial ones 
should not be resorted to. As Mr. Spencer has shown, 
a child may be cured, to some extent at least, of such a 
bad habit as untidiness by being led to experience the 
ill effects of the habit. 

Proportioning of Punishment to Fault. Not only does it 
need much care to determine what cases are meet for 
punishment, it is a matter of delicate judgment to decide 
what the degree or amount of the punishment should be 
in any case. The most important consideration here is 
that the punishment is. intended to supply a counteract- 
ing motive. If it does not supply a sufficient force, it is 
useless. Weak indulgent parents averse to severe 
punishment are often unkind in the worst sense by 
administering slight punishments which are wholly 
inadequate and so of no good to the child. If on the 
other hand the penalty is more than adequate for the 
purpose of counteracting an impulse, the excess is so 
much cruelty. To determine the proper amount of 
punishment in any case requires not only a general 
knowledge of children's feelings and active propensities, 
w 



354 THE WILL. 

but a special knowledge of the sensibilities and impulses 
of the individual child. Since this knowledge is only 
acquired gradually it is a good rule to begin with slight 
punishments, and only go to more severe ones as these 
prove necessary. 

There is room for judgment too in selecting the hind 
of punishment appropriate to a particular fault. The 
question what sorts of punishment are best, is a very 
troublesome one. What is wanted is some kind of 
penalty the evil of which is little affected by differences 
of individual sensibility, and which easily lends itself to 
graduation or gradual increase. Over and above these 
considerations there is another, namely the appropriate- 
ness to the particular kind of offence. There is often a 
certain fitness between a wrong act and the punishment. 
A child who has neglected his work for play is appro- 
priately punished when he is kept in during play hours 
to make up arrears. 

Enough has been said to show how much scope there 
is for individual knowledge, good feeling, and tact in 
administering any system of discipline. It is hardly 
too much to say that every parent and teacher who has 
a discipline at all, has his own method of discipline, the 
moral effects of which vary widely according to the 
degree of its severity, the fineness of moral discrimina- 
tion shown, and so on. 1 

Reward, Encouragement. Punishment is for the most 
part negative in its effect: it deters from action or arrests 

i On the considerations which should determine the limits of punish- 
ment, and the apportioning of it in different cases, the reader should 
read Bentham's rules quoted by Dr. Bain, Education as a Science, p. 106. 



REWARD, ENCOURAGEMENT. 355 

impulses to action rather than excites to activity. Even 
where it is employed as a stimulus to action, as when a 
child is punished for not preparing his lesson, its depress- 
ing influence is still seen. The little delinquent feels 
himself driven or forced to be industrious, and his 
activity is in consequence put forth without heartiness 
and even grudgingly. Moreover as a mode of pain, the 
fear of punishment has only a restricted range. As 
soon as the minimum quantity of task-work is done the 
pressure of the motive ceases. As was pointed out 
above, aversion to pain, though a powerful spring of 
action, is necessarily limited in its effects. 

Discipline includes not only the checking of impulse 
by deterrents, but the stimulating of activity by posi- 
tive inducements. That is to say, it makes use not 
merely of the child's natural aversion to pain, but of 
his equally natural, and more far-reaching desire for 
pleasure. It may be a question how far such artificial 
stimuli are necessary or desirable. Where it is possible 
it is well perhaps for a child to be industrious, good, 
and so on, in view of the natural consequence of his 
action (the good opinion and love of others^etc). But 
the weakness of the social feelings in the young makes 
some amount of artificial stimulation necessary. And 
there seems to be a certain correlation between punish- 
ment and reward, blame and praise. 

Here, again, there is room for wise discernment and 
moral judgment in determining the right occasion and 
ground of reward, and the amount of reward merited. 
Just as in the case of punishment there are the two ex- 
tremes of over-severity and laxity, so here there are the 
extremes of lavish and stinted reward. The moral 



356 THE WILL. 

effect of reward will depend much on what is regarded 
as the ground of merit. We have already seen that the 
rewarding of absolute, as distinguished from relative 
proficiency exerts but a limited influence. The incident 
of the motive is just where it is (in general) least need- 
ed. To this it may be added that the rewarding of ef- 
fort and industry, as distinguished from intellectual 
ability, has a much better effect on the growing charac- 
ter of the young. It serves to accentuate and dignify 
the moral element, the exertion of will, in all intel- 
lectual attainment. 

Relaxing of Discipline. Discipline both on its negative 
and on its positive side is intended to be temporary 
only. It is the scaffolding needed for the building up 
of the simpler moral habitudes. As the habits grow in 
fixity, a smaller amount of punishment becomes neces- 
sary. Physical pain, loss of liberty, and so on, cau now 
be exchanged for the milder penalties, exposure to 
shame, private rebuke. A look, or a tone of voice, is 
enough, in the case of a well-trained boy or girl, to 
check any nascent impulse to wrong-doing. Similarly 
as good habits become formed the need of reward grows 
less. The renumeration of good conduct by tangible 
gifts is no longer necessary: the word and look of com- 
mendation are a sufficient reward. In this way the good 
habits, industry, punctuality, politeness, become inde- 
pendent and self-supporting. 

The educator may help on this higher stage of moral 
attainment by exercising the powers of reflection and 
judgment, and strengthening the higher emotions. 
This can be effected to some extent in connection with 



EXERCISE OF FREE WILL. 357 

the processes of discipline themselves. At first the 
child has to obey unintelligently, blindly, knowing 
nothing about the reasons or grounds of the rule en- 
forced. But moral training includes much more than 
the securing of such blind obedience. A moral habit 
such as veracity, is as we have seen only fully formed 
when the child's mind has come to reflect about it and 
voluntarily to adopt it. It is only when he discerns an 
action to be right, and when he makes free choice of it 
irrespectively of the penalties attached to the non-per- 
formance of it, or the reward following the performance 
of it, that it is in the full sense his own act, an outcome 
of his own 'second nature'. The parent and teacher 
should have this end in view, and seek as soon as pos- 
sible to enlist the child's intelligence and good feeling 
on the side of what is wise or prudent, and morally 
good. 

Exercise of Free Will. Over and above this the educator 
should take care to secure to the child a free region of 
activity uncontrolled by authority where other feelings 
besides those specially appealed to in discipline may be 
exercised as motives, and where the powers of reflecting 
and choosing may be brought into full play. Nothing 
is more fata! to will-growth than an excess of discipline, 
permeating the whole of a child's surroundings. Free- 
dom, in the popular sense of the term, that is liberty 
to decide what to do for oneself, is essential to the 
development of the will. The educator will find ample 
scope for the exercise of a fine judgment in determining 
the boundaries of the several regions of compulsion, 
persuasion, mere suggestion or guidance, and absolute 



358 THE WILL. 

neglect, or laissez-faire. Play owes no little of its moral 
value to the fact that it provides this area of unrestricted 
activity. 

Discipline of the Home and of the School. The home is 
the garden of moral character. If the will and moral 
character are not nourished and strengthened here, they 
will fare but ill when transplanted into the more artifi- 
cial surroundings of school life. In the home the whole 
life is in a mannner brought under the supervision of 
the educator. Not only so, the strong and close affection 
which grows up between the parent and child gives a 
unique character to the home discipline. On the one 
side, the mother is solicitous about her charge as the 
teacher cannot be, and is far better able as well as much 
more strongly disposed to study his moral peculiarities. 
On the other side, the child's feeling of dependence and 
his love are strong forces tending from the first in the 
direction of obedience. Here then the foundations of 
character have to be laid if they are to be laid at all. 
The relations of home moreover serve to bring out and 
exercise all the moral habits, not only the rougher virtues 
of obedience, veracity, the sense of right and justice, 
etc., but the more delicate virtues of sympathy, kindli- 
ness, and self sacrifice. 

Contrasted with this the discipline of the school has 
but a very restricted moral effect. The immediate 
object of school discipline is indeed not moral training 
at all, but rather the carrying on of the special business 
of the school, namely, teaching. Incidentally the 
management of a school necessarily does subserve moral 
education, calling forth habits of obedience, orderliness, 



HOME AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE. 359 

industry, deference, etc. And the teacher is expected 
to make the best of his opportunities for training the 
will and forming the character of his pupils. The 
limitations here are obvious. The first is the restricted 
range of life brought under the master's control. School 
occupations are a kind of artificial addition to the child's 
natural life, and offer but little play for his characteristic 
tastes and inclinations. Again, since the teacher has to 
do with numbers there must necessarily be wanting the 
aid of those moral forces of close individual sympathy 
and strong personal attachment which play so important 
a part in home discipline. 

These defects are, however, made good to some extent 
by the presence of a new agency in the school, namely 
that of public opinion. We have already touched on 
the effect of this in shaping and giving strength to the 
growing moral sentiment of the individual. To this 
must now be added that the existence of public opinion, 
of a mass of corporate feeling on the side of order and 
right conduct, is a powerful force working in the direc- 
tion of good conduct. Such a body of sentiment may, 
indeed, be said to be, in these days at least, a necessary 
support of the master's authority. It is to the school- 
master what public opinion is to the ruler of a state. 
School experience familiarizes the mind of the boy with 
the fact that he is a member of a society, that the 
command to be brave, or truthful, is enjoined by the 
voice not of an individual but of a community. In this 
way he learns to regulate his actions by a reference to a 
social law, and a common rule of conduct. 

The effect of the ideal school regime, the master re- 
moved at a certain distance, inspiring a feeling of awe, the 



360 THE WILL. 

little society of the school sustaining his authority and fol- 
lowing out the principles and spirit of his discipline even 
in the playground and in his absence, is to cultivate a 
certain type of moral character which is in a manner 
supplementary to that specially cultivated by home sur- 
roundings. The mind acquires a manly tone of self-re- 
liance, and the severer virtues, obedience and respect for 
law, courage, ambition, sense of honor and of justice, are 
nourished. Where this regime is- happily favored by 
the presence of a fine and admirable personal character 
in the governor, and of a healthy and lofty public spirit 
among the governed, it is capable, as we know, of doing 
much to mould the permanent character. 

References. 

On the nature of the processes of Deliberation and Choice, see Prof. 
Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. VII.; Dr. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, 
Ch. IX., § 4; H. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, I., Pt. IV., Ch, IX. On 
the nature of Moral Habit and of Character, see Bain, op. cit., Ch. IX; 
Carpenter, op. cit , Ch. VIII. 

On Discipline and the Formation of Character, see Locke, On Educa- 
tion, especially §§ 32-117 ; H. Spencer, Education. Ch. III. ; Bain, Education 
as a Science, pp. 100-119. 



APPENDIX. 

SUGGESTIVE AND TEST EXERCISES. 

1. Review the general argument of this work. Consider 
carefully the author's aim and his general plan as now developed, 
questioning yourself thus: What topic was discussed in the first 
chapter? What has been the logical succession of topics? What 
methodical elements has this order of presentation? 

2. Compare the three-fold classification of mental powers — 
Intellect, Feeling, and Will— with J. S. Mill's classification of 



KEVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 361 

the various states of consciousness: Sensations, Thoughts, Emo- 
tions, and Volitions. {Logic, Bk. VI., chap. IV., § 1.) 

3. In perfecting your comprehension of the general drift of 
this treatise, re-read the chapter on Mental Development. Take 
the topic, 'Unity of mental development' (see page 44), and 
trace the doctrine there expressed throughout the succeeding 
chapters. See clearly, if possible, that the complete develop- 
ment of intellectual faculty consists simply in exercising the 
fundamental functions, — the 'Power of Detecting Differences ' 
and the 'Power of Detecting Agreements.' Note that this doc- 
trine of assimilation and discrimination may be used in the 
treatment of the phenomena of Feeling and of Will. 

REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 

1. What phenomena are included under Will? With what 
propriety does Sir William Hamilton speak of the same class of 
mental states as 'the Phenomena of Will and Desire '? In what 
respects is the relation of Willing to Intellect and Emotion an 
' opposition '? In what respects are they closely connected? 

2. What is a voluntary action? Can such a term be accu- 
rately defined other than by an example? How is belief related 
to an act of volition? Show the intimate connection of desire or 
aversion with such an act. Is desire a state purely pleasurable or 
one of mixed pleasure and pain? Justify your answer. 

3. Is an act of Willing always accompanied by external 
action? Illustrate your answer. What is the educational im- 
portance of ' Habit and Routine ' ? How may the strength of a 
habit be estimated? Name three conditions on which such 
strength depends? Does 'nature ' train the child's will? How? 

4. What is meant by aiming at 'permanent ends'? At 
what period of development can a child realize health, knowl- 
edge, reputation as enduring goods? What is meant by actions 
becoming united and consolidated into ' conduct'? 

5. What is meant by 'complex action'? Illustrate what is 
meant by Choice or Decision. What are the characteristics of 
an enlightened and regulated will? What is implied by the term 
individual character? What by moral character? 



362 THE WILL. 

6. When does the need of discipline and command begin* 
At what stage does it end? Why are artificial restraints neces- 
sary? What is the educational use of a wise relaxation of 
restraints? To what extent is public opinion, i. e., of a school 
or community, an educative force? How would you describe the 
ideal character which a good school should tend to form? 

RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO EDUCATIONAL 
THEORY. 

1. ' The performance of one action or chain of actions suggests 
and excites its usual successor.' 'In this way much of our daily 
routine tends to take on a semi-automatic character ' (p. 337). 

This dictum of psychology which the most ordinary experi- 
ence daily confirms, leads to the doctrine of Automatic Activity, 
the exposition of which from an educational point of view is the 
object of Dr. Carpenter's Menial Physiology. The great practical 
importance of the subject (he thus states) is ' To bring into clear 
view the distinction between the automatic and the volitional oper- 
ation of the Intellectual Faculties, Propensities, and Emotions, 
which has long appeared to me to be the only sound basis for Edu- 
cation and Self-education.' 

Several important educational maxims may be instanced as 
intimately connected with this doctrine of education into auto- 
matic intellection, emotion and volition. 

(1) It is impossible not to recognize the influence of Habit, — 
that is to say of the voluntary repetition of similar acts under 
similar circumstances — in establishing a condition of the nervous 
apparatus which leads to the automatic performance of such acts. 
— Carpenter. 

(2) Any sequence of mental action which has been frequently 
repeated tends to perpetuate, so that we find ourselves automatic, 
ally prompted to think, feel or do, what we have been before 
accustomed to think, feel, or do under like circumstances, with- 
out any consciously formed purpose or anticipation of results. — 
Carpenter. 

(3) The struggle of development, consists in acquiring knowledge 



PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 363 

and skill so thoroughly that it can sink into the automatic, thus leav- 
ing the mind free for new attainments — Parker. 



REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS 
READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 

The following references on character, action, and conduct 
should be considered in connection with the preceding chapter: 

1. On moral science in schools, see JohonuoVs Principles and 
Practice of Teaching, chap. XII., page 277; on the means of 
moral strength and growth, see the same, p. 20; on the basis 
of moral instruction in schools, see the same, chap. XII., pp. 
253 and 259 ; on moral teaching in school exercises, see the same, 
chap. XV., p. 429; on moral teaching latent in school exercises, 
see the same, p. 431 ; on the influence of study of science on 
morals, see Spencer's Education, p. 89. 

2. On moral and religious education, see Quick's Educa- 
tional Reformers, p. 282; on the cultivation of the moral powers, 
Page's Theory and Practice, chap. V., p. 71; on the teacher's re- 
sponsibility as respects religious training, see the same, chap. II., 
sect. IV., p. 30; on the slow evolution of the moral faculties, see 
Spencer's Education, chap. III., p. 207; on parental unwisdom 
as the source of juvenile perversity, see the same, p. 167; on all 
moral training as based on religion, see Tate's Philosophy of Edu- 
cation, Part II., chap. VII., p. 288, also Quick, p. 282; on the 
intimate connection of the sense of the beautiful and the moral 
sense, see Tate, chap. L, p. 173; on morality more important 
than learning, see Quick, p. 282; for Rousseau's dictum that the 
aim of true education is 'complete living,' see the same, p. 104. 

3. On the terrible mistake of the teacher's divorcing moral 
and intellectual training, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, p. 167; 
on the teacher's responsibility for the moral training of the 
child, see Page, as above, chap. II., sect. II., p. 26; the school 
no place for a master without principle, see the same, chap. IX., 
sect. I., p. 158, and chap. II., sect. II., p. 29; on minds of pupils 
as controlled in three ways, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, 
p. 168; on teacher must not wholly neglect moral and spiritual 



364 THE WILL. 

training, see the same reference; on the insufficiency of mere 
meditation to form good habits, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, 
chap. IV., p. 103; on the influence of the master on the moral 
tone of the school, see Quick, pp. 282-3; on the influence of the 
boys on the tone of the school, see the same, p. 289. 

4. On emulation, — worthy and unworthy, - see Page, chap. 
VIII., sect. I., p. 120; on the proper incentives to action, see the 
same chapter, sect. III., p. 139; on influence of rewards and pun- 
ishments on the school and on characters of the pupils, see 
Fitch, chap. IV., p. 108; and for Rousseau, Bain, and Spencer 
on the discipline of consequences, see the same, chap. IV., 
p. 117; on natural and rational punishments, see Spencer, p. 181; 
for Locke quoted on the effects of chastisement, see the same, p. 
204; on the motives with which a teacher should stimulate a 
poor struggling boy, see Tate, Part II., chap. III., p. 200; on 
the only way of curing a bad habit, see Parker, p. 169; on the 
point beyond which the will of the parent or teacher must not be 
carried, see the same reference. 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND NAMES. 



Abstraction, the second stage in concept-formation, 246; ab 
stract conception, 257; training of the power of abstraction, 
258; when this training should begin, 259; when the ab- 
stract sciences should be taken up, 262. 

Activity, laws of pleasurable activity, 295; change in degree of, 
295; in kind of, 296. 

^Esthetics, the aesthetic sentiment, 316; origin of aesthetic en- 
joyment, 317; good taste, 317; refined taste, 318; education 
of the taste, 219-221; varieties of Fine Art, 318; exercise of 
the aesthetic faculties, 321 ; the aesthetic sentiment in practi- 
cal education, 322; aesthetics and morals, 323; the study of 
art in schools, 323. 

Apprehending, how related to comprehending and understand- 
ing, 241. 

Approbation, love of, 300. 

Ascham, quoted on Attention, 87. 

Association of impressions, 156; by contiguity, 157; law of con- 
tiguity, 158; degrees of associative force, 159; association 
and repetition, 161; verbal association, 167; association by 
similarity, 172; by contrast, 172; of numbers, 176. 

Attention, definition of, 68; objects of, 68; effects of, 69, 87; 
extent of, 70; degree of, dependent on what, 71; external 
and internal stimuli, 71; attention and interest, 72; effect of 
novelty on attention, 73; non-voluutary and voluntary, 72; 
reflex attention, mechanism of, 74; function of will in atten- 
tion, 75; laws of voluntary attention, 77; development of 
power of attention, 77; impulse of curiosity in attention, 78; 
keeping attention fixed, 79; concentration of, 79; concentra- 
tion and genius, 80; grasp of, 81; transition of, 81; habits of, 
82; varieties of, 82; training of, 83; power of, in children 



366 INDEX. 

rudimentary, 84; teacher's duty to arouse and develop, 85; 
new and old pedagogical rules of, 85; educational doctrine 
of, 87-89; Ascham quoted on, 87; Hamilton, 88, 89, 208; 
Marcel, 88; Malbranche, 87, 208; Ratich, 88; Tate, 89; Sir 
Henry Holland, 88; pedagogical doctrine on interest and 
attention, 209. 

Belief and doubt, 271; sources of, 272; effect of feeling on, 273. 

Brain, physiological knowledge of, important to teacher, 8; effi- 
ciency of brain centres, 9 ; need of brain rest, 9. 

Beneke, on periods of child-life, 62. 

Carpenter quoted on volitional direction of the attention and on 
the formation of character, 88, 89 ; on no perception without 
attention, 146 ; on decline of memory in old age, 189. 

Causaubon, on Scaliger's powers of memory, 191, note. 

Cause, first reasonings about, 280. 

Child-life, periods of, 62. 

Classification, importance of, 35. 

Complexity, increase of, in mental development, 42. 

Comprehension, how related to apprehension and understand- 
ing, 242. 

Concentration, 79; concentration and genius, 80; Hamilton 
on, 88. 

Concept, as involving a synthesis, 249; concepts of magnitude, 
number, and geometry, 259; accuracy and inaccuracy of 
concepts, 251 ; concepts which are too narrow, 251 ; too wide, 
250; revision of concepts, 252. 

Conception, growth of, 256; formation of abstract conceptions, 
257. 

Connection of knowing, feeling, and willing, 20, 49, 293. 

Conditions of mental operations, 25-26 ; attention a condition 
of mental operations, 26; nervous conditions, 27; conditions 
of belief, 272. 

Currie, on observation and questioning, 146; on perception and 
emotion, 146. 

Deductive element in pedagogics, 1, 16; deductive reasoning, 
276, 278. 

Development and growth distinguished, 38; characteristics of 
mental, 39; development of single faculty, 39; of sum of 



INDEX. 367 

faculties, 41 ; unity of development, 43; scheme of develop- 
ment, 58 ; varieties of, 60 ; from presentative to representa- 
tive knowledge, 66; development begins with sensation, 66, 
146; development through perception, 144. 

Diesterweg quoted on intuition, 65, 145; on Pestalozzianism, 
144; on what the intuitions are, 145; on instruction as hav- 
ing two sides, 144; on observation and reflection, 145. 

Dispositions, inherited, 55. 

Drobisch on association by contrast, 174, note; on ingenious 
memory, 193. 

Education, relation of, to psychology, 1; principles of, not 
necessarily laws of mind, 1; three-fold classification of prin- 
ciples of, 1. 

Emotions, order of developmemt, 298; three orders of, 298; cul- 
tivation of, 302; stimulation of, 303. 

Emulation, in education, 209, 306. 

Environment, external factor in development, 56; adjustment 
to, 52. 

Ethics, relation to pedagogics, 1, 16; ethical or moral sentiment, 
324. 

Exercise, what is involved in exercise of intellect, 45; improve- 
ment by exercise, 44. 

Experience, a source of belief, 272. 

Factors of development, internal and external, 54. 

Faculty, modes of measuring, 30; exercise of, 44; growth of 
single faculty, 40; training of faculty, 60; faculties to becul- 
vated within limits, 62. 

Feeling, a source of belief, 273; defined, 292; importance of 
studying, 293; relation of feeling to knowing, 293, 294; 
classes of feelings, 297, 298; the social feelings of childhood, 
300; love of approbation, 300; cultivation of emotion, 302; 
self-esteem, 301; repression of, 302; management of egoistic 
feelings, 305. 

Functions, fundamental, of intellect, 23. 

Fundamental intellectual processes, discrimination and assimi- 
lation, 23. 

Galton, on bookish and wordy education, 227, on chess playing, 
229. 



368 index. 

Genius and attention, 80; and concentration, 80. 

Granville, on memory. 201. 

Growth and development, 38; of faculty, 44; and habit, 46; of 
brain, 50; movement of growth from presentative to repre- 
sentative, 42, 66. 

Hamilton, quoted on definition of psychology, 15; on analysis, 
15; on estimating comparative utility of methods, 66; on 
law of limitation in attention, 88; on reminiscense, 179; no 
royal road to learning, 208; on interest and attention, 209; 
on emulation, 209. 

Images, representative, 148; distinguished from percepts, 150; 
involved in percepts, 151; conditions of reproduction of, 153. 

Imagination, reproductive, 148; constructive, 213; definition of, 
149; imagination and memory, 150; includes what, 214; 
analysis of constructive imagination, 215; receptive and cre- 
ative, 216; limits to, 217; imagination in scientific acquisi- 
tion, 220; in discovery, 221; in invention, 224; imagination 
and feeling, 225: and intellect, 226, 227; development of, 
228; imagination of children, 229; training of, 231; restraint 
of, 231; gradual development of, 233; imagination in teach- 
ing, 235 ; pedagogical references on, 240. 

Impressions, persistence and revival of, 148; depth of, 153; as- 
sociation of, 156. 

Inductive method, 15; inductive reasoning, 276; spontaneous 
and regulated induction, 277. 

Inference and proof, 275. 

Intellect, the intellectual sentiment, love of knowledge, 311; 
earlier stage of, 313; later stage, 314; cultivation of intel- 
lectual sentiment, 315; the logical feelings, 313; what exer- 
cise of intellect includes, 45. 

Introspection is retrospection, 3, note; introspection and obser- 
vation, 3, 5; Lewes quoted on, 14. 

Intuition, definition of, 144; has two sides, 145; the basis of all 
instruction, 92; intuition of things, 119, 124; of number, 
122; 'from intuition to notion,' 145. 

Intuitional instruction, place of, 135; importance of, 92, 139, 
145; doctrine of, 144; quotations on, 144, 145; defined, 144. 

Judgment, defined, 268; judgments about classes, 269; judg- 



* INDEX. 369 

ment and proposition, 269; judgment and belief, 270; af- 
firmative and negative, 271. 

Kant, on ingenious memory, 200, note. 

Knowledge, opposition and connection between knowing, feel- 
ing and willing, 20, 293; species of , 22; particular and gen- 
eral, 241 ; increase of complexity of knowledge, 42 ; love of 
knowledge, 311; pleasures of knowledge, 311; pleasures of 
discovery and of possession of knowledge, 312; the logical feel- 
ings in relation to knowledge, 315. 

Landon, on memory training, 202, note; on habits of inquiry, 
observation and comparison, 210. 

Language, and thinking, 243 ; discovery of the meaning of words, 
248; connection of naming and conception, 247; parallel 
growth of speech and thought, 243. 

Laws of mind, 1, 7, 24, 25. 

Lewes, on methods of studying psychology, 14; on drawing out 
the senses, 141. 

Logic, relation to pedagogics, 1, 12, 16; logical feelings, 315. 

Malbranche, on habits of attention, 87, 208. 

Mansel, on intuition, 144. 

Marcel, on one thing at a time, 88. 

Maudesley, on recollection, 180, note. 

McCosh, on methods of studying psychology, 15; on inductive 
method in psychology, 16. 

Memory, as reproductive imagination, 148, 150; conditions of 
reproduction, 153; attentive and retentive, 153, 207; repeti- 
tion and retention, 155; memor}*- and expectation, 159; pas- 
sive and active memory, 178; recollection, 178; divisions of 
memory, 183, 191 ; memory of things and words, 184: growth 
of memory, 185, 189; habits of, 190; training of, 196; mne- 
monic training, 197, 199; learning by rote, 198; exercises in 
recalling, 201 ; memory-subjects, 202; memory-training but 
a part of education, 202; educational maxims on memory, 
208, 209; maxims on recollection, 210; pedagogical refer- 
ences on memory, 211, 212. 

Mental Development, defined, 38; and growth distinguished, 
38; characteristics of, 39; unity of development and sum- 
mary of process of, 43, 47. 
x 



370 INDEX. 

Mental Phenomena, whether ever unconscious, 2; analysis of, 
18; primary classification of, applied to rhetoric, 35. 

Mental Science, what it consists of, 17. 

Methods, inductive and deductive, 16, 276,278; of instruction 
and discovery, 287. 

Mill, J. S., on certitude of consciousness, 15; on laws of mind, 
15; on order of psychologic study, 150. 

Mill, J., on value of mnemonics, 200. 

Minds, how they vary, 28; quantitative aspects of mind, 29; 
teachers must note differences of, 28; should be able to com- 
pare minds, 33. 

Moral Sentiments, 324; moral standard, 325; training the 
moral faculty, 326-329; by self-reliance, 327; by examples, 
327; by social environment, 328; by public opinion, 329-330. 

Notion, definition of general notion, 244; how notions are 
formed, 245, 248; notions which involve synthesis, 249; no- 
tions of magnitude, number, and geometry, 250; accuracy 
and inaccuracy of, 251 ; notions too narrow, 251 ; too wide, 
251; notions formed out of images, 253; defining notions,. 
254; early notions, 255; abstract notions, 257. 

Novelty, pleasures of, 295. 

Observation, 128; distinctness and accuracy of, 129; child must 
observe accurately, 145, and must reflect on its observations, 
145; the world unfolded only to the observing mind, 145; 
Diesterweg on, 145; observation must be accompanied with 
suggestion and question, 146. 

Opposition between knowing, feeling, and willing, 20, 293. 

Order of mental development, 41 ; order of subjects of instruc- 
tion, 288. 

Payne, quoted on mental development, 65, 66; on the funda- 
mental elements of knowlenge, 144. 

Pedagogics, relation to psychology, 1; derives its data from 
psychology, physiology, and logic, 16; derives its aim from 
ethics, 16; deductive and inductive element of, 1, 16; matter 
and aim of, 17; unity of, 16; assumes the general truths of 
psychology and other sciences, 18. 

Perception, 110; the invariable accompaniment of sensation, 
111; the result of acquisition, 113; process of, analyzed, 112; 



INDEX. 371 

definition of, 113; source of knowledge, 114, 148; tactual 
perception, 121 ; perception of number, 116, of temperature, 
hardness, and softness, 117; of weight, roughness, and 
smoothness, 118; of space, 122; of our own body, 126; per- 
ception and observation, 128; development of perceptual 
power, 130; training the perceptual power, 133; educational 
doctrine on perception, 143-146; Carpenter on, 146; percep- 
tion an emotion (Currie), 146. 

Pestalozzianism defined, 144; fundamental maxims of, 145. 

Pleasure, the reflex of unimpeded energy (Hamilton), 209; Law 
of pleasurable activity, 294. 

Proof and Inference, 275. 

Psychology, definition of, 1; scope and method of , 1 ; relation 
of, to educational science, 1, 16; methods of studying, 14; 
maxims of study of, 14; synopsis of relation of pedagogics 
to, 16; concrete psychology the teacher's province, 28. 

Quick, quoted on observation and reflection, 145. 

Ratich, on one study at a time, 88. 

Reasoning, the higher stage of thinking, 268; nature of, 274; 
implicit reasoning, 275; explicit, 276; inductive and deduct- 
ive, 276, 278; first reasoning, 280; training the reasoning 
power, 282; reasoning and judgment, 283; reasoning taught 
by questioning, 284: reasoning and the sciences, 286. 

Reflection, should follow observation, 145; leads to clear con- 
sciousness, 145. 

Representation by mental images, 148; trains of representa- 
tion, 163; motor representation, 166; of time, 177; of the 
past, 171. 

Reproduction, 150; conditions of, 153; repetition, a condition 
of, 155; frequency of, 156; retention and reproduction, 150. 

Science, Mental, aim of, 17; educational aim of, 17; all sci- 
ence grows deductive, 287. 

Self-esteem, cultivation of, 301. 

Sensations, defined, 93; characters of, 95, qualities of, 92; dis- 
crimination of, 103. 

Sense, organic, 93; special senses, 94; five senses, 94; taste, 
smell and touch, 98; hearing, 99; sight, 101; muscular sense, 



372 INDEJJ 

102; sense-impressions and attention, 103; classes of sense- 
impressions, 104; improvement of, 105. 

Social Environment, 56 : social feelings of childhood, 300. 

Society, influence of in mental development, 47. 

Soldan, quoted on pedagogics and other sciences, 16. 

Stewart, quoted on essentials of a good memory, 188, 196. 

Stimulation of emotions, 303. 

Sympathy, a non-personal sentiment, 307 ; growth of sympathy, 
308 : uses in education, 308 ; cultivation of, 309 ; the aesthetic, 
316-320. 

Sentiments, the intellectual, 311-315; the moral, 324-329. 

Tate, quoted on expedients for securing attention, 89 ; on habits 
of concentration, 89, 208 ; on knowledge derived through the 
senses, 144; on sensation, 144; on the primary intuitions, 
145; on emulation, 209; on instruction should give pleasure, 
209. 

Teachers, to develop interest, 85; concrete psychology the 
teacher's province, 28; to note how minds vary, 29; should be 
able to compare minds, 33 ; should know the terms of psy- 
chology, 32. 

Thinking, denned, 241 ; three stages of, 243 ; all thinking is re- 
presentation, 241; thinking and understanding, 242; based on 
comparison, 242; based on imagination, 253; connected with 
language, 243. 

Thought, 48; definition of, 241; thinking denned, 242; thought 
and imagination virtually connected, 253. 

Training of judgment and reasoning, 282, 288; of abstraction, 
258; of the faculties, 60; based on laws of development, 61; 
methods of, must be adapted to individuals, 63; training the 
imagination, 231; the attention, 83; the senses, 133; training 
of memory, 196-203. 

Understanding, of a description, 219; what is meant by under- 
standing a thing, 242. 

Verbal- Suggestions, 272. 

Wayland, quoted on philosophical association, 211. 

Whately, quoted on curiosity, 209. 

Words, perils of empty words, 253. 



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Dime Series of Question Books, 

With Full Answers. Notes, Queries. Etc., ly A. F. Southwick. 



Elementary Series. 

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6. U. S. History and Civil Gov't. 
10. Algebra. 

13. American Literature. 

14. Grammar. 

15. Orthograph and Etymology. 

18. Arithmetic. 

19. Physical and Political Geog. 

20. Reading and Punctuation. 



Advanced Series* 

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7. Astronomy. 

8. Mythology. 

9. Rhetoric 

11. Botany. 

12. Zoology. 

16. Chemistry. 

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The immense sale of the Regents' Questions in Arithmetic, Geog- 
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many books of the sort already published, presents the following 
advantages : 

1. Economy.— The teacher need purchase books only on the subjects 
upon which special help is needed. Frequently a $1.50 book is bought 
for the sake of a few questions in a single study. Here the studies may 
be taken up one at a time, a special advantage in New York, since 
applications for State Certificates may now present themselves for 
examination in only part of the subjects, and receive partial certifi- 
cates to be exchanged for full certificates when all the branches 
have been passed. The same plan is very gererally pursued by county 
superintendents and commissioners who are encourageing their teach- 
ers to prepare themselves for higher certificates. 

2. Thokoughness.— Each subject occupies from 32 to 40 pages, care- 
fully compiled, and referring to the leading text books. The questions 
in large type compare in number with those given in other Question 
Books, while besides these there are many notes, queries, and practical 
hints, that fill the learner's mind with suggestions to further investi- 
gation and personal thought upon the subject. In this particular 
these Question Books escape the severe critisism that has been 
passed upon the mere Cramming -Books. 

3. Utility.— The Dime Question Books are printed in three sizes of 
type, carefully distinguishing which is most essential, that the teacher 
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afterward fill in the interesting but less important matter at leisure. 
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The Entire Series is now ready. Each sent Post-paid for 10 cts. 
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Here all facts are presented L— exington. 
In groups. The key- word to I— ndependence. 
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These are among the most interesting books in the series, 
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No one can read this essay without pleasure and profit. 

5. The Art of Questioning. By JOSHUA G. Fitch, lfimo, 
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Mr. Fitch, one of Her Majesty's inspectors of schools, now 
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